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This thesis examines how ideas about citizenship emerged out of the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the ‘everyday’ state and society in the specific 
region of Maharashtra, western India. By concentrating upon Maharashtra 
between the 1930s and 1950s, it looks to provide new perspectives upon the 
construction of citizenship in India during this formative period, thereby 
complementing, building upon and re-contextualising recent scholarship that has 
been principally interested in deciphering the repercussions of independence and 
partition in the north of the subcontinent. This thesis suggests that the reasons 
why Maharashtrians supported the reorganisation of provincial administrative 
boundaries on linguistic lines were intrinsically linked to ideas and performances 
of citizenship that had emerged in the past few decades at the local level. Despite 
the state’s interactions with its citizens being theoretically based upon 
accountability, objectivity and egalitarianism, they often diverged from these 
hyperbolical principles in practice. Because local state actors, who were drawn 
from amongst regional societies themselves, came to be subjected to pressures 
from particular sub-sets, groups, factions and communities within this regional 
society, or shared the same exigencies and sentimental concerns as its ordinary 
members of the public, the circumstances in which citizenship was 
conceptualised, articulated and enacted within India differed from one location to 
the next. Perceptions of the state amongst ordinary Indians, and their sense of 
belonging to and relationship with it were thus formulated in the discrepant 
spaces between the state’s high-sounding morals and values, and its regionally 
specific customs and practices on the ground. 
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. iii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... vi 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... vii 
Glossary .................................................................................................................... ix 
Note on Terminology ............................................................................................. xiii 
1: Introduction: Citizenship, the State and Society in Western India ....................... 1 
1.1 The Setting ...................................................................................................... 3 
1.2 Conceptualising Citizenship ........................................................................... 14 
1.3 Citizenship, the State and Society ................................................................. 22 
2: Caste, Language and the State in Maharashtra .................................................. 35 
2.1 The Pre-Colonial Maratha Polity ................................................................... 37 
2.1 Meanings of ‘Maratha’ under Shivaji’s ‘Swaraj’ ....................................... 38 
2.2 Patriotism in the Peshwa Period ............................................................... 44 
2.2 The Colonial State, Caste and Language in Maharashtra, 1818-1918 ......... 50 
2.2.1 The British and the Brahmans in Bombay .............................................. 51 
2.2.2 Phule’s Bahujan Samaj and Shahu’s Non-Brahmans ............................. 58 
2.3 Linguistic Reorganisation and the Transition from Subjecthood to 
Citizenship, 1919-1956 ........................................................................................ 64 
2.3.1 The Congress, Independence and Reorganisation ................................. 64 
2.3.2 The Proponents of Samyukta Maharashtra ........................................... 72 
2.3.3 Reorganisation’s Detractors – National ‘Unity in Diversity’ and 
‘Minority’ Rights .............................................................................................. 78 
2.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 83 
3: Region, Nation, Election: Politics, Government and the Selection of Congress 
Candidates in Bombay ............................................................................................ 86 
3.1 Community Classifications in an Era of Political ‘Provincialisation’ .............. 90 
3.2 The ‘Congress System’ in Bombay before Independence .............................. 98 
3.3 The 1937 and 1946 Elections in Bombay: Citizenship at the Nexus of 
Congress Ideology and Practice ........................................................................ 105 
3.4 The Selection of Congress Candidates in Bombay, 1951: Citizenship in the 
Context of Independence, Partition and Linguistic Reorganisation .................. 115 
3.5 Representativeness and Accountability ...................................................... 122 
viii 
 
3.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 130 
4: Region, Reservation and Government Recruitment, 1930s-1950s .................. 133 
4.1 Citizenship, Community and Reservations .................................................. 135 
4.2 Classifying Communities and Reserving Representation in Bombay .......... 141 
4.2.1 The Provincial Services and ‘Advanced’ Classes .................................. 142 
4.2.2 The Inferior Services and ‘Backward’ Classes ...................................... 144 
4.2.3 The Subordinate Services and ‘Intermediate’ Classes ......................... 150 
4.2.4 The 1950 Constitution, OBCs, and Bureaucratic Reservations ............ 155 
4.3 Provincial Reservations at the All-India Level?............................................ 160 
4.3.1 Interwar Provincial Reservation Practices at the All-India Level ......... 161 
4.3.2 Post-Independence Provincial Reservations at the All-India Level ...... 166 
4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 174 
5: Classifying and Counting Language at the 1951 Census ................................... 177 
5.1 The Census, Language and Local Intermediaries ........................................ 179 
5.2 Boundaries, Enumerators, and the Census of 1951 .................................... 186 
5.2.1 The 1951 Census: Class versus ‘Community’ ....................................... 187 
5.2.2 Local Census Enumerators and Trans-local State Principles ................ 190 
5.2.3 Citizenship at the Census ..................................................................... 194 
5.3 Bhili, Gujarati, Marathi? Adivasis in the Dangs and Elsewhere .................. 199 
5.3.1 Adivasi ‘Uplift’, Religion and Language ................................................ 200 
5.3.2 The Dangs – Language and Citizenship ahead of Linguistic 
Reorganisation .............................................................................................. 206 
5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 212 
6: Introducing Hindi: National and Vernacular Languages in India ...................... 215 
6.1 Hindustan and the Deccan .......................................................................... 217 
6.1.1 Regional Perspectives in Nehru’s The Discovery of India..................... 219 
6.1.2 Introducing Hindi/Hindustani .............................................................. 226 
6.2 Civil Servants, the State and the Introduction of Hindi ............................... 230 
6.2.1 Language and Accountability ............................................................... 232 
6.2.2 Recruitment and Reallocation: Intra- and Inter-Provincial Locals and 
Outsiders ....................................................................................................... 238 
6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 243 
7: Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 246 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 254 





Abhang – Hindu devotional hymn 
Adivasi – The term for ‘tribal’ groups, meaning the ‘original inhabitants’ of India 
Ahir – Cow-herding caste of relatively low status, traditionally from north India 
Avatar – An earthly incarnation of a Hindu deity 
Bahujan Samaj – ‘People in the majority’; refers to people of low-caste origin 
Bandh – Literally ‘closed’; a form of protest involving a general strike 
Bania – An occupational caste of traders, merchants, bankers and moneylenders 
Bhat – A Brahman caste surname; also used by non-Brahmans as a derogatory 
term for a Brahman priest 
Bhil – An adivasi people who generally follow agricultural occupations 
Brahman – Highest varna in the fourfold varna scheme; traditionally priests, but 
now also involved in governmental, landowning and entrepreneurial occupations 
and activities 
Chhatrapati – Literally ‘paramount sovereign’ 
Chitpavan – A Brahman sub-caste originally from the Konkan, western 
Maharashtra 
Daivadnya – A Brahman sub-caste originally from coastal Maharashtra, Karnataka 
and Goa 
Daldi – A Muslim community who traditionally work as fishermen 
Dalit – Literally ‘ground’, ‘suppressed’, ‘broken to pieces’; preferred designation of 
former ‘untouchables’ 
Desh – Native land; region; nation 
Deshashta – A Brahman sub-caste originally from the Deccan plateau in 
Maharashtra 
Deshmukh – Headman of a group of villages 
Dhangar – An occupational caste of shepherds located primarily in Maharashtra 
Dharma – Religious and moral ‘natural’ law 
Fitna – The ‘drawing away of allegiance’ or ‘sedition’ 
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Gaud Saraswat – A Brahman sub-caste originally from the Konkan coast of 
Maharashtra and Karnataka 
Harijan – Literally ‘child of God’; Gandhian term for Dalits/‘untouchables’ 
Inam – Hereditary land rights 
Jain – A follower of Jainism, a South Asian religion that originally developed out of 
protest against caste restrictions within Hinduism, but now often operates like a 
separate caste group 
Jat – A non-elite ‘peasant’ caste of north India 
Jati – Literally ‘birth’, ‘name’, ‘breed’, ‘order’; caste in the sense of a specific 
named ‘birth-group’ 
Jus sanguinus – An exclusive interpretation of entitlement to citizenship based 
upon ethnicity and descent 
Jus soli – An inclusive interpretation of entitlement to citizenship based upon birth 
and residence 
Kaliyuga – ‘The Age of Kali’; last of the four stages the world goes through as part 
of the cycle of yugas described in the Indian scriptures, associated with the 
apocalyptic demon Kali 
Kanbi – Gujarati ‘peasant’ caste title 
Kayastha – Predominantly north Indian caste involved in scribal occupations 
Khot – Landlords with proprietary rights in the villages of the coastal Konkan 
districts of western India 
Kshatriya – second highest varna in the fourfold varna scheme; traditionally 
occupied in lordly/kingly and martial pastimes 
Kshetra – Land; field; place 
Kulkarni – Brahman village book-keeper of Maharashtra 
Kunbi – Marathi ‘peasant’ caste title; closely linked to Maratha caste 
Kurubar – An occupational caste of shepherds located primarily in Karnataka 
Lathi – Literally ‘stick’; commonly used as a crowd control device by Indian police 
Lingayat – Caste title of Kannada-speaking ‘peasant’ population with distinctive 
Shaivite sectarian religious tradition 
Mali – An occupational caste of gardeners and flower growers 
Mamlatdar – Administrative heads of sub-districts 
xi 
 
Maratha – A caste title of superior ‘peasants’ and warriors in Maharashtra with 
traditions of arms-bearing and privileged land rights 
Marwari – Indian ethnic group that originate from Rajasthan, traditionally 
involved in business enterprises 
Mleccha – Literally ‘barbarian’ or ‘foreigner’ 
Mofussil – Rural hinterland 
Mohalla – Urban neighbourhood 
Panchayat – Form of local self-government 
Pandit – Brahman religious scholar with knowledge of classical Hindu scriptures 
Parsi – An ethnic Persian member of Zoroastrian religious communities in India 
Patidar – Caste title of superior ‘peasant’ tillers in Gujarat 
Patil – Village headman 
Pavada – Ballads 
Peshwa – ‘Prime Minister’ of the Maratha polity in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries 
Poona Sarvajanik Sabha – Poona People’s Service Society 
Rashtra bhasha – National language 
Samyukta Maharashtra – ‘United’ Maharashtra 
Satyagraha – Literally ‘truth force’; Gandhian non-violent/civil resistance 
Satyashodhak Samaj – Truth Seekers’ Society 
Shiv Sena –Maharashtra-based organisation with an anti-Muslim and pro-Marathi 
political agenda 
Shuddhi – Literally ‘purification’; can refer to reverting to Hinduism after initially 
converting from Hinduism to another religion 
Shudra – The lowest of the orders defined in the fourfold varna scheme; 
traditionally peasant or occupational castes 
Sonar – Occupational caste of goldsmiths 
Swadeshi – Literally ‘own country’; home industry; early twentieth-century 
nationalist campaigns featuring boycott of British goods 
Swaraj – ‘Self-governance’, ‘self-rule’, ‘home rule’; synonymous with Gandhi’s 
anti-colonial nationalist campaign 
Tahsildar – Local tax-collector 
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Taluka – Sub-district; small unit of administration below the district 
Vaishya – Third in the rank order of the fourfold varna scheme; usually 
designating commercial livelihoods 
Varna – Literally ‘colour’, ‘rank’, ‘class’; the idealised fourfold scheme of ranked 
human callings or orders as set out in ancient Hindu scriptures 
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Note on Terminology 
Throughout this thesis I will refer to the particular area under study as Bombay 
Province, despite the fact that it was also known as and referred to by 
contemporaries as Bombay Presidency (after Bombay was declared a Presidency 
Town by the East India Company alongside Calcutta and Madras in the late 
seventeenth century). I have also chosen not to begin referring to this area of 
South Asia as Bombay State after 1950, when the nomenclature was changed for 
sub-national units of administration with the introduction of independent India’s 
first constitution. This is to avoid confusion with any references I make to ‘the 
state’ during this thesis. My study of ‘the state’ is not just about Bombay State, 
but also ‘the state’ at the levels of the nation, the district, and more locally. Whilst 
these levels are interconnected with one another, they are not reducible to one 
sole entity. Throughout this thesis, I have therefore endeavoured to make it clear 
which particular echelon of ‘the state’ I am referring to at that particular moment. 
I have also referred to the largest metropolis and administrative capital of 
Bombay Province throughout as ‘Bombay City’ in accordance with contemporary 
usage in the period under study, rather than using the present official pseudonym 
of ‘Mumbai’. The same reasoning applies to my references to all-India locations 
such as ‘Calcutta’ (Kolkata) and ‘Madras’ (Chennai), and Maharashtrian places 




1: Introduction: Citizenship, the State and Society in Western 
India 
‘Thackrey [sic] was the ugly reality of so-called democratic India, this artificial 
democracy always worked for Majority but it’s just a dream for minorities ... Bal is 
gone but his legacy will carry on’. Sukhvinder-Punjabi 
‘[Thackeray] was a real “Tiger” to have take[n] on religio[us] extremis[m] 
operating from Pak[istan]. He worshipped in Mah[arashtra], but he constantly 
fought for Kashmir ... I am really proud that I read about Sardar Patel but lived in 
an era of “Tiger” Thakre [sic]’. Vishsays 
‘Forget Bal Thackeray and move on, his views are antithesis to the fabric of our 
constitution’. Amith1 
--------------- 
Invited to comment and respond to an editorial by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s Delhi correspondent on Bal Thackeray’s legacy, after his death on 
17 November 2012, the lines quoted above are indicative of the mixed feelings 
that this right-wing Hindu leader of the Maharashtra-based Shiv Sena party had 
aroused throughout his life. Over the past fifty years, Thackeray had presided over 
a nativist agenda based around opposition to Muslims, as well as south Indian and 
north Indian migrants to the western Indian city of Bombay/Mumbai.2 For many 
Indians he was a hero, standing up for the interests and rights of the ordinary 
Hindu and/or Marathi-speaking citizen in response to non-native, anti-national 
and extra-territorial enemies. For others, Thackeray’s majoritarianism, based 
around the demographic politics of community, epitomised the problems that an 
unhindered political democracy had let loose upon the original national project of 
‘modernisation’ (and its component parts – secularism, welfare, and 
development). Originally initiated in the constitutional legislation of the state’s 
                                                          
1 Excerpts taken from, Soutik Biswas, ‘Comments’, The Legacy of Bal Thackeray 
(2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20389849> [accessed 6 
July 2013]. 
2 The Bombay City Municipal Government, under the political leadership of the 
Shiv Sena, changed the city’s name from the Anglicised ‘Bombay’ to the 
indigenous Marathi ‘Mumbai’ in 1995. See, Thomas Blom Hansen, Wages of 
Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); Meera Kosambi, ‘British Bombay and Marathi 
Mumbai: Some Nineteenth-Century Perceptions’, in Bombay: Mosaic of Modern 
Culture, ed. by Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 
1995), pp. 3-34. 
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‘founding fathers’, this project was perceived to have stuttered and stalled as the 
primarily parochial and communitarian concerns of the ‘masses’ had ultimately 
trumped national imperatives. For yet another decipherable set of Indian opinion, 
the success of Thackeray’s politics instead demonstrated the inherent hollowness 
of these state principles from the start, with entirely negative consequences for a 
whole ‘minority’ sub-set of its citizenry. By now, then, it should be clear that the 
remarks on Thackeray’s legacy quoted above are also suggestive of the various 
ways in which ordinary members of society3 have come to conceptualise and 
articulate their own membership and identity, and their particular rights and 
responsibilities, within India over the course of the twentieth century. The central 
objective of this thesis is to trace the manner in which these diverse ideas about 
citizenship came to be formulated and enacted in the Marathi-speaking districts 
of Bombay Province, in the context of the anticipation and achievement of 
independence, partition, and the reorganisation of provincial administrative 
boundaries on linguistic lines, between the 1930s and 1950s. 
This thesis argues that citizenship was not solely constructed as a result of the 
legal-jurisdictional frameworks implemented within the first constitution of an 
independent India in 1950. Rather, it considers the ways in which ideas about 
citizenship emerged out of the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
‘everyday’ state and society in the specific region of Maharashtra in western India. 
By concentrating upon Maharashtra it looks to provide new perspectives upon the 
construction of citizenship in India during this formative period, thereby 
complementing, building upon and re-contextualising recent scholarship that has 
been principally interested in deciphering the repercussions of independence and 
partition in the north. Despite the state’s interactions with its citizens being 
theoretically based upon accountability, objectivity and egalitarianism, they often 
diverged from these hyperbolical principles in practice. And because local state 
actors, who were drawn from amongst regional societies themselves, came to be 
subjected to pressures from particular sub-sets, groups, factions and communities 
within this regional society, or shared the same exigencies and sentimental 
concerns as its ordinary members of the public, the circumstances in which 
                                                          
3 Although I refer to ‘ordinary’ Indians/citizens/members of society throughout 
this thesis, this is not to be interpreted as a catch-all phrase that homogenises and 
generalises the subcontinent’s population. Rather, this introduction and the rest 
of the thesis go on to highlight the class- and community-based differences within 
this category, and the implications of these differences upon interactions with the 
state and constructions of citizenship rights. 
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citizenship was conceptualised, articulated and enacted was to differ from one 
location to the next. Perceptions of the state amongst ordinary Indians, and their 
sense of belonging to and relationship with it, i.e. citizenship, were thus 
formulated in the discrepant spaces between the state’s high-sounding morals 
and values, and its regionally specific customs and practices on the ground. 
In October 1966, Thackeray launched the Shiv Sena as an organisation demanding 
greater access to both public and private jobs for Marathi-speakers in Bombay 
City. The Sena looked to employ regional and linguistic rhetoric and pride in a 
historic Maratha past to mobilise support around this ‘nativist’ agenda. In doing 
so, it effectively redeployed the strategies and tropes of the Samyukta (‘united’) 
Maharashtra movement of the 1940s and 1950s, whose supporters had 
campaigned for the reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries on 
linguistic lines. On the one hand, its proponents anticipated the formation of a 
separate province that would develop local democratic representativeness, assist 
the effective distribution of state jobs and resources, and support the 
improvement of state-society relations by making the local vernacular the 
language of governance. On the other hand, calls for linguistic reorganisation 
were also formulated around the potential for state ‘capture’ by locally dominant 
groups and communities, in which they would be able to monopolise bureaucratic 
appointments, parliamentary posts and governmental resources, and introduce 
discriminatory legislation against ‘outsiders’. The reasons why Maharashtrians 
supported the reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries on linguistic 
lines were therefore, this thesis suggests, intrinsically linked to ideas and 
performances of citizenship that had emerged in the past few decades at the local 
level. 
 
1.1 The Setting 
The focus of this thesis’s attempts to ascertain constructions of citizenship at the 
nexus of ‘everyday’ state-society relations will therefore be upon western India 
and, in particular, the Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay Province. In 1960 
these districts were separated from other parts of Bombay Province to create part 
of the new unilingual province of Maharashtra. The decision was the culmination 
of the aforementioned demands amongst many Marathi-speakers in Bombay to 
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form Samyukta (‘united’) Maharashtra, which had first emerged in the context of 
growing anticipation of a forthcoming independence from British colonial rule. 
The expectancy of autonomy, democracy, self-government, ‘Swaraj’, ‘Pakistan’, 
and other ‘various vocabularies of freedom in circulation’, were critical to the 
formulation of a multiplicity of contrasting and overlapping ideas about the future 
status of the various peoples of South Asia, within, as of yet, ill-defined and 
shapeless nation-state(s).4 And this diverse assortment of demands, visions and 
‘ideas of India’5 continued to prevail in the aftermath of the achievement of 
independence and the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 – this was indeed, as 
the title of Vazira Zamindar’s 2007 monograph has suggested, a ‘long partition’.6 
This thesis therefore adheres to the current trend amongst historians of South 
Asia, which has emerged over the past decade, to traverse the 
colonial/postcolonial divide and enter a domain previously the preserve of 
political and social scientists. 
One particular subset of this scholarship has focused upon the events of 
independence and partition, noting how the new postcolonial Indian government 
had to establish and assert its legitimacy and integrity, delineate its territorial 
boundaries, control the transfer of populations, and conceptualise who 
constituted its citizenry, all within a prevailing atmosphere of insecurity and flux.7 
Over the course of the next decade, attempts to resettle and rehabilitate huge 
numbers of Hindu and Sikh refugees were accompanied by suspicions over the 
                                                          
4 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (London: 
Yale University Press, 2007), p. 5; see also, Sugata Bose, ‘Nation as Mother: 
Representations and Contestations of “India” in Bengali Literature and Culture’, in 
Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, ed. by 
Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 50-75 
(particularly pp. 70-75). 
5 I have borrowed this phrase from, Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: 
Penguin, 1999). 
6 Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern 
South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007). 
7 Khan, The Great Partition; Ian Talbot, ‘Punjabi Refugees’ Rehabilitation and the 
Indian State: Discourses, Denials and Dissonances’, Modern Asian Studies 
[henceforth MAS], 45 (2011), 109-130; Zamindar, The Long Partition; Sarah Ansari, 
Life After Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh, 1947-1962 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and 
India, 1947-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); William Gould, 
Taylor C. Sherman, and Sarah Ansari, ‘The Flux of the Matter: Loyalty, Corruption 
and the Everyday State in the Post-Partition Government Services of India and 
Pakistan’, Past and Present, 219 (2013), 237-279. 
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loyalties of Muslims who had either chosen, or been forced by circumstances, to 
remain behind. With state representatives casting doubt on their patriotic 
devotion, and considered ‘fifth-columnists’ in the employ of an aggressive and 
menacing Pakistan, Muslims in India quickly came to be seen as ‘the most 
excluded members in the whole body of Indian citizenry’.8 In this context, debates 
on citizenship and belonging in the immediate post-independence years have 
come to be principally constructed along the lines of religion, a tendency captured 
in the evocative title of Gyanendra Pandey’s essay, ‘Can a Muslim be an Indian?’.9 
Yet if we look beyond those parts of the subcontinent that were directly 
partitioned, we can discern a much more nuanced perspective on partition’s 
spectre in addition to this ‘Hindu-Muslim Question’. 
First, however, it is necessary to note that Pakistan was only one manifestation of 
the demands for freedom, autonomy and self-government that were 
strengthened by the increased likelihood and then achievement of independence 
– indeed, there was nothing inevitable about its territorial distinctiveness and 
separate sovereignty. As Ayesha Jalal was to suggest in her revisionist account of 
the high politics of partition, the Muslim League leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
actually sought to secure Muslim interests within India in a loose con-federal 
arrangement based upon Hindu-Muslim parity at the centre.10 For Jinnah, 
Pakistan was a ‘bargaining chip’ in his efforts to be recognised as the ‘sole 
spokesman’ of India’s Muslim community – not only by the British, but amongst 
Muslims themselves. The demand served as a political device through which to 
reorient Muslim allegiances in the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab, Bengal, 
and elsewhere, away from (often inter-communal) provincial parties and towards 
religious identity politics and the League instead. Jinnah therefore intentionally 
‘avoided giving the demand a precise definition, leaving the League’s followers to 
make of it what they wished’.11 Jalal’s work, as David Gilmartin proposes, thus 
begins to suggest that, 
                                                          
8 Ornit Shani, ‘Conceptions of Citizenship in India and the “Muslim Question”’, 
MAS, 44 (2010), 145-173 (p. 145, Abstract). 
9 Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can a Muslim be an Indian?’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 41 (1999), 608-629. 
10 Asim Roy, ‘Reviews: The High Politics of India’s Partition: The Revisionist 
Perspective’, MAS, 24 (1990), 385-408 (pp. 391, 398). 
11 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand 
for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4. 
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‘It is critical also to bring into the narrative the British devolution of power 
to the provinces in the period after 1919, a process that had as much 
influence on the dynamics of the debates leading to partition as did an 
earlier British policy of “divide and rule” tied to religion’.12 
In her account of the ‘forgotten alternative’ in Bengal during this period, the work 
of Sana Aiyar fleshes out the central implications of this revisionist scholarship. 
Aiyar suggests that the predominant focus upon ‘two possible alternatives – 
[Congress] secular nationalism or [Muslim League] religious communalism’ in 
conventional historiography has ignored the possibility of a ‘third alternative’ that 
relates to regional sentiments and solidarities.13 The support proffered by the 
Bengali Premier, Fazlul Huq, for the Muslim League’s 1940 Lahore Resolution was 
actually based around a pluralised conception of autonomous and sovereign 
‘independent states’, rather than a singular ‘Pakistan’. It thus ‘amounted to more 
provincial autonomy than the [1935 Government of India] Act had so far provided, 
for it gave independence not only from the central government but also from the 
central policy of the Muslim League’.14 Despite being a prominent supporter of 
the Pakistan demand and although ultimately overrun by exclusive communal 
rhetoric and practice, Huq’s provincial politics, built around Bengali regional 
identities, thus cut across any straightforward representation of a homogenised 
and unitary Muslim community promulgated by Jinnah and the League. 
If we look beyond Bengal and Punjab, we can trace similar manifestations of 
regional sentiment in more novel arenas within India, which demonstrate the 
broader, more comprehensive impact of independence and partition. Semi-
autonomous princely rulers in territorially-viable areas like Bhopal, Hyderabad, 
Kashmir and Travancore began to plan for their own separate nationhood, 
opening up diplomatic ties with European and North American states.15 Outbreaks 
of violence and popular resistance ensured that military force was resorted to in 
Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir to ensure their accession to the Indian Union. 
Beyond the princely states, other conceptualisations of freedom and democracy 
prevailed. The Rajaji formula of 1942, for example, fashioned by C. 
                                                          
12 David Gilmartin, ‘Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a 
Narrative’, Journal of Asian Studies, 57 (1998), 1068-1095 (p. 1072, fn. 3). 
13 Sana Aiyar, ‘Fazlul Huq, Region and Religion in Bengal: The Forgotten 
Alternative of 1940-43’, MAS, 42 (2008), 1213-1249 (p. 1215). 
14 Ibid., p. 1220; see also, Roy, ‘Reviews: The High Politics of India’s Partition’, p. 
392. 
15 Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 229-260. 
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Rajagopalachari, the Madras-based Gandhian Congress leader, advocated 
permitting the Muslim majority provinces of the north-east and north-west the 
option to go their own way. But as a committed Tamil of southern India, Rajaji’s 
plan also sought to cut down the political, demographic and cultural weight of the 
north in comparison to the south. The plan was supported by leaders of the 
Dravidian movement as evidence of the need for autonomy from the troubles and 
demands of the north.16 Across the south and west of the subcontinent, new 
movements that demanded the reconstruction of provincial administrative 
boundaries on cultural and linguistic lines emerged.  Whilst largely non-
secessionist in intent, Tamil-, Telugu-, Malayalam-, Kannada-, and Marathi-
speakers envisaged the creation of semi-autonomous sub-national units within a 
federally-structured Indian Union. 
A broadened outlook upon independence and partition has important 
implications for the study of citizenship in India. The majority of previous 
scholarship on citizenship during this period has focused primarily on the 
implications of boundary demarcation, refugee rehabilitation, and Muslim 
loyalties in northern India, thereby corroborating the argument of David 
Washbrook, who has pointed out that South Asian histories of ‘the whole’ have 
invariably focused on Bengal and the Gangetic valley. Alternative histories of 
‘India’s pluralism and the parallel construction of multiple cultural nationalisms’ 
have been ignored – ‘except perhaps as supposed challenges to and betrayals of 
an Indian national principle’.17 There have been compelling reasons, however, for 
privileging such an ‘instituted perspective’, ultimately tied into dominant 
narratives of nationalism, partition, and religious conflict.  
Politically, the north Indian province of Uttar Pradesh (UP) was the epicentre of 
the ‘cow protection’ movement of the late nineteenth century and the shuddhi 
(literally ‘purification’) campaign of the Hindu Mahasabha in the 1920s, whilst 
Bengal played host to the swadeshi movement of 1905-11 and Punjab witnessed 
the colonial massacre at Amritsar in 1919. UP is the birthplace of both the Aligarh 
                                                          
16 J.B. Prashant More, Muslim Identity, Print Culture, and the Dravidian Factor in 
Tamil Nadu (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2004), pp. 160-162. 
17 David Washbrook, ‘Towards a History of the Present: Southern Perspectives on 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: 
India and Pakistan in Transition, ed. by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar 




Muslim University and the Deobandi movement, and it continues to be the home 
of the Nehru family dynasty, including that most important of scions, Jawaharlal.18 
Demographically, UP maintains a sizeable Muslim minority community, whilst 
being the most populous province in the country by some distance. And 
ultimately, it was the provinces of Bengal and Punjab that were arbitrarily divided 
at independence. Yet there are also many benefits to exploring conceptions of 
belonging and citizenship beyond the north in a country as large and diverse as 
India. This thesis, by focusing upon particular Marathi-speaking districts of 
western India instead, considers how ‘everyday’ notions of citizenship were also 
formulated around local exigencies and concerns related to an impending 
reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries on linguistic lines. 
The contemporary province of Maharashtra, according to the 2011 Census, is the 
second most populous province in India, and of comparable demographic size to 
Mexico (the eleventh largest country in terms of population in the world) with a 
population of over 112 million people.19 Situated on the western side of the 
southern peninsula of the Indian Union, it can be divided into three distinct 
regions, which reflect the historical separation of Marathi-speakers into different 
provinces and princely states under the British Raj. Vidarbha, situated in the east 
of the contemporary province, previously made up part of the Central Provinces, 
whilst Marathwada was an erstwhile dominion of the semi-autonomous Nizam (or 
princely ruler) of Hyderabad. But it is upon western Maharashtra, and the former 
Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay Province, which this thesis concentrates.  
                                                          
18 Sandria B. Freitag, ‘Sacred Symbol as Mobilizing Ideology: The North Indian 
Search for a “Hindu” Community’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 24 
(1980), 597-625; Charu Gupta, ‘Articulating Hindu Masculinity and Femininity: 
Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements in United Provinces in the 1920s’, Economic 
and Political Weekly [henceforth EPW], 33 (1998), 727-735; Sumit Sarkar, The 
Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908 (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 
1973); K.L. Tuteja, ‘Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian National 
Movement’, Social Scientist, 25 (1997), 25-61; Taylor C. Sherman, State Violence 
and Punishment in India (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), ch. 2; David Lelyveld, 
Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2003 [1978]); Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: 
Deoband, 1860-1900 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002 [1982]). 
19 ‘Statement – 1: Population and Decadal Change by Residence: 2011 (PERSONS)’, 
Census of India, 2011: Primary Census Abstract (2011) 
<http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/PCA/PCA_Highlights/pca_highlights
_file/India/Chapter-1.pdf> [accessed 20 July 2013].  
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In 1931, Marathi-speakers comprised 11.1 million of the 26.6 million inhabitants 
of the Bombay Presidency (including the princely states), primarily residing in the 
central districts of East and West Khandesh, Nasik, Ahmadnagar, Poona, Satara, 
and Sholapur; the coastal districts of Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri; the city of 
Bombay; the princely states and tribal chiefdoms of Kolhapur and the Dangs; and 
the southern district of Belgaum.20 Besides a common language, the relative 
homogeneity of these districts was also reflected in terms of caste and, in 
particular, the exclusive preponderance of the Maratha-Kunbi caste cluster, which 
made up the vast majority of the rural Marathi-speaking community.21 Another 
4.9 million of Bombay province’s inhabitants were classified as Gujarati-speakers, 
and mainly resided in the province’s northern districts where the Patidar-Kanbi 
caste cluster predominated, whilst a further 3.2 million Kannada-speakers were 
found in the southern districts where the Lingayat caste comprised a large 
proportion of the population.22 Muslims, treated as a homogeneous bloc despite 
their sectarian, linguistic and class differences, constituted only 970,886, or less 
than eight per cent of the total population in the Marathi- and Kannada-speaking 
central and southern districts of Bombay.23 It was language, region and caste 
which therefore served as the primary means whereby ‘everyday’ perceptions of 
citizenship came to be shaped by local state-society interactions in western 
India.24 
                                                          
20 A.H. Dracup and H.T. Sorley, Census of India, 1931: Volume VIII: Bombay 
Presidency: Part II: Statistical Tables (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1933), 
pp. 359-369. 
21 Marathas made up approximately 5.8 million inhabitants of Bombay Province, 
according to the 1931 Census. See, Dracup and Sorley, Census of India, 1931: 
Volume VIII: Part II, pp. 412-443. Schwartzberg argues that, in the case of non-
elite peasant castes, exclusivity from region to region seems to be the rule. This 
thesis suggests that his hypothesis holds true in late-colonial Bombay Province. I 
am not arguing, however, for ‘static’ peasant castes rooted to the land, but rather 
that as individuals moved about, in search of new opportunities and higher social 
status, they would pick up particular caste nomenclature dependent upon the role 
they performed in the particular linguistic region in which they were found. See, 
Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ‘Caste Regions of the North Indian Plain’, in Structure and 
Change in Indian Society, ed. by Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn (Chicago, 
Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 81-114. 
22 Dracup and Sorley, Census of India, 1931: Volume VIII: Part II, pp. 359-369, 412-
443. 
23 Ibid., pp. 412-443. 
24 This is not to treat linguistic and caste ‘communities’ as homogeneous and 
reified entities in some form of ‘primordial’ competition with one another. 
Indeed, as much of this thesis demonstrates, language and caste were frequently 
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A provincial-level analysis of Bombay thereby provides new perspectives upon the 
construction of citizenship in India during this formative period. It allows this 
thesis to draw upon materials contained within the Maharashtra (ex-Bombay) 
State Archives which are demonstrative of both the connections and dissonances 
between the centre and the locality, between high-level government rhetoric and 
low-level state actions. And by privileging the province as its point of analysis, this 
thesis therefore engages with theoretical work on regionalism, as well as its 
various incarnations and manifestations, such as the demands for linguistic 
reorganisation (including calls for the creation of Maharashtra) that emerged 
most vociferously during the late 1940s and 1950s.25 Regionalism has been 
conceptualised and studied in a variety of different ways and formats by 
historians and social scientists interested in South Asia – as ethnicity, as political 
process, as secessionist movement, as culture, as centre-state relations in a 
federal context.26 The demand for Maharashtra has been variously treated as 
indicative of the ‘process of (party political) opposition’, the culmination of a 
complex series of negotiations, machinations and compromises between 
provincial and all-India politicians, and as evidence of the ‘aesthetic, emotive 
                                                                                                                                                   
cut across by each other and other forms of identity – whether class-based, sub-
regional, tribal, or religious. 
25 At this point it is worth nothing that I am aware of the multiple and changeable 
meanings of the word ‘region’, although I use it in a specific context to refer to the 
space between the national and the local on this occasion. See, Bernard S. Cohn, 
‘Regions Subjective and Objective: Their Relation to the Study of Modern Indian 
History and Society’, in An Anthropologist Amongst the Historians and Other 
Essays, ed. by Bernard S. Cohn (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), ch. 6. 
26 See, for example, Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and 
Comparison (New Delhi: Sage, 1991); Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security and 
Separatism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert W. Stern, 
The Process of Opposition in India (London: University of Chicago Press, 1970); 
Robert L. Hardgrave, The Dravidian Movement (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 
1965); Balraj Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 
1993); D.W. Attwood, M. Israel and N.K. Wagle, eds., City, Countryside and Society 
in Maharashtra (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Ellen E. McDonald, 
‘The Growth of Regional Consciousness in Maharashtra’, Indian Economic and 
Social History Review [henceforth IESHR], 5 (1968), 223-243; Madhav M. 
Deshpande, ‘Nation and Region: A Socio-Linguistic Perspective on Maharashtra’, 
in National Unity: The South Asian Experience, ed. by Milton Israel (New Delhi: 
Promilla, 1983), pp. 111-134; Ian Copland and John Rickard, eds, Federalism: 
Comparative Perspectives from India and Australia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999). 
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representations and performances of identity that draw on images from popular 
history and cultural symbols and are used to mobilise people in Maharashtra’.27 
More recently, a new crop of scholarship on regionalism has sought to distance 
itself from much of this older work.28 Prachi Deshpande, for example, has 
criticised such research as ‘being ... excessively statist’.29 Having traced the crucial 
significance of Maratha historical memory to the creation of a modern regional 
Marathi identity, Deshpande has instead looked to take issue with ‘the flat 
treatment in South Asian historiography of the category of the region and its 
relationship to the nation’.30 Deshpande therefore rejects the simplistic 
representation of regionalisms ‘either as local linguistic flavours of an essentially 
homogeneous Indian/Hindu nationalist discourse or as separatist and oppositional 
platforms to the homogenising and overcentralised Indian nation-state’ and 
instead draws upon Sanjib Baruah’s description of the evolving and ‘dialogic 
relationship’ between regionalism and pan-Indianism in his study of regional 
consciousness in the north-east Indian province of Assam.31 However, despite 
noting that regionalism and pan-Indianism are therefore mutually constitutive, 
Baruah has elsewhere distinguished between the ‘obligations of national 
citizenship [or what he calls “macro-nationalism”] ... as a project of the modern 
state’, and the ‘politics of micro-nationalism ... located in the theoretical space 
                                                          
27 Stern, The Process of Opposition; Y.D. Phadke, Politics and Language (Bombay: 
Himalaya Publishing House, 1979); Shreeyash Palshikar, ‘Breaking Bombay, 
Making Maharashtra: Media, Identity Politics and State Formation in Modern 
India’ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2007), p. 11. 
28 See, for example, Prachi Deshpande, Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and 
Identity in Western India, 1700-1960 (New York, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006); Sanjib Baruah, India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of 
Nationality (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); 
Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the 
Making of Kashmir (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003); Sumathi Ramaswamy, 
Passions of the Tongue: Language Devotion in Tamil India, 1891-1970 (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1997); Jayeeta Sharma, Empire’s Garden: 
Assam in the Making of India (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
2011); Rajendra Vora and Anne Feldhaus, ‘Introduction’, in Region, Culture, and 
Politics in India, pp. 7-23 (p. 13). 
29 Prachi Deshpande, ‘Writing Regional Consciousness: Maratha History and 
Regional Identity in Modern Maharashtra’, in Region, Culture, and Politics in India, 
ed. by Rajendra Vora and Anne Feldhaus (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), pp. 83-118 
(p. 83). 
30 Deshpande, Creative Pasts, p. 208. 
31 Ibid.; Baruah, India against Itself, p. 14. 
12 
 
that is usually referred to as civil society’.32 Such a distinction between the state 
and society, as we shall see in the final section of this introduction, is inherently 
problematic.  
This thesis thus builds upon this recent work on regionalism, but seeks to reapply 
its arguments about regionalism’s constantly evolving relationship with ‘macro-
nationalism’ within the context of the much-maligned state and its interactions 
with local society. Rather than treating it solely as a site of ‘national citizenship’, 
we can trace how the state was itself constituted by ordinary members of the 
public, and was also implicated in forms of regional consciousness that 
contradicted the strong and centralised compulsions which presided at the all-
India level. The state therefore simultaneously existed as a site of ‘regional 
citizenship’, too. As we have already seen and will continue to consider 
throughout the course of this thesis, appeals on the basis of protecting ‘local’ 
rights and status, as well as public notions of regional forms of self-government, 
democracy, and swaraj (such as the Pakistan demand), were frequently 
conceptualised and articulated through the provincial state. 
Indeed, the important question of how state power was constituted, and what 
that meant for ordinary Indians and their sense of citizenship, has yet to be 
considered in detail in the context of linguistic reorganisation and regional 
consciousness during these critical decades. However, a particular subset of 
scholarship concerned with more contemporary demands for provincial 
reorganisation during the 1990s can provide us with some more concrete insights 
into ‘a whole range of issues around governance, state and civil society’ in India.33 
In her analysis of the demands for the creation of the Himalayan province of 
Uttarakhand, Emma Mawdsley has demonstrated how ‘many men and women 
spoke not just of a new state but a different state ... a “good” state’.34 In this 
regard, ‘One of the stated goals of many involved in the demand for a separate 
state ... is to improve democratic transparency and accountability in the region, 
                                                          
32 Sanjib Baruah, ‘“Ethnic” Conflict as State-Society Struggle: The Poetics and 
Politics of Assamese Micro-Nationalism’, MAS, 28 (1994), 649-671 (pp. 651-652); 
see also, Sanjib Baruah, ‘Politics of Subnationalism: Society versus State in Assam’, 
in State and Politics in India, ed. by Partha Chatterjee (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 496-520. 
33 Emma Mawdsley, ‘Redrawing the Body Politic: Federalism, Regionalism and the 
Creation of New States in India’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 40.3 
(2002), 34-54 (p. 36). 
34 Ibid., p. 51, fn. 7. 
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and to involve local people to a greater extent in the development process’.35 
Likewise, the proponents of Samyukta Maharashtra argued that the creation of 
unilingual provinces with common traditions, affinities and social structures would 
make the achievement of national developmental objectives both quicker and 
easier – the state would be more accountable to its citizens if capable of 
conversing in the regional vernacular.36  
These perceptions compare favourably with the ‘mythic’ or ‘sublime’ perceptions 
of the state, standing apart as an impartial arbiter and guarantor of social 
egalitarianism, which will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this 
introduction.37 Yet the redrawing of boundaries could also be demonstrative of 
the state’s more ‘profane’ dimensions and its ‘capture’ by locally dominant 
individuals, groups and communities.38 As Stuart Corbridge has suggested in 
relation to the movement for the creation of the separate province of Jharkhand, 
local mobilisations reflected local patterns of domination, ‘with little regard for 
the adivasi [tribal] communities so long in the vanguard of the Jharkhand 
movement’.39 Similarly, as Chapter Five of this thesis suggests, the linguistic 
affinities of adivasis within Bombay Province became a point of contention 
between the supporters of Gujarat and Maharashtra, with an ultimately 
detrimental impact upon the protection of tribal vernaculars. The multiple and 
ever-changing set of relationships between the state and society, conditioned by 
‘everyday’ interactions between ordinary Indians and local state actors, as well as 
larger public discourses about the nature of the state, are thus critical for any 
understanding of the motivations for linguistic reorganisation and its effects upon 
the conceptualisation and enactment of citizenship. 
 
                                                          
35 Emma Mawdsley, ‘A New Himalayan State in India: Popular Perceptions of 
Regionalism, Politics, and Development’, Mountain Research and Development, 19 
(1999), 101-112 (p. 101). 
36 Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad [henceforth SMP], Reorganization of States in 
India with Particular Reference to the Formation of Maharashtra (Bombay: 
Topiwalla Mansion, 1954), p. 9. 
37 Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Governance and Myths of the State in Mumbai’, in The 
Everyday State and Society in Modern India, ed. by C.J. Fuller and Véronique Bénéï 
(London: Hurst and Company, 2001), pp. 31-67. 
38 Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche, ‘Dimensions of Dominance: Class and State in 
Uttar Pradesh’, in The Everyday State and Society, pp. 91-114. 
39 Stuart Corbridge, ‘The Continuing Struggle for India’s Jharkhand: Democracy, 
Decentralisation and the Politics of Names and Numbers’, Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 40.3 (2002), 55-71. 
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1.2 Conceptualising Citizenship 
‘Citizenship’, in a succinct definition provided by Daniel Gorman, is the ‘primary 
means through which societies assert, construct, and consecrate their sense of 
identity. It is about who belongs to the nation, who does not, and why. Citizenship 
thus connotes a sense of civic belonging, comprising both social and legal-political 
identities’.40 We might add that citizenship is also about rights, to equality, 
freedom, and against exploitation, as officially enshrined within the ‘Fundamental 
Rights’ of Part III of the 1950 Constitution of India.41 The notion of citizenship 
arises, as we shall see in greater detail in the next section of this introduction, 
from a multiplicity of interactions between governments, administrative officials, 
political interests, and citizens, which coalesce around political mobilisation, 
electoral and bureaucratic representation, and census enumeration. For this 
thesis, citizenship serves as the primary paradigm through which to consider the 
nature of western India’s transition from colonialism to independence. Citizenship 
provides a novel conceptual frame of analysis that departs from existing 
scholarship and offers new perspectives upon the nationalist movement and the 
demands for linguistic reorganisation within Marathi-speaking portions of Bombay 
Province. This thesis thus builds upon recent scholarship on imperial, 
transnational, and ‘everyday’ notions of citizenship, which have sought to 
redefine the parameters through which citizenship is currently conceptualised. 
Many conventional theories of citizenship, as Joya Chatterji has recently noted, 
tend ‘to locate the origins of modern notions of citizenship at the conjuncture of 
political, intellectual, and legal currents in early modern Europe’.42 In these 
hypotheses, citizenship is also inextricably linked to, and derived from, the 
concomitant emergence of nationalism and the modern nation-state. For Rogers 
Brubaker, citizenship in France and Germany was shaped by their own nationalist 
movements: generally speaking, French citizenship is deemed ‘civic’ and 
‘republican’ in nature, as a consequence of the decisive events of 1789-93; whilst 
German citizenship is ‘ethnic’, as an upshot of German unification in 1871 around 
                                                          
40 Daniel Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 1. 
41 ‘Part III – Fundamental Rights’, Constitution of India, pp. 6-18 
<http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-indexenglish.htm> [accessed 20 
July 2013]. 
42 Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946-1970’, The Historical 
Journal, 55 (2012), 1049-1071 (p. 1049). 
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a common linguistic medium.43 The legal status of citizenship has thus come to be 
approached primarily around the binary of jus soli (an inclusive interpretation 
based upon birth and residence) and jus sanguinus (an exclusive interpretation 
based upon ethnicity and descent), with a nation deemed to either adhere to one 
principle or the other. Jus soli can also be further subdivided into liberal and 
republican conceptions, whereby the former envisages citizenship as being 
embodied by individual rights and liberties, whilst the latter emphasises the 
performance of collective, civic duties.44 Perhaps the most well known and most 
extensively critiqued conceptualisation of citizenship is that embodied in the work 
of T.H. Marshall on post-Enlightenment Britain. Marshall delineated three 
different facets which, he argued, had developed in distinctive phases: the ‘civil’ 
aspect of citizenship, based upon the civil rights necessary for individual freedom 
and embodied in the 1832 Reform Act; the ‘political’, which was theoretically 
based upon political equality and was exemplified by the inclusion of practically all 
men in the political system under the 1918 Reform Act; and the ‘social’, whereby 
citizens were to be provided with certain social rights connected to the 
emergence of the welfare state and the abolishment of the Poor Law.45 
Both the works of Brubaker and Marshall have been widely considered and 
appraised since their original publication. The delineation of two dichotomised 
approaches to citizenship in Brubaker’s thesis has been undermined by the 
recognition that, ‘In practice, however, the pure type of either [the jus soli or the 
jus sanguinus] principle is rare, with the rules governing citizenship by marriage or 
naturalisation complicating this neat delineation’.46 Patrick Weil, for example, has 
highlighted how the French government has actually been prepared to deviate 
and adopt more exclusive policies on nationality and belonging at particular 
historical moments since 1789.47 Meanwhile, the sociologist Michael Mann has 
decried the utilisation of Marshall’s hypothesis on citizenship as a template by 
                                                          
43 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
44 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
45 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1992 [1950]). 
46 Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents: An Indian History (London: 
University of Harvard Press, 2013), p. 13. 
47 Patrick Weil, How to be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789, translated 
by Catherine Porter (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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noting that ‘It is entirely about Great Britain’.48 Mann has instead suggested five 
alternative ‘strategies of citizenship’ that ‘deviate from this Anglophile and 
evolutionary model’, and which he argues have been employed by various 
‘advanced industrialised countries’ such as Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, Spain, and the United States.49 These theories of citizenship have been 
considered, applied, and critiqued in the context of the non-Western world, too. 
For Ornit Shani, citizenship in India is embodied by four main conceptions (liberal; 
republican; ethnic; and ‘non-statist’), which have co-existed within an ‘ongoing 
dialogue and shifting balance ... since independence’.50 Taken together, these 
divergent yet overlapping approaches are said to constitute a ‘four-fold 
citizenship regime’ or ‘mechanism of incorporation’51, which, whilst ‘offer[ing] 
alternative strategies for diverse people to make sense of their social 
predicament, as well as to define demands for remedies or change’, also 
‘provided the state with an effective means of (re)positioning its authority and 
reclaiming legitimacy from its subjects in the context of contestations and 
dissent’.52 India’s national integrity, then, Shani suggests, owes something to its 
ability to contain multiple contestations and grievances within the citizenship 
paradigm. By contrast, Vazira Zamindar has suggested that the imposition of 
citizenship in South Asia produced ‘with some force, bounded citizens of two 
nation-states’, thereby restricting ordinary Indians’ previously manifold and 
changeable affiliations.53  
                                                          
48 Michael Mann, ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, Sociology, 21 (1987), 
339-354 (p. 340). 
49 These are ‘liberal’, ‘reformist’, ‘authoritarian monarchist’, ‘Fascist’, and 
‘authoritarian socialist’. See, Ibid. 
50 Shani, ‘Conceptions of Citizenship’, p. 150. 
51 The concept of a ‘citizenship regime’ thus helps to delineate the directives and 
practices of particular polities at particular moments in time: strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion; the identification of citizenship with nationality or cultural 
identity; the unit of citizenship (individuals or groups), etc. It can also, as Shani’s 
hypothesis suggests, seem to encompass multiple modes of relating to and 
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Whilst these revisionist approaches have done much to modify our understanding 
of citizenship, they still, like those of Brubaker and Marshall, position national 
governments as the essential players in determining its nature. By focusing upon 
the region as its site of inquiry instead, this thesis suggests that citizenship was 
actually constructed through mutually constitutive interactions between 
quotidian state actors and particular elements of local society – it was not an 
abstract entity without public input. However, in most of the conventional and 
revisionist approaches which have considered the emergence of African and Asian 
nation-states after decolonisation, citizenship is considered to have been based 
around, or to have incorporated a mixture of, models and approaches emanating 
from the West. Much scholarship on citizenship therefore reflects Benedict 
Anderson’s earlier thesis on colonial nationalism’s primarily European origins.54 In 
India, this has led some postcolonial critics to reject citizenship entirely as an alien 
concept, as part of their efforts to outline what they perceive as a broader 
disjunction between the discourse and practices of the Indian state and that of 
society. For Partha Chatterjee, ‘civil society’, on the one hand, belongs to the 
western educated Nehruvian elites, who ‘derivatively’ inherited the colonial 
state’s mantle, whilst ‘political society’, on the other, belongs to those without 
direct recourse to the state’s machinery, who expressed their rights through 
moments of resistance outside its reach.55 This thesis will suggest that there are a 
number of problems with this dichotomy, which will be critiqued in more detail in 
the next section of this introduction. For now, however, it is important to note the 
way in which the apparent European origins of citizenship has important 
implications for our understanding of the processes by which it is formulated in 
the postcolonial world. 
For Marshall, as noted above, citizenship in Britain was seen to emerge as part of 
a gradual, staged and evolutionary process, which passed from ‘civil’ liberties, 
included the achievement of ‘political’ privileges, and culminated in the provision 
of ‘social’ rights for all. By contrast, in many of the former colonies of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, citizenship has been considered in much conventional 
scholarship as having appeared fully-formed, inclusive, and universal from the 
outset, at least in theoretical/constitutional intent, as a concatenate of the 
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achievement of independence – a perception that this thesis and others, as we 
shall see momentarily, have critiqued. Valerian Rodrigues, for example, has 
suggested that the underlying imperatives of Indian citizenship were based upon 
‘non-preference to any community and [were] inclusive of all communities. The 
fact of Partition ... was not allowed to affect the understanding and demarcation 
of citizenship. If anything, it made the Constituent Assembly deeply sensitive to 
issues of group affiliation’.56 In this scholarship, it is only the inability of 
postcolonial governments to live up to the liberal principles that were supposedly 
enshrined within their constitutions that has inhibited the enactment of truly 
universal citizenship practices. James Holston, for example, has criticised ‘the 
substantive distribution of ... rights ... to those deemed citizens’ in Brazil, 
characterising these failures as ‘de facto deprivations of “inclusive” but 
“inegalitarian citizenship”’.57 Likewise, Niraja Jayal, despite also tracing the 
emergence of ideas about citizenship amongst both colonised and coloniser 
during the early twentieth century in India, has postulated that, 
‘Unlike in countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom, where 
histories of citizenship had entailed struggles for institutionalizing inclusion, 
the Indian Republic started life already equipped with it ... [A] radical notion 
of citizenship held out the promise of transforming a deeply hierarchical 
society into a civic community of equals’.58 
In contrast, ‘The second half of the twentieth century’, Jayal goes on to argue, 
‘has demonstrated the fragility of that constitutional consensus and a steady 
erosion of the civic ideal that animated it’.59 These approaches therefore seem to 
suggest that ‘earlier exclusions [from citizenship are only] ... temporary glitches in 
a perfectible, ever-expanding pluralist system’.60 In many ways, Jayal’s 
periodisation is reflective of much writing on the postcolonial state in India, 
whereby the stability and optimism of the early decades of governance are 
compared favourably to the difficulties and instability which are seen to 
characterise the 1970s and 1980s under the premiership of Indira Gandhi. This is 
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something which we will consider in greater detail in the next section of this 
introduction. For now, it is worth noting how the perceived binary between the 
governments of Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter have papered over the 
contests and quarrels over the nature of citizenship in Nehruvian India, which 
were played out against a backdrop of uncertainty and flux during its first, 
formative decade. Likewise, the conceptualisation of citizenship as emerging fully-
formed at the moment of independence pays scant attention to its steady 
development in the early twentieth century, especially against a backdrop of 
increased provincial self-government for Indians under the British Raj. This thesis 
therefore challenges conventional accounts on citizenship in India in three ways. 
First, it problematises the depiction of citizenship in India as emerging fully-
formed, inclusive and universal, by both tracing the significance of its earlier 
colonial manifestations, and outlining its exclusions and limitations.  Second, and 
following on from the first, it disputes the embedded proposition within this 
scholarship that citizenship is thus derived from entirely European origins. And, 
finally, related to both of the other two points, it ultimately contests the extent to 
which citizenship has been primarily affiliated with the rise of the nation-state, by 
approaching its articulation within an alternative, regional milieu. 
During the last couple of decades or so, the interest of political and social 
scientists in citizenship has been reignited by the impact of neo-liberalism and the 
increasingly interconnected nature of the global economy. Citizenship has been 
reconceptualised around an international and ‘cosmopolitan’ framework, which 
circumvents the efficacy of the nation as the only arena through which citizenship 
can be enacted. This is not to point towards the demise of the nation-state – 
indeed, the universalism of global citizenship can serve as a kind of ‘Trojan horse’ 
for more selective interests and prerogatives, oft defined on a nationalistic basis61 
– but to note the ‘flexible’ nature of citizenship, to borrow Aihwa Ong’s helpful 
phrase, in which citizenship can be performed in a variety of different spatial 
locations, from the local to the transnational.62 In some ways, then, the increased 
sense of a global, ‘moral’ citizenship has served to ‘unhinge’ it from the nation-
state as its most obvious referent. In a colonial/post-colonial setting such as South 
Asia, the recent focus amongst historians of empire upon formulations of 
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‘imperial citizenship’ is particularly prescient.63 Focusing on the ‘languages of 
citizenship’ invoked in the writings, speeches and petitions of such Indian 
luminaries as Dadabhai Naoroji, Surendranath Banerjea, Cornelia Sarabji, and M.K. 
Gandhi, Sukanya Banerjee has demonstrated how ‘the British Empire itself 
provided the ground for claiming citizenship even as the thrust of these claims 
implicitly critiqued British colonial practices’.64 This thesis thus draws upon the 
utility of transnational and imperial approaches to citizenship, noting how this 
scholarship elucidates its fluctuating nature and its application in alternative 
spatial arenas.65 
Scholarship on imperial citizenship is also significant to this thesis’s efforts to 
contest the idea that citizenship emerged inclusive, universal and fully-formed in 
India at the moment of independence, having traced the earlier manifestations of 
belonging and membership back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Likewise, some historians of South Asia have started, in the last decade, 
to resituate the emergence of ideas about citizenship within a colonial setting. 
Sandip Hazareesingh has explored local demands for civic rights in early 
twentieth-century Bombay City, ‘that accompanied but were by no means 
identical with, the struggle for national self-determination’.66 Darren Zook has 
traced both British and ‘nationalist’ attempts to construct the model/responsible 
‘rural citizen’ in early twentieth-century southern India through the cooperative 
movement and agricultural education initiatives.67 And Eleanor Newbigin has 
demonstrated the continuities within the debates over Hindu and Muslim 
personal law under the British Raj and then within a postcolonial milieu, thereby 
‘question[ing] the degree to which we can divide and treat as separate categories 
the notion of colonial subject and independent citizenship in India’.68 The formal 
codification of citizenship at independence should not detract from the longer 
                                                          
63 Gorman, Imperial Citizenship; Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: 
Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 2010). 
64 Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens, pp. 3-4. 
65 Saskia Sassen, ‘The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance’, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10 (2003), 5-28. 
66 Sandip Hazareesingh, ‘The Quest for Urban Citizenship: Civic Rights, Public 
Opinion, and Colonial Resistance in Early Twentieth-Century Bombay’, MAS, 34 
(2000), 797-829 (p. 797). 
67 Darren C. Zook, ‘Developing the Rural Citizen: Southern India, 1900-47’, South 
Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 23.1 (2000), 65-86. 
68 Eleanor Newbigin, ‘Personal Law and Citizenship in India’s Transition to 
Independence’, MAS, 45 (2011), 7-32 (p. 10). 
21 
 
processes through which it was refracted from the late nineteenth century – 
these works thus amply demonstrate citizenship’s colonial antecedents. Perhaps 
most important for this thesis, however, is the recent work of both Joya Chatterji 
and Taylor Sherman, who have highlighted how citizenship at independence was 
not only formulated around the imperatives of the new nation-state, but instead 
was pervaded and complicated by the messy, ad hoc and complicated nature of 
ordinary Indians’ own perceptions, needs and concerns during this decisive 
period. 
Sherman has traced how, in the aftermath of partition and before the enactment 
of the 1950 Constitution, ‘formal legal questions over citizenship and residency’ 
for non-Indian Muslims residing in the princely state of Hyderabad were ‘reliant 
upon more informal, on the ground negotiations over the meaning of nationality 
and the nature of belonging’.69 This dependence upon the self-identification of 
individuals could render those who categorised themselves as ‘Afghans’ or ‘Arabs’ 
potentially ‘stateless’, as their non-Indian ethnic origins seemingly conflicted with 
the requirements of the legal regime.70 But it also provided a space through which 
official depictions of membership could be circumvented, allowing both those 
who wished to leave India and those who preferred to remain the opportunity, 
often with local official collusion, to ‘change the way they self-identified in order 
to secure a better outcome for themselves’.71 Likewise, Chatterji has described 
how partition’s refugees ‘exerted considerable pressure on the functionaries 
charged with dealing with them, who in turn were members of a bitterly divided 
society, and whose actions were shaped by their own norms and beliefs’.72  
Everyday actions of local state actors thus departed significantly from official, 
legal imperatives and policies, ultimately shaping conceptions of citizenship afresh 
in relatively novel directions. For Chatterji, this informed ‘a de jure status of a new 
and particular kind’ which departed from the universal premises which 
supposedly accompanied the achievement of Indian independence.73 Building 
upon this scholarship, this thesis suggests that abstract conceptualisations based 
around particular paradigms are relatively ineffective in tracing the consistently 
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fluctuating nature of citizenship across time and space. Debates about citizenship 
both in the build-up to and aftermath of independence ensured that it was not 
enacted in a vacuum free from societal tensions and concerns – rather, ordinary 
and everyday perceptions effected, moulded, and reconstituted, in entirely novel 
directions, the universal premises upon which a European-derived citizenship was 
supposedly based. 
 
1.3 Citizenship, the State and Society 
As the recent works of Chatterji and Sherman have therefore started to suggest, a 
consideration of the multiple actors and varying trajectories of thought and action 
implicit within dealings between the state and society is critical to any efforts to 
quantify the nature of citizenship in India. The state-society dialectic provides the 
context through which this thesis is able to consider how manifestations of 
citizenship in Maharashtra were developed around local exigencies and concerns, 
which departed from, overlapped with, and influenced, both all-India and other 
regional notions of membership and belonging. It thus builds upon existing 
anthropological literature on the nature of the contemporary state in India, which 
has qualified older conceptualisations that have posited that the state and society 
exist as discrete and separate entities. Instead, it highlights how interactions 
between bureaucrats, powerful individuals or lobbying groups, and the general 
public, ensured that the state was consistently contested and subverted during 
this period. This thesis therefore resituates and draws longer connections with 
scholarship on the ‘everyday’ state, in the context of both the anticipation and 
working out of independence and partition during the mid-twentieth century, 
thereby challenging standard depictions of governance and society under both 
the British Raj and the premiership of Jawaharlal Nehru. 
In the years immediately after independence, work on the state in India inevitably 
entailed thinking about the extent of its ‘stability’ in the face of the innumerable 
perceived threats, challenges and demands of national and territorial integrity, 
political and economic autonomy, and attempts at poverty alleviation and social 
egalitarianism. In this context, the ‘modernising’ imperatives of Nehruvian rule – 
democracy, development and secularism – received tacit support from many 
23 
 
contemporary academics.74 This positive perception of the early postcolonial 
state, and the ideologies and methods it sponsored, was further reinforced by 
many political and social scientists during the 1970s and 1980s, when this 
formative period was increasingly contrasted with what was considered to be 
India’s growing crisis of governability under the premiership of Nehru’s daughter, 
Indira Gandhi.75 The suspension of elections and civil liberties during the 
Emergency (1975-77), the emergence of the Hindu Right, the perceived growth in 
venality and casteism within contemporary politics, and the persistence of slow 
levels of economic growth, are cited as examples of the state’s attempts at 
‘modernisation’ beginning to stutter and stall. Amongst those academics who 
have sought to ascertain why this has happened, two broadly distinguishable 
theories have prevailed, which can be split into a political economy approach and 
a postcolonial perspective. Amongst political economists, Pranab Bardhan has 
argued that the ‘failure’ of state-sponsored development is inextricably linked to 
the complex and interconnected relationship between the three ‘dominant 
proprietary classes’ (capitalists and industrialists; rich farmers and agriculturalists; 
and bureaucrats and professionals) in India who seek to control the state: 
‘When the diverse elements of this loose and uneasy coalition of dominant 
proprietary classes pull in different directions and when none of them are 
individually strong enough to dominate the process of resource allocation, 
one predictable outcome is the proliferation of subsidies and grants to 
placate all of them, with a consequent reduction in the available surplus for 
public capital formation’.76 
When combined with the ‘ever-widening circle of democratic awareness and 
raised aspirations’ amongst the lower classes, it is this ‘demand overload’ which 
Bardhan and others suggest was to blame for the state’s weaknesses.77 In this 
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view, therefore, the transformative potentialities of ‘modernisation’ are still 
acknowledged, but need to be revivified and shorn of their vested interests to be 
truly emancipatory for all of Indian society. However, whilst they establish that 
‘proprietary’ elites have generally dominated the allocation of the state’s 
resources, Bardhan and others have persisted with conventional depictions of the 
state as an autonomous entity separated from society at large.78 In Achin Vanaik’s 
account of post-independence India, for example, the state is ‘an actual 
organisation with certain interests distinct from those of the dominant classes, 
controlling real people and territories’.79 Conventional political economy 
approaches have thus also neglected the manner in which ordinary Indians 
perceive of and describe the state. It was partly in response to this ongoing ‘focus 
on large-scale structures, epochal events, major policies and “important” people’, 
through which the contrasting postcolonial perspective on the relationship 
between the state and society was to emerge.80 The work of these academics is 
thus invaluable in bringing ordinary Indians’ understandings of the state and their 
relationship with it to increased scholarly attention. 
For a broad cross-section of Indian scholars including Sudipta Kaviraj, Satish 
Saberwal and Ashis Nandy, the failings of the state in India are attributed to its 
detachment from either ‘traditional’ practices or subaltern society.81 In this 
scholarship, a small, isolated and primarily English-speaking elite was unable to 
exercise cultural leadership over society, having ‘neglected the creation of a 
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common thicker we-ness (something that was a deeper sense of community than 
merely the common opposition to the British) and the creation of a single political 
language for the entire polity’.82 Broadly speaking, then, this cultural critique of 
the state rejected both the imposition and transformative impact of Nehruvian 
‘modernity’, deprecated its ‘Western’ origins, and suggested it had been 
‘derivatively’ applied within an incompatible Indian context.83 Building upon these 
approaches and his own previous research, perhaps the most effective and 
nuanced of this postcolonial scholarship can be found in Partha Chatterjee’s The 
Politics of the Governed.84 Chatterjee begins by refining the dichotomous 
opposition between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ prevalent within liberal, Marxist, 
and, frequently, postcolonial approaches, too. He rejects what he perceives to be 
the dominant historiographical motif on modernity, which suggests that it is 
‘distributed in homogeneous empty time’ and thus ‘succeeds not only in branding 
resistances to it as archaic and backward, but also in securing for capital and 
modernity their ultimate triumph’.85 Building upon the work of Michel Foucault, 
Chatterjee instead postulates that ‘[t]he real space of modern life consists of 
heterotopia’ – with important implications for this thesis’s reflection that politics, 
the state and ‘modernity’ mean different things to different people at different 
times.86 Rather than treating ‘these “other” times’ as ‘mere survivors from a pre-
modern past’, Chatterjee suggests that we should instead conceptualise them as 
‘new products of the encounter with modernity itself’.87  
Chatterjee then goes on to make a distinction between ‘civil society’ and ‘political 
society’, or ‘citizens’ and ‘populations’, which forms a central element in his 
understanding of the relationship between the state and society in India. Upper- 
and middle-class citizens are part of civil society, carrying ‘the moral connotation 
of sharing in the sovereignty of the state and hence of claiming rights in relation 
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to the state’.88 On the other hand, political society covers, ‘Most of the 
inhabitants of India [who] are only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and 
contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution’.89 
Members of ‘political’ society are unable to become fully paid-up citizens of the 
Indian Union because the only mechanisms through which they are able to 
influence the state utilise illegitimate means – sit-ins, strikes, violence, and the 
violation of laws governing property and squatting. Their political relationship 
with the state, Chatterjee argues, is one in which they are looked after and 
controlled, based upon state representatives’ political calculations about the 
potential costs and benefits of mobilisation. In this interpretation, therefore, the 
rights of these ‘populations’ to make claims upon the state are mediated ‘through 
the moral context of “community” by high level observers, government and the 
media’.90 In fact, ‘Late colonial political leaderships based their strategies on the 
same assumptions, and the official historical archives in India are littered with 
commentaries on the religious sentiments aroused by the soap box’.91 By 
suggesting that the state mobilises and deals with ‘populations’ on the basis of 
‘community’, Chatterjee inadvertently perpetuates colonial and national elite 
stereotypes which can be traced back to prevailing notions of nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century govermentality. 
The work of Chatterjee is thus particularly useful for highlighting the problems 
inherent within the idea of an indefatigable march towards universal 
‘modernisation’ and state representativeness, and aids our efforts to contest 
older portrayals of other ‘ways of being’ as pre-modern. Yet, despite using a 
slightly different conceptual framework in his analysis, he continues to depict a 
binary distinction between the state (and its elite representatives) and the rest of 
society in India, ‘in which “bourgeois politics” follows a particular modality and 
the politics of the underprivileged follows another’.92 ‘[C]riminality and violence 
were by no means the prerogative of the deprived’, and appeals to the state’s 
supposed impartiality and legal-juridical frameworks ‘in the language of 
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supplication and concession, grants and demands, charters and petitions, 
grievances and repression’ could emerge, at particular moments, from broad 
cross-sections of Indian society.93 This thesis instead utilises the theoretical 
frameworks employed by anthropological work on the nature of the ‘everyday 
state’ in contemporary India to challenge this rather abstract notion that the state 
and (‘political’) society, or ‘citizens’ and ‘populations’, exist as discrete units of 
analysis. As Chris Fuller and John Harriss have demonstrated, the state is not an 
exotic entity to which society has no recourse, but for many ordinary Indians is 
‘banal, mundane and routinised’.94 Likewise, Akhil Gupta, in trying to collapse the 
distinction between the state and society in their local-level encounters, has 
described the likelihood of finding bureaucratic officials at roadside tea-stalls and 
at their homes, rather than in their offices.95 Ordinary Indians’ perceptions of the 
state and their claims upon it are thus constructed, at least in part, in their 
‘everyday’ interactions with these local state agents. 
Nevertheless, in Gupta’s analysis of the state at least, Chatterjee’s ideas about 
‘community’ continue to have some theoretical purchase. Like Chatterjee’s more 
recent concept of ‘political society’, Gupta’s perception of ‘the public’, ‘the 
people’ or ‘plebeians’ actually ‘cross-cuts class divisions’ within these categories 
and thus homogenises ‘community’ – in doing so, it fails to take into account 
‘oppositional class strategies and demands’ and the variety of different 
‘community’ interests that exist within society.96 In this sense, the state can 
actually perpetuate local class and ‘community’ advantage, because civil servants 
are drawn from amongst the very same public which they are expected to 
impartially preside over, and are often subject to the same beliefs, concerns and 
exigencies. They can be put under pressure by certain sub-sections of local 
society, whose members might cajole, influence and threaten these officials to 
come to particular administrative decisions, or redirect resources in their favour. 
In the process, local bureaucrats frequently contravene (ostensible) central 
directives and principles of accountability, democracy, development and 
secularism, and are often liable for ensuring that they, their kin, or their 
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‘community’ are able to co-opt, or even colonise, certain elements or spaces 
within the state in their own interest.97 
This depiction of a blurred relationship between the state and society at the local 
level has two important implications for this thesis.98 First, it demonstrates that 
the difficulties in presenting and inculcating a single shared sense of ‘Indian-ness’ 
owed nothing to the inapplicability of ‘derivative’ models from the West, but 
rather was conditioned by the state’s own structural complexity – its multiplicity 
of actors situated in a variety of localised settings.99 Citizenship, whether 
conceptualised as an assertion of identity or the performance of rights, is 
frequently formulated and enacted in these mutually constitutive, ‘everyday’ 
encounters between the state and society (rather than emerging solely in a 
discrete ‘bourgeois’ public sphere or being based solely on legal/rational 
frameworks). Its construction is not, therefore, related only to the elites who 
constitute and control the central state, but could also be developed and asserted 
by different elements amongst the rest of society who influence and negotiate the 
state’s localised actions. Second, and following on from the previous point, this 
thesis therefore suggests that ordinary members of society in western India were 
able to make reference to their ‘community’ identities on their own terms, too. 
Instead of caste, language and religion serving solely as a means through which 
elites could mobilise the ‘primordial’ sentiments of the ‘masses’, they also 
provided paradigms through which to challenge and contest the dictates of the 
central state, thereby asserting their own citizenship claims, rights, and 
particularised notions of belonging. 
This thesis, by tracing the applicability of ideas about ‘community’ in the local 
machinations of the state, does not, however, attempt to draw upon a broad 
theoretical disjunction between corrupt, nepotistic, and community-oriented 
lower level bureaucratic customs and the aloof, impartial and ultimately 
accountable practices supposedly embodied by the higher echelons of the 
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services.100 As William Gould has demonstrated, these perpetuate older colonial 
assumptions about the ‘corruptibility’ and untrustworthiness of the ‘inferior’, 
Indian-manned levels of the administration in direct comparison to the European 
governmental traditions of the ‘heaven-born’ all-India Indian Civil Service (ICS).101 
Rather, this thesis employs some of the later path-breaking work of Rajnarayan 
Chandavarkar on state-society relations in the late colonial/early independence 
period, which was concerned with the construction and endurance of colonial 
‘customs of governance’. As Chandavarkar argues, ‘The colonial state tolerated, 
even helped to create, local domains of power from which it averted its gaze and 
in which dominance was asserted, contested and sometimes perpetuated with 
some degree of freedom from the systematic operation of the rule of law’.102 
Rather than a manifestation of ‘primordial’ sentiment or the essential 
corruptibility of the lower levels of the bureaucracy, the relevance of ‘community’ 
in the mediation of citizenship was instead a product of modern colonial and 
postcolonial customs of governance at the everyday level. However, there was 
certainly nothing fixed about these strategies – they could be shaped by 
interactions and influences emanating from local society, and reinterpreted and 
utilised for particular group interests, thereby diverging and shifting accordingly 
between different spatial and temporal settings. Meanwhile, the self-association 
of the central state with secularism, cosmopolitanism and modernisation, as 
Chapter Six will reveal, was often actually a means of consolidating more 
parochial group interests. This thesis therefore corroborates Gupta’s argument, 
‘that lower-level officials are only one link in a chain of corrupt practices 
that extends to the apex of state organisations and reaches far beyond 
them to electoral politics ... The difference is that whereas higher-level 
state officials raise large sums from relatively few people who can afford to 
pay it to them, lower-level officials collect it in small figures and on a daily 
basis from a very large number of people. It is for this reason that 
corruption is so much more visible at the lower levels’.103 
And yet, despite the increasingly frequent revelations of malfeasance at the apex 
of governance in contemporary India, ordinary members of society have 
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continued to appeal to what Thomas Blom Hansen has called the state’s ‘mythic’ 
or ‘sublime’ dimensions, whether these are represented by its supposedly liberal 
constitutional premises, its secularism and communal impartiality, or its 
‘accountability’ in its conduct towards the Indian public.104 The state is thus often 
held to account for not living up to its stated morals and principles. Likewise, 
although the boundaries between state and society are ‘blurred or porous or 
contextually shifting’, Fuller and Harriss argue, ‘they are nonetheless perceived as 
boundaries so that the threshold of government office symbolises an internal 
boundary – a “wall of separation” ... by which the state is ideologically parted 
from the society that it governs’.105 Ideas about citizenship amongst ordinary 
Indians are thus not only conditioned by their interactions with local 
administrative officials, but by larger discourses about the nature of the state 
which they, alongside state representatives, political parties, and the media, 
imagine and articulate. As all of the chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, at 
important moments it serves the interests of particular groups of people in 
western India to imagine what Gupta has called a ‘hierarchical vision of the state’, 
in which ‘corrupt’ local representatives are contrasted with ‘benevolent’ and 
‘charitable’ elements within the higher echelons of the services, which these 
groups are then able to appeal to for the redress of their grievances and the 
protection of their rights.106  
An analysis of citizenship in western India between the 1930s and 1950s, this 
thesis therefore suggests, is perhaps best conducted by taking note of these 
recent anthropological critiques, frameworks and studies. These reveal the 
multiple actors and shifting trajectories of thought and action implicit within 
dealings between the state and society within particularised regional settings, and 
therefore the ‘situated knowledges’ through which citizenship is variably 
visualised. By resituating and applying this work in the context of the formative 
decades of late colonial/early independent India, this thesis joins a still relatively 
embryonic body of historical scholarship which has begun to contest the 
supposed pervasiveness of Nehruvianism during this period.107 However, by 
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focusing upon a region hitherto neglected in much of the literature on the 
transition from colonial subjecthood to independent citizenship, it looks to 
broaden the implications of this work by applying its paradigms in a contextual 
arena where migration, refugee rehabilitation and Muslim ‘minorities’ were 
relatively less significant. 
--------------- 
The next chapter of this thesis, however, contextualises and qualifies this research 
by demonstrating how, by the late colonial period, Maharashtra had already 
existed for a number of centuries as a space of historical imagination and political 
mythology. It reveals that the development of this historical regional 
consciousness was a matter of constant contestation and negotiation between 
diverse groups and divergent interpretations, an ‘arena for the expression of 
conflicting political and social identities’.108 Regional sentiments did not emerge 
amongst a Maharashtrian public only through conflicts over access to the late 
colonial and postcolonial state’s resources, but were embedded in linguistic and 
cultural worlds of considerable depth, duration and contestation, worlds and 
horizons that had already been invented, and reinvented several times over since 
the late seventeenth century. At the same time, this chapter suggests that these 
older notions of regional consciousness came to be shaped and redirected in 
novel ways by the larger historical transformations between the pre-colonial, 
colonial and postcolonial periods. In the nineteenth century, for example, the 
increased recognition accorded to ethnography amongst British colonial 
administrators and Indian ideologues was to link caste, language and region to 
race and ethnicity. These identities were then to inflect ideas about citizenship in 
the later transition towards swaraj. 
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The remaining chapters, which form the central component parts of this thesis, 
thus generally begin during the interwar period, where the gradual devolution of 
power had increased expectations about forms of self-determination and, 
ultimately, independence. The historical background of regionalism thus came to 
be reconfigured by the ‘provincialisation of politics’ and sub-national autonomy, 
raising questions about the nature and structure of the future state as well as the 
place of Maharashtrians as citizens within it. Chapter Three focuses in particular 
upon the choice of Congress Party candidates ahead of elections in 1937, 1946 
and 1951. It suggests that the selection of candidates by Provincial Congress 
Committees (PCCs) was often made on the basis of both their ‘community’ 
background – particularly in relation to the selection of candidates from locally 
dominant caste groups – and their ability to ‘plug in’ to, and extract state 
resources from, networks of influence and patronage. The regional imperatives of 
electoral politics based around caste and community diverged noticeably from the 
ostensible principles of the Congress High Command (CHC), who had paradoxically 
presented the party as a secular and egalitarian organisation. The right to vote, a 
fundamental privilege of citizenship, therefore came to be performed locally on 
the basis of community networks and affiliations, ensuring ‘everyday’ notions of 
membership and belonging came to be configured by discourses relating to 
regional indigeneity and demography. And yet, despite these imperatives, local 
Congressmen who had been rejected as potential party candidates still appealed 
to the higher echelons of the party on the basis of its lofty values and their long 
history of Congress service, whilst deprecating the apparent communalism and 
corruption of others. 
The state, in a similar way to how slippages had permeated the various structural 
levels of the Congress organisation, was also marred by inconsistencies and 
contradictions in the implementation of policies of affirmative action for 
bureaucratic employment. This forms the basis of analysis for the fourth chapter 
of this thesis. First, there were obvious discrepancies in the categorisation of 
those ‘communities’ worthy of reservation by the provincial Government of 
Bombay (GOB) and the central Government of India (GOI). But, in an era of 
(relative) autonomy of action for the provinces, legislation on affirmative action 
also diverged from province to province, conditioned by particular regional 
concerns and exigencies. Therefore, whilst northern and all-India policy implicitly 
privileged religion as the key category in affirmative action for Muslim 
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‘minorities’, in western India reservation revolved primarily around caste instead. 
Second, colonial and nationalist elite theories regarding the inherent nature and 
temperament of different levels of the administration within Bombay Province 
conditioned the extent to which reservations were introduced within the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Whilst the highest-level Provincial Services were governed 
by the rhetoric of state objectivity and non-interference in appointments, 
Subordinate and Inferior Services in Bombay were subjected to checks, balances 
and percentages so that all ‘communities’ received their ‘proper share’ of 
government jobs. And as it was these local-level civil servants through which the 
majority of ordinary society encountered the state, their recruitment on the basis 
of their right to community-defined reservations helped further shape how 
citizenship was conceptualised and enacted on an ‘everyday’ level. 
Chapter Five of this thesis focuses upon the everyday enumerative and 
classificatory practices of local census officials. It examines in particular the critical 
nature of the collection of data on citizens’ mother tongue at the 1951 Census 
ahead of linguistic reorganisation in western India during the forthcoming decade. 
Representations and petitions from ordinary members of society sent to the GOB 
and the GOI regarding the census often appealed to the state’s supposed 
impartiality and unimpeachable integrity in the collection of data, emphasising 
the enumerator’s role as one of hypothetical detachedness and disinterestedness. 
Indeed the collection of the vast majority of statistics on caste and religion in the 
census had been discontinued by the Congress government after independence, 
shifting instead (at least theoretically) to the gathering of class-based economic 
statistics. However, it was local census officials, often drawn from amongst 
ordinary members of the public, who acted as the intermediaries of the state in 
collecting and classifying this data. By focusing upon the manipulation of 
statistical and classificatory information in a number of contentious localities, 
situated in borderline areas between Gujarati-, Marathi-, and Kannada-speakers, 
this chapter demonstrates how local census officials often sought political, social 
and material advantage for themselves or their community in the returns. This 
had important implications for ‘minority’ interests and concerns at the census. 
The tribal communities of the Dangs, for example, saw their linguistic affinities 
become sites of contestation between proponents of Gujarat and Maharashtra, 
ensuring that the recording of their own tribal vernaculars in the record were to 
suffer as a result. Ordinary Indians’ ideas about citizenship were thus formulated 
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in the nexus between these local social tensions, which mapped on to the 
‘everyday’ machinations of the state, and appeals to its conjectural values and 
ideals. 
Despite appeals to the ultimate objectivity, egalitarianism and accountability of 
the upper echelons of the state, this thesis does not suggest that, at this level, the 
state was any less impervious to the interests of faction, group and community. 
Chapter Six of this thesis demonstrates the ways in which a north Indian 
majoritarianism pervaded the rhetoric and actions of leaders of the CHC and the 
GOI during this period, regardless of the egalitarian and secular principles upon 
which, they otherwise emphatically asserted, both the Indian state and their own 
values were theoretically predicated. Concentrating in particular upon Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s history of India, The Discovery of India, originally published in 1946, the 
chapter demonstrates how Nehru, as a Kashmiri Brahman residing in UP, 
approached the history of India from a particular regional perspective.109 It then 
goes on to interrogate the implicit dominance of a north Indian agenda in the 
efforts to introduce Hindustani (a language spoken across the north Indian 
Gangetic plains) as the lingua franca of the Congress organisation and the state. It 
suggests that whilst this was couched in the rhetoric of greater accountability on 
the part of the Congress towards the ‘masses’, the introduction of Hindustani 
within Bombay had the opposite effect. The rest of the chapter focuses upon the 
responses of both local state actors and the public in Bombay Province to these 
efforts. In these responses, much was made of the provincial state’s apparent 
obligations to privilege ‘locals’ in recruitment to the services. Newly conditioned 
by the gradual realisation of forms of self-government, they also came to be 
constructed in the language of local citizenship rights and interests.  
                                                          




2: Caste, Language and the State in Maharashtra 
‘It is obvious that for the working of the democratic process a minimum 
degree of homogeneity must exist in the primary units. Without such 
homogeneity the emotional response to a unit-area would be lacking, and 
in that event democratic forms must fail. It is necessary to insist on this 
great difference between the formation of administrative and regional 
units under non-democratic and under democratic forms of government’. 
Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad, Reorganization of States in India with 
Particular Reference to the Formation of Maharashtra (Bombay: Topiwalla 
Mansion, 1954), pp. 1-2.1 
............... 
This chapter provides a broad synopsis of the larger historical socio-political 
contexts and processes through which various constructions of citizenship 
developed in Maharashtra between the 1930s and 1950s. It suggests that the 
meaning of such regionally evocative terms as ‘Maratha’, ‘Marathi’ and 
‘Maharashtrian’ underwent decisive transformations in the transition between 
pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial states, and were variously transmitted, 
contested and claimed by different groups and ‘communities’. These 
developments served as the background against which Maharashtrians 
conceptualised and articulated their rights and sense of belonging in their 
interactions with local manifestations of the state. The chapter thus highlights the 
ways in which caste and language became intertwined with and central to 
expressions of ethnicity in the late nineteenth century, and then citizenship during 
the twentieth century, as control of the state in Maharashtra was transformed. 
The first section considers the development of a particular sense of place, 
patriotism or attachment to the locality during the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In doing so, it looks to circumvent the implication that it was 
the British colonial state’s structures and customs of governance alone that 
shaped ‘community’ consciousness in Maharashtra. It focuses in particular upon 
the development of ideas about who comprised the ‘Marathas’ or ‘Marathi-
speakers’, and notes the shift from its relative inclusivity under Shivaji’s Maratha 
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polity to a more hierarchical and reified ‘system’ under the eighteenth-century 
Peshwa. 
The second section begins with the formal annexation of the Maratha polity’s 
territories by the British East India Company (EIC) in 1818. It demonstrates the 
manner in which colonial and elite Brahman interests in Maharashtra coalesced 
around particular forms of colonial knowledge during the early nineteenth 
century. Brahmans thus came to dominate the growing notions of 
‘Maharashtrian-ness’, articulated through a novel Marathi-speaking public sphere 
linked to vernacular newspapers and publishing and, after the 1857 
Mutiny/Rebellion, early forms of oppositional politics. But this shift towards 
opposition amongst Brahmans in the aftermath of 1857 also encouraged the 
British Raj to look beyond the EIC’s erstwhile allies in an effort to reassert their 
authority. The idea of inherently loyal ‘martial races’ (such as the Marathas) as 
potential collaborators, was partly inspired by the rising tide of ethnography in 
the late nineteenth century. In the process, this section reveals how caste and 
language in Bombay came to be increasingly assimilated to ethnicity and race. 
This was not solely the preserve of British administrators. The section also touches 
upon similar invocations of race and nationality evident in the writings of 
Brahman Congressmen like M.G. Ranade and B.G. Tilak, and non-Brahman 
ideologues like Jotirao Phule. The emergence of a strong non-Brahman movement 
under Phule and then Shahu Maharaj, which contested the socio-political 
hegemony of Brahmans and their dominance over the articulation of a sense of 
Maharashtrian consciousness, forms the final point of analysis within this section. 
The third section (in tandem with the first two sections of Chapter Three) 
demonstrates how this Maharashtrian identity was further altered and modified 
in the context of the gradual devolution of power and the eventual achievement 
of independence during the twentieth century. In this sense, it focuses upon 
demands for linguistic reorganisation as a manifestation of this regionalism and 
provides the circumstantial backdrop against which the rest of this thesis’s 
chapters play out. The section begins by demonstrating the shift within Indian 
National Congress circles from support for linguistic reorganisation before 
independence to hesitation and avoidance of the issue in the aftermath of 
partition. This had much to do with the stress on national and developmental 
ideals. It then moves on to consider how both proponents and detractors of 
reorganisation framed their arguments in the context of citizenship rights and 
37 
 
notions of belonging, as is evident in the quotation drawn from the memorandum 
of supporters of Samyukta (‘united’) Maharashtra with which this chapter began. 
For these supporters regional consciousness became increasingly imbued with 
ideals of autonomy and democracy, as they anticipated swaraj (self-rule) and held 
provincial and national governments to account as rights-bearing citizens. 
 
2.1 The Pre-Colonial Maratha Polity 
The political and social horizons within which Marathi-speaking people acted, 
imagined their own possible freedom and contemplated their sense of belonging 
between the 1930s and 1950s, were embedded in linguistic and cultural worlds of 
considerable depth, duration and contestation. As Chris Bayly has pointed out, 
early Indian patriotisms were ‘active forces’ in the construction of later 
nationalisms, rather than simply ‘symbols to be reinvented at will’ by late colonial 
Indian nationalists.2 This section of the chapter will examine the creation of a 
conceptual realm of Marathas and Marathi-speakers during the pre-colonial 
period. This is not to argue that Maharashtra had a ‘natural’ unity or intrinsic 
‘nationhood’, or to anachronistically trace an unchanging and homogenised 
regional consciousness from the seventeenth century to the present day.3 Rather, 
by placing later claims and conflicts over access to state resources and citizenship 
rights within this wider context, this section seeks to avoid the argument that it 
was the British colonial state’s structures and its forms of recognition and 
adjudication alone that ultimately determined and constituted a sense of regional 
consciousness in Bombay Province.4 
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2.1 Meanings of ‘Maratha’ under Shivaji’s ‘Swaraj’ 
In the mid seventeenth-century, Marathi-speaking portions of the Indian 
subcontinent were under the control of various Muslim kingdoms with differing, 
contending, and often overlapping spheres of influence. In the south, east and 
west of the region, Sultanates based around the towns of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur 
and Golconda presided, paying nominal homage to the Mughal Empire in distant 
Delhi through an annual tribute, but continuing to act as independent kings within 
their own territories. In the northern domains of what would become 
Maharashtra, which constitute modern-day Khandesh and Vidarbha, the Mughals 
asserted a more direct authority from their Hindustan heartland. Both Sultan and 
Mughal, however, were reliant upon local elites in the countryside to buttress 
their power, as these deshmukhs (headmen of a group of villages) and patils 
(village headmen) became ‘middlemen’ tasked with maintaining the peace, 
collecting the state’s revenue and providing manpower for the kingly and imperial 
armies.5 
In the service of these kingdoms, these local intermediaries were able to advance 
through loyalty and military expertise or, conversely, factionalism and 
collaboration with an opposing power, depending upon the particular exigencies 
of the time.6 It was in such circumstances that Shivaji Bhosale (1630-1680), who 
had inherited his father’s rights at the behest of the Bijapur government in 1640, 
was able to begin to create an area of influence of his own.7 Over the next thirty 
years, Shivaji consolidated his own authority beyond his hereditary lands at the 
                                                          
5 The nature of the state in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century India has been a 
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Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983).  
6 This is an early example of what André Wink has termed ‘fitna’, the drawing 
away of allegiance or sedition. See, André Wink, Land and Sovereignty in India: 
Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth-Century Maratha Svarajya 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); see also, Norbert Peabody, Hindu 
Kingship and Polity in Precolonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 5-8. 
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expense of other landed families in the central plateau regions of western India 
known as the Deccan, and through skirmishes and battles with Bijapur, 
Ahmadnagar and the Mughals. In 1674, he was able to pronounce himself an 
independent ruler, and was crowned Chhatrapati (literally ‘paramount 
sovereign’). By the time of his death in 1680, Shivaji had left a ‘Maratha’ kingdom 
with a full treasury, and rights to revenue (albeit some rather tenuous) extending 
east and south into the Karnatak. 
There has been much debate on the kind of polity that Shivaji was creating in 
Marathi-speaking portions of western India over this half-century. Most notably, 
André Wink and Stewart Gordon have stressed the continuities between 
Mughal/Sultanate and Maratha policies, in an attempt to overcome the 
predilections of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Hindu nationalist writers and 
historians such as V.K. Rajwade, who have preferred to emphasise Shivaji’s role in 
creating a Hindu state as ‘something fundamentally different and in opposition to 
the Muslim states that surrounded it’.8 Instead, Gordon and Wink point to the 
similarities in administration and tax collection and continued Muslim 
employment at the court, as well as in Shivaji’s administration and army. For 
them, Shivaji, was not attempting to create a universal Hindu rule, nor did he 
‘represent “proto-nationalism”’.9 Meanwhile, whilst noting the validity of their 
evidence on administrative and governmental continuities, Chris Bayly has 
suggested Gordon and Wink have gone too far the other way in downplaying the 
‘ideological and affective components and context’ of state formation in 
seventeenth-century western India: 
‘To Wink, the idea of swarajya, “self-rule”, which in the nineteenth century 
was interpreted as Maratha “freedom”, is simply a technical Mughal 
revenue term meaning the home fiefdom of Shivaji and his successors. No 
greater ideological charge is inherent in it, and certainly not a popular 
one’.10 
By contrast, Bayly suggests that an early sense of patriotism coalesced in the 
seventeenth century around the establishment of a Maratha ‘patria’ and 
‘memorialised homeland’.11 The implication of Bayly’s argument (which also drew 
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upon the contentions of his previous article on ‘The Pre-History of 
“Communalism”’), is that a variety of ‘identities’ – national, communal, caste, 
class and linguistic – did not simply emerge as consequences of the colonial 
encounter.12 Simultaneously, however, Bayly went on to suggest that moments of 
state transformation were critical in explaining the consequent shifts in the nature 
of these ‘identities’. This sub-section likewise uses the background of the rise of a 
Maratha military service elite closely intertwined with the Maharashtrian land and 
the rural peasantry, as well as the particular case of Shivaji and the controversial 
matter of his coronation, to consider the stirrings of emerging ideas about who 
constituted the ‘Marathas’ or ‘Marathi-speakers’. But at the same time it avoids 
drawing too firm an analogy between these earlier notions of belonging in the 
pre-colonial seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and their colonial and then 
postcolonial incarnations. Although these ‘patterns of social relations, sentiments, 
doctrines and embodied memories’ were not akin to ‘nationalism’ as we know it 
today, they could be, at least to some extent, constructed around a particular 
sense of place or attachment to the locality.13 This starts to become apparent 
when we consider the manner in which the term ‘Maratha’ first emerged and was 
applied in western India. 
Since the fourteenth century, local military servicemen were frequently drafted 
into the armies of the Muslim dynasties in the Deccan. With only a small 
population of Muslims in the region, the Sultanates were reliant upon local elites 
to mobilise native Marathi-speaking military units, which were kept separate from 
‘Dakhani’ (Muslims born in India) and ‘Afagi’ (Muslim immigrants from Central 
Asia or Arabia) groups. The term ‘Maratha’ probably became the name of 
designation for these military servicemen gradually over time, and represented an 
amalgam of families from several artisanal and agricultural occupational statuses, 
many of which were considered socially low in status and esteem.14 Like the terms 
Rajput and Sikh in the north, Marathas came to be distinguished and 
differentiated from both ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ Muslims, stimulating the growing 
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perception that they entailed a homogeneous ‘community’ fighting as a group 
inside, and increasingly against, the Sultanates and Mughals.15 
By the seventeenth century, the term ‘Maratha’ had also come to signify the loose 
distinction of a military elite standing apart from those ordinary peasants from 
whence they had come, invoked most emphatically through patil and desmukh 
rights to shares in the revenue of the land. However, the ongoing conflicts and 
intrigues between different states and their local revenue-extracting 
intermediaries always provided opportunities for new headmen to emerge 
throughout this period, who were then able to lay claim to greater social worth 
and status. This continued to confuse any strictly delineated distinction between 
rights-holding Marathas and cultivating Kunbis or artisanal groups. As the colonial 
ethnographer R.E. Enthoven was to note at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, 
‘The differentiation between Marathas and Maratha Kunbis appears never 
to have become so complete as to result in two distinct castes. At present 
the terms Maratha and Kunbi, in many cases, are used synonymously ... 
Instances are not wanting, in which Kunbi families, owing to a fortunate turn 
in their circumstances, have formed connections with poor Maratha families 
and ultimately become absorbed into the general Maratha community’.16 
Whilst in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ‘caste’ had not yet become 
the reified, Brahmanic (i.e. dominated and defined by the ‘high-caste’ practices of 
the Brahman priestly elite) and hierarchical ‘system’ that was to emerge under 
the British Raj, much of western Indian society was becoming more ‘caste-like’ 
than in earlier times.17 This was a distinctively Maharashtrian process, which often 
came to be replicated in other regions of the subcontinent at a later date under 
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colonial rule.18 It was linked to the rise of Shivaji as a ‘royal man of prowess’, who 
‘made a conscious decision to use caste as a strategic asset, garbing himself in the 
trappings of Kshatriya [i.e. the ‘traditional’ ruling and martial elite] kingship as a 
means of stabilising his fortunes and those of his client groups’.19 At the same 
time, however, high office was offered to men of skill and loyalty, with little 
regard to their faith or formal ‘caste’ backgrounds – it was not, therefore, totally 
exclusionary. It is this relative openness that distinguishes these ‘caste-like’ forms 
and practices from later manifestations and developments beginning under the 
Peshwa and culminating in British colonial rule, whereby caste identities were 
conceptualised as hereditary and became linked to ethnicity and race. 
Bonds of affinity between leaders of warbands did not conform to priestly 
Brahmanic concepts of purity, those that criticised the shedding of blood and the 
veneration of warlike deities. Even into the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries, early Orientalist observers of the Marathas noted their distinctly un-
Brahmanical qualities. In 1798, the Irish soldier William Henry Tone argued that 
Brahmanical notions of caste purity ‘trespass[ed] upon convenience’ and ‘in a 
military point of view may be productive of the worst effects: from all these 
observances the Maratta is happily free’.20 Caste for the Maratha warrior and 
landholder in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was instead embodied 
within what Nicholas Dirks has seen in another context as the politics of kingship 
and service, with fluctuations in ‘caste-like’ identities prevalent amongst those 
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who fell in and out of royal favour.21 Notions of belonging to a community of 
Marathas were therefore augmented by the inclusive nature of Shivaji’s rule, in 
which careers were open to loyalty and talent – technically anyone could become 
a ‘Maratha’. 
Ultimately it was his coronation in 1674 which provided Shivaji with the authority 
of a thread-wearing Kshatriya king.22 It seems one of Shivaji’s foremost concerns 
in having himself crowned was to portray himself as a rightful ruler and forge his 
legitimacy in the eyes of other large landowning families in Maharashtra – hence 
the title ‘Chhatrapati’. This is corroborated by André Wink’s translation of the 
Sivdigvijaya (a chronicle of Shivaji’s life) on the coronation: 
‘Shivaji was unwilling to share the leadership of the Marathas with others, 
and although he had formerly been on one level with many other Maratha 
sardars as (mere) servants of Bijapur, he could justify his new claims to pre-
eminence amongst them by pointing out that this dependence, through his 
efforts, no longer existed’.23 
Emphasising his ‘Kshatriya-ness’, then, was a means of augmenting his local 
fortunes. But it was also a mechanism through which Shivaji could distinguish 
himself and his Maratha polity from the Muslim Sultanates and Mughals that had 
come before. Shivaji clearly existed in an Indo-Islamicate world, which influenced 
his style of dress, infused his language with Persian terms, and ensured that he 
patronised all religious traditions. He continued, then, many of the forms of 
Mughal rule and the symbols of Mughal office.24 Yet, whilst it is necessary to note 
that the ‘exaggerated hostility to Islam’ that both nineteenth-century and 
present-day Hindu nationalist advocates have ascribed to Shivaji is profoundly 
ahistorical, his coronation did provide an alternative image of resistance to 
Mughal authority. Cloaked in the regalia of a Hindu Kshatriya king, Shivaji 
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abandoned references to lineages stretching back to Timurid, Chinggis Khan, and 
Muhammad, which had been important Mughal and Indo-Islamic legitimising 
idioms over the past few centuries.25 Instead, he declared himself as a descendant 
of Rajput forebears, who had migrated south to escape Muslim invasion in the 
thirteenth century. This then was a novel realm, a Marathi-speaking realm, which 
developed over the next 144 years until the capitulation of the Maratha polity in 
1818. 
2.2 Patriotism in the Peshwa Period 
Shivaji’s coronation, however, brought other issues and concerns to the forefront 
of Maharashtrian politics and society. In Maharashtra, local Brahmanic ‘tradition’ 
held Kshatriya lineages had been destroyed by Parashurama, a warrior Brahman 
avatar of Vishnu, who had sought to avenge the death of his father at the hands 
of a Kshatriya king. This ‘tradition’ was accorded contemporary reality by local 
Brahmans, who saw in the Muslim rule over the Deccan from the fourteenth 
century evidence that Hindu kingly lineages had died out and lapsed, as Kshatriyas 
had been either killed in battle or emigrated further south.26 This was the 
‘kaliyuga’, the ‘Age of Kali’, referring to the final of the four ages in Hindu cyclical 
time, a degenerate and corrupt age, in which dharma (religious and moral 
‘natural’ law) was at its lowest ebb. It was often associated with ‘foreign’ (i.e. 
Muslim and later, British) rule, in which ‘traditional’ hierarchical social patterns 
were said to be inverted.27 In this context, Shivaji’s claims to Kshatriya status came 
under intense scrutiny from local Brahmans. He was perceived as merely a 
Shudra, meaning there could be no grounds for investing him with the sacred 
thread and ritual devices of a Kshatriya. Instead, Shivaji was to utilise pandit 
(Brahman scholar) networks from further afield, employing a Maharashtrian 
Brahman residing in Banaras, known as Gaga Bhatta, whose family had an all-India 
reputation for religious scholarship and public debate. The Bhattas had a long 
history of emphasising the social worth of the upwardly mobile and successful in 
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contemporary Indian society, and Gaga was able to ‘locate’ a Rajput lineage for 
Shivaji.28 
Shivaji’s coronation therefore also points towards the increased significance of 
Brahmans in legitimising kingly rule, especially as it came to encompass Hindu 
connotations with its linkages to Kshatriya genealogy. This sub-section will explore 
how Brahmanic conceptions of ‘rank and purity’ gradually came to the fore in 
Maharashtra, first by considering the rise of a Brahman service elite under the 
Sultanates and Mughals. It will touch upon the mechanisms and rhetorical tropes 
Brahmans used to maintain their elite social status, whilst they purged and 
refined the boundaries of Brahmanism itself. With temporal control coming to be 
vested ultimately in the figure of the Peshwa (the Brahman ‘prime minister’) by 
the early eighteenth century, a reified and hierarchical conception of ‘caste’ 
society was increasingly privileged at the expense of previously inclusive 
interpretations. The increased significance of Brahmans within the Maratha polity 
was to reshape and transform the transmission of patriotism in western India 
during this period, through which a growing emphasis upon Hinduism (with 
Marathas as ‘defenders of Hindustan’ against Muslim ‘outsiders’), and 
Brahmanism (as having a greater impact on state policy than non-Brahman 
‘upstarts’), progressively defined its character and scope. This is not to argue that 
the vision of a Kshatriya king determining the local social order was entirely 
overwhelmed: patriotism within the Maratha polity became a site of contestation 
during this period, broadly defined by two major divergent interpretations, based 
around contrasting social relations, sentiments and doctrines.29  
The recent works of Sumit Guha and Rosalind O’Hanlon have highlighted the 
processes by which the ascendancy of Brahmanism in western India was 
beginning to be firmly established through their roles as service elites under the 
Sultanates and Mughals in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, simultaneous to 
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the rise of the Marathas.30 The Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan inaugurated 
complex systems of governance which relied upon pre-existing literate members 
of the local population, employed to keep records of land ‘ownership’ and tax 
collection. Brahmans, as priests trained in the reading and writing of religious 
texts, occupied a position of key advantage to undertake these roles. The 
enticement of socio-economic opportunities meant Brahmans justified their 
service to mlecchas (‘foreigners’) and their abandonment of priestly occupations 
by inventing suitable textual authorities. Arguing that Brahmans of sufficient 
worth still existed in the kaliyuga to receive alms, and presenting the concerns of 
this world as part of their dharma as well, it was declared that Brahman’s highest 
destiny in this degenerate time was to be working within the administration, 
where they could still access pious gifts in the form of rights to substantial 
hereditary livings and lands (inams).31 From an early stage, Maharashtrian 
Brahmans therefore came to dominate the administration in the Deccan, 
providing a model to be emulated across southern India.32 
In a fluid and open pre-colonial setting, in which subordinate groups could claim 
superior status through administrative service, the Brahman literati sought to 
protect their interests and use their position for their own ends. Guha has 
documented how Brahmans had developed, from the fifteenth century onward, a 
priceless advantage as a barrier to any upwardly mobile scribal group in the 
Deccan, by writing all accounts and records in the Modi script, which was 
‘impenetrable to anyone not trained in it’.33 The theory that no Kshatriyas could 
exist in the kaliyuga was also employed by local Maharashtrian Brahmans as a 
mechanism to protect their administrative positions and deny ritual entitlements 
to the upwardly mobile scribal caste of Kayasthas, who had migrated into the 
Deccan from the north to serve Mughal and Sultan rulers.34 Those who held 
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administrative power thus sought to develop a homogenised image of the 
Brahman as a ‘cultivated administrator and dignified intellectual’.35 
After Shivaji’s death, the next forty years of the Maratha polity were wracked by 
familial disputes over his successor, as the court and landowning families with 
rural power-bases of their own divided amongst themselves.36 This was an era of 
increased Mughal influence in the Deccan, as Emperor Aurangzeb moved his 
capital south to Aurangabad, fought relentless campaigns and exhausted vast 
amounts of Mughal military and economic resources until his death in March 
1707.37 These years of conflict and intrigue were only ended with the 
consolidation of the Maratha polity under Shahu (r.1707-1749), Shivaji’s 
grandson, who filled the vacuum left by the decline of ephemeral Mughal 
authority. To aid the securing of his power, Shahu had appointed Balaji 
Vishwanath (Peshwa 1713-1720), a Chitpavan Brahman from the coastal Konkan 
region as his Peshwa, the first of what would become a hereditary title, and 
entrusted him with control of the Maratha army. By the 1720s, Balaji’s son Bajirao 
I (Peshwa 1720-1740) had become de facto ruler of the polity from his base in 
Pune, with Shahu’s authority confined solely to his palace at Satara. The most 
profound effect of the rise of the Peshwa ‘was widespread, rapid social mobility 
for Brahmins somehow connected to the polity. They became the administrators 
of the newly conquered regions as well as in the expanding bureaucracy at the 
centre’.38 Whilst these men were mainly Chitpavans, other Brahman communities 
such as Gaud Saraswats (originally from Goa) and Deshashtas (Deccan Brahmans) 
were often pressed into service too.39 It was Chitpavans, however, who were most 
obviously patronised, as the Peshwa made use of kin and caste networks to form 
the core of an administrative and tax-collecting elite, as well as promoting 
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Chitpavan banking families whose credit was crucial for funding Maratha military 
campaigns and the effective functioning of government. 
The increased prominence of Brahmans also lent a new conservative tone to the 
Maratha polity. Brahmans increasingly saw the state as representing their own 
community’s ‘Raj’, as the new central government in Pune sought to define and 
regulate the region’s Brahman communities in contradistinction to other social 
groups. As O’Hanlon and Minkowski have noted, the Peshwa ‘sought to shift the 
terms in which Maharashtra’s Brahmins were discussed, away from debates about 
the relative status of different Brahmin communities regionally defined, and 
towards a single and monolithic model of ideal Brahmin social practice’.40 
Supposedly rustic and plebeian countryside customs were to be prohibited, and 
individual Brahman identities (i.e. Chitpavan/Deshashta/Saraswat), whilst not 
suppressed, were to be potentially subsumed, particularly in relation to other 
castes, within an overarching and unitary Brahman identity.41 A ‘List of orders to 
establish dharma’, issued under Peshwa Balaji Bajirao in 1735, laid down 51 
central stipulations which sought to emphasise Brahmanic unity and their 
concomitant separateness from other castes. These included restrictions on inter-
dining, the prohibition of hard labour, and rules relating to female 
comportment.42 Simultaneously, Pune increasingly asserted its authority in the 
adjudication of ‘everyday’ ritual disputes and the maintenance of caste discipline, 
replacing independent neighbourhood assemblies with new panchayats, whose 
decisions needed verifying by the local Peshwa-employed state official.43 It was 
becoming increasingly commonplace for the Peshwa to demand that notions of 
loyalty and belonging be directed exclusively towards the central state, in 
preference to local allegiances and alliances. 
A sense of belonging to place in Maharashtra, in conjunction with eighteenth-
century Peshwa expansionism, thereby frequently became caught up with the 
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expansion of a Brahmanic Hinduism. Bajirao and his successors presided over a 
period of territorial expansion which culminated in the polity reaching its greatest 
territorial extent in 1798, reaching beyond Marathi-speaking portions of the 
Indian subcontinent to incorporate regions as distant as Delhi in the north, and 
Cuttack in the east. The Maratha state could be seen as a protector of dharma 
and Brahmans, with expansion and warfare justified on the basis of the Maratha 
‘defence’ of Hindustan from the depredations of Muslim ‘invaders’.44 This was 
part of a wider notion of national belonging to a ‘common realm of India’ – 
Maratha documents of the 1750s, for instance, ‘stated that the Persian and 
Afghan invasions of India were illegitimate because the kings of Iran and Turan 
“have never held dominion within Hindustan”’.45 Likewise, during the eighteenth 
century, the Chitpavan Peshwas marked themselves out as patrons of supra-local 
Brahmanical worship and learning, sponsoring the building of temples, bathing 
ghats and rest houses in Banaras and embarking upon supra-regional pilgrimage.46  
Such patronage, however, was not linked solely to Brahmans. From her seat of 
authority in Indore, the Maharashtrian Dhangar queen Ahilyabai Holkar also 
sponsored festivals and gave pious donations to many Hindu temples all the way 
from the Himalayas to the southern peninsular. As the Maratha polity expanded, 
the Peshwas became increasingly reliant on military middlemen, such as the 
Holkars, the Shindes at Gwalior, the Bhonsles of Nagpur, and the Gaikwars of 
Baroda. These elite Maratha and Dhangar families had been granted land 
amongst the newly-annexed territories, and had gradually built up large local 
power bases and resources through regular administrations, which included tax 
collection and judicial functions. By the late-eighteenth century, shifts in power 
from the Peshwa court at Pune to the peripheries ensured that ‘the tail was 
wagging the dog’.47 Many of these leaders opposed Chitpavan dominance of the 
governmental apparatus, and made conscious efforts to avoid employing them in 
their services. In Indore and Gwalior, the Holkars and Shindes utilised Saraswats 
as their administrators, a Brahman sub-caste who did not intermarry with 
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Chitpavans. In Baroda and Nagpur, the Gaikwar and Bhonsle rulers preferred 
Kayasthas.48 They could also, and frequently did, ally with alternative powers, 
such as the Nizam of Hyderabad and the EIC based at Bombay. Whilst these 
autonomous dynasties did on occasions make use of Hindu legitimising strategies, 
such as the sponsoring of temples and pilgrimages, they were therefore often 
avowedly anti-‘Brahman Raj’.  
Rather than treating the eighteenth century as a period of uncontested Brahman 
supremacy within the Maratha polity, it might be more worthwhile to consider it 
as an era of conflicting, overlapping spheres of authority. This complexity is 
mirrored in the ‘looser, cascading political structures’ of the Maratha polity, in 
which the concept of boundaries proves to be of little utility.49 In a system where 
rights over revenue interpenetrated, and rulers’ legitimising strategies diverged 
depending upon their particular context, notions of allegiance and belonging 
could differ, but also intermingle and blur. On occasions, the Marathas emerged 
as ‘defenders’ of Hindustan. At other times a sense of loyalty and belonging to a 
Marathi-speaking community could retreat into more localised understandings, or 
be related to the particular concerns of non-Brahman Marathas in opposition to 
Brahmanic hegemony. A sense of patriotism in western India had therefore begun 
to develop in the interstices between antagonistic segmentary states and 
competition for control within them, in which distinctions made on the basis of 
‘caste’ often proved critical. 
 
2.2 The Colonial State, Caste and Language in Maharashtra, 1818-1918 
The advent of British rule in 1818 had a transformative impact upon patriotism, 
caste and language in western India, widening competition to control their 
meanings in the context of colonial forms of knowledge and governance. This 
section begins by considering how the extension of EIC control across much of 
western India and their preference for particular understandings of Indian society 
initially consolidated the power of Maharashtra’s Brahmans. As the primary 
indigenous clients through which the colonial state was able to engage with the 
wider public, Brahmans were to promote depictions of Maharashtrian society 
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which emphasised caste’s hierarchical and reified nature. Yet colonial knowledge 
was neither monolithic nor static. Particularly in the aftermath of 1857, Brahmans 
were disparaged and described as the subversive element behind the Uprising. 
Colonial attentions shifted towards venerating the martial and kingly prowess of 
the Marathas as a potentially ‘loyal’ community, culminating in an alliance with 
the non-Brahman princely ruler of Kolhapur, Shahu Maharaj. In many ways, these 
colonial preferences mapped onto older antagonisms within Maharashtrian 
society. But in the context of the growing efficacy of ethnographical classifications 
for colonial knowledge in India, they also came to be increasingly refracted 
through the paradigms of ‘race’ and ethnicity. In the process, Marathi-speaking 
patriotisms were transformed into Maharashtrian nationalisms. 
2.2.1 The British and the Brahmans in Bombay 
As the British EIC attained political ascendancy in western India in the early 
nineteenth century, the new imperatives of internal pacification and revenue 
extraction required a greater knowledge of local Indian societies. Preferences for 
particular interpretations of Indian society and the search for potential 
collaborators drew upon both the necessities of control and early articulations of 
the ‘civilising mission’ ideology. Whilst, as we shall see, colonial understandings of 
Indian society were never monolithic, there was a distinct tendency to privilege 
what Susan Bayly has defined as ‘exalted qualities of industry, sobriety and thrift’ 
which were found within Brahmanic ‘caste-based’ norms.50 This promoted an 
ordered and settled society, to be controlled and taxed through indigenous high-
caste intermediaries, in preference to the insecurities and practical difficulties 
that accompanied attempts to control itinerant arms-bearing groups. These 
Brahman collaborators, then, acted as the primary clients through whom the EIC 
was able to engage with the wider Indian public. Concerned with protecting their 
own privileged positions, many were to promote depictions of Maharashtrian 
society that emphasised caste’s hierarchical and reified nature.51  
The framing of codes of Hindu civil law serves as one such example. Thought to be 
congruent with indigenous traditions and institutions, they also simultaneously 
took into account British ideas of ‘justice’, ‘proper discipline’ and correct judicial 
                                                          
50 S. Bayly, Caste, Society and Politics, p. 83. 
51 David Washbrook, ‘Economic Depression and the Making of “Traditional” 




procedure.52 However, the British presumption that supposedly pre-existing 
Indian ‘codes’ could be readily extrapolated into the colonial legal apparatus 
proved problematic. For example, Arthur Steele’s The Law and Custom of Hindoo 
Castes, first published in 1826, suggested a primarily textual basis for Hindu law 
within the Deccan. These works and their interpretations were authored almost 
entirely by learned Brahman pandits (scholars with knowledge of the classical 
Hindu scriptures), and it was therefore almost inevitable that for Steele the law 
would be based around a ‘caste system’, which ‘was founded on the supremacy of 
the Brahmun Caste, and the ignorance and dependence of the others’.53 Local 
customs and traditions that diverged from the supposed Brahmanic textual 
‘orthodoxy’ were to be disregarded. 
Brahman ascendancy existed behind a smokescreen of British liberalism – 
seemingly providing equal access to education, whilst widening opportunities for 
administrative and political power amongst previously marginalised social groups, 
in reality it created prospects primarily for those who could already read and 
write.54 The Bombay Government’s implicit stress on a Brahmanic Hinduism, 
coupled with, ‘The old association of the higher castes with the skills of literacy[,] 
gave them a much greater flexibility and readiness to exploit these new 
possibilities than was possessed by any of western India’s agricultural or urban 
lower castes’.55 In 1884, for example, out of 109 students in the Deccan College at 
Poona, 107 were Brahmans, despite the fact they constituted only four per cent of 
the population in the region.56 Similar statistics reflected the composition of the 
provincial administrative services. In 1887 the Public Services Commission found 
that 41.25 per cent of the deputy collectors, 75.5 per cent of the mamlatdars 
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(administrative heads of sub-districts), and 70 out of 104 subordinate judges were 
Brahmans in the Bombay Presidency.57 As Veena Naregal has succinctly put it, 
‘The reification of group boundaries under colonial influence counteracted the 
transfer of modern egalitarian possibilities through pedagogy’.58 
Under British colonial rule, Marathi was homogenised and systematised by 
missionaries, orientalists, and their indigenous informants, who sought to remedy 
what they saw as a complete dearth of suitable reading material in the vernacular. 
A unified, standard Marathi promised much for the growing reception of 
Maharashtrian patriotism. Through the patronage of institutions such as the 
Bombay Native Education Society, a standardised grammar, syntax and style for 
Marathi was developed during the early nineteenth century, and embedded 
within a bilingual educational policy. A distinctive Marathi ‘public sphere’ 
emerged, in which ‘vernacular intellectuals’ such as Krishnashastri Chiplunkar 
(1824-1876) and Balshastri Jambhekar (1812-1846) ‘were engaged in rendering 
important texts and ideas of political economy into Marathi’.59 Yet initial access to 
these ‘modern’ ideas and discourses was dependent upon an individual’s 
proficiency in English, and hence it was educated Brahmans who controlled and 
directed the attendant growth in Marathi prose and patriotic cultural productions. 
By the 1870s, the Brahman intelligentsia was ‘articulating a collective self-identity 
of the Marathi people’, in which only they would have the right to ‘speak on 
behalf’ of the entire Marathi-speaking community.60 The monthly Nibandhmala 
(‘A Garland of Essays’), for example, edited by Krishnashastri’s son, Vishnushastri 
Chiplunkar (1850-1882), asserted an exclusive upper-caste claim to define the 
boundaries of vernacular textuality. 
Despite the initial preference shown towards Brahmans by the colonial state in 
Maharashtra, the British also worried about their previous loyalties towards the 
recently deposed Peshwa. Before 1857, the growing influences of utilitarianism 
and Protestant evangelicalism had allowed the concept of a seditious, immoral 
and oppressive Brahmanism to gather increased favour, linked to Western ideas 
‘of a priest-ridden, tyrannised papist Europe awaiting liberation by the triumph of 
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the Reformation spirit’.61 In the aftermath of the 1857 Uprising, British 
perceptions of Brahmans in Maharashtra shifted further – they became the 
‘seditious nationalists’ who were ‘to be neutralised through the patronage of 
client “non-Brahman” political collaborators’.62 Sir Richard Temple (Governor of 
Bombay, 1877-1880), for example, was to argue that Maharashtra’s community of 
Chitpavan Brahmans shared ‘a national and political ambition’ that it was 
impossible, whether ‘by way of education, emolument, or advancement in the 
public service’ for the colonial authorities to satisfy.63 
Partly in response to this shift in colonial rhetoric, the second half of the 
nineteenth century saw the progressive rise of early assertions of oppositional 
politics in western India. Indigenous organisations which aimed at directing and 
influencing the British government now began to contest the legitimacy and 
actions of the colonial state.64 The Poona Sarvajanik Sabha (People’s Service 
Society), founded in the early 1870s, petitioned the Bombay government on a 
number of issues, including reforming the legislatures and the widening of Indian 
access to the civil service. But it also took up subjects that were related more 
directly to an older Maharashtrian patriotism, being organised originally to lobby 
for the reform and replacement of the supposedly corrupt and inefficient 
management of the Parvati temple at Poona, which had strong historical 
connections with the Peshwa rulers.65 However, these early upper-caste reformist 
organisations, founded on their control over sites of cultural production and their 
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pre-eminence within spheres of representative political association, had a limited 
ability to enunciate an inclusive discourse: two out of every three of the 125 
people who served on the Sabha’s management committee between 1878 and 
1897 were Chitpavan Brahmans.66 
In its early years, the Sabha was associated in particular with the jurist M.G. 
Ranade (1842-1901), who was at the forefront of attempts to invoke a liberal, all-
Indian interpretation of a united Maharashtrian past. As noted in the first section 
of this chapter, in the pre-colonial period the term ‘Maratha’ could be applied 
narrowly, referring to an exclusivist interpretation which defined a 
military/administrative elite. But we also considered how it could be applied more 
flexibly, to all Marathi-speakers who fought in Sultanate, Mughal and Shivaji’s 
armies. Under the British, these coterminous, yet ambiguous meanings were now 
‘ethnicised’, and linked to colonial ideas of heredity and ‘race’, thereby 
transforming a patriotism based primarily around language into an ethno-
linguistic nationalism instead. Many nineteenth-century colonialists were prone to 
describing the Marathas more broadly in such racial language, particularly in the 
context of growing interest in ethnological race science both at home and in the 
‘Indian laboratory’.67 Classificatory and enumerative procedures introduced under 
Victorian-era imperial rule came to define Marathas afresh as a caste of the 
‘national’ type. Likewise, in an attempt to diminish contemporary caste 
antagonisms and questions over Brahman dominance of the political and 
administrative scene, Ranade was to pick up on this language in his own discourse 
on the cohesive and harmonious nationhood achieved by the Maratha ‘race’. This 
was a result of an alliance between Brahmans, Marathas, and other regionally-
based jatis throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 
‘The foundation was laid broad and deep in the hearts of the whole people. 
Unlike the Subhedarships of Bengal, Karnatak, Oudh, and Hyderabad, the 
rise of the Maratha Power was due to the first beginnings of what one may 
call the process of nation-making ... It was the upheaval of the whole 
population, strongly bound together by the common affinities of language, 
race, religion and literature, and seeking further solidarity by a common 
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independent political existence ... It was a national movement, or upheaval 
in which all classes co-operated’.68 
The period of Maratha suzerainty thus foregrounded Ranade’s own personal 
predilections as a reformist Brahman with strong loyalties to both Maharashtra 
and a wider Indian nation. Other interpretations also emphasised the importance 
of ‘Maharashtra desh [i.e. native land]’ through a nationalist idiom, but chose to 
place greater emphasis on Brahman power to counter growing low-caste critiques 
of Brahman dominance.69 Brahmanic assertiveness in the writing of 
Maharashtrian history was embodied most emphatically in the works of V.K. 
Rajwade (1863-1926) and the ‘Poona School’ of Marathi political history during 
this period. Rajwade, inspired by Vishnushastri Chiplunkar’s call for a history of 
Maharashtrian power and national pride, was to give to Marathi historiography a 
‘modern philosophical basis and method’, based upon European models.70 His 
interpretation of the Maratha polity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
emphasised an active, anti-Muslim and orthodox Hinduism based around 
Brahman precepts and concerns: 
‘If truth be told, during Aurangzeb’s reign ... like the Marathas, other regions 
of Hindustan too should have rebelled, established Swarajya and protected 
cows and Brahmans. But this did not happen because these people did not 
embody the necessary and exalted qualities of unity and leadership ... so the 
leaders in Maharashtra sought to liberate [other regions of India] from 
Muslim clutches ... This was the principal motive underlying the Maratha 
expansion across India after 1720’.71 
Marathas, under the influence of Brahmans and providing plentiful illustrations of 
pious religiosity, were an example to be emulated by the rest of the subcontinent. 
Just as Brahman-dominated Marathi historiography emphasised regional 
imperatives for all-India contexts, the early Indian National Congress was 
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dominated by Brahman leaders from Marathi-speaking Bombay, whose ‘regional 
alignments affected their national strategies’.72 Nowhere was this more evident 
than in factional disputes between Maharashtrian ‘Moderates’ and ‘Extremists’, 
which pervaded the annual Congress sessions during the 1890s and 1900s. 
Founded in 1885, throughout this formative period many of the Congress’s most 
important leaders came from either Bombay City or nearby Poona – the Poona 
Sarvajanik Sabha now operated as a provincial wing of the Congress organisation. 
At first, under the tutelage of Ranade and his successor, G.K. Gokhale (1866-
1915), the Sabha was a paradigm of ‘Moderate’ opinion, mirroring the Congress’ 
early concerns to extract greater shares in government for an educated Indian 
elite. Gokhale came to be recognised by the British as an important Congress 
spokesperson, cultivating a position as perceived broker between government 
and people by acting as Lord Minto’s confidante ahead of the 1909 Morley-Minto 
reforms.73 By 1895, however, the Sabha had been ‘captured’ by B.G. Tilak (1856-
1920), who had consolidated ‘anti-reform’ Brahman opinion in Maharashtra 
during the 1880s by denouncing government interference in indigenous social and 
cultural issues.74 
As Vishnushastri Chiplunkar’s ideological successor, Tilak was to combine 
Brahmanic social conservatism, radical anti-colonial nationalism and popular 
appeals to Maharashtrian patriotism through his Kesari (Marathi) and Mahratta 
(English) newspapers. Generally credited in nationalist historiography as India’s 
first ‘popular’ national leader, Tilak recognised ‘the decisive importance of the 
symbolic manipulation of the avenues for publicity within modern politics’.75 
Besides newspapers, the Ganapati utsava (a festival in honour of the Hindu deity 
Ganesh celebrated with particular vigour in Maharashtra) and Shivaji jayanti (birth 
anniversary celebrations of Shivaji) ‘captured’ the ‘imagination’ of Tilak, who saw 
the ‘potential’ of the festivals for stimulating mass national consolidation through 
symbols of regional unity and belonging.76 The performative spectacles (songs, 
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dramas and dances) that encompassed these festivities from the 1890s 
encouraged Maharashtrians beyond the high-caste, middle-class dominated 
literary spheres and debating chambers of the Congress to take part in 
celebrations of their heritage and display an active interest in contemporary 
political themes and nationalist rhetoric. 
2.2.2 Phule’s Bahujan Samaj and Shahu’s Non-Brahmans 
Yet for these subaltern groups, their participation in such festivities may have 
invoked patriotic longings far removed from the prerogatives of educated 
Brahman elites. Lower-castes in Maharashtra did not easily identify with either 
the ‘public’ as defined by upper-caste vernacular intellectuals, nor early assertions 
of Congress nationalism linked to Brahman privilege and concerns.77 Awareness of 
Brahmanic hegemony over indigenous cultural spheres and institutions, political 
associations, and the low-level governmental apparatus of the colonial state, 
combined with emphasis on Shivaji’s non-Brahman status as a Kshatriya warrior-
king, to invoke a Maharashtrian patriotism far removed from the Brahman-
inspired stress on national unity. This sub-section traces these ideas in the 
writings and actions of two prominent non-Brahman ideologues, Jotirao Phule 
(1827-1890) and Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj (1874-1922). 
From the late eighteenth century, as the EIC re-invented itself as a patron of 
indigenous learning, European Orientalists such as William Jones (1746-1794) and 
Henry Colebrooke (1765-1837) began to learn Sanskrit and access Brahmanical 
tradition. These administrators-cum-scholars were to ‘discover’ in Brahmanic 
textual sources a common cultural heritage between European and Indo-Aryan 
‘races’, who had spread from an ancient Central Asian homeland into Europe, 
Persia and South Asia.78 Jones, for example, was to delineate from his reading of 
the Vedas a history of the penetration of Brahmanism into India. His writings 
therefore ‘gave rise to the powerful and far-reaching myth of an ancient invasion 
of the subcontinent by “tribes” of the so-called Aryan race’, who brought with 
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them the fourfold varna scheme embedded within the laws of Manu (a ‘divine’ 
legislator).79 The descendants of these ancient ‘fair-skinned’ Aryans in India, linked 
as they were in historic kinship with Europeans, were to be deemed heirs to a 
civilisational ‘golden-age’ in the subcontinent.80 
Orientalist thinking on the philological antecedents of Sanskrit provided the 
historical context for the increased ethnicisation of caste and language with the 
advent of a new ‘scientific’ and evolutionary anthropology in India towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. Under the work of Herbert Hope Risley (1815-
1911), Aryans were classified at the top of a hierarchy of seven racial ‘types’ as 
the most ‘advanced’ of Indians, with ‘pre-Aryan’ aboriginals and Dravidians as the 
most ‘primitive’.81 A hierarchical and stratified caste ‘system’, in this particular 
interpretation (albeit one of many), was an ‘evolutionary weapon’ to maintain 
racial ‘purity’ through processes of exclusion and ritual distance.82 Caste and 
varna distinctions were thereby linked to racial and ethnic differences, as pre-
Aryan Indians were primarily incorporated into the ‘system’ as lowly Shudras or 
left outside as ‘untouchables’. The ideological content of patriotism was thus 
transformed anew in this period, as more intrusive analyses and ‘surveys’ of 
Indian society on the basis of ethnography and linguistic geography were 
introduced, and as state institutions were developed and reformed within a 
‘nationalist’ framework. 
Indians themselves soon came to employ and express various interpretations of 
the Aryan race theory, perhaps most famously in the formation and growth of the 
Hindu ‘revivalist’ Arya Samaj, which sought to restore a ‘fallen’ Hinduism to its 
ancient purity through reform. In Maharashtra, Bal Gangadhar Tilak focused on 
the vitality and strength of the Aryans in invading and conquering India from what 
he perceived to be their ‘Arctic homelands’, as an example of vigour, virility and 
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superior ‘nationhood’.83 However, a polemical pavada (ballad) by Jotirao Phule 
entitled ‘A Ballad of the Raja Chhatrapati Shivaji Bhosale’ and published in 1869, 
was to turn Brahman pride in their perceived Aryan heritage on its head. Phule a 
low-caste reformer from the Mali (gardener) caste, had been enrolled at a school 
in Pune run by missionaries from the Free Church of Scotland during the 1840s. In 
1847, influenced by the lives and writings of Shivaji, George Washington and 
Thomas Paine, as well as Brahman critiques of British rule, Phule and some friends 
had become involved in anti-British activity. By the following year, however, 
Phule’s emphasis had shifted away from confrontation with the colonial 
authorities to indigenous social and religious reform, particularly on attitudes 
towards low-castes and women. His biographers put this shift down to a closer 
reading of Paine’s work, and his removal from a Brahman friend’s marriage 
procession by other guests on their realisation that he was a lowly Mali.84 
In ‘A Ballad of the Raja Chhatrapati Shivaji Bhosale’, Phule inverted late 
nineteenth-century British and Brahman interpretations of the racial and ethnic 
ascendancy of descendants of high-caste ‘Aryans’.85 In this interpretation, India’s 
civilisational ‘golden age’ was re-envisaged as occurring in an idyllic pre-Aryan 
period of Kshatriya supremacy, under the rule of the mythical King Bali. ‘Phule 
supported this interpretation by deriving the term Kshatriya from the Marathi 
word kshetra, a field or place’, in which Kshatriya ‘denoted all those living 
peaceably together on the land before the arrival of the Brahman invaders’.86 
‘Kshatriya-ness’ was thus delinked from its religious connotations, in which 
Brahman priests and scholars were necessary in the bestowing of such status. In 
this context, Phule could invoke Shivaji’s own struggle to be recognised as a 
Kshatriya kingly-warrior in the seventeenth century, both as a mechanism through 
which the lower castes could claim their old identity as Kshatriyas, and as an 
inheritance of King Bali’s leadership of the lower castes and protection of the land 
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from foreign ‘invaders’. Shivaji, Bali, and more generally the Kunbi/Kshatriyas, in 
Phule’s interpretation, became the paradigmatic symbols of Maharashtra’s rural 
and martial culture and tradition. 
Rather than emphasising Shivaji’s role as the protector of cows and Brahmans 
(like Rajwade), or as the creator of an independent and unified ‘Hindu’ kingdom 
(in a similar way to Ranade), the ballad prefers to concentrate on the glorious 
military past of Maharashtra’s lower castes. Phule’s interpretation then, was to 
foreground the patriotism of non-Brahmans who as ‘the common man, the soldier 
and the tiller of the soil’ could legitimately express real loyalty and devotion to 
Maharashtra ‘as the original master[s] of the land’.87 This discourse, as we will 
see, fed into ideas about citizenship in Maharashtra during debates over the 
linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries.88 The Aryan 
invasion myth was now invoked by Phule to downplay the affinities of Brahmans 
to Maharashtra as ‘aliens’ who had subjugated the indigenous natives. But it also 
served to establish an ethno-linguistic base for the unity of Maharashtrians 
(excluding Brahmans), evident in the phrase ‘Bahujan Samaj’ (‘people in the 
majority’) as it was popularised in the early twentieth century under the auspices 
of the Satyashodhak Samaj (Truth Seekers’ Society).89 
The Satyashodhak Samaj, formed by Phule in 1873, was to become the premier 
non-Brahman social-religious reform organisation in western India during this 
period. Its emergence coincided with the formation of the Pune Sarvajanik Sabha 
and the Marathi literary renaissance, whilst the next forty years of its history 
existed parallel to the rise of the Congress in Maharashtra’s urban centres and the 
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advent of Tilak’s mass nationalist politics. Its history, and its invocation of regional 
patriotism, must therefore be considered in the context of growing nationalist 
demands amongst an English-speaking, middle-class Brahman elite. The Samaj’s 
support at this time was concentrated amongst peasants and cultivating tenants 
in the Maharashtrian mofussil (the rural hinterland), who it put forward as the 
true inheritors of Maharashtra’s traditions and cultures. It used popular forms like 
pavadas and abhangs (hymns) to universalise Phule’s non-Brahmanism, and made 
efforts to encourage the undertaking of religious ceremonies without the 
intercession of the bhats (a derogatory term for Brahman priests).  
The Samaj, however, was to bifurcate into two distinctive ideological/social 
strands within its organisation during this period, which reflected this chapter’s 
earlier emphasis on the ambiguous meanings of the term ‘Maratha’. One, 
considered by historians as ideologically ‘anti-Brahman’ because of its rejection of 
caste in its entirety, continued to foreground ‘Phule’s assertion of mass equality 
and brotherhood of indigenous non-Aryan peoples’; the other, described instead 
as ‘non-Brahman’ because of its implicit support for a hierarchical, and reified 
caste ‘system’, involved elite Marathas claiming Kshatriya status to distinguish 
themselves from the Kunbis as Shudras.90 Krshnarao Bhalekar, an active 
participant in the Satyashodhak Samaj, was to comment on this ‘chaotic variation’ 
within the non-Brahman movement in the Din Mitra newspaper in July 1888: 
‘Some claim that we all have a right to wear the sacred thread; others 
dispute whether it should be worn around the neck or the loins; some say, 
we do our marriages with Vedic rituals, and others say we should use 
puranic texts; others still condemn both as just another excuse for 
Brahmans to fatten themselves. Some ask what is the use of sacred verses 
and the sacred fire in the marriage rite, and say that it is all an empty game 
[etc] ... ’.91 
Historians have tended to personify these two strands within the non-Brahman 
movement through the lives of two prominent Maharashtrian individuals – first 
with Phule, and then corresponding to the later emergence of the Indian ruler of 
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the princely state of Kolhapur, Shahu Maharaj (r.1894-1922).92 Shahu, as a direct 
descendant of Shivaji, had become increasingly involved in the non-Brahman 
movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of his own 
personal troubles regarding his claims to Vedic rights as a Kshatriya king during 
religious ceremonies. At first, Shahu was primarily concerned with emphasising 
the ‘purity’ of his own lineage, but the course of events was to radicalise his 
thinking. Unlike Phule, however, he sought to concentrate upon the ‘Kshatriya-
ness’ of Marathas as evidence of their ‘Aryan’ descent. Simultaneously, Shahu’s 
emphasis was more firmly upon providing avenues for non-Brahmans to access 
the resources of the state, rather than socio-religious reform. 
In July 1902, Shahu introduced an ordinance which reserved at least half of the 
bureaucratic posts within the state for non-Brahmans, paving the way for him to 
preside over a complete change in the caste composition of his services.93 Upon 
Shahu’s accession in 1894, 85.5 per cent of the 124 administrators were 
Brahmans. By 1922, however, at the time of Shahu’s death, 71 per cent of the 238 
administrators were non-Brahmans.94 This was to embitter relations between the 
Maharaja and Brahmans not only within his state, but more widely across western 
India. Antagonism between nationalist Brahmans and Shahu also emerged in the 
context of the support Shahu received from the British government, as a potential 
shield against the mounting and more militant Indian nationalism in western India 
under the auspices of B.G. Tilak. The Raj sought to hijack non-Brahmans’ sense of 
patriotic loyalty to the Maharajah as a direct descendant of Shivaji and thereby 
circumvent Tilak’s populist appeals. The alliance also provided immense benefit to 
Shahu in his efforts to overcome Brahmanic dominance within his state, a matter 
which the British watched with interest and were to emulate with the 
introduction of reservations in the administration for ‘Backward’ classes in 1925.95 
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2.3 Linguistic Reorganisation and the Transition from Subjecthood to 
Citizenship, 1919-1956 
The last paragraph of the preceding section of this chapter begins to hint at 
another period of historical transformation in Maharashtra, which had already 
begun to emerge in the late nineteenth century but was to accelerate in the 
aftermath of the Great War. This was the shift towards greater rights and 
representation for Indians within the colonial bureaucracy and the electoral arena 
which, although tied into colonial efforts to bolster their dwindling authority and 
counteract growing support for the anti-colonial nationalist movement, was (at 
least rhetorically) justified in the language of greater ‘self-governance’. As the 
subcontinent inched towards swaraj (self-rule), Indian subjects became 
increasingly interested in anticipating their potential rights and statuses within a 
variety of differently defined state spaces. And after independence in 1947, newly 
defined citizens looked to hold postcolonial provincial and all-India governments 
to account for their ostensible commitments and principles. The construction and 
anticipation of citizenship thus came to inflect a whole host of older regional, 
caste and other ‘community’ identities in novel ways. How these developments 
played out will be dealt with in much greater detail in the rest of this thesis. This 
section, however, looks to focus upon the shifting context in which provincial 
forms of self-government linked to linguistic reorganisation were anticipated and 
achieved, and around which the selection of Congress candidates for election 
(Chapter Three), state recruitment to the bureaucracy (Chapter Four), 
classificatory and enumerative procedures at the decennial census (Chapter Five), 
and the reaction to efforts to introduce Hindi/Hindustani as an official provincial 
language in Bombay (Chapter Six) now coalesced. 
2.3.1 The Congress, Independence and Reorganisation 
British Bombay was a polyglot province, broadly split into Gujarati-speakers 
residing in the northern districts, Marathi-speakers in the central districts, and 
Kannada-speakers in the southern districts. At its Nagpur Session in December 
1920, the Congress had gone some way towards attempting to rectify this 
perceived problem by reorganising its Provincial Congress Committees (PCCs) on 
the basis of language, as a precursor to an analogous commitment to the 
reorganisation of the state’s provincial administrative boundaries after the 
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achievement of independence.96 These organisational changes were justified on 
the basis of the Congress’s greater ‘representativeness’ and ‘accountability’ in 
comparison to the Raj. Such rhetoric also shaped the recommendations contained 
within the Nehru Report of 1928, the first Indian effort at a potential constitution 
drafted by two eminent lawyers from the United Provinces (UP), the Liberal T.B. 
Sapru and the Congressman Motilal Nehru. The Report suggested a number of 
problems inherent within multilingual and multicultural provinces where English 
also served as the language of administration: 
‘As long as provincial legislatures consist of representatives of different 
cultures, races with their different viewpoints and interests and carry on 
their deliberations in a language which most of the people outside do not 
understand, responsible Government must necessary be a farce’.97 
Simultaneously, however the Report also warned about the potentially divisive 
effects of the further devolution of power to the provinces, which threatened to 
tamper with the growth of an Indian ‘national’ consciousness. The influence of 
Motilal’s son, Jawaharlal, can be seen in the fresh emphasis also placed upon 
economic considerations, whereby reorganisation was seen to potentially menace 
‘the organic cohesion of an economic area by dividing it according to lines of 
language’.98 These two contradictory constituents of nationalist thought in 
relation to regional sentiments continued to exist in an uneasy relationship for the 
remainder of the colonial period. In October 1937 the Congress reiterated its 
commitment to linguistic reorganisation in an AICC resolution calling upon the 
Bombay and Madras Governments to consider the formation of separate 
Karnataka and Andhra provinces.99 But in January 1939, responding to the 
‘Bengali-Bihari controversy’ over the delineation of administrative boundaries, the 
Congress Working Committee (CWC) emphasised that ‘the idea of a common 
nationality and the common background of our cultural and historical inheritance 
must always be encouraged, so that India should become a free and strong nation 
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built upon a unity of purpose and aim’.100 It was necessary in the circumstances to 
‘discourage all separatist tendencies and narrow provincialism’.101 
In the aftermath of independence and partition, it was the concern over the 
divisive tendencies perceived to be inherent within demands for provincial 
reorganisation that achieved ascendancy over all other interpretations amongst 
the Congress High Command (CHC) at the centre. Partition ensured that for the 
next thirteen years the increasingly vociferous demands for the creation of a 
unilingual Maharashtra were rejected as damaging to Indian unity. So, for 
example, in July 1948 the Indian Minister for Industry and Supply, Syama Prasad 
Mookerjee, sent a letter to the Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, in which he 
commented, 
‘It is tragic to find that in various parts of India a wave of provincialism is 
moving the minds of many people. This has to be immediately put down, for 
this contains the germs of our destruction. This will be worse than 
communalism. History will repeat itself and we shall lose our country if we 
allow disruptive tendencies to become powerful and block the road to 
national unity’.102 
From this perspective, partition and the Pakistan demand can be seen as part of a 
much broader trend towards regional mobilisation and sub-national autonomy 
across South Asia during this period (see Chapter 1.1). Ahead of independence 
and partition, for example, most Congressmen outside the CHC supported 
linguistic reorganisation and a federal take on a future Indian state. In December 
1946 a Convention on Linguistic and Cultural Provinces in India was held in which 
Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a prominent Congress proponent of the Telugu-speaking 
Andhra Pradesh province, presided. Sitaramayya called for the Indian Constituent 
Assembly to ‘constitute a sub-committee for considering the question of linguistic 
provinces ... which should be taken note of before provincial constitutions are 
framed’.103 
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In response to these increased demands for reorganisation, the Constituent 
Assembly’s President Rajendra Prasad convened the Linguistic Provinces 
Commission (LPC) in June 1948. The Commission was tasked with looking into the 
potential formation of the linguistic provinces of Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and 
Maharashtra in the south and west of India. Reporting back in December, after 
receiving written deputations and touring the country, the LPC proclaimed: 
‘India has, in the words of its Prime Minister, just survived a major 
operation. It is in the midst of an undeclared war with Pakistan. It has still to 
settle its refugee problem and the problem of feeding its teeming millions 
and as a result of British withdrawal it is working and must work for some 
time to come with a depleted and over-strained administration’.104 
The LPC ultimately recommended that no new provinces should be formed. With 
regards to Maharashtra, the LPC argued that the coastal Konkan region had ‘not 
become thoroughly Maharashtrian in political outlook, language and culture’.105 
Marathi-speaking portions of Madhya Pradesh (MP), known as Vidarbha, were 
said to ‘have lived a separate life of their own, which has given them 
characteristics and outlook different from Deccan Maharashtra’.106 Meanwhile 
Bombay City, which ‘stands in special relation to Maharashtra, Gujarat and to 
India as a whole’ was accorded its own separate chapter in the report on account 
of its ‘cosmopolitan and multi-lingual’ nature.107. If the Constituent Assembly 
decided to go against their advice and reorganise provincial boundaries, the LPC 
counselled that Bombay City and Vidarbha should be kept apart from 
Maharashtra as entirely separate entities. 
The LPC’s recommendations were given further accord in December 1948 after 
the Congress appointed its own Linguistic Provinces Committee, consisting of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sitaramayya. More popularly 
known as the JVP Committee after this triumvirate of Congressmen, proponents 
of linguistic reorganisation hoped that it might reach more favourable conclusions 
on account of the fact Sitaramayya was one of its members. However, the JVP 
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Committee supported the conclusions of the LPC. Whilst in the past the Congress 
Party had supported reorganisation, the Committee argued it had not been ‘faced 
with the practical application of this principle and hence it had not considered all 
the implications and consequences that arose from this’.108 A composite sense of 
Indianness needed to be further developed and cherished before reorganisation 
could be even contemplated – between Sitaramayya’s December 1946 demand 
for a sub-committee on linguistic reorganisation, and his role in rejecting its 
suitability as part of the JVP Committee 24 months later, the repercussions of 
division had become manifestly apparent. 
After independence and partition, the new Indian Government was tasked with 
dealing with the fall-out from mass genocide, violence and displacement, the 
matters of refugee rehabilitation and resettlement, and the definition of both 
territorial boundaries and citizenship rights and statuses.109 Meanwhile, the new 
Indian Government had also the small matter of integrating hundreds of semi-
autonomous princely states, an anomaly of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century British pattern of conquest, into the Union. Indeed, the princely states of 
Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir had to be assimilated by force of arms.110 The 
integration of the latter provoked armed conflict with Pakistan, who also claimed 
Kashmir as part of its territory, culminating in the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-
48) and an uneasy ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. Partition was not a 
contained historical event, but was rather a deeply ambiguous and transitional 
phenomenon. The scale of the disruption even threatened the collapse of the new 
postcolonial governments. 
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In these circumstances, the Congress moved swiftly to try and consolidate the 
authority of the new postcolonial Indian state. Particularly emblematic in this 
context was the assassination of M.K. Gandhi, the ‘father of the nation’. 
Murdered in June 1948 by Nathruam Godse, a Marathi-speaking Brahman with 
links to the right-wing Hindu Mahasabha, Gandhi’s death allowed the Congress to 
triumph over its political rivals and challengers on the right, whilst strengthening 
Nehru’s own authority within the party. In doing so, it ‘guaranteed the 
ascendancy of secularism and democracy as the legitimate ideological foundation 
of the Indian state’.111 Gandhi’s death also had particular significance for the 
demand for a unilingual Maharashtra. Antipathy towards Marathas (owing to 
initial confusion as to Godse’s caste identity), and then Marathi-speaking 
Brahmans emerged.112 The LPC, for example, was to accuse ‘the Poona school of 
thought’ (a broad catch-all phrase applied to Marathi-speaking, Brahman Hindus 
residing in Poona) of not seeing ‘eye to eye with the rest of India as to the future 
destiny of this country’.113  
Meanwhile, in response to Gandhi’s death, anti-Brahman rioting broke out across 
Maharashtra, thus highlighting the continuing tensions between Brahmans and 
non-Brahmans despite efforts by the proponents of Samyukta Maharashtra to 
focus upon Marathi-speaking solidarity.114 Anti-Brahman violence was particularly 
noteworthy in the princely state of Kolhapur, where an enquiry was convened 
with the aim of ascertaining whether the disturbances occurred as a result of 
‘popular feelings on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi or the result of 
communal propaganda in the press and on the platform carried on in the State, 
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indicating a pre-arranged plot’.115 For the Congress, the expression of anti-
Brahman sentiment was linked to efforts by the Maharaja of Kolhapur to oppose 
the integration of the Marathi-speaking princely states into what was perceived to 
be the Gujarati-dominated Bombay Province. In early 1948, a resolution was 
passed by the Kolhapur Government stating that they ‘wanted merger with a 
separate Marathi-speaking state of Maharashtra but not with the Bombay state 
that existed. Until Maharashtra was created [they] called for the retention of 
Kolhapur’s distinctiveness as a political unit’.116 By connecting the issue of 
integration with the anti-Brahman riots after Gandhi’s assassination, the Congress 
was able to generate propitious circumstances to impose central control. 
In the context of partition, the princely states’ integration and the need to 
consolidate the authority of the new state, it is no wonder that the postcolonial 
Indian Government sought to postpone provincial reorganisation. But besides 
these practical considerations, ideological imperatives emerged too. Although 
eventually conceding to the groundswell of public opinion insisting upon 
reorganisation, Nehru and other all-India leaders continued to depict regional 
sentiments as ‘parochial’, ‘fissiparous’ and potentially dangerous to India’s 
national integrity, unity and stability.117 These ‘primordial’ forms of identity were 
perceived to obscure Indians’ ‘true’ class-based interests and concerns. 
‘“Communalism”, by this definition, was both a false nationalism and a false 
consciousness’.118 For Robert King, Nehru was right to be wary of the more 
malignant implications of regionalism, and by vacillating and deferring decision-
making on unilingual provinces for the first five years after independence he 
ensured that reorganisation was ultimately undertaken in a more reasoned and 
objective environment. If it had not been for Nehru, King asserts, ‘we should have 
today not a unified India with a strong government at the centre but an India 
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weakly divided along linguistic and cultural lines’.119 In a similar vein Ramachandra 
Guha has argued that linguistic reorganisation, as an example of Nehruvian ‘unity 
in diversity’ in action, ‘seems rather to have consolidated the unity of India’.120 
Both King and Guha therefore suggest that the policy decisions of Nehru 
ultimately eased the threat of India’s ‘Balkanisation’. However, whilst the demand 
for Samyukta Maharashtra and other forms of reorganisation were never 
secessionist in intent, if we look towards the nature of contemporary Indian 
federal politics, a rather different picture of their historical impact emerges. In a 
special report on Indian federalism in March 2012, the Times of India noted that  
‘In the 1990s the Mandal upsurge ... threw up fragmented yet powerful 
regional entities which transformed Indian Parliament’s character. The 
emergence of regional stalwarts – Lalu Prasad, Mulayam Singh Yadav and 
Mayawati in north India – tipped the scales against the Congress which, till 
then, had been firmly in charge. Meanwhile, in the southern states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu a strong anti-Congress sentiment had 
already been present for decades. These developments made complicated 
coalition politics a reality of Indian polity’.121 
Likewise, rather than treating the acceptance of reorganisation as an example of 
the Nehruvian Congress’s ideological commitments to ‘accommodationism’ and 
inclusivity, after an initial ‘cooling-off’ period in which to soothe linguistic 
passions, in reality Nehru and other members of the CHC ultimately ‘acceded to 
this process with extreme reluctance’.122 In Maharashtra, it was only after the 
Congress’s electoral defeat at the hands of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti 
(henceforth SMS, a coalition of opposition parties supporting the Maharashtra 
demand) that the CHC was prepared to change course and accept the linguistic 
principle. As Katherine Adeney has pointed out, ‘The initial rejection of linguistic 
reorganisation after independence, despite Congress’s previous commitment to 
it, was precisely because of the unwillingness to bring these identities into the 
decision-making process at the centre and politicise them’.123 
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To understand why this was the case, it is necessary to think about the Congress’s 
‘constitutional preferences’ before independence, and to broaden out the 
implications of the machinations over partition and the Pakistan demand: 
‘Nehru’s rejection of the confederal form of the Cabinet Mission Plan [of 1946] is 
indicative of the fact that he was prepared to concede the two-nation theory [i.e. 
Pakistan] in order to create a centralised state to carry out his aims of social and 
economic reconstruction’.124 Partha Chatterjee, for example, has noted how ‘the 
very institution of a process of planning became a means for the determination of 
priorities on behalf of the “nation”’.125 For Nehru development, rather than forms 
of consociationalism, was the crucial prerequisite to social egalitarianism and 
communal harmony, in which antiquated ‘primordial’ identities would be 
overcome by the impact of ‘modernisation’.126 Reorganisation was thus 
undertaken slowly, and begrudgingly. 
2.3.2 The Proponents of Samyukta Maharashtra 
Before independence, the contrasting elements within the Congress’s discourse 
on reorganisation ensured that both those in favour and against reorganisation, 
whether members of the public, lower-level civil servants, or local Congressmen, 
could frame their arguments in anticipation of the ideals that the postcolonial 
Indian nation-state was expected to represent. In April 1941, for example, the 
Maharashtra Sahitya Sammelan (All-India Marathi Literary Conference) passed a 
resolution which argued it was ‘essentially necessary to form a separate Province 
of tracts containing a majority of Marathi-speaking people’ to ensure ‘the due 
protection of the interests of the Maharashtrians’.127 Likewise during the debates 
within the Constituent Assembly in November 1946, the Maratha Congressmen 
B.S. Hiray sponsored a resolution calling for the appointment of a Boundary 
Commission, so as ‘to afford ... satisfaction of natural aspirations and 
consciousness of self-rule and self-determination and establishment of happy 
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relations among the different classes inhabiting the various provinces’.128 Those 
that supported provincial reorganisation in Bombay thus couched their demands 
within the language of self-government and the protection of the interests of a 
homogenised ethno-linguistic community. 
During the late 1940s and 1950s, however, prominent Brahman and non-Brahman 
figures in the Maharashtra PCC such as Shankarrao Deo, B.S. Hiray and Y.B. 
Chavan were pressed by the CHC to adhere to the party’s official position on 
reorganisation. Yet at the same time, these provincial Congressmen were also 
subject to increasing demands from their affiliates within the Samyukta 
Maharashtra Parishad (henceforth SMP), a conglomerate of politicians from 
parties across the political spectrum, to endorse direct agitational methods in the 
fight for the creation of a unilingual Maharashtra. During the 1950s, the calls for 
reorganisation in western India also became more broadly based amongst society 
at large, more forthright, and more violent. Maharashtrian Congressmen thus 
struggled to reconcile ‘national’ and ‘provincial’ prerogatives, and ultimately failed 
to convince the CHC of the viability of a unilingual Maharashtra. By early 1956, 
they were to cede control of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement to the 
opposition parties. 
Whilst the JVP Committee of 1948 had endorsed the recommendations of the LPC 
it had also, under the influence of Pattabhi Sitarammaya, accepted the future 
prospect of the creation of Andhra Pradesh. During the early 1950s demands for 
the formation of a Telugu-speaking province became increasingly vocal and 
insistent, and in October 1952 one advocate of Andhra, Potti Sriramalu, went on 
hunger strike in a bid to force the central government’s hand. With Nehru initially 
adamant that he would not ‘proclaim any decision because somebody is fasting to 
death’, Sriramalu’s demise on 15 December was met with three days of rioting 
and violence across Telugu-speaking areas.129 On 19 December it was finally 
proclaimed that a new Telugu-speaking province would be formed – Andhra was 
formally inaugurated in October 1953. For India’s Congress President, Rajendra 
Prasad, 
‘Sriramulu’s death only is a burst-up of something that has been brewing for 
a long time. I am afraid the question will have to be tackled and our hope 
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that by putting it off, we might make things subside, at any rate for some 
time, has not been fulfilled ... My fear is that the agitation for linguistic 
provinces will not remain confined now to Andhra but will assume more 
acute form in other parts of the country also’.130 
As Prasad’s letter to Nehru suggests, the creation of Andhra had two major 
effects. First, despite Nehru’s emphasis upon keeping the ‘Andhra issue quite 
separate and not mix[ing] it up with others’, a States Reorganisation Commission 
(SRC) tasked with looking into the feasibility of reorganising other provincial 
boundaries was formed in December 1953 under the chairmanship of the 
Governor of Orissa, Fazal Ali.131 Second, it became an increasingly common 
observation amongst proponents of reorganisation that it would be difficult for 
the central government to ignore the movements if they were ‘more active, 
popular, rhetorically vitriolic, and eventually violent’.132 The SRC spent the 
majority of the next two years touring the country, conducting interviews, and 
receiving written memorandums from interested individuals, organisations and 
parties. At the same time, the Samyukta Maharashtra movement became 
increasingly widespread, popular and vocal. In this context, the Provincial 
Congress Committees (PCCs) in Bombay were asked to submit memorandums to 
the SRC, representing their opinions on the subject of reorganisation. 
In the Marathi-speaking regions of Bombay Province, most of the members of the 
MPCC were agreeable to having the SMP draft a joint memorandum to the SRC on 
their behalf.133 The SMP had been formed after an all-party Maharashtra 
Unification Conference in Bombay in July 1946. It existed as a conglomerate of 
different political interest groups and parties, who all came together on a 
common platform to support Samyukta Maharashtra in the context of India’s 
impending independence, and the Constituent Assembly debates on the nature of 
the new state. The SMP aimed to popularise and politicise what had previously 
been primarily an elite demand emerging out of the Marathi literary sphere, and 
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was dominated by both Brahman and Maratha Maharashtrian Congressmen such 
as Shankarrao Deo, Keshavrao Jedhe, B.S. Hiray, Y.B. Chavan and N.V. Gadgil.134 It 
also included independent politicians and activists such as P.K. Atre and D.R. 
Gadgil, as well as representatives of opposition parties such as S.M. Joshi of the 
Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and S.A. Dange of the Communist Party of India (CPI).135 
The SMP’s memorandum to the SRC was drafted by the renowned Poona-based 
economist Professor D.R. Gadgil. As is evident from the quotation with which we 
started this chapter, the SMP embedded its arguments for the creation of a 
unilingual province of Maharashtra in the language of democracy, national 
cohesion and social egalitarianism. The Indian state’s constitutional commitments 
were thus reinterpreted to apply to exigencies arising from a particular provincial 
context. So, for example, the memorandum suggested that ‘the recognition of the 
importance of regional societies is as helpful to the growth of the sentiment of All-
India Unity as the growth of civic consciousness is to the working of national 
democracy’.136 The creation of unilingual provinces with common traditions, 
affinities and social structures would make the achievement of national 
developmental objectives both quicker and easier. ‘True’ democracy would only 
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be possible when the state’s interactions with local society were conducted in the 
vernacular, which all citizens would be able to understand – ‘even local 
government areas must be endowed with meaning to their inhabitants and evoke 
spontaneous loyalty’.137 Meanwhile, in response to those that claimed demands 
for reorganisation strained ethno-linguistic relations, the SMP argued that this 
was ‘to reverse the actual causal relation’.138 Instead it was multilingual provinces 
that were disparaged for fomenting suspicions of favouritism and impartiality in 
the allocation of resources. The SMP thus couched its claims to reorganisation in 
the ideals of the postcolonial state, but reoriented them to apply to their specific 
line of reasoning in support of a unilingual Maharashtra. 
The SRC finally announced its recommendations on reorganisation in October 
1955. It noted the efficacy of the linguistic principle, but also ‘a growing 
realisation of the need to balance it with other factors relevant to the reshaping 
of the political geography of India, such as national unity and administrative, 
economic and other considerations’.139 Much of the south and west of the 
subcontinent was to be reorganised into linguistically ‘homogenous’ units: new 
provinces for Kannada-, Malayalam-, and Tamil-speakers were thereby created to 
complement the Telugu-speaking province of Andhra Pradesh. Marathi-speakers, 
however, were to be divided. Those residing in Marathi-speaking portions of 
Madhya Pradesh were organised into a new province called Vidarbha. Meanwhile, 
Bombay was to be retained as a composite state, minus Kannada-speaking 
districts in the south, but with the addition of the Gujarati-speaking former 
princely states of Saurashtra and Kutch in the north. Bombay Province’s ‘special 
position’ as an example of ‘one of the best-administered States of the Indian 
Union’ and ‘a great co-operative venture’ were cited as contributory factors in this 
decision.140 
Amongst the MPCC, all agreed that the report ‘showed a feeling of suspicion and 
distrust against the people of Maharashtra’ and ‘that the Commission singled out 
Marathi-speaking people as the only people who should have no linguistic State of 
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their own’.141 Yet the Maharashtrian Congressmen deviated amongst themselves 
on the correct methods through which to continue to press the Samyukta 
Maharashtra demand. During October 1955, representatives of the Bombay, 
Gujarat and Maharashtra PCCs were to meet with Nehru, the Home Minister G.B. 
Pant, and the Congress President U.N. Dhebar, in an effort to thrash out an 
acceptable compromise. Ahead of the talks, Shankarrao Deo promised to 
‘maintain a firm stand’ on Samyukta Maharashtra, emphasising that the 
Maharashtrian Congressmen were not going to ‘get convinced about the need for 
having a bilingual State of Bombay’.142 During the course of the meetings Nehru 
suggested a ‘three-state formula’, in which the SRC’s recommendations for a 
composite Bombay would be disregarded, and separate provinces of Bombay, 
Gujarat and Maharashtra constituted instead. He included the option for Bombay 
City’s legislature to, at the end of a five-year period, decide whether to merge 
with Maharashtra. Yet this plan was still unacceptable to the representatives from 
Maharashtra as it left open the possibility of their separation from Bombay City. 
It was in response to this impasse that Deo contradicted his earlier public 
statements, now proposing a bigger bilingual Bombay Province including 
Vidarbha, with Gujarat having the option to secede after five years. This proposal 
was unacceptable to the BPCC and GPCC. But it also provoked consternation 
amongst a separate faction represented by T.R. Deogirikar and Y.B. Chavan within 
the MPCC, who ‘were baffled by this unexpected move. Chavan lost his temper 
and accused Deo of betraying them’.143 As well as disagreeing on the extent to 
which the Samyukta Maharashtra demand should be modified, the MPCC also 
experienced ‘serious differences ... on deciding the course of action to be taken 
against the CHC ... They appeared bewildered, divided, vacillating and unprepared 
for the coming struggle’.144 Over the course of the winter of 1955-56, the political 
leadership of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement thus rapidly shifted from the 
MPCC to the opposition parties within the province, as local Congressmen from 
Maharashtra tried to reconcile their allegiances to both the Congress and the 
SMP. 
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2.3.3 Reorganisation’s Detractors – National ‘Unity in Diversity’ and 
‘Minority’ Rights  
Part of the reasoning behind the successive rejections of the Samyukta 
Maharashtra demand by the Government of India and the CHC was the potential 
threat of provincial majoritarianism. The LPC’s members, for example, were 
apprehensive that ‘the moment a province is allotted a majority linguistic group ... 
it begins to regard the area as exclusively belonging to that particular linguistic 
group, and to treat all persons not belonging to the majority linguistic group as ... 
outsiders and aliens’.145 Superior rights and statuses for ‘natives’ neither accorded 
with the stress on Indian ‘unity in diversity’, nor the commitment laid down in 
Article 19 of the 1950 Constitution that ‘All citizens shall have the right ... to move 
freely throughout ... [and] ... to reside and settle in any part of the territory of 
India’.146 In the Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay Province, then, the 
introduction of democracy was perceived by some as a potential harbinger for a 
provincial Marathi majoritarianism (thereby ignoring/overcoming, depending 
upon the individual’s perspective, internal antagonisms on the basis of caste, class 
and sub-region), which could coalesce around the idea of the ‘Marathi manus’ or 
Marathi man.147 In such circumstances, those that felt threatened by plans for 
unilingual provinces could invoke the goals of national solidarity to buttress their 
arguments against reorganisation. For the BPCC, for example, the retention of a 
multilingual Bombay Province would serve as a fine example and experiment in 
secularism and unity in diversity: 
‘No part of the world has witnessed such unique and close cooperation 
amongst its residents, drawn from a number of communities and nations, to 
build it to as pre-eminent a position and prosperity like Bombay in history. 
Trade, industry and commerce, which contributed to Bombay’s prosperity 
could be described as the outcome of the united efforts of the cosmopolitan 
population of Bombay, capital, labour, artisans, traders, Gujerathis, 
Maharashtrians, South Indians [etc] ... ’.148 
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A similar stress on ‘national’ objectives was evident in the supposed perspectives 
of both the Bombay Citizens’ Committee and the Indian Merchants’ Chamber 
(IMC) in their memorandums on reorganisation presented to the SRC. The 
Bombay Citizens’ Committee, for example, argued that their arguments reflected  
‘the views of responsible leaders of public opinion, who have no provincial 
or sectarian bias in their approach to the problem ... They have been 
unanimously of the view that unless the people are infused with the spirit of 
national consciousness and rise above regional or sectarian interests, it 
would not be possible to consolidate the forces of national unity, for 
economic reconstruction, essential for the maintenance of our hard-won 
freedom’.149 
However, despite the emphasis upon communal impartiality, national unity and 
Bombay City’s ‘cosmopolitanism’, these petitions often obscured ‘community’ 
interests. All of these organisations, despite presenting themselves as 
encompassing public opinion from a cross-section of the city’s population, were 
dominated and controlled by Gujarati-speaking political and industrial elites. 
Statistics on membership of Bombay’s various commercial organisations, 
accumulated in June 1947 in an effort to ‘show that Bombay is an all-India city 
which is not a natural part of any particular province and must therefore be an 
independent unit in India’, actually revealed the primarily Gujarati-speaking 
interests of these groups.150 The IMC, for example, out of a total of 1,858 
members, was made up of 1,602 Gujarati-speakers, 74 Marathi-speakers, and 10 
Kannada-speakers.151 Likewise the Seed Traders’ Association had 252 Gujarati-
speaking merchants and brokers, 31 Marwaris, 9 Muslims, and only 1 ‘Deccani’ 
(probably Marathi-speaking).152 In a note on the various alternative plans for any 
potential reorganisation of provinces, contained within the private papers of the 
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prominent Bombay businessman, Purushottamdas Thakurdas, it was asserted that 
Gujarat and the Gujarati-speaking people were ‘closely and inextricably 
interwoven with the life of the City of Bombay’, had made a large ‘contribution to 
the growth and development of Bombay ... of a very special and substantial 
nature’, ‘and even today in the various spheres of economic activity as also the 
cultural life of the City Gujarati-speaking people have a vital and important 
stake’.153  Gujarati-speakers could thus protect their community’s interests by 
couching their memorandums in the language of national objectives. 
Simultaneously, however, it could also serve the interests of Gujarati-speakers 
residing in Bombay City to present their arguments against reorganisation through 
the idiom of the extra guarantees and privileges the state was expected to 
provide for ‘minority communities’. This shifted the context of the debates on 
unilingual provinces away from the Nehruvian national and developmental 
prerogatives and towards ‘community’-based interests and forms of 
consociationalism instead. Universal forms of individual citizenship were not felt 
to be protection enough from the superior rights that would be accorded to 
‘majorities’ in democratically-elected provincial administrative arenas. The BPCC, 
for example, also argued that, ‘In a purely linguistic state there is bound to be 
preference or partiality in the service and other things for those who speak the 
language of that state and discrimination against others. Naturally this would not 
be tolerated by linguistic minorities’.154 The practical application of democracy 
and universal citizenship was therefore perceived to potentially accord superior 
rights to communal ‘majorities’ in ethno-linguistic provinces. In such 
circumstances, Gujarati-speakers could present themselves as a beleaguered 
‘minority’ threatened by a Maharashtrian majoritarianism and in need of the 
state’s special protection. 
This discourse of ‘community’-based interests ahead of reorganisation was not 
the sole preserve of Gujarati-speakers in Bombay, but could also be invoked by 
other linguistic groups in a similar manner, albeit inverted in an altogether 
different local context. In the last section we saw how Marathi-speakers in 
Bombay presented their demands for reorganisation on the basis of local and 
more effective forms of self-government. But the Marathi-speaking ‘minority’ of 
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Karwar District, which would go on to form part of Karnataka, felt sure they were 
to be overrun by a Kannada majoritarianism if reorganisation went ahead. In a 
memorandum sent to the Lok Sabha Select Committee tasked with considering 
the States Reorganisation Bill, they claimed it would, 
‘be nothing short of cultural tragedy for these major Marathi areas of 
Karwar to be forced into an ethnologically alien Kannada language State, to 
be compelled to rest content with so-called “minority mercies” and thus be 
perpetually deprived of all the good things of life which can be theirs by 
right in Maharashtra, with whom they share their language, culture and 
traditions’.155 
Neither was the emphasis upon ‘minority’ rights ahead of reorganisation limited 
exclusively to ethno-linguistic communities. Caste, class, religion and sub-region 
could cut across any homogenous depictions of Maharashtrian interests.156 In 
1948, the renowned Maharashtrian Dalit (the preferred nomenclature of the ex-
untouchable/Scheduled Caste ‘community’) politician B.R. Ambedkar had 
supported the demand for the creation of Maharashtra in his statement 
submitted to the LPC. Here, he had invoked the commonalities amongst the 
Marathi-speaking working classes in Bombay City, which connected them across 
caste divides and in opposition to the ‘vested interests’ of Gujarati-speaking 
industrialists.157 Simultaneously, he railed against the introduction of group-
differentiated rights for Gujarati-speakers within a potential Maharashtra on the 
basis that ‘citizenship will be common throughout India. There is no provincial 
citizenship. A Gujarathi in Maharashtra will have the same rights of citizenship in 
Maharashtra as a Maharashtrian will have’.158  
By 1955, however, Ambedkar had reformulated his commitment to a unilingual 
Marathi-speaking province and instead reasserted an earlier position in which he 
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expressed his concern over the impact of reorganisation upon ‘minorities’.159 As 
we shall see momentarily, this had a lot to do with his perception of the potential 
problems that Dalits were likely to face within Maharashtra at the hands of both 
Maratha and Brahman dominant interests within provincial society and politics. 
Whilst Ambedkar’s Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) joined up with the SMS 
shortly before his untimely death in 1956 to advocate for the creation of 
Maharashtra, the party did so primarily to counter the threat of being decimated 
by the wave of popular support for Samyukta Maharashtra at the forthcoming 
elections.160 SCF politicians always remained wary of their fellow coalitionists 
within the SMS – they perceived the CPI and PSP as being led by Brahmans whose 
primary focus was upon class rather than caste identities; meanwhile, the Hindu 
Mahasabha represented the enslaving politics of Hindu nationalism – Ambedkar 
led a mass Maharashtrian Dalit conversion to Buddhism in one of his final acts 
before his death.161 
Shortly after the SRC Report was published, Ambedkar penned his own Thoughts 
on Linguistic States. Within it, he reiterated his commitment to ‘a separate 
Maharashtra, separate from Gujarathis and separate from Hindi speaking people. 
But [he was] unable to understand why a free Maharashtra should be made into 
one single State’.162 Whilst supporting the idea of one language within one 
province, he suggested that people speaking one language could be grouped in a 
number of separate administrative arenas. With regards to Marathi-speaking 
areas, for example, Ambedkar proposed the formation of four new provinces: 
Bombay City (which he renamed ‘Maharashtra city state’); ‘Western 
Maharashtra’; ‘Central Maharashtra’; and ‘Eastern Maharashtra’.163 The reasoning 
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behind his recommendations was coined in the rhetoric of ‘minority’ caste-based 
interests: ‘As the area of the State increases the proportion of the minority to the 
majority decreases and the position of the minority becomes precarious and the 
opportunities for the majority to practice tyranny over the minority becomes 
greater. The States must therefore be small’.164 Smaller provinces would thus 
serve as a potential safeguard, limiting the ratio of majority to minority castes. 
Linguistic reorganisation’s detractors thus drew upon a range of rhetorical devices 
linked to ideas about citizenship rights and statuses to highlight the negative 
consequences emerging out of the potential formation of a unilingual 
Maharashtra. Like the proponents of reorganisation considered in the previous 
sub-section of this chapter, these could be framed in terms of the ideals that the 
newly independent nation-state was supposed to encompass. This section of the 
chapter has thus traced a variety of perspectives on citizenship whilst delineating 
the history of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement up to 1956. It has highlighted 
how CHC and GOI perspectives on these rights and statuses were shaped by the 
events of independence and partition, and has looked into how older notions of 
caste, language and region within Maharashtra were redefined in the context of 
new constitutional obligations and full democratic representation. It is these 
larger historical processes which form the backdrop against which the rest of this 
thesis considers the construction and articulation of citizenship in a number of 
quotidian state-society interactions. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In February 1956, the opposition party elements within the SMP broke away to 
form a new organisation known as the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS). The 
SMS looked to adopt more direct agitational methods, including strikes, 
satyagrahas and public rallies, after becoming disillusioned with the slow progress 
of the petitioning advocated by the MPCC. Whilst the CHC sought to bring closure 
to the debate on reorganisation after the ratification of the States Reorganization 
Act on 31 August 1956 (which created a bigger bilingual Bombay Province of 
Gujarati- and Marathi-speakers), the SMS continued to campaign for the creation 
of a unilingual Maharashtra in the build-up to the 1957 elections. Whilst Chief 
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Minister Y.B. Chavan retained his seat (touted ‘as a “clear verdict” on the issue of 
the bigger bilingual Bombay State and a “triumph” for the Congress organization 
and its ideals’ by The Hindustan Times),165 Congress came out of the elections with 
only 33 out of 136 seats in the legislative assembly from Maharashtra.166 The SMS, 
meanwhile, won 100 seats. This pattern was repeated in the twelve by-elections 
between 1957 and 1960, when the Congress won only three seats. The party thus 
needed to urgently review its decision on bilingual Bombay, or face potentially 
catastrophic political consequences in Maharashtra.167 Consequently, by 1 May 
1960 Bombay had been bifurcated into the two separate linguistic provinces of 
Gujarat and Maharashtra (including Bombay City), amidst scenes of great public 
fanfare and acclaim.168 
This chapter has looked to analyse the emergence of these notions of regional 
belonging which culminated in the formation of Maharashtra Province in 1960, as 
well as the ways in which they were inflected, cross-cut and contested by the 
politics of caste, class, language, race and nation. It has suggested that there is a 
longer, pre-colonial history to notions of and contestations over place and 
belonging in western India, but that these came to be shaped in novel directions 
by larger historical processes linked to state transformation. During the 
nineteenth century, under the growing influence of ethnographic race science 
both in the metropole and the Indian ‘laboratory’, a number of both British 
colonial administrators and Indian ideologues were to treat caste, language and 
region in Maharashtra as embodiments of distinct, reified and ‘ethnicised’ 
identities. In the twentieth century, these identities served as the medium 
through which to articulate ideas about citizenship rights and status, as 
Maharashtrians became increasingly interested in the forms that self-government 
and democracy were to take ahead and in the aftermath of independence and 
partition. This history of a changing and contested sense of region thus serves as 
the backdrop against which the rest of this thesis looks to analyse the 
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April 27-May 1, 1960 (Bombay: Rekha Publications, 1960); ‘Maharashtra 
Resurgent’, Blitz (Bombay), 23 April 1960. 
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development of citizenship in the quotidian interactions between the local state 
and ‘everyday’ society. 
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3: Region, Nation, Election: Politics, Government and the 
Selection of Congress Candidates in Bombay 
‘I find it difficult to become enthusiastic about large numbers of people whom we 
are likely to set up as our candidates. Many of them are third-rate from any point 
of view – Congress, education, intellect, service of any cause or any other record. 
Then their behaviour in many cases has been little short of scandalous ... The 
whole thing turns round caste divisions ... I have felt recently as if I was in a den of 
wild animals. This is the background of our candidates. We can hardly talk of any 
high principle’. 
Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Morarji Desai, 27th October 1951.1 
--------------- 
Over the course of the winter of 1951-52, India held its first general elections 
since independence from the British Raj. The introduction of universal adult 
suffrage and the creation of an electorate of 176 million Indians would see 
candidates elected to both the all-India Lok Sabha (India’s national legislative 
assembly) and to the various provincial legislatures in the regions. The Indian 
National Congress, as the premier political organisation in the country, and 
credited as the major force behind the achievement of independence, was 
expected to win comfortably. The results supported the predictions. In the Lok 
Sabha, the first-past-the-post system saw Congress secure 45 per cent of the total 
votes polled, and gain a huge majority of 364 out of 489 seats. In the provincial 
assemblies, 42.4 per cent of the vote for the Congress won them 68.6 per cent of 
the seats, or 2,247 out of the 3,280 available.2 Yet, despite the standing and 
prestige of the party, which led to their eventual success, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
India’s first Prime Minister and the President and leader of the Congress, 
remained apprehensive in the build-up to the elections about the quality of the 
party’s nominees. Nehru’s letter to Morarji Desai, the Chief Minister of Bombay 
Province, from which the comment quoted above is taken, hints at a divergence, 
between Nehruvian thinking at the centre, which believed in the eradication of 
‘primordial’ identities through the consolidation of a plural all-Indian 
                                                          
1 New Delhi, National Archives of India [henceforth NAI], Morarji Desai Papers, File 
No. 2 (1952), ‘Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Morarji Desai’, 27 October 1951. 
2 These statistics have been culled from Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: 




consciousness based on secularism, democracy and development; and the 
regional imperatives of electoral politics based around caste and community. 
This chapter explores these conflicting approaches in the context of citizenship. It 
suggests that the centrality of ‘community’ in how the Congress perceived of and 
conducted local political practices within Bombay was imperative to the ways in 
which ideas about membership and rights amongst ordinary civilians in western 
India came to be mediated, imagined, articulated and enacted during this 
formative period. But it also demonstrates how recourse to the ostensible 
Congress principles of secularism and egalitarianism could also be made by these 
same members of the public when the need arose. The first section of this chapter 
looks to contextualise these political principles and practices by focusing upon the 
nature and impact of interwar constitutional reforms introduced by the colonial 
state. It suggests that the gradual introduction of limited forms of democratic self-
government during this period encouraged embryonic ideas about the rights and 
status of Indian citizens, which were oft articulated through political parties 
reorganised as quasi-state alternatives. However, the colonial state 
simultaneously divulged this partial governmental autonomy to the various 
provinces of British India on the basis of communal representation. This had 
important implications for the Congress’s own mobilisational strategies, which 
forms the subject of analysis for this chapter’s second section. Of critical 
importance here were the Congress’s claims to all-India representativeness. To 
substantiate these declarations, the Congress had to rely upon local powerbrokers 
to organise popular support behind its anti-colonial protests and election 
campaigns. But by doing so overarching Congress principles were mediated and 
re-contextualised to fit with local concerns and political contingencies – the kind 
that Nehru deprecated in the quotation cited above. 
The third section demonstrates these discrepancies between the principled 
secular rhetoric of the Congress and its privileging of ‘community’ in the selection 
of potential party candidates ahead of the 1937 and 1946 provincial assembly 
elections in Bombay. But it also begins to highlight the manner in which these 
discrepancies influenced curiously hybridised notions and performances of 
citizenship amongst the public, which were re-contextualised to fit with their 
particular exigencies and concerns. Whilst members of society and local 
Congressmen suggested that the process of selecting Congress candidates should 
take account of their representativeness and accountability, this was frequently 
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mediated through ‘community’-based paradigms rather than on an individual 
basis. The final two sections of this chapter also demonstrate how citizenship was 
formulated in the contested terrain of Congress candidate selection ahead of the 
1951 elections. But by focusing upon notions of rights and status in the context of 
demands for the linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries 
the sections also place emphasis upon a concurrent trend that runs throughout 
the rest of this chapter. Whilst linguistic reorganisation was welcomed by some 
members of the public as a mechanism through which to guarantee the interests 
of their particular ‘community’, for others who mobilised on the basis of their 
minority ‘community’ status, reorganisation potentially threatened to diminish 
their ability to access citizenship’s privileges. The chapter therefore also 
demonstrates that the politics of ‘community’ were subject to fluctuations 
dependent upon the particular spatial and temporal location of the individual 
concerned. 
My arguments might in some ways seem to corroborate the arguments of Partha 
Chatterjee who, as noted in the Introduction to this thesis, has suggested that 
citizenship developed within a discrete and European-derived bourgeois public 
sphere. For Chatterjee, although vast swathes of contemporary Indian society 
participate in their right to vote, this is a product of their treatment by politicians 
as ‘populations’ rather than ‘citizens’, whereby westernised elites have mediated 
the community-based sentiments of the ‘masses’ for their own political benefit.3 
This notion of the efficacy of ‘community’ identities amongst the poor and low in 
status grew out of one particular early aspect of the highly influential Subaltern 
Studies literature and the idea of the ‘autonomy of peasant insurgency’.4 
However, in doing so, it repeats the widespread assumption of both colonial 
administrators and nationalist politicians that, ‘Political messages to the 
                                                          
3 Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in 
Most of the World (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); see 
the ‘Introduction’ to this thesis for more information on this. 
4 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1983); Ranajit Guha, ‘On Some Aspects of the 
Historiography of Colonial India’, in Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian 
History and Society, ed. by Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 
1-8 (pp. 3-4); Partha Chatterjee, ‘Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 
1926-35’, in Subaltern Studies I, pp. 9-38; Partha Chatterjee, ‘More on Modes of 
Power and the Peasantry’, in Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History 




uneducated ... are ... most effectively delivered with reference to their “own” 
ethnic or religious traditions’.5 
In one sense, Chatterjee’s hypotheses are accurate – elite politicians did often 
seek to manipulate the politics of ‘community’ for their own more parochial 
interests, thereby undermining the party’s ostensibly secular and egalitarian 
principles.6 However, the political treatment of ‘community’ by elites also begins 
to weaken Chatterjee’s distinction between the particular modalities of politics of 
an upper-caste, upper-class and English-speaking elite and the rest of society, 
whereby recourse to the politics of ‘community’ no longer serves solely as the 
prerogative of the deprived.7 Equally, when ‘community’ was utilised in the 
interests of electoral allegiance amongst those outside of the bourgeois 
leadership, it provided members of the Marathi-speaking public with agency in 
the articulation and practice of their citizenship, allowing them to circumnavigate 
and contest elite hegemony over its articulation and practice. As the penultimate 
section of this chapter demonstrates in the context of the 1951 elections, the 
demand for the creation of a semi-autonomous and unilingual province of 
Maharashtra serves as one such example – Maharashtrians hoped that state 
resources would be distributed more effectively and provincial politics would be 
more representative as a result of reorganisation.8 This, then, was the protection 
of particular communities’ rights and privileges as citizens, in which their 
preferred Congress party candidate ahead of elections would exist as ‘an extractor 
of State resources for their constituencies’.9 As these politicians were also 
members of local society, who were subject to the same pressures and exigencies 
                                                          
5 William Gould, Religion and Conflict in Modern South Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 30. 
6 The manner in which these principles actually served to obscure the more 
parochial and communal concerns of a national political elite will be considered in 
more detail in Chapter Six. 
7 Howard Handelman, ‘Review: The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on 
Popular Politics in Most of the World by Partha Chatterjee; Nostalgia for the 
Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey by Esra Özyürek’, 
Perspectives on Politics, 5 (2007), 382-384 (p. 383); Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, 
‘Customs of Governance: Colonialism and Democracy in Twentieth-Century India’, 
Modern Asian Studies [henceforth MAS], 41 (2007), 441-470 (pp. 447-448). 
8 Emma Mawdsley, ‘A New Himalayan State in India: Popular Perceptions of 
Regionalism, Politics, and Development’, Mountain Research and Development, 19 
(1999), 101-112 (p. 101). 
9 Mukulika Banerjee, ‘Democracy’, India: The Next Superpower?, SR010 (2012), 45-
49 (p. 47) 
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR010/banerjee.pdf> 
[accessed 6 July 2013]. 
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as the local electorate, they could be subject to the influence of ordinary citizens 
themselves. 
However, preference in the selection of candidates on the basis of ‘community’ 
also hints at the ways in which the provincial Congress organisation became a site 
to be ‘captured’ by locally dominant factions and groups. This chapter therefore 
also seeks to refine Chatterjee’s perception of the homogenised vernacular-
speaking ‘masses’ by demonstrating their conflicting interests and concerns.10 By 
focusing upon the ability of the Maratha caste to assert their dominant and 
numerically preponderate position in rural Marathi-speaking society through the 
co-option and colonisation of the local Congress organisation, this chapter 
highlights the tensions and contestations, rather than any overarching unity, 
amongst vernacular-speaking society. In fact, it explores how those outside of this 
dominant caste group frequently appealed to the ostensibly impartial and 
egalitarian values of the party, by analysing the emphasis upon discourses of 
public service, merit, corruption, and communalism used in representations and 
petitions to the higher echelons of the Congress organisation. It was in this 
intersection between the quotidian political practices of the Congress in selecting 
and rejecting its candidates as it encountered the vicissitudes and influences of 
local society, and public perceptions of its supposed overarching morals and 
values, that a multitude of ‘everyday’ ideas about citizenship came to be 
conceptualised. 
 
3.1 Community Classifications in an Era of Political ‘Provincialisation’ 
In order to understand how and why the Congress came to perceive of the 
centrality of ‘community’ in their local political practices, as well as its impact 
upon notions of belonging and rights amongst subjects/citizens in Bombay 
Province, it is first essential to consider in more detail the political adjustments of 
the interwar period. In the aftermath of the Great War, the British Government 
had been forced to concede a greater degree of political power to Indians, both in 
                                                          
10 For a critique of this tendency towards homogenisation see, Sumit Sarkar, 
Writing Social History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 305-306; and, 
Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche, ‘Dimensions of Dominance: Class and State in Uttar 
Pradesh’, in The Everyday State and Society in Modern India, ed. by C.J. Fuller and 
Véronique Bénéï (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), pp. 91-114. 
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recognition of their contribution to the war effort, and in an attempt to dampen 
down heightened disaffection caused by high prices and the extension of 
repressive wartime legislation.11 The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, or 
Government of India (GOI) Act of 1919, introduced for the first time the principle 
of diarchy, or partial provincial self-government. Whilst the most important 
provincial portfolios of police, justice and finance were ‘reserved’ in the hands of 
nominated British officials, for the first time elected Indian politicians were now 
able to take control of such subjects as agriculture, education, and public works at 
the provincial level. In Bombay Province, 86 members (or 75 per cent) of the new 
provincial legislature were to be elected, the remaining 28 members nominated. 
Approximately 500,000 of the 19 million civilians within Bombay were 
enfranchised on the basis of the amount of tax they paid.12  
Further constitutional reforms were enacted under the GOI Act of August 1935, 
which extended the principle of autonomous provincial power beyond diarchy’s 
limitations to make Indian ministers responsible for all branches of provincial 
government. Such autonomy was given additional credence by an increase in the 
province’s financial resources. The 1935 Act also significantly extended the Indian 
franchise, with about thirty million Indians now having the right to vote.13 Yet 
despite being couched in the rhetoric of gradual self-government this was no 
announcement licensing independence, no intended relaxation of British control 
of the nature and pace of constitutional change. Like the 1919 Act, the British still 
hoped to divert attention towards opportunities for provincial power and prestige 
– no control was devolved at the centre. However, although the Acts were limited 
in the extent of real representation and power they granted to Indians, they did 
help arouse (as much through anger and disappointment at their checks and 
constraints) new incentives to rearrange political organisations and bodies as 
potential quasi-state alternatives.14 The growing demands for full autonomy and 
                                                          
11 John Gallagher and Anil Seal, ‘India Between the Wars’, MAS, 15 (1981), 387-
414; John Gallagher, ‘Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire’, MAS, 15 (1981), 355-
368. 
12 Judith Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 205-208; Peter Robb, The Government of India and 
Reform: Policies Towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), pp. 112-113. 
13 Brown, Modern India, pp. 283-288. 
14 Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Sovereigns Beyond the State: On Legality and Authority 
in Urban India’, in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
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self-government during the interwar period encouraged the reorganisation and 
building of political parties as ‘national’ institutions in anticipation of 
independence. As a result, they began to serve as sites through which ideas about 
citizens’ statuses and rights could be constructed before 1947. As we shall see 
later on in this chapter, there has been a large amount of literature that has 
considered the emergence of a ‘Congress system’ of political mobilisation that 
replicated the organisational structure of the state (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
However, almost none of this literature has been framed in terms of citizenship. 
Simultaneous to this ‘provincialisation’ of politics, both GOI Acts also saw the Raj 
distribute the novel modicums of provincial political power on the basis of 
communal representation – something Steven Wilkinson has described as a form 
of ‘consociationalism’.15 Significantly, these drew upon older forms of colonial 
knowledge based around caste and religious community, through which the state 
could plug-in to locally significant patterns of dominance and influence and attract 
‘collaborators’ to buttress its own authority.16 In the writings of late nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth century colonial ethnographers like H.H. Risley and W.W. 
Hunter, the collection and classification of data on Indian society, and particularly 
caste, was ‘subsumed’ within ‘theories of biologically determined race essences’, 
where ‘political allegiance [was] mapped in the physiognomy of the citizen’ as ‘a 
sociological form of fingerprinting’.17 At one level, the colonial government thus 
‘equated representation with recognition’ – specific ethnic communities were 
provided with reservations in return for professions of loyalty and allegiance.18 At 
another, reservations or separate electorates within the political arena were also 
                                                                                                                                                   
Postcolonial World, ed. by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 169-191. 
15 Steven I. Wilkinson, ‘India, Consociational Theory and Ethnic Violence’, Asian 
Survey, 40 (2000), 767-791. 
16 Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996); Chandavarkar, 
‘Customs of Governance’. 
17 Susan Bayly, Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to 
the Modern Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 127; 
Christopher Pinney, ‘Colonial Anthropology in the “Laboratory of Mankind”’, in 
The Raj: India and the British, 1600-1947, ed. by C.A. Bayly (London: National 
Portrait Gallery Publications, 1990), pp. 252-261 (pp. 257-258). 
18 Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in 
Colonial India, 1860-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 211; 
William Gould, ‘Muslims in India: Secularism and its International Preconditions’, 
in India in the World since 1947: National and Transnational Perspectives (Oxford: 
Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 35-59 (pp. 40-41). 
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often represented as a necessity for the state to protect beleaguered, backward 
and minority ‘community’ interests. In this setting, loyalism frequently came to be 
constructed around the opportunities for democratisation, social mobility and 
justice that the British liberal ‘civilising mission’ had ostensibly promised to 
provide. 
However, being by nature subject to practical exigencies on the part of the 
colonial state, whilst it remained often ignorant of the competition and 
differences likely to surface within these homogeneously-defined community 
groupings, the basis of communal representation was also highly liable to 
fluctuations across time and space. So whilst Muslims were provided with 
separate electorates across all of British India, continuing the precedent set by the 
1909 Morley-Minto Reforms and the 1916 Lucknow Pact, these forms of religious 
representation were likely to have much more political purchase in provinces 
across north India with large Muslim populations than in the peninsula provinces 
of Bombay and Madras. Of seemingly greater significance in Bombay were the 
seats reserved within the general (or ‘Non-Muhammadan’) constituency for 
‘Marathas and Allied Castes’ in 1919. The Award of Sir John Heaton, a former 
judge in the Bombay High Court, had accepted the necessity of allotting to the 
Marathas seven reserved seats within the Bombay Legislative Council (BLC) as ‘a 
device or abnormality’ on the basis of their ‘ignorance ... , their want of power of 
cooperation and their susceptibility to outside influence’.19 Representatives of the 
newly-formed and Maratha-dominated Non-Brahman Party, established to 
demand and exploit these structures of separate representation in Bombay, also 
championed their interests on the basis of the Marathas’ loyal service during the 
Great War, and their backwardness and weakness in the face of local Brahman 
socio-political ascendancy.20 However, in an era of expanding electoral 
                                                          
19 Mumbai, Maharashtra State Archives [henceforth MSA], Government of 
Bombay [henceforth GOB], Reforms Office File 142 I, ‘Sir John Heaton’s Award’, 28 
April 1920. 
20 The Maharaja of Kolhapur, for example, compared the military service of the 
Marathas in the Great War favourably to the Muslims, who had received separate 
electorates. He also described ‘five great monsters’ who did ‘much damage’ to 
rural agricultural society – the Kulkarni (village record-keeper); the Brahman 
Sawkar (moneylender); the school master; the Brahman civil servant; and the 
village priest. See, New Delhi, NAI, Government of India [henceforth GOI], 
Reforms Office File 130-148 B (June 1920), ‘Private. Note by His Highness the 
Maharaja of Kolhapur on the Necessity of Separate Communal Electorates for the 




democracy, reservations gave the Marathas, as the renowned Dalit (traditionally 
‘untouchable’, or in the language of the state, ‘Scheduled Caste’) politician Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar explained, a double advantage:  
‘They will thus have an assured chance in these areas (where they have 
seats reserved) and an equally certain prospect of returning their 
representatives in other areas where seats are not proposed to be reserved 
for them but where, owing to their numerical strength they will be in a 
position to win’.21 
The term ‘Maratha’ had always had a rather ambiguous meaning, and had been 
applied to identify both particular and more broadly-based social groups in a 
variety of different contexts. During the late nineteenth century, ‘the caste-based 
register of “Maratha”’, as it ‘was shaped through a complex, interactive process 
both by colonial policies of classification and representation, as well as 
Maharashtrian attempts to engage with new vocabularies of identity’, had come 
to contest alternative notions which linked the term to the entire Marathi-
speaking ‘polity’ or ‘nation’.22 These conflicting interpretations and status claims 
continued to condition ‘the confusion among colonial ethnographers about the 
exact nature of “Maratha”’ into the inter-war period.23 This classificatory 
uncertainty coincided with a notable demographic increase in the number of 
Marathi-speakers stating their caste as ‘Maratha’ at the decennial all-India census. 
According to the 1901 census, 2.3 million persons residing in the Marathi-speaking 
districts of Bombay Province (excluding Bombay City) returned themselves as 
Marathas (a grouping which had been subdivided into Maratha ‘Proper’, Maratha 
‘Kunbi’ and Maratha ‘Konkani’), whilst 987,722 returned themselves as Kunbis.24 
However, by the 1931 Census, of the 5.8 million ‘Mahrattas and Kunbis’ residing in 
                                                          
21 B.R. Ambedkar, quoted in NAI, Reforms Office File 5-36 F, ‘Written Stattement 
containing the representation to the Indian Delimitation Committee with 
reference to the final proposals of the Bombay Provincial Delimitation Committee 
and of the Government submitted through the Chief Secretary to the 
Government, Political and Reforms Department, by Mr. A.N. Surve, Member of 
Legislative Council [henceforth MLC]’, n.d. 
22 Prachi Deshpande, ‘Caste as Maratha: Social Categories, Colonial Policy and 
Identity in Early Twentieth-Century Maharashtra’, The Indian Economic and Social 
History Review [henceforth IESHR], 41 (2004), 7-34 (pp. 8, 23); See also the 
discussion of the interpretations of Maratha history by M.G. Ranade and Jotirao 
Phule in the previous chapter. 
23 Ibid., p. 25. 
24 Collated from, ‘Table XIII: Caste, Tribe, Race or Nationality’, in Census of India 
1901: Volume IX-B, pt. III: Bombay: Provincial Tables, ed. by R.E. Enthoven 
(Bombay: Government Central Press, 1902), pp. 168-243. 
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the entire Bombay Presidency (including the Bombay States and Agencies), 4.2 
million returned themselves as Marathas, whilst 833,542 declared themselves to 
be Kunbis. Between 40 and 50 per cent of the entire population in the 
Maharashtra area of the province had now come to use the term ‘Maratha’ to 
identify themselves.25 
On one level, this was undoubtedly about the possibilities of representation in the 
legislative assembly through access to reserved seats. In January 1920 the GOI 
received letters from representatives of both the Yadav Gavlis and Ramoshis, who 
petitioned for their inclusion on the list of ‘Marathas and Allied Castes’ for 
franchise purposes. Both looked to quote back to the Raj supporting evidence 
about their ethnic background, drawn from imperial gazetteers and census 
reports, whilst also invoking histories of loyalty and martial service towards the 
British Government and Crown during the Great War.26 Nonetheless, there was 
nothing fixed about these strategies and communal groupings – ‘Allied Caste’ 
political organisations quickly began to claim that they were unable to benefit 
from the reforms because of Maratha dominance within this caste-based 
category. Of the 21 reserved seats contested in elections to the BLC in 1920, 1923 
and 1926, 18 were won by Marathas and only 2 by ‘Allied Castes’.27 It was against 
this background of Maratha dominance of the reservations that an Allied Castes 
Conference held in Poona in November 1932 petitioned the state for a further 
seven separate seats to be reserved for the ‘Allied Castes’ alone.28 For A.N. Surve, 
who chaired the Conference, the Marathas’ demographic preponderance in 
                                                          
25 The other 800,000-odd ‘Mahrattas and Kunbis’ returned themselves as either 
‘Leva Kunbis of Khandesh’ (87,050); ‘Mahratta-Kunbis’ (545,766); or ‘Tirole Kunbis 
of Khandesh’ (108,091). See, ‘Imperial Table XVII: Caste, Tribe, Race or 
Nationality’, in Census of India 1931: Volume VIII, pt. II: Bombay Presidency: 
Statistical Tables, ed. by A.H. Dracup and H.T. Sorley (Bombay: Government 
Central Press, 1933), pp. 412-443; H.T. Sorley, Census of India 1931: Volume IX: 
The Cities of Bombay Presidency (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1933), pp. 
39-40. 
26 NAI, Reforms Office File 4-8, ‘Letter from R.V. Khedkar and others, to the 
Secretary to the Government of India, Political Department’, 21 January 1920; 
Ibid., ‘Letter from Anaji Kushaba Chavan Mokashi and others, to the Honourable 
Sir William Sinclair Marris, Reform Commissioner, Secretariat, Delhi’, 29 January 
1920. 
27 One seat became a general seat ‘because no Maratha candidate came forward’. 
See, NAI, Reforms Office File 5-36 F, ‘Written Statement to the Indian Delimitation 
Committee by Mr. A.N. Surve, Member of Legislative Council [henceforth MLC]’. 
28 MSA, Reforms Office File 142 II, ‘Resolutions passed by Allied Castes’ 




Maharashtra was nothing but a ‘false picture presented by combining together 
the total population of the Kunbi caste (which is one of the Allied Castes) and the 
Maratha caste’.29 Demands about weightage in the legislative assemblies were 
thus related to the political circumstances of the locality, and could serve the 
interests of particular, regionally located communities. This, as we shall see in the 
next section of this chapter, had important repercussions upon the mobilisational 
strategies employed by local Congressmen, as allegiances shifted towards the 
party and it began to replicate colonial governmental customs. 
It is clear that the Non-Brahman Party’s efforts to promote non-Brahman 
representation in the BLC mainly worked in the interests of Maratha urban and 
landed elites.30 This is not to suggest, however, that poorer non-Brahmans were 
disinterested in forms of community identity assertion. In the 1920s the Jotirao 
Phule-inspired Satyashodhak Samaj continued to invoke the degradations of the 
bahujan samaj at the hands of Brahmans during its tours of the Maharashtrian 
countryside through popular performative forms.31 The Samaj also provided the 
Non-Brahman Party’s ‘ideological definition’, as it was forced at crucial moments 
to respond ‘to pressure from below’.32 Party policy came to include favourable 
measures geared towards peasant and tenant interests, the extension of 
education and social reform, and a broad commitment towards ‘democratisation’ 
by opening up administrative and educational posts for lower castes.33 In Bombay 
City, meanwhile, ‘the mechanisms of the labour market encouraged workers to 
develop and maintain their village and neighbourhood connections, upon whose 
strength they drew to resist more effectively the demands and defy the pressures 
of their employers’.34 These associations could often develop along the lines of 
                                                          
29 GOI, Reforms Office File 5/36-F, ‘Letter from A.N. Surve to the Reforms 
Commissioner to the Government of India’, 20 December 1935. 
30 Gail Omvedt, Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society: the Non-Brahman Movement 
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31 The Satyashodhak Samaj was considered in much greater detail in Chapter Two 
of this thesis. 
32 Omvedt, Cultural Revolt, p. 177. See also, pp. 193-198. 
33 See, for example, MSA, GOB, Educational Department File LC-824/F, ‘Letter 
from M. Hesketh, Director of Public Instruction, Bombay Presidency, to the 
Secretary to the Government, Educational Department, “Council Question No. 2 
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caste and community – it helped that elements of the Marathi-speaking 
population were often concentrated in particular mohallas (neighbourhoods) 
within the city. Marathas were also recruited in large numbers to the Indian Army, 
albeit with careful restrictions on who ‘may endeavour to pass themselves off as 
such’.35 As late as the Second World War, military employers were noting that, 
‘Mahratta recruiting has suddenly taken a new lease of life and has rocketted [sic] 
and everything of Mahratta is bumper full and still they are coming in’.36 For 
Donald Attwood the 
‘ ... broadening and unification of the Marathas came about not so much 
from a conscious elite strategy but as a result of factors over which 
individual leaders had little control. These factors included the historical 
flexibility of caste boundaries, the competitiveness of Maratha alliances, 
and the mobility of the Maratha leadership – combined with the new 
demands and opportunities posed by mass politics under late colonial 
rule’.37 
The politics of ‘community’ was thus important to a range of variable and 
fluctuating concerns, not only linked to the interests of elites seeking 
representation in the BLC. Of course, practising forms of political representation 
through the paradigm of ‘community’ also drew upon older histories of local 
societal contestations, circumstances and concerns, which were outlined at length 
in Chapter Two of this thesis. However, these longer antecedents underwent a 
process of reinvigoration and transformation during the interwar period, in the 
context of new opportunities for increased indigenous political influence as a 
result of the transfer of (albeit gradual and limited) power. With the 
‘provincialisation’ of politics and the reconstitution of political parties as quasi-
state institutions, ‘community’ now became vested with a new political 
importance, as a site through which the public’s membership and rights as 
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potential citizens could be evoked and contested. It was this combined context of 
the implications of the greater devolution of political power to Indians by the Raj, 
and the distribution of this power through forms of communal mobilisation and 
reservation, which was so significant in shaping how the Congress conducted its 
quotidian attempts to appear fully representative of Indian society in changeable 
local circumstances. 
 
3.2 The ‘Congress System’ in Bombay before Independence 
In the aftermath of the 1919 GOI Act the Congress passed a new constitution at its 
December 1920 Nagpur session, whereby the party came to be reorganised along 
analogous lines to the structure of the colonial state. A new and more compact 
Congress Working Committee (CWC) was to act as the central executive in 
preference to the unwieldy All-India Congress Committee (AICC), where disparate 
regional interests had hindered decision-making in the past. The Congress’s 
institutional composition also came to be restructured around the provinces, 
thereby reflecting the recently ‘provincialised’ nature of the colonial 
administration. In a relatively new departure, however, Provincial (or Pradesh) 
Congress Committees (PCCs) were now organised primarily on the basis of 
language. This had a varied impact across the different parts of the subcontinent. 
In Bengal, the new Bengali vernacular PCC mapped onto the colonial 
administration’s comparatively homogeneous linguistic boundaries relatively 
effortlessly, not least because the Bengal Presidency had been reconstituted into 
the separate provinces of Assam, Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa in 1912. In 
Bombay, however, this meant the creation of four new distinct PCCs within the 
one province: the Gujarat PCC in the primarily Gujarati-speaking north of the 
province (the GPCC); the Maharashtra PCC in the principally Marathi-speaking 
central districts (the MPCC); the Karnataka PCC in the chiefly Kannada-speaking 
south (the KPCC); and the ‘cosmopolitan’ and linguistically diverse Bombay City 
PCC (the BPCC).38 This divergence in provincial demarcation between the state 
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and the Congress had important consequences for ideas about citizenship in 
Bombay, as we will consider in the later sections of this chapter. 
The new PCCs were to serve as the parent authorities of more local 
representations of the party, which was now theoretically supposed to have 
infiltrated society to the taluka, or sub-district, level. At the heart of these 
changes were efforts to expand the Congress’s representativeness to the nation 
as a whole in an era of increased electoral democracy and anti-colonial 
mobilisation. By reconfiguring its provincial organisation on the basis of 
vernacular languages, the Congress thus hoped to broaden its support base 
beyond an English-speaking and Western-educated elite.39 For similar reasons, the 
Congress membership fee was reduced to the relatively paltry sum of two annas. 
Across the subcontinent the organisational reforms signified a shift in Congress 
politics away from the maritime presidency cities (Bombay, Calcutta and Madras) 
and towards the vernacular-speaking interiors of places like Bihar, Punjab and UP. 
These changes were also paralleled by similar transformations within Bombay 
Province. In 1921, 12 of the 20 members who represented Bombay at the AICC 
annual meeting were residents of Bombay City; however, the following year there 
were only seven Bombay urbanites out of the 50 AICC members drawn from the 
province’s various PCCs.40 Rather than reflecting a relatively homogenised social 
elite (which, although drawn from various cities across the subcontinent, 
generally shared amongst themselves a common history of western instruction, 
the English language, and urban and high-caste norms and values), the reforms 
thus demonstrably broadened the party’s social heterogeneity.  
In Bombay, the interwar period heralded a shift within Congress politics away 
from the longstanding influence of urban Maharashtrian Brahmans, based in 
Bombay City and Poona and embodied by the ‘radical’ leadership of Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920), and towards a broad vani-vakil-patidar Gujarati 
alliance, whose various constituent elements supported Gandhi and his 
programme of non-cooperation with the Raj on the basis of shared background, 
motivations, values and sentiments.41 Increasingly sidelined within an expanding 
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Congress nationalist movement, some of Maharashtra’s Brahmans, especially 
Chitpavans, diverted their attention to parties with more viable opportunities to 
maintain high-caste control over sites of political authority and cultural 
production. The Democratic Swaraj Party (DSP), whose prominent politicians 
included such Tilakite Chitpavans as N.C. Kelkar and L.B. Bhopatkar, advocated the 
social status quo and recommended working the GOI reforms throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, in contrast to Gandhian resistance. However, many of their 
representatives retained their Congress membership and worked towards social 
conservatism and religious nationalism within the anti-colonial movement at the 
same time. Ahead of the 1937 provincial elections, for example, Bhopatkar was to 
describe Congress policy towards peasants’ and workers’ rights as an example of 
the ‘“insidious inroads of Communism”, a menace “not only to the political peace, 
social stability and domestic happiness but also a sure means of destroying 
Congress politics built up during the last fifty years and of promoting class hatred 
and internecine feuds”’.42 Bhopatkar and others were to put up a number of DSP 
candidates to oppose official Congress nominees at these elections, an act which 
led to their being disciplined by the Congress Parliamentary Board in 
Maharashtra.43  
Other Brahmans found more amenable homes in the ideology of Hindutva, in 
which the future Indian nation-state would be linked to Hindu majoritarian rule 
presided over by upper-caste ideologues. V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva’s chief 
progenitor, was a Chitpavan Brahman who served as President of the Hindu 
Mahasabha (1937-43), whilst the newly-formed Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS) brought two other Chitpavans to political prominence: its founder K.B. 
Hedgewar, and its major ideologue, M.S. Golwalkar.44 However, other prominent 
Brahman politicians, such as the Gandhian Shankarrao Deo and the socialist N.V. 
Gadgil, remained with the Congress and were supportive of particular elements of 
its new principles and beliefs. 
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Amongst non-Brahmans in Maharashtra, the reception accorded to the Gandhian 
Congress was equally ambivalent. For much of the 1920s many non-Brahmans in 
Maharashtra continued to equate the Congress with Brahman hegemony and 
expressed their allegiances towards the Raj instead. In April 1921, for example, 
meetings held at Satara in support of Non-Cooperation ‘were said to be total 
failures, as the lecturer was boldly met by the Satya Shodak Samaj enthusiasts. 
They heckled him rather severely, chiefly on social questions and the meeting 
ended with cheers for the King Emperor’.45 Even as late as August 1937, at least 
one non-Brahman correspondent to the Bombay Sentinel was associating the 
‘Puppet Bania Gandhi and Puppet Congress’ with Brahmanic supremacy in 
religion, society and politics.46 However, simply because Gandhi, as Gail Omvedt 
has noted, ‘was outside the Maharashtrian conflict and because the 
Maharashtrian extremist leaders scorned him so, non-Brahmans in the region 
could [also] see him as an ally’.47 This contrasted notably with non-Brahman 
responses to Gandhi in Madras, where he was originally introduced on a 
predominantly Brahman platform and linked to the Tamil Brahman politician C. 
Rajagopalachari.48 In March 1928 the first conference of the Nationalist Non-
Brahman League was held at Nasik, which permitted its members to also be 
affiliated with the Congress. The Bombay Chronicle reported that 
‘[t]he restrictive regulations of the old Non-Brahmin movement governing 
the admission of members ha[ve] been entirely done away with in order to 
facilitate the entry of as many members as possible subject to their 
adoption of the creed of the Conference which is the attainment of the full 
responsible government under the aegis of the British Empire by all 
peaceful methods’.49 
Non-Brahman political interests thus slowly began to shift towards the Congress. 
By 1930 one of the most prominent Maharashtrian non-Brahman politicians, 
Keshavrao Jedhe, was participating in and propagating for Civil Disobedience 
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alongside the left-wing Brahman Congressman N.V. Gadgil.50 And by 1938 the 
integration of non-Brahmans within the party was seemingly complete, as Jedhe 
was appointed the new President of the MPCC, replacing the Brahman Gandhian 
politician Shankarrao Deo. In most conventional accounts of the non-Brahman 
movement, the Congress is thus seen to have overcome its association with 
‘Brahman Raj’ amongst non-Brahmans in Maharashtra by introducing 
constitutional reforms that broadened its support base and (particularly amongst 
left-leaning elements within the Congress Party, such as the Congress Socialists) 
by championing welfare reform.51 This was a position also given contemporary 
accord by the Congress itself, who contrasted their ameliorative policies with the 
Non-Brahman Party’s record whilst in office. For example, ahead of the 1937 
provincial elections Jedhe and N.V. Gadgil gave a public meeting at Kopargaon in 
Ahmednagar District, where 
‘The grievances of the agriculturalists were dwelt on and the audience was 
informed that [the Non-Brahman Party politicians] Diwan Bahadur Kambli, 
Rao Bahadur Navle and Mr. Jadhav had done nothing for the agriculturalists 
and that the Village Improvement propaganda was only an attempt on the 
part of the Government to mislead the people’.52 
These historical studies thus finish their accounts of the non-Brahman movement 
either before or at this moment during the 1930s, giving the impression that the 
particularities of non-Brahmanism were subsumed and overcome by their 
burgeoning sense of ‘Indianness’ within the nationalist movement. However, the 
absorption of many Maharashtrian non-Brahmans within the Congress was never 
a straightforward process. In fact, in 1948 Jedhe was to briefly leave the Congress, 
angered by the slow pace of welfare reform and the continuing dominance of 
Brahmans within the organisation. He became one of the founding members of 
the Peasants and Workers Party (PWP), only to rejoin the Congress in 1952. And 
this episode also coincided with violence directed against Brahmans in many parts 
of Maharashtra in reaction to Gandhi’s assassination by N.V. Godse, a 
Maharashtrian Chitpavan Brahman with links to the RSS.53 By focusing upon how 
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Congress candidates could be selected on the basis of their ‘community’ ahead of 
elections, the rest of this chapter traces the continuing efficacy of group-based 
forms of representation even after non-Brahmans had been subsumed within the 
anti-colonial nationalist movement. 
Although the electorate remained highly circumscribed, and at certain moments 
(1920-2; 1930-4; 1939-45) during this period the Congress refused to cooperate 
with the political structures of colonial rule, party politicians still needed to 
mobilise public support behind its anti-colonial campaigns of Gandhian civil 
disobedience as ‘the most visible and unquestionable evidence of the fact that the 
masses had transferred their allegiance from the Raj to the nationalist leadership 
and its party’.54 Indeed, at certain moments ‘alliances made and constituencies 
fashioned by politicians working within the legislatures and municipalities could 
sometimes be pressed into service during movements of protest’.55 This was the 
embryonic beginnings of a ‘Congress system’, which provided the context for an 
era of ‘one-party dominance’ in the first two decades after independence.56 
Anthropologists working in India in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Anthony Carter, 
Mary Carras and David Rosenthal in Maharashtra, have suggested that this 
‘system’ was reliant upon local political link men, who would mobilise voters 
around various client and patronage networks.57 Since the Congress was to 
become so politically dominant during this period, these different factions within 
it were often apt to perform like opposition parties. This was also a swiftly 
changing inner-party arena, constantly in the process of modification: ‘Since state 
politics is highly competitive and non-ideological, patronage alliances sometimes 
changed with bewildering rapidity, tending to crystallise during important 
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elections and then shifting as competitors adjust to the results of one election and 
prepare for the next’.58 
Despite the fact that this ‘Congress system’ was in its initial phases of 
development before independence, the mobilisation of society around local 
factional networks in an ever-changing political arena had important implications 
for forms of representation in India. Rearranged to replicate the organisational 
structures of the Raj, the Congress, like the colonial state, came to rely upon local 
powerbrokers to represent its authority at the quotidian level and thereby 
inherited older colonial habits and customs of governance.59 Where the 
Congress’s anti-colonial campaigns of Non-Cooperation (1920-2) and Civil 
Disobedience (1930-4) were at their most successful, for example, they had often 
coalesced with pre-existing and particularised socio-economic grievances.60 Much 
of the Congress’s lofty nationalist rhetoric looked to emphasise the ultimate unity 
of purpose, identity and culture amongst Indians, and sought to downplay 
differences demarcated on the basis of class, caste, religious and linguistic 
‘community’. But in these localised practices, the overarching principles, 
objectives and symbols employed by the nationalist elite were frequently 
contorted into something unrecognisable by interactions between local 
Congressmen and quotidian society.61 Like the everyday structures of dominance 
and influence that had bolstered the authority of the Raj, allegiances towards the 
Congress thus came to be frequently mediated through the idiom of ‘community’. 
Needing to newly speak and appeal to a variety of social groups, the employment 
of ‘community’ in the Congress’s political practices also came to be increasingly 
inflected by particular circumstances and local contingencies. This meant that as 
the Congress became an increasingly accessible institution for a whole range of 
political actors and ideologies its practices varied from one governmental arena to 
the next. Although the division of political life along the lines of religious 
community emerged across the entire subcontinent, it was primarily in the Indo-
Gangetic plains of the north that many of the Congress’s ‘agents continued to 
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identify with forms of “Hindu” politics and ideas of the “Hindu” nation, with 
ultimately serious repercussions for independence and partition.62 In the context 
of social conditions in Bombay and other parts of peninsula India, however, local 
Congressmen were more frequently drawn towards utilising caste and, 
increasingly, language, as the key criteria for mobilising Indian society behind the 
nationalist movement. The shift in the loyalties of many non-Brahmans from the 
colonial state towards the Congress during the interwar period therefore 
presaged a sharpened sense of the importance of caste in the quotidian 
interactions between the organisation and Maharashtrian society. As Susan Bayly 
has noted, ‘Constitutional politics developed in India against a background of 
debates and power struggles in which both Indians and Britons treated caste as a 
natural unit of electoral allegiance’.63 And as this chapter explores in greater detail 
in the next section, these political practices in Bombay therefore had their own 
divergent implications upon citizenship in India, as expressed through forms of 
identity, belonging and rights. 
 
3.3 The 1937 and 1946 Elections in Bombay: Citizenship at the Nexus of 
Congress Ideology and Practice 
In early 1937, elections were held to decide the composition of the legislative 
assemblies and governments in the eleven provinces of British India. The Indian 
National Congress achieved clear electoral majorities in five provinces – Bihar, 
Central Provinces (CP), Madras, Orissa and United Provinces (UP) – and was only 
defeated by other political parties who received a higher amount of votes from 
the electorate in three provinces – Bengal, Punjab and Sindh. Additionally, in 
Assam and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) the Congress emerged as the 
single most popular party and was to enter into coalitions with other minor 
political partners so as to form provincial governments.64 Likewise in the new 
Bombay Legislative Assembly (BLA) the Congress emerged as the province’s 
largest party, falling just short of obtaining half of the total seats (86 out of 175 
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seats). After convincing a couple of independent MLAs (Members of the 
Legislative Assembly) to sign the Congress pledge in March of that year, the party 
was also to go on to form a majority provincial government in Bombay.65 
After the passage of the 1935 GOI Act, the 1937 elections represented the first 
opportunity for elected Indian politicians to hold office within an autonomous 
and, importantly, a fully responsible provincial administration. The electorate was 
now ‘five times larger than the electorate for the old Provincial Legislative 
Councils of the 1919 GOI Act and the new Assemblies had direct control over the 
entire executive government of the provinces’.66 In Bombay, this was reflected in 
an extension of the voting public to 17.1 per cent of the provincial population 
from the minuscule 2.6 per cent previously granted suffrage in 1919.67 Obviously, 
this was still an extremely limited proportion of Indian society able to flex their 
newly-found rights to electoral participation and political representation. Yet the 
efforts of the Congress to acquire popular legitimacy and act in the name of the 
Indian people as an entirety (as discussed in the previous section of this chapter) 
ahead of these elections also had important implications for anticipatory ideas 
about citizenship in an independent India amongst the public at large, even 
though they were still predominantly excluded from the vote. Reflecting on the 
party’s successes at the elections a decade later in The Discovery of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, who had been President of the Congress at the time, suggested 
that, 
‘My approach to these elections, and to some extent the approach of most 
Congressmen, was different from the usual one. I did not trouble myself 
about the individual candidates, but wanted rather to create a country-
wide atmosphere in favour of our national movement for freedom as 
represented by the Congress, and for the programme contained in our 
election manifesto ... We wanted no false votes, no votes for particular 
persons because they liked them’.68 
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At least ostensibly, then, the focus of the party’s election campaign was to be 
upon a vote for a united anti-colonial nationalist movement. Whereas the colonial 
government was perceived to act in its own interests, the Congress presented 
itself as accountable to its currently subordinated citizens.69 It was only through 
the achievement of independence, advocated Nehru, that substantive social 
inequalities could be addressed by a welfare-oriented and development-driven 
national state. In a speech delivered to a meeting at Satara ahead of the elections, 
Nehru proclaimed that ‘To solve our problems the whole system – not merely a 
handful of men who governed us to-day – should be replaced ... Not until they 
had overthrown these burdens and captured power could the problems of 
poverty, unemployment and slavery be solved’.70 Similar premises permeated the 
electoral rhetoric of regional Congress leaders. In a meeting held at Dhond in 
Poona District in January 1937, Keshavrao Jedhe  
‘explained the Congress programme and remarked that the Britishers were 
ruling over India for their own benefit regardless of the peasants who were 
the real masters of the Country. [N.V.] Gadgil said that the Government was 
dependent upon the peasants and it was their right to replace it by another 
if it was not functioning properly’.71 
In the same speech at Satara, Nehru also disparaged those parties that formulated 
their policies around the protection of particular ‘community’ interests. By doing 
so, he claimed, they were deviating from ‘the real issue, namely poverty, 
unemployment and freedom’. Instead Nehru pronounced that ‘poverty attacked 
all without distinction of religion, race or class. It took all by the throat. Therefore 
there could not be any communal solution but only a national solution to our 
problems’.72 Within the Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay Province, for 
example, the Non-Brahman Party was depicted by Congressmen as an elitist 
organisation focused upon the rewards and resources of office. In January 1937, 
Vallabhbhai Patel conducted a whirlwind tour of Maharashtra ahead of the 
elections, in which he visited four districts and addressed thirty meetings over the 
course of six days. According to the Bombay Chronicle correspondent who 
accompanied Patel on this tour, one particular subset of his speeches focused on 
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the Non-Brahman Party, ‘which tried to approach the peasantry and say that they 
would fight for their cause in the legislatures’. According to Patil, ‘These very 
people had been in the legislatures in the past and everyone should have known 
by now that they did pretty little for the peasantry. On the contrary they 
hampered the progress of the country towards its cherished Goal’.73 The politics 
of ‘community’ was therefore officially rejected by the Congress in its 
electioneering idiom as holding no meaning for low status groups within Indian 
society. Rather, emphasis was placed upon highlighting the public’s ultimate unity 
of purpose under the anti-colonial nationalist movement. The speeches of these 
Congressmen suggested that the achievement of swaraj was to be accompanied 
by postcolonial efforts to eliminate social inequality. As the ‘masses’ became 
citizens of a modern nation-state, it was argued, their ‘primordial’ attachments to 
ethnicity and community would cease to have any political purchase. 
However, this overarching rhetoric diverged considerably from the localised 
political practices of the nascent ‘Congress system’ amongst the various PCCs in 
Bombay Province ahead of the elections. In the build-up to the elections, the 
Times of India had published an article under the headline ‘The Elections will be 
Fought by Persons, Not Parties’, which suggested that the Congress had ‘in 
innumerable cases ... pinned the Congress label to the coats of candidates who 
even without that label would be almost certain of victory’.74 Such arguments 
about the propensity of factionalism within the everyday organisational structure 
of the Congress were corroborated by the Nasik DCC President Dr. G.B. Bhutekar, 
who protested against his non-selection as a Congress nominee ahead of the 
election by suggesting ‘that many candidates selected by the MPCC ... [were] 
nonentities, accredited with no active Congress services, but [were] perhaps 
mainly preferred on account of their affluent conditions to genuine 
Congressmen’.75 As noted in the previous section of this chapter, the work of both 
historians and social/political scientists in the 1960s and 1970s concentrated upon 
the actions of such political brokers based in the locality, who were capable of 
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quickly mustering support around particular electoral contingencies and factional 
affiliations.76  
Much of the focus of this older scholarship was thus upon the lack of importance 
of ideology within local Congress mobilisations, an outlook critiqued for denying 
that ‘to countless Indians nationalism was a fire in the blood’.77 This chapter notes 
the relevance of these local political practices and their divergence from all-India 
rhetoric. But at the same time, it avoids suggesting that caste, ethnicity and 
language were ‘no more than labels ... no mere camouflage for factionalism’.78 
Instead it suggests that these Congress practices, which drew upon and politicised 
longer standing and local societal tensions, also impacted upon the imagination 
and expression of a variety of ideas about citizenship, via ‘community’. This was 
not least because the majority of the Indian public’s encounters with the 
Congress, as a political party that was supposed to be both representative and 
accountable towards local society, were conducted at the lowest levels of its 
organisational structure. 
In a similar way to which inconsistencies and contestations emerged between 
different spatial arenas of colonial governmentality in their approach towards 
communal reservations within the legislative assembly, there was also rarely 
anything definite about how ‘community’ played into these forms of political 
mobilisation. In particular political arenas at particular moments, it might benefit 
‘a local leader to highlight the idea of a caste or religious constituency, as a way of 
building a power base ... but of course there often had to be underlying reasons 
for competition between the constituencies that were being mobilised’.79 So 
whereas across the north, with its sizeable Muslim population, mobilisations 
around religion often served the interests of factional alliances and affiliations (on 
the basis of both communal antagonisms and cross-communal cooperation), for 
the Times this recourse to ‘individualism’ in selecting nominees in Maharashtra 
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came to be shaped by a broad historical binary between Brahmans and non-
Brahmans. This had particular relevance in a period in which the Congress’s 
expanding support base and socially ameliorative rhetoric was attracting more 
non-Brahmans into the Congress, internalising this conflict within the party: 
‘Brahmin will vote for Brahmin and if there is a good percentage of Brahmin 
votes in any one constituency then a Brahmin will be returned no matter 
what his ticket. In the same constituency a non-Brahmin may score for the 
same reason ... From saying that the elections are being fought upon an 
individual basis one can safely go on to suggest that parties in the new 
Legislative Assembly are likely to be based to begin with on personalities 
rather than on adherence to a common platform’.80 
Such assessments were replicated in the colonial reportage of the era. According 
to the District Magistrate of Ahmednagar, in the Northern Division constituency in 
the province, where the representatives of four seats were to be chosen, ‘The 
three Congress candidates elected were all Non-Brahmans who had not 
previously taken a very active part in Congress affairs and were clearly selected 
for tactical reasons on account of their caste’.81 However, in alternative 
constituencies and at other elections within Maharashtra the dichotomous and 
homogenised depiction of a Brahman/non-Brahman divide could be cut across by 
different forms of political mobilisation within these categories, or united in 
contention with an externalised ‘other’. Ahead of the elections in 1937 in Bombay, 
for example, the leader of the MPCC and one of those responsible for choosing 
suitable Congress nominees for election was the Brahman and Gandhian politician 
Shankarrao Deo. In August 1936, Deo was to receive a letter from K.M. Munshi, 
the prospective Congress candidate for the BLA’s University constituency, which 
disclosed the importance of linguistic affinities (in which Brahman and non-
Brahman interests combined around a Marathi-speaking identity) in the internal 
wranglings behind party preferences for this particular seat. 
Munshi, a prominent barrister who had been active in the Home Rule Movement 
of the 1910s, who had joined the Congress under the influence of Gandhi, and 
who would become Home Minister in the Bombay Congress Government in 1937, 
was well known for stressing the importance of developing a Gujarati regional 
consciousness. As a prominent author, his novels were based on Gujarati 
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historical themes that aimed at the reconstruction of a Gujarati cultural golden 
age.82 And in the aftermath of independence, both Deo and Munshi would 
emerge as possibly the most prominent Congress advocates of often antagonistic 
Marathi and Gujarati interests in the context of demands for linguistic 
reorganisation. This is something which we will consider in greater detail in the 
next section of this chapter, when we focus upon the 1951 elections. In 1936, 
however, Munshi accused Deo of suggesting that if he, as a Gujarati, ‘stood for 
the University constituency sufficient support from Maharashtra [would] not be 
forthcoming on personal grounds’.83 In response Munshi insisted, in the 
circumstances, he would not stand ‘if the Congress leaders of Maharashtra have 
no confidence in me or if they think that they cannot marshall [sic] sufficient 
voting strength in my favour in their province’.84 For Deo and others who had 
voiced concern over Munshi’s candidature, linguistic affinities rather than caste 
cleavages were central to forms of political mobilisation in this particular 
constituency. 
At other times, forms of political mobilisation around particular factional 
networks could disturb the neat compartmentalisation of non-Brahman interests. 
Ahead of provincial elections in 1946, Deo and the President of the Congress’s 
Central Parliamentary Board Vallabhbhai Patel received a letter from V.C. Pawar, 
the Secretary of Nasik City DCC, in which Pawar claimed as many as 42 
Congressmen had applied for six Congress candidacies in the city. But of the six 
chosen, Pawar alleged, three were former representatives of the ‘communal-
minded’ Maratha League.85 The Maratha League, originally a caste-based 
organisation that had sought to distinguish Marathas from other non-Brahmans 
during the 1910s, had been revived as a totally new party in the mid-1930s under 
the patronage of the Maharaja of Kolhapur, as ‘a sectarian organisation, on the 
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lines of the Muslim League ... to safeguard the interests of the Marathas, as apart 
from the general interests of the Hindus’.86 Public support for this new party was 
judged by the Raj to be relatively minimal – the League was generally thought to 
be constituted by elite loyalist politicians, including former officers in the Indian 
army.87 Having opposed Congress candidates in the 1937 election, the League also 
offered ‘unanimous support to the British Government in the prosecution of this 
war against Germany’, and purportedly aided in the suppression of Congress 
activities during the 1942 Quit India movement after organising a Maratha 
militia.88 
Therefore, because of their history of service within the Maratha League, Pawar 
argued, these men did not deserve to be selected as potential Congress 
candidates in 1946. For him, they were ‘not full Khadidhari [wearers of khadi, 
hand-spun cloth favoured by Congress nationalists who sought to boycott foreign 
goods], they never worked in the Congress before, and they never participated in 
any Congress activities’.89 Rather these candidates’ ‘inner aim’, Pawar claimed, 
was to ‘establish Maratha domination in all social spheres by any way’.90 Whereas 
the Congress had been oft conflated with ‘Brahman Raj’ at the start of our period 
of study, in this instance it was now the non-Brahman Marathas who were 
perceived as dominating local manifestations of Congress political power. The 
potential for antagonisms to emerge within the non-Brahman category, and for 
inter-caste Brahman/non-Brahman alliances to coalesce around a Marathi-
speaking identity, therefore point towards the complexity and contingency of the 
Congress’s local mobilisational practices. And in the variety of these everyday 
political processes, Congress official rhetoric about Indian society’s cultural and 
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purposive harmony is thus oft dislocated and its developmental programmes 
frequently misapplied. 
The divergence between the practices of local Congress powerbrokers and the 
discourse of Congress communal impartiality and social egalitarianism ‘enable a 
certain construction of the [organisation] that meshes the imagined translocal 
institution with its localised embodiments’.91 This is what Thomas Blom Hansen 
has elsewhere defined as the ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ dimensions of state power.92 
By appropriating this terminology, and applying it to a quasi-state institution such 
as the Congress instead, we are able to envisage the complex situated 
perspectives from which the party is perceived in the imagination and everyday 
practices of ordinary people. Because the party increasingly emerged as the 
dominant repository for votes in the gradual transition from colonialism to 
independence and democracy, it thus also came to serve as the primary site 
through which certain ideas about citizenship rights and forms of belonging – the 
right to vote, the representativeness of Congress candidates or elected politicians 
within their chosen constituency, the accountability of politicians for ensuring 
state resources reach their intended targets, or their ability to redirect them in 
the interests of particular groups within local society – were constructed and 
mediated. These everyday imaginings and enactments of citizenship could thus 
mould and reconstitute the official party line on belonging and rights in India into 
something relatively unrecognisable. Yet the public could also make recourse to 
ostensible party principles to castigate the actions of local party representatives 
when the need arose. Since not everyone imagined their relationship with the 
Congress organisation in exactly the same manner, a variety of hybridised and 
interchangeable conceptualisations of citizenship could emerge out of individual 
and group interactions with the party, and could shift depending on context. 
One particular example will suffice here to explicate the argument that I am 
making, before we move on in the following sections of this chapter to consider 
how these various manifestations of citizenship were both defined and transpired 
within the context of independence, partition and linguistic reorganisation. Ahead 
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of the provincial elections of January 1946, Vallabhbhai Patel received a letter 
expressing interest in the selection of Congress candidates in Bombay City. 
Significantly, the letter was addressed from ‘the Voters of the G Ward and 
Suburbs (Dadar and Suburbs)’ constituency, and made explicit reference to the 
necessity of conveying ‘the feelings of the citizens of this ward’.93 Concerned 
about the representativeness of the Congress candidate within their constituency, 
the signatories first listed a number of points ‘in order of preference’, which they 
hoped the party would take into account within the selection process:  
‘length of service to the nation through the Congress – whether since 1920, 
1930, 1935 or very recently; sacrifices done in the cause of the Congress 
Fight for Independence; continuous and unchallenged loyalty to the 
Congress; service to the area from where he is to be returned; the majority 
of voters must feel the candidate as their own; other points such as 
educational qualifications, capacity, leisure, monetary conditions etc from 
our point are secondary’.94 
At one level, then, their appeal was couched in the language of ideological criteria 
relating to party and national loyalty and service. In this sense the letter reflected 
the rhetoric of the CWC, particularly as it sought to address the higher echelons of 
the Congress organisation, embodied here by Patel as the President of the Central 
Parliamentary Board. But the signatories to the letter also sought to apply and 
utilise this principled language for the constituency’s benefit. The candidate was 
also described as needing to be accountable to the voters, evident in the 
emphasis placed upon ‘service to the area from where he is to be returned’. 
Finally, the penultimate point concerned the necessity of the candidate’s 
representativeness, something elaborated upon in one further prerequisite 
described in the letter: 
‘The number of Voters is predominantly Marathi Speaking, and it would not 
be fit to select somebody however eminent he may be who is also not a 
Deccani. We do understand that under the Congress Flag there is no 
provincialism or communalism but we have not grown up to that stage as 
yet and our opponents like Hindu Sabha etc. are likely to carry on a 
mischievous propaganda to appeal to the provincialism etc. We know that 
whoever he is the Congress Candidate will be elected but every time the 
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dissatisfaction goes on increasing and may burst when there is over 
accumulation’.95 
The high-sounding ideological rhetoric of the CWC regarding representativeness 
was thus re-contextualised, to be locally mediated on the basis of the candidate’s 
linguistic affiliations. Whilst other political organisations matched their candidates 
with local communal demographics, the Congress is implicitly criticised for having 
selected unrepresentative elites from amongst the constituency’s linguistic 
minorities.96 The signatories suggested that the best way through which the 
Congress candidate could both represent and be accountable to the interests of 
their constituency was if they epitomised the locally numerically-preponderate 
Marathi-speaking community. The utilisation of ‘community’ in the interests of 
electoral allegiance would therefore provide the majority of local society with a 
form of agency in the articulation and practice of their citizenship. But at the same 
time, by privileging the majority of local society in the selection process as the 
letter advised, the local Congress could also threaten to disregard linguistic 
‘minority’ communities in the constituency. The letter is therefore indicative of 
the situated perspectives through which citizens envisage and interact with the 
Congress. It was in the context of this meshing of local political practices and 
representations of party ideology that the right to vote and the right to 
representation, as performances of citizenship, were imagined and enacted. And 
this could create curious hybrids, where principled commitments to accountability 
and representativeness were imagined as best delineated on the basis of 
‘community’ interests. 
 
3.4 The Selection of Congress Candidates in Bombay, 1951: Citizenship in 
the Context of Independence, Partition and Linguistic Reorganisation 
Ahead of general elections to be held in the winter of 1951-52 Jawaharlal Nehru, 
now the first Prime Minister of an independent India, drafted a resolution on ‘The 
Right Kind of Candidates’ to be chosen by the various PCCs in the selection 
process, which was ratified by the CWC in its July 1951 session at Bangalore. For 
Nehru and the CWC, it was imperative that 
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‘Candidates should be chosen with great care and should be men and 
women of integrity, who by their past record and present professions, have 
shown that they believe in and act up to the principles and objectives 
proclaimed on behalf of the Congress. In particular, care should be taken 
that the choice of suitable candidates is not affected by the predominance 
of any group or clique in any area’.97 
These criteria were further elaborated upon in a letter from Nehru to the 
Chairmen of the Provincial Election Committees in September of that year. One of 
the key ideological considerations here was the approach of the Congress in 
comparison to the ‘communal bodies’. Nehru was to stipulate that ‘Congress 
candidates must be chosen with particular care so that they might represent fully 
the non-communal character and approach of the Congress. Persons who have 
been connected with communal organisations should therefore be suspects from 
this point of view’.98 Likewise, during his countrywide campaign ahead of the 
elections, Nehru indicated that he was ‘laying great stress on one thing in 
particular – communalism which is rearing its head in some parts of the 
country’.99 The primary context for this shift in emphasis around communalism 
(which had always been something which had threatened the Congress’s efforts 
to present itself as embodying the needs, concerns and purposes of all of Indian 
society) were the events of 1947. With the advent of independence, ‘most Indians 
... were [now] theoretically defined by the state as “citizens” rather than 
“subjects”. Rights were defined by democratic conventions and ... a written 
constitution’.100 Full adult suffrage and participation within electoral politics now 
became a reality for all. 
However, independence was also accompanied by the events of partition and the 
creation of a separate Muslim ‘homeland’ of Pakistan. In one of his speeches 
ahead of the elections, Nehru proclaimed that ‘Many of our brethren were misled 
and the poison spread far and wide, bringing a great disaster upon us and 
ultimately led to the partition of the country. So we must learn from experience 
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and understand where communalism is likely to lead us’.101 By raising the spectre 
of partition, Nehru and other leading Congressmen sought to distinguish an 
outwardly secular and ‘progressive’ India from a religiously-inclined and 
‘backward’ Pakistan. A vote for the Congress was thus presented by Nehru in 
terms of this starkly polarised contrast: 
‘In a nation, all its citizens should have equal rights, whatever their religion. 
This has been put down in our Constitution, and the Congress has followed 
this fundamental principle all these years ... I am not bothered about your 
vote. I am more bothered about your mind and heart and that you should 
grasp this fact. I am worried that what has been achieved after tremendous 
difficulty and sacrifices – our freedom – should not slip away or get 
weakened, and that we may again become backward. We will become 
backward unless we constantly follow a progressive path. Communalism 
will certainly set us back and bind us down, especially the sort of 
communalism shown by some of these Hindu and Sikh organizations 
nowadays’.102 
The implications of this ideological position ahead of the elections were not solely 
restricted to the Congress rallying against religious forms of communalism. These 
tendencies could also manifest themselves around alternative forms of 
‘community’ interest related to caste, language and region. In this broader 
context, partition had larger, more comprehensive consequences and implications 
upon forms of citizenship, representing only one realised manifestation of a range 
of regionalised imaginings and ‘ideas of India’.103 Across the south and west of the 
subcontinent, and including Maharashtra, movements demanding the 
reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries on cultural and linguistic 
lines emerged in the context of an impending independence, and on analogous 
lines to the Pakistan demand, as alternative and autonomous sites through which 
citizens could conceptualise their rights and status. In Bombay, this also owed 
something to the mismatched nature of provincial administration and the PCCs – 
the Bombay Congress government was frequently depicted by Maharashtrians as 
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primarily serving the interests of, and redirecting state resources towards, 
Gujarat.104  
Ahead of independence, a group of leading Congressmen (not least Nehru) had 
therefore come to acknowledge the necessity of accepting partition in the north-
east and north-west as a means by which to assert the power of the centre over 
the other provinces elsewhere in the subcontinent.105 Congress rhetoric against 
communalism ahead of the elections was also therefore constructed in the 
context of the party’s efforts to contain further ‘fissiparous’ demands. Here, it was 
the possibility that electoral choices would be made on the basis of caste and 
language which was presented as the greatest cause for Congress concern.  The 
1951 election manifesto made specific reference to the demands for linguistic 
reorganisation, but asserted that other factors, ‘such as economic, administrative 
and financial, ... have to be taken into consideration’.106 In his campaign speeches 
Nehru also referred to the constant 
‘danger ... that any caste which is in a majority in a particular area will 
choose its caste men ... [T]his narrow-minded way of electing a candidate 
will mean that the future Parliament will be full of men of low stature, of 
individuals who think all the time only of parochial interests, of their own 
caste and locality, and not of the entire country and its problems’.107 
Nehru and the CWC therefore demanded that an emphasis on integrity, past 
record, and agreement with the principles and objectives of the Congress, rather 
than communalism and factionalism in the context of the recent partition and 
demands for the refashioning of provincial administrative boundaries, should 
govern the selection of potential Congress candidates. However, the localised 
practices on the part of the PCCs in Bombay were to depart considerably from 
these prerequisites. At one level, the problem emanated from discrepancies 
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within the rhetoric of Nehru and other Congressmen themselves. Despite 
emphasising that factional and communal affinities should play no part in the 
selection process, Nehru went on in his letter to the Chairmen of the Provincial 
Election Committees (cited above) to assert that 
‘It is not only a matter of honour for us, but something of great practical 
importance, that we put up representatives of the minority communities in 
adequate numbers. Separate electorates and reservations have been given 
up, and this has increased our responsibility in this respect. If we fail to 
discharge this responsibility, critics will be entitled to say that joint 
electorates have failed, and that we cannot adequately protect the 
interests of minorities ... Normally we should try to give them 
representation in accordance with their population’.108 
It was in this regard that Nehru was to get in touch with the Chief Minister of 
Bombay Province, Morarji Desai, to criticise the list of potential Congress 
candidates provided by the BPCC. Nehru advocated the inclusion of one Abid Ali, a 
long-serving Congressman who had participated in several Satyagrahas during the 
colonial period, had been imprisoned for the Congress cause, and was a current 
AICC member. But another reason in favour of his selection related to ‘his being a 
Muslim’ and ‘member of a minority community which we wish to encourage’.109 
By recommending candidates on the basis of their community whilst otherwise 
advocating the essential unity of Indian citizens before the law, Nehru and others 
thus opened the party up to criticism over the contradictions evident within its 
rhetoric.110 At another level, however, the privileging of ‘community’ in the 
selection process was tied in with the local politics of clientelism and faction. In 
the same letter to Desai, reference was made by Nehru to the suggestion that Ali 
had not been selected because of his differences with the BPCC President and the 
Chair of its Provincial Election Committee, S.K. Patil. There was a ‘general 
impression’, Nehru claimed, ‘that [the BPCC] is controlled by a narrow clique, and 
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any person who cannot fit into that clique has no chance of survival. S.K. Patil is 
the bête noire of large numbers of people’.111 
Generally, the procedure for choosing Congress candidates ahead of elections 
involved the various DCCs making recommendations to the Provincial Election 
Committee, who could then either accept these proposed candidates or select its 
own nominees. ‘The factional groups based in the DCCs then, had to engage 
patronage networks and leaders at a state level, in order to get their men 
selected’.112 In Bombay City, S.K. Patil was situated at the apex of this network of 
political cliques and clientelistic networks and could thus preside over the 
selection of candidates that were allied with his particular faction. For example, 
after local Congressmen based within the suburb of Mahim had passed a 
resolution recommending a candidate for the forthcoming elections in September 
1951, Patil quickly chastised the Mahim Committee’s President. According to Patil 
it was ‘neither fair nor proper for subordinate Congress Committees to suggest 
any names’, as it ‘would only create embarrassing situations’. Therefore, ‘no 
notice can be taken of any such recommendations’.113 Once decisions had been 
made by the Provincial Election Committees, the list of proposed candidates was 
then passed on to the Central Parliamentary Board for ultimate approval. 
As we have seen in the previous sections of this chapter, the manner in which 
these political cliques, factions and clientelistic networks could be constructed 
could, at certain moments, privilege the paradigm of ‘community’ in the interests 
of electoral contingency. In choosing candidates for the national and provincial 
assemblies in Bombay City, Patil proposed and implemented his idea that 
representation was to be given to communities on a ‘communal-wise as well as 
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territorial-wise’ basis.114 In theory, this meant that where a community had a 
population of 100,000 members or more in the city, they were to be given at least 
one representative to contest from the place in which, as far as possible, they had 
the largest concentration. The other members of the Bombay City Election 
Committee agreed that it was ‘quite necessary to make such an allotment and 
approved of the plans of the Chairman’.115 ‘Community’ affinities therefore 
became a legitimate means through which the rationale behind the selection of 
Congress candidates was conducted at the local level. But this could also work the 
other way. Allegations of communal preference could also emerge within the 
context of disputes between factions about the selection of particular candidates. 
Issues regarding communal and ethnic allegiances in the selection process were 
thus voiced in the appeals which the AICC permitted unsuccessful Congress 
candidates and other members of the party to make against the decision of the 
PCCs, or to send in representations against the chosen candidate. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses upon a series of vignettes drawn from 
these files of complaints on individual Congressmen in Bombay Province 
contained within the AICC Papers, to make inferences about everyday 
conceptualisations of citizenship in the context of linguistic reorganisation.116 Of 
course, these factional appeals and representations were often of doubtful 
veracity and quite possibly based on hearsay. But they provide a number of 
significant insights into the centrality of ‘community’ in the discourses 
surrounding the rights of the citizen to suitable electoral representativeness and 
accountability. In this regard, the complaint to the AICC serves as the site through 
which the citizen or local Congressman questioned the legitimacy of the provincial 
selection panel for not correctly discharging their responsibilities.117  
References to ‘community’ occurred in a number of different circumstances. They 
emerged in instances where complaints were made about a candidate being not 
quite representative enough. Conversely, they materialised around objections to 
the selection of candidates on the basis of local demographic dominance. They 
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could also develop around the past propensities of candidates to manipulate and 
extract state resources in the interests of particular communities. All of the 
complainants considered below employed aspects and provided examples of both 
the Congress’s secular and egalitarian rhetoric and local political practices, in a 
variety of ways which were dependent upon their own particular situations and 
circumstances. But at the same time, these ordinary Congressmen were 
themselves members of local society, whose petitions were shaped by their own 
norms and beliefs, and by the application of everyday societal pressures upon 
them.118 The politics of ‘community’ was thus sometimes also considered by 
members of ordinary society as the best method through which to guarantee the 
actualisation of citizenship’s privileges and guarantees. And in this sense, notions 
of representativeness and accountability were mutually constituted through both 
the ideologies and processes of the Congress as a quasi-state organisation, and 
the imaginings and practices of ordinary people. 
 
3.5 Representativeness and Accountability 
Our first case study concerns an appeal received by the AICC from one D.P. 
Tandel, a rejected Congress candidate from the Palghar and Jawahar Constituency 
in Thana District, who claimed that the Congress’s chosen nominee for this ward 
was unable to fully represent the interests of the majority of the region’s 
constituents. This, Tandel suggested, owed something to the candidate’s own 
ethno-linguistic affinities.119 Bordering Bombay City to the south-west, the 
Marathi-speaking districts of Kolaba, Poona, Ahmednagar and Nasik to the south 
and east, the Gujarati-speaking former princely state of Baroda to the north, and 
the Arabian Sea to the west, the political situation in Thana during this period was 
particularly vexing for a number of reasons. First, the structure of the district’s 
administration caused considerable confusion and numerous disputes in the 
context of demands for linguistic reorganisation. Whilst its proceedings were 
conducted in the Marathi language, Thana had been grouped within the ‘Northern 
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Division’ of Bombay Province, which otherwise was made up of primarily Gujarati-
speaking districts.120 Its location on the border between Marathi-speaking and 
Gujarati-speaking areas in the province also ensured both proponents of Gujarat 
and Maharashtra made claims to the district, or certain tracts within it, in 
anticipation of the new provincial jurisdictions.  
Second, Thana District was culturally and ethnically diverse. Much of the coastal 
region around Bombay City, including the district administrative headquarters at 
Thana City, was becoming an overflow for the metropolis during the twentieth 
century. Owing to both rapid urbanisation and international, inter-provincial and 
intra-provincial migration, this south-western corner of the district had become a 
site of considerable linguistic heterogeneity, with large populations of Gujarati-, 
Hindi-, Marathi- and (after partition) Sindhi-speakers. Further up the coast, and in 
the mountainous interior, Thana District was home to both ‘backward’ and adivasi 
(‘tribal’) communities such as the Kolis, Warlis, Katkaris, Dhublas, Dhodias and 
Gabits (fishermen). The ethno-linguistic affinities of these borderline 
‘communities’ were also open to question ahead of provincial reorganisation, and 
were contested by proponents of Gujarat and Maharashtra who sought to take 
advantage of these territories being included within the new administrative 
boundaries.121 For example, in a representation to the Linguistic Provinces 
Commission of 1948, tasked with discussing the feasibility and practicalities of 
reorganisation, the Thana District Gujarati Conference claimed that the ‘grammar 
and construction’ of the adivasis’ language was ‘more akin to Gujerati than 
Marathi’.122 In the same year, Harsidhbhai Divatia argued, on behalf of the Gujarat 
Research Society, that these adivasis were an indigenous, Gujarati-speaking ‘old 
[racial] stock’ of Thana District, who were ‘closely connected with the soil’.123 
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Marathi-speakers, on the other hand, had ‘come to Thana recently for service or 
for other form of maintenance’.124 
It was in these larger circumstances linked to reorganisation and the ethno-
linguistic allegiances of Thana’s adivasi and backward communities that our 
rejected candidate D.P. Tandel protested the decision to award the Congress 
candidacy in Palghar-Jawahar to 
‘Kumari Jayanti Shroff, a Gujarati lady, when the whole constituency is 
predominently [sic] Maharashtrian and of the backward classes. She is the 
daughter of a businessman and businessmen in Palghar can be counted on 
the tips of fingers. I do not know why this nonentity who cannot and does 
not command the confidence of voters and who has done no social work of 
any importance or taken any part in political activity has been selected ... 
’.125 
In contrast, Tandel recommended his own candidature within the appeal on the 
basis of a number of different considerations. References were made to his 
engagement in Congress activities ‘from the very beginning of the Congress 
movement since 1922. I have been jailed not once, twice but thrice. I was once in 
Jail for one year, another time for two years and a third time also. At no time in 
my whole service have I done anything against the Congress’.126 On the one hand, 
then, Tandel sought to position his appeal within the context of Nehru’s 
recommendations about the selection of appropriate candidates on the basis of 
their past record towards the nationalist cause. He presented his own historical 
involvement in the Congress in stark contrast to Shroff’s failure to ‘take part in 
any political activity’. He also emphasised his participation in social work over the 
past thirty years in a similar manner, thereby highlighting his sense of 
accountability towards the local electorate. But it was here that an emphasis on 
‘community’ also permeated his appeal. Whereas Shroff was a Gujarati woman 
with links to business interests, he was ‘born a Fisherman and [did] business as a 
fisherman and [had] done social uplift work among the fishermen and the 
backward class and [had] started and aided cooperative institutions of the 
Backward class and ... [enjoyed] their confidence’.127 On the other hand, Tandel 
was thus both representative of and accountable towards his constituency on the 
basis of shared ethnic affinities. 
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In this appeal, then, Tandel positioned himself as the protector of Maharashtrian 
and ‘backward’ community interests, in which he would serve the electorate by 
ensuring an equitable distribution of state resources. It helped that he was 
himself a member of this ‘backward’ community, and thus subject to the same 
pressures, exigencies and concerns. By approving the selection of a Gujarati-
speaking businesswoman who had shown a distinct disinterest in social work 
amongst the region’s ‘backward’ communities, Tandel believed the local Congress 
committee had reneged on its commitments towards the majority of Palghar-
Jawahar’s voters. This was part of a broader provincial malaise: ‘although the 
Congress has many times avowed that it stands for the amelioration of the 
condition of the backward class and fishermen, ... there is no single spokesman of 
that class or community’ selected as a potential Congress candidate from Bombay 
Province.128 In this sense, the politics of ‘community’ within the selection process 
were presented by Tandel as the best means through which to guarantee the 
privileges and guarantees of citizenship amongst this section of the population. In 
many ways, Tandel’s ambitions are also thus a localised reflection of ideological 
motivations behind the demands for linguistic reorganisation. Like the proponents 
of a unilingual Maharashtra, he sought to improve ‘democratic transparency and 
accountability in the region’ and involve ‘local people to a great[er] extent in the 
development process’.129 By doing so he would thus improve the everyday 
purchase of citizenship rights amongst his constituents.  
Invocations of the rights of citizens to representation and accountability were 
thus critical to factional struggles within the Congress organisation over candidate 
selection, and could potentially benefit particular sections of the public. But 
precisely because these forms of political representation and thus access to the 
resources of the state were arranged on the basis of ‘community’, they could 
potentially benefit particularly locally dominant groups more effortlessly than 
others.130 Our second vignette concerns a range of appeals, petitions and 
complaints received by the AICC in October 1951 from disgruntled members of 
the public and local Congressmen in Poona District.131 Poona District was situated 
in the centre of what would become Maharashtra, surrounded by the 
predominantly Marathi-speaking districts of Ahmednagar, Sholapur, Satara, 
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Kolaba and Thana. The implications of a potential reorganisation of provincial 
administrative boundaries here may thus seem relatively insignificant in 
comparison to Thana. The introduction of democracy in the context of 
reorganisation has perhaps most persistently been perceived as a harbinger of 
Marathi linguistic majoritarianism, whereby a newfound consensus between 
Brahmans, Marathas and other Marathi-speaking communities had coalesced 
around the idea of the ‘Marathi manus’, or Marathi man, in opposition to a 
Gujarati ‘other’.132 But in the context of the rapid identification of issues in the 
interests of electoral contingency, at other times and places this ‘Maharashtrian-
ness’ could be cut across by other forms of identity linked to caste, class and 
religion. In fact, it was in Poona that the most frequent references to the 
manipulation of the selection process on the basis of ‘community’ appeared 
within the appeals and representations received by the AICC ahead of the 1951 
elections.  
Of central importance to the accusations about the selection of candidates were 
fears that in a future unilingual Maharashtra, Marathas, as the province’s most 
numerically preponderate caste group, would monopolise access to elected 
political posts, government jobs and state resources. Whereas in Bombay 
Province, the strength of the ‘Maratha vote’ was diluted by the presence of 
Gujarati- and Kannada-speaking voters, the creation of Maharashtra would 
increase the percentage of Marathas within the provincial electorate. This 
process, many of the appeals and representations suggested, was already evident 
in Poona District, where the selection of Congress candidates was made on the 
basis of demographic ‘community’ interests. N.K. Gokhale, a Brahman pleader 
from the town of Baramati, regaled the AICC with a tale of how he was forced 
from local office in 1940 by the former MPCC President Keshavrao Jedhe on 
account of his caste identity, and had resigned from the Baramati Taluka Congress 
Committee in protest. He suggested that he had applied once again to be a 
Congress candidate ‘to test whether the efforts and constant declarations of 
Nehru had any effect on the local and provincial Congress committees, which I still 
saw had a strong bias for community and caste’.133 In this regard, W.H. Kothadiya, 
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another pleader from Baramati but from amongst the local Jain ‘community’, 
cited a recent statement made by the MPCC President B.S. Hiray to the press, in 
which Hiray had asserted ‘that he had selected only 63 candidates as Marathas 
out of 143 seats of the BLA though there is an outstanding overwhelming majority 
of the Maratha community in Maharashtra. If properly considered they would 
have got more seats than they had already got’.134 For Kothadiya, this 
demonstrated that communal considerations had infiltrated the allocation of 
seats. 
Kothadiya also suggested that Hiray’s claims about a Maratha ‘majority’ distorted 
provincial demographics: ‘In Maharashtra there are so many communities such as 
Malis, Dhangar, Sonar, Sali, Koshti, Shimpi, Lingayat, Brahmin, Jain, Parsi, Christian 
etc etc. that if properly considered the number of Marathas would not be eight to 
ten per cent’.135 R.K. Karkhanis, a journalist from Poona City, made similar claims 
in his assertions about the division of Poona District’s communal populations – 
whilst ‘ten candidates out of 14 selected were from the Maratha community 
alone ... the majority of the voters in this District is of non-Marathas (nearly 
double the Maratha community)’.136 In Karkhanis’ opinion, it was evident that 
Hiray and the Poona DCC President A.S. Awate, both Marathas by caste, had 
‘joined hands together to suppress non-Maratha communities’ in the district.137 
Reflecting on what he perceived to be the manipulation of the selection process in 
the Maratha’s interests, the journalist R.K. Karkhanis argued that 
‘It is a fact as clear as day-light that there is hardly any selfless worker in the 
Maratha community devoted to the Congress. They are all first-class 
opportunists taking advantages of power politics. It is extremely doubtful 
whether these Maratha candidates have any ability to preserve the prestige 
of the great Congress. All these so-called king-makers (Parliamentary Board) 
and candidates selected are a gang of selfish persons. They have got vested 
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interests for their community alone. After taking advantage of the power, 
they would mercilessly kick the mother Congress at any time’.138 
Perhaps the most significant appeal came from D.R. Wayase, a member of the 
Dhangar (a politically, socially and educationally ‘backward’ caste who were 
traditionally shepherds) ‘community’ who had applied for nomination as a 
Congress candidate in either the Indapur or Baramati constituencies within 
Poona. Wayase noted that ‘the movement for national freedom was not smooth 
in this part, as several movements of a communal nature originated and thrived 
here’.139 For Wayase, longstanding Brahman/non-Brahman antagonisms had left a 
‘legacy’ of communal consciousness amongst the Marathas, which had been 
utilised by a section of Congressmen ‘to capture most places of importance’ 
ahead of the elections.140 He suggested that this had important implications for 
Dhangars and other non-Brahman ‘communities’ beyond the Marathas residing 
within Poona District: 
‘I found an appeal from Dhangar communalists finding ready response to 
break away from Congress which was being a vehicle of Maratha 
domination. Their demand was more and proper representation for their 
community in all elections. This feeling and demand by itself is not proper 
and commendable. But it must not be forgotten that this is a reaction to the 
communalism of the Marathas’.141 
These extracts are revealing of the ways in which local Congressmen and 
members of the public in Poona negotiated and re-contextualised both 
overarching Congress rhetoric about communal impartiality in the selection 
process and local Congress practices which had apparently privileged Marathas. 
First, as the quotation taken from Gokhale’s letter demonstrates, appeals 
frequently drew upon the language of the Congress High Command’s claims to all-
India ‘representativeness’ and political secularism. In all of the appeals, this was 
contrasted with the propensity towards ‘communalism’ on the part of the MPCC 
and Poona DCC in the selection of their candidates. And in the context of an 
impending linguistic reorganisation, the potential for particular Maratha-based 
interests to control provincial politics would be amplified. Both Kothadiya and 
                                                          
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., ‘Letter from Devrao Ramrao Wayase, to the Chairman, Central Election 
Committee, “Appeal against the decision of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress 





Karkhanis went on to suggest that the candidates chosen were ultimately 
unrepresentative and unaccountable because they had been selected in the 
interests of their caste; Marathas, despite being a numerically preponderate 
‘community’, did not represent the interests of the majority of the non-Maratha 
public in Poona District. However, by focusing upon communal demographics, the 
efficacy of ‘community’ in these appeals was to clandestinely return. In the appeal 
of Wayase, for example, reference is made to the need for ‘more and proper 
representation’ for the Dhangar community to counter ‘the communalism of the 
Marathas’ and ‘Maratha domination’. On the one hand, local Congressmen and 
the public raised demands for more inclusive forms of representation as a crucial 
manifestation of their citizenship; but on the other, these continued to be 
constructed around ‘community’ interests. Local imaginings and enactments of 
rights and status, formulated around everyday interactions between the Congress 
organisation and local society over the candidate selection process, thus 
circumnavigated and refashioned citizenship’s definition within the party’s 
overarching electoral rhetoric into curiously imagined hybrids at the quotidian 
level. 
In their references to ‘community’ as critical within the selection process, the 
memorandums and petitions within Poona District paralleled Tandel’s 
conceptualisation of citizenship at the nexus of political ideology and practice. 
Central to the appeals made in both Poona and Thana was an emphasis upon 
guaranteeing the rights, privileges and interests of Marathi-speaking society. To at 
least some extent, then, the local public was granted agency in the articulation of 
their citizenship, particularly when the interests, allegiances and ethnicities of 
local Congressmen and particular elements coalesced. However, the ability of the 
public to influence the selection process was also often conditioned by these 
same caste and linguistic affinities, with Marathas and Marathi-speakers more 
likely to dominate its articulation and enactment in a potential Maharashtra. 
Meanwhile, Tandel’s particular spatial and temporal location in Thana at the time 
of growing demands for reorganisation, and in circumstances in which a Gujarati-
speaking candidate had been chosen to represent the Congress, ensured that he 
privileged the politics of language instead of caste. By raising the issue of ethno-
linguistic affinities, Tandel was also able to suggest that the interests of the 
constituency’s majority had been overlooked rather than raising fears over the 
weaknesses of a communal minority, as in Poona. The examples presented here 
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thus highlight how conceptualisations of citizenship could fluctuate around local 
societal circumstances, political contingencies and the manipulation of ostensible 
Congress principles, depending upon the situated perspective of the citizen. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has concentrated upon citizenship in Bombay Province as a dynamic 
process, conceptualised, articulated and practised in response to the increased 
forms of democratic self-governance at the provincial level during the interwar 
period, and then in anticipation of and reaction to the events of independence, 
partition and linguistic reorganisation. Central to all these experiences’ impacts 
upon ideas about citizenship were both the Indian National Congress’s ostensible 
ideological commitments to secularism and social egalitarianism, and its 
propensity towards the politics of faction and community in its localised practices. 
Throughout this period the Congress attempted to present itself as both 
representative of and accountable towards all Indian subjects/citizens, whether in 
its efforts to succeed at provincial and general elections within the constitutional 
structure of the state or to mobilise society behind ‘non-cooperative’ Gandhian 
protests. In this sense, debates about citizenship in India were always wrapped up 
within these larger political agendas. However, because the nationalist anti-
colonial struggle needed to take place at a popular level to certify its all-India 
representativeness, the Congress came to rely upon local political powerbrokers 
to mobilise public support for the party. This chapter has shown how the interwar 
period witnessed a gradual shift in the vast majority of these local 
representatives’ allegiances, generally away from the colonial state and towards 
the Congress as a quasi-state alternative. But these new members also frequently 
brought with them habits and customs of governance which they had developed 
during their years of collaboration with the Raj. 
In the context of the centrality accorded to ‘community’ in colonial forms of 
political representation and collaboration, the emergence of a nascent ‘Congress 
system’ therefore often led to the more forceful articulation of ‘community’ 
interests within the Congress. Yet this was a practice which was subject to a 
number of fluctuations across time and space. Particularly in the north of the 
subcontinent, Congress agents often became associated, both symbolically and in 
actuality, with organisations and ideologies of Hindu revivalism. In the Marathi-
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speaking districts of Bombay, meanwhile, local Congressmen were more 
frequently drawn towards utilising caste and, increasingly, language, as the key 
criteria for mobilising society behind the nationalist movement. This was 
represented by a vast shift in the allegiances of Maharashtrian non-Brahmans 
during the interwar period, away from the Raj and the ‘loyalist’ Non-Brahman 
Party and towards the Congress. Brahman/non-Brahman antagonisms thus came 
to be newly internalised within the party. At the same time, however, this chapter 
has highlighted instances where this broadly-based Brahman/non-Brahman divide 
could be cut across by politicians in the interests of electoral contingency. 
Increasingly throughout this period, non-Brahmanism came to be seen as a site of 
Maratha dominance. Equally, Brahman, non-Brahman and other interests could at 
times combine around regional Maharashtrian political interests. This variety in 
‘community’-based mobilisations across different arenas within the Congress 
organisation had important implications for the divergent ways in which 
‘community’ influenced particular constructions of citizenship.  
Whereas the demand for Pakistan was devised and orchestrated on the basis of 
representing the interests of a Muslim citizenry, similar calls for forms of 
provincial autonomy elsewhere in the subcontinent were organised on the basis 
of language. Nehru’s emphasis on combating communalism within the Congress’s 
selection process ahead of the 1951 elections was thus not only directed at stifling 
support for the parties of the Hindu Right, but also at postponing the insistent 
demands for the creation of unilingual provinces in the south and west of India. 
Similarly, the selection of Congress candidates in Bombay City and Maharashtra 
ahead of these elections was also made with one eye on the likelihood of 
linguistic reorganisation over the forthcoming years. The penultimate section of 
this chapter highlighted how some of the appeals and representations received by 
the AICC from members of the public and rejected local Congressmen 
demonstrate the ways in which ideas about citizenship were formulated in the 
context of both these ‘sublime’ ideological precepts and ‘profane’ everyday 
machinations.142 In this sense, we have been able to expose how perceptions of 
citizenship have been re-contextualised to fit with contemporary local exigencies 
and concerns. In these fluctuating circumstances, the manner in which 
‘community’ was applied to guarantee the actualisation of citizenship’s privileges 
and guarantees could vary. For example, in the context of linguistic 
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reorganisation, community could be invoked to demand the greater 
representation and accountability of politicians towards a linguistic majority. 




4: Region, Reservation and Government Recruitment, 1930s-
1950s 
‘On the one hand, it is most desirable that the standards of qualifications for 
admission to the public services should be uniform for all communities and that, as 
far as possible, they should not be lowered ... On the other hand, it must be 
recognised that every community is entitled to its proper share in the public 
services, that it is the duty of the State to see that it gets its proper share and that 
if any class or community, by reason of its illiteracy and backward condition, is 
unable to secure its proper share, the State ought to provide for it ... ’ 
Political and Services Department Note by V.H. Vachhrajani, 19th September 
1938.1 
--------------- 
The note of V.H. Vachhrajani, a civil servant in the Political and Services 
Department of the Bombay Government, cited above, provides clear evidence of 
the conflict of interests inherent to the discourse surrounding the implementation 
of policies of affirmative action within the Bombay administration. Within only 
twelve years of Vachhrajani’s note, this contradiction had been enshrined within 
independent India’s 1950 Constitution. Under the ‘Right to Equality’, Article 16.1 
of the Constitution provided for ‘equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters 
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State’.2 Yet 
Articles 16.3 and 16.4 provided occasion to circumvent such universal rights 
provided for the individual citizen, pertaining to residence and state-defined 
‘backwardness’.3 This chapter considers how both a variety of colonial and 
postcolonial state actors and members of Indian society framed their arguments 
regarding reservations in both the provincial and all-India administrative services 
in terms of the contrary ideals contained within Vachhrajani’s note and the 
Constitution. In this sense, this chapter complements the work of Rochana Bajpai, 
who has looked to ‘unpack ... the articulations of a range of nationalists, both 
eminent and less well known’ within the Constituent Assembly debates on 
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affirmative action, thereby providing ‘a better grasp of the internal complexity 
and ideological variations within nationalism’.4 However, it departs from Bajpai’s 
primary focus upon the debates by arguing that in the context of the anticipation 
and then repercussions of independence and partition, local and provincial 
enactments of citizenship rights to bureaucratic representation not only diverged 
from those constructed in the Assembly but also predated and influenced it.5 
Critical to these local interpretations were the particular ‘situated perspectives’ of 
both the local state actor and the individual member of society. Interpretations of 
citizenship rights thus differed from region to region, were dependent upon the 
context of larger ongoing historical processes and were linked in with divergent 
individual, class and ‘community’ exigencies.  
The first section of this chapter briefly considers these ideas in the context of the 
existing historiography on affirmative action, which was created and justified by 
both colonial and postcolonial states on the basis of the necessity of representing 
particular ‘community’ interests. It suggests that we need to pay closer attention 
to the different spatial complexities of the state and how the practices of its more 
local manifestations were shaped in its interactions with local societal exigencies 
and concerns to understand why reservations were implemented differently from 
one administrative space to the next. It thus looks to demonstrate a western 
Indian ‘pre-history’ to the more recent moves towards ‘universal backwardness’ 
with the implementation of reservations for OBCs in the 1990s. It does so by 
reflecting upon the impact of the ‘provincialisation’ of politics and independence 
and partition in Bombay.  
The second section contains a close case-study of the various ways through which 
the provincial government in Bombay classified ‘communities’ and designed 
reservations for the various sub-stratums of its provincial administrative services. 
It considers how the provincial practices of the Bombay Government deviated 
from all-India reservation policy, despite a theoretical commitment to the same 
overarching principles, because of alternative and localised societal 
circumstances. In fact, in the Subordinate services, reservations were introduced 
in proportion with the demographic strength of particular ‘classes’ rather than on 
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the basis of ‘minority’ community interests. Finally, this section also briefly 
highlights how reservation practices in interwar Bombay were approached and 
interpreted in a postcolonial setting. Whilst they influenced the approach and 
recommendations of the first Backward Classes Commission in 1955, they were 
rejected by the Nehruvian Congress central government as encouraging casteism. 
The final section further explores the discrepancies in affirmative action between 
Bombay Province and the centre. It considers the ongoing demands and 
discussions throughout the 1930s and 1940s over the introduction of provincial 
reservation practices for locally-recruited elements of the all-India services. It 
then goes on to analyse the calls for proportionate quotas to be recruited from 
each province to the all-India services in accordance with provincial population 
size. In doing so, it focuses upon how the proponents of these forms of 
reservation could interpret them in a positive light, in the context of the 
transformations which accompanied independence, as a performance of self-
government. Simultaneously, it notes how their detractors suggested that by 
favouring local, indigenous rights to representation, these reservations would 
potentially damage attempts to foster a wider sense of ‘Indianness’. Again, these 
reservations were described in the language of ‘community’ interests, with caste, 
linguistic and religious ‘minorities’ worried about the dominance of local 
‘majorities’. Taken together, these interlinked debates over and practices of forms 
of affirmative action served as a contextual framework upon which citizenship 
rights were identified, expressed and enacted by a variety of different members of 
Maharashtrian society. 
 
4.1 Citizenship, Community and Reservations 
Whilst much has been written on the introduction of reservations in the colonial 
administrative services, particularly in relation to Muslim and Scheduled Caste 
(SC) ‘minorities’, historians have yet to consider in detail the manner in which 
these reservations could diverge in the context of particular provincial societal 
stresses and strains.6 The work of Christophe Jaffrelot has in part begun this 
                                                          
6 For the role of separate reservations and electorates in Muslim identity 
formation and the formulation of the Pakistan demand see, for example, David 
Gilmartin, ‘Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative’, 
Journal of Asian Studies, 57 (1998), 1068-1095 (particularly pp. 1078-1081). 
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process, noting in its acknowledgements that ‘North India is going the way South 
India – and, to a lesser extent, West India – have already gone’.7 However, whilst 
delineating a history of Maharashtrian caste antagonism by focusing in early 
chapters on such individuals as Jotirao Phule and B.R. Ambedkar, Jaffrelot’s efforts 
are geared primarily towards explicating the later rise of Kanshi Ram’s Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP) and more recent low-caste assertion in northern India. This 
chapter will therefore build upon his and others’ efforts to concentrate on 
provincial governmental policies on reservations during this critical period of state 
transformation in India.8 But it will do so within the context of regional 
patriotisms of a longue durée (as considered in Chapter Two), the uncertainties of 
independence and partition, and the demands for the reorganisation of provincial 
administrative boundaries on linguistic lines. It thus links the demands and 
debates over reservations to the expression of citizenship rights and status in 
anticipation of forms of indigenous autonomy and self-government. The chapter 
thereby plans to resituate supposedly recent developments in north India related 
to the rise of numerically preponderate, low-status ‘Other Backward Classes’ 
(OBCs) within an alternative spatial and temporal setting, whilst contributing to a 
greater understanding behind the imperatives of linguistic reorganisation in this 
period. 
The Government of India (GOI) Acts of 1919 and 1935, despite being limited in 
their nature and organised to extract resources and control Indian subjects, did 
contribute towards a number of notable social and political changes in the 
subcontinent.9 For an array of scholars working in the 1970s and 1980s, often 
collectively labelled as the ‘Cambridge School’, greater financial and legislative 
self-governance for the thirteen British India provinces under the reforms had 
encouraged the ‘provincialisation’ of Indian politics, as a range of often competing 
political patrons, factions and interests were now able to extend their networks of 
power and influence beyond the locality.10 Many of these works were primarily 
                                                          
7 Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in 
North India (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), pp. v, 5-6. 
8 See, for example, William Gould, ‘“The Dual State: The Unruly Subordinate”, 
Caste, Community and Civil Service Recruitment in North India, 1930-1955’, 
Journal of Historical Sociology, 20 (2007), 13-43. 
9 For more on the impact of these inter-war constitutional reforms, see Chapter 
Three of this thesis. 
10 David Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency 
1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1976]); John Gallagher, 
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interested in delineating how these provincial interests and concerns then 
coalesced through cross-communal alliances at the all-India level. In fact it was 
recognised colonial policy to divert Indians’ attentions away from all-India 
agitations and towards provincial machinations and concerns, where they could 
wield a considerable degree of authority. In these works initiative was thus vested 
primarily in the slow divulgence of greater forms of self-government to Indians by 
the colonial authorities, resulting in the Cambridge School’s thesis being 
thoroughly and accurately critiqued for denying ordinary Indians their own 
‘agency’ in the political process.11 Although it remains an unasserted point, in 
these accounts it is also therefore implicit that it was the upper echelons of the 
colonial state and its constitutional reforms which determined the nature of 
nascent ideas about citizenship in India. This has led Partha Chatterjee, as noted in 
more detail elsewhere in this thesis, to suggest that citizenship emerged in India 
within a discrete and European-derived bourgeois public sphere.12 
The impact of ‘provincialisation’ as a topic worthy of concerted research, 
however, has recently been re-opened in new and innovative ways, especially as 
there has been little effort to consider the divergent spatial trajectories of diarchy 
and full provincial autonomy.13 As well as denying Indians agency in the assertion 
of their citizenship, the work of the Cambridge School can also be critiqued 
because ‘The teleological framework that structured their narratives tended to 
construe the politics of the [provincial] arena as an increasingly inconsequential 
sideshow to the anticolonial struggle as it unfolded at the national level’.14 
                                                                                                                                                   
Gordon Johnson, and Anil Seal, eds. Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on 
Indian Politics 1870 to 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); B.R. 
Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942: The Penultimate 
Phase (London: Macmillan, 1976); C.J. Baker and D.A. Washbrook, South India: 
Political Institutions and Political Change 1880-1947 (Delhi: Macmillan, 1976). 
11 Tapan Raychaudhuri, ‘Indian Nationalism as Animal Politics’, Historical Journal, 
22 (1979), 747-763; Ranajit Guha, ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of 
Colonial India’, in Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society, 
ed. by Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-8. 
12 Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in 
Most of the World (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
13 This lies partly behind the recent research efforts of the political geographer 
Stephen Legg. See, Stephen Legg, ‘Scalar geographies of dyarchy: sexuality, 
morality and the government of India 1919-1935’, Paper given at South Asia 
seminar series, University of Leeds, 11th May 2011. 
14 I thus apply Prashant Kidambi’s critique of the Cambridge School’s neglect of 
the impact of urban politics upon nationalist politics to an analogous neglect of 
the province in the context of nascent ideas about citizenship. See, Prashant 
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Instead, this chapter argues that ‘provincialisation’ also had important 
repercussions when scrutinised more carefully from the perspective of the 
province. Importantly, it initiated a whole host of legislative discrepancies in the 
classification of ‘communities’ deemed worthy of forms of affirmative action 
within the bureaucracy, both from province to province and between the 
provinces and the all-India centre. Far from denying Indians agency, this chapter 
therefore suggests that it was the history of Brahman/non-Brahman social, 
cultural and political tension which was crucial to how the Government of 
Bombay (GOB) applied constitutional reform in western India. These prerogatives, 
shaped in mutually constitutive interactions with local society, diverged 
considerably from those that governed the introduction of reservations at 
alternative spatial levels and trajectories of the state in the north of India and at 
the all-India centre. Constructions of citizenship were not therefore limited to a 
bourgeois public sphere but developed out of the variable discourses and 
practices of the different levels of the state.15 This is evident in the manner in 
which administrative reservations in Bombay were composed and structured, 
thereby helping to shape particularised regional perspectives on citizenship 
amongst Maharashtrians. 
Whilst across much of northern India Muslims represented the primary 
constituency to which affirmative action was provided, in Bombay Province 
(especially after the separation of Sindh in 1935) they formed a relatively small 
fraction of an ‘Intermediate’ class, in which non-Brahman interests 
predominated.16 These spatial incongruities in the definition of ‘communities’ 
deserving of reservation, as well as the extent and scope of provincial and central 
policies, are suggestive of the divergence in all-India prerogatives and regional 
governmental concerns, and highlight the processes behind the development of 
contrasting notions of citizenship in the context of independence, partition and 
the linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries. Whilst 
notions of national belonging in the north and at the all-India level were 
                                                                                                                                                   
Kidambi, ‘Nationalism and the City in Colonial India: Bombay, c.1890-1940’, 
Journal of Urban History, 38 (2012), 950-967 (p. 951). 
15 Akhil Gupta, Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence and Poverty in India 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2012), p. 99. 
16 Reservations for ‘non-Brahmans’ also shaped the nature of affirmative action in 
Madras Province. See, Eugene Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India: 
The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929 (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1969); Eugene Irschick, Tamil Revivalism 
in the 1930s (Madras: Crea Publications, 1986). 
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dominated by this ‘Muslim Question’ and the repercussions of the creation of 
Pakistan during the 1940s and 1950s, if we look beyond the north, as suggested in 
the Introduction to this thesis, we can discern a much more nuanced perspective 
on partition’s spectre. By considering the Pakistan demand as part of a much 
broader trend towards regional mobilisation, we can discern its impact on 
stimulating further efforts to both define and resist autonomous administrative 
spheres of political interest elsewhere in the subcontinent. 
Dominant, numerically preponderate or majority ‘communities’ often presented 
demands for greater provincial autonomy in the language of citizens’ rights to 
forms of ‘self-governance’. And linked in with this was the notion of the greater or 
exclusive entitlement of ‘locals’ to receive a greater share of provincial 
bureaucratic roles.17 But whereas in the north-east and north-west of the 
subcontinent these were primarily mediated in the colonial period on the basis of 
‘majority’ religious ‘community’ interests, in the south and west of India, it was 
caste and linguistic ‘community’ rights that shaped these demands. As Susan 
Bayly has noted, 
‘The ... crucial factor here was the creation ... of the new linguistically 
defined state boundaries which were drawn up so that individual states 
became zones of high numerical concentration for the members of only one 
(or at most two or three) of the broad sat-sudra “peasant” jati blocs’.18 
As Joseph Schwartzberg argued as long ago as 1968, in a study of caste and region 
in north India, in the case of ‘non-elite peasant’ castes, exclusivity seems to be the 
rule. His analysis revealed both the preponderance of Jats in the district of 
Ludhiana in the Punjab, where they measured over 50 per cent of the population, 
and the absence of similar ‘peasant’ castes of comparable status in the area.19 
This is not to argue for ‘static’ castes rooted to the land, but rather that as 
individuals moved about, in search of new opportunities and higher social status, 
they would pick up particular caste nomenclature dependent upon the role they 
performed in the particular linguistic region in which they were found. This 
                                                          
17 William Gould, Taylor C. Sherman, and Sarah Ansari, ‘The Flux of the Matter: 
Loyalty, Corruption and the “Everyday State” in the Post-Partition Government 
Services of India and Pakistan’, Past and Present, 219 (2013), 237-279 (pp. 258-
264). 
18 Susan Bayly, Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to 
the Modern Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 287. 
19 Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ‘Caste Regions of the North Indian Plain’, in Structure 
and Change in Indian Society, ed. by Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn (Chicago, 
Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 81-114. 
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hypothesis holds true in Bombay Province, where three distinctive ‘peasant’ 
castes were concentrated in three distinct linguistic regions: in the northern, 
Gujarati-speaking districts of the province, there existed a sizeable Patidar-Kanbi 
caste cluster; in the central, Marathi-speaking districts, the Maratha-Kunbi caste 
cluster made up the vast majority of agrarian society; and the Lingayats were 
found in large numbers in the southern, Kannada-speaking portions of the 
province. ‘Exclusivity’ amongst these castes was therefore closely linked to 
language, demonstrated by the major role each of these communities played in 
the reorganisation of Bombay into its three separate linguistic provinces. In fact, 
as we shall see, the movement for the creation of Maharashtra and Karnataka 
grew out of attempts by these distinct ‘pockets’ of numerically preponderate 
peasant caste groups to assert their authority within district, divisional and 
provincial reservation practices in Bombay during the interwar period. Conversely, 
those who felt threatened by these manifestations of local majoritarianism 
articulated their concerns in the language of ‘minority’ citizenship rights, whether 
on the basis of caste, religious or linguistic ‘community’ interests. 
‘Majority’-based reservations in Bombay also predated the later move to universal 
‘backwardness’ at the all-India level, as conceived by the Backward Classes 
(Kalelkar) Commission in 1955, reinforced by the Mandal Commission of 1980, 
and partially implemented in the face of much high-caste resistance by 1993.20 
Since the early 1990s, political scientists have noted the increased prominence of 
regionally-based political parties in all-India politics, often dominated by peasants 
of ‘non-elite’ origins who demand preferential treatment in the extension of 
welfare provision through ‘majority’ reservations.21 This development has often 
been regarded as a novel, contemporary trend, a result of the collapse of a 
‘Congress system’ which had seen the Indian National Congress party govern India 
almost continuously since its first independent elections in 1951 until 1989.22 Yet, 
as noted above, the extension of policies of affirmative action beyond 
demographically defined ‘minorities’ such as Scheduled Castes and Muslims, had 
                                                          
20 Report of the Backward Classes Commission [henceforth BCC] (Delhi: 
Government of India Press, 1956). 
21 Aditya Nigam, ‘India after the 1996 Elections: Nation, Locality and 
Representation’, Asian Survey, 36 (1996), 1157-1169; Mahesh Rangrajan, ‘One, 
Two, Many Indias’, Seminar, 480 (1999), 26-29. 
22 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For more on the ‘Congress 
system’, see Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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notable precursors in inter-war western India. Part of the problem behind the 
shrouding of this ‘pre-history’ has been the tendency within South Asian 
historiography to focus on the north, particularly Bengal and the Gangetic plain, at 
the expense of the alternative histories of the south and west.23 And this relates 
to the particular problematics of writing histories of the ‘whole’ in this period of 
India’s past, which was conditioned by the commencement of provincial 
autonomy. 
 
4.2 Classifying Communities and Reserving Representation in Bombay 
In 1925 the Government of Bombay (GOB) classified various ‘communities’ as 
diverse as low-status caste Hindus, ‘untouchables’ and ‘tribals’ as ‘Backward’ for 
the first time, prescribing ‘a minimum percentage of recruitment from members 
of the Backward Communities to the clerical staff of all Departments in the 
Presidency proper’.24 The bureaucratic reservations coincided and paralleled 
another communal classification for educational purposes, which fixed a 
minimum percentage of ‘Backward’ classes to be admitted to Primary Teacher 
Training Colleges. These rather broad and overlapping arrangements, however, 
caused considerable ambiguity and confusion both amongst the public and within 
governmental policy, and the special provincial report of the Depressed Classes 
and Aboriginal Tribes Committee in 1930 proposed ‘that the nomenclature of 
classifications ... should be changed’.25 By 1933 the Government of Bombay had 
decided to classify homogenised caste and religious ‘communities’ into 
‘Advanced’, ‘Intermediate’ and ‘Backward’ classes, a policy which was continued 
under the first (1937-39) and second (1946-51) Congress governments in the 
province. 
                                                          
23 David Washbrook, ‘Towards a History of the Present: Southern Perspectives on 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: 
India and Pakistan in Transition, ed. by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar 
and Andrew Sartori (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 332-357. For 
more on the reasoning behind this northern and eastern focus in the 
historiography of the subcontinent, see Chapter One of this thesis. 
24 MSA, Political and Services Department File 1673/34 VIII, ‘Political and Services 
Department Note’, 10 May 1940. 
25 Report of the Depressed Classes and Aboriginal Tribes Committee, Bombay 
Presidency (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1930), pp. 8-9. 
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Brahmans, who dominated the civil service, were classed as ‘Advanced’ alongside 
other traditionally literate ‘communities’ such as Kayastha Prabhus, Parsis and 
Banias.26 The ‘Intermediate’ category, meanwhile, was primarily represented by 
‘communities’ involved in the non-Brahman movement, most prominently the 
Marathas in Maharashtra and the Lingayats in Karnataka. It was also deemed the 
most suitable class for all of Bombay’s Muslim population, and the large agrarian 
Patidar-Kanbi caste cluster in Gujarat. Finally, the Scheduled Castes (SCs), 
Scheduled Tribes (STs), and a special ‘Other Backward Communities (OBCs)’ 
category (a disparate collection of ‘communities’ which included all those deemed 
‘Criminal Tribes’), were classified as ‘Backward’.27 This arbitrary division of 
‘communities’ into three broadly-defined classes for the purposes of bureaucratic 
reservation, and the contradictory language in which reservations for different 
levels of the services were defined, ensured a number of divergent intra-
provincial conceptualisations of citizenship. However, these ideas about 
citizenship also diverged from both northern and all-India conceptualisations of 
rights and status, primarily because reservations were based around caste rather 
than religion, and thus reflected the principal social cleavages of local 
Maharashtrian society. 
4.2.1 The Provincial Services and ‘Advanced’ Classes 
In the highest stratum of the provincial administration, generally referred to as 
the Provincial Services, no percentage of recruitment from any class was fixed. 
The reasoning behind this decision was ostensibly couched in the language of 
administrative efficiency, and echoed the first sentence of the note drawn up by 
V.H. Vachhrajani with which this chapter began, by foregrounding the state’s 
supposed impartiality. ‘If the standard of the Provincial Service is to be 
maintained’, claimed a note jointly written by the Commissioners of the Northern, 
Central and Southern Divisions of the Province, ‘it would be most undesirable in 
our opinion that a definite percentage for the recruitment of Backward and 
Intermediate Classes should be prescribed’.28 The emphasis here, then, was on a 
                                                          
26 See, for example, the schedule of ‘Advanced’ classes in, MSA, Political and 
Services Department File, ‘Statement showing the percentage of Intermediate and 
Backward communities’, n.d. 
27 MSA, GOB, Reforms Office File 218, ‘Schedules of Backward Classes’, 29 May 
1933. 
28 MSA, Political and Services Department File 1673/34 IX, ‘Political and Services 
Department Note’, 18 November 1940. 
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detached, efficient and monolithic state, objectively arbitrating social conflict – 
the subject-citizens of Bombay could theoretically rely upon the state to protect 
their rights and privileges. 
Beyond the smokescreen of balanced neutrality, however, was a tendency to 
encourage particular ‘communities’ to fill such posts on account of their own 
specific virtues and merits. The aforementioned note, for example, went on to 
read, ‘ ... for higher appointments the bulk of the candidates must still be found in 
those classes where there is a hereditary tradition of culture, a high standard of 
intelligence and a full appreciation of the value of education’.29 As colonial forms 
of knowledge concerning Indian society thus continued to condition the nature of 
administrative recruitment, the Provincial Services remained primarily the domain 
of the ‘Advanced’ classes despite the introduction of the classificatory system. By 
1939, 71.5 per cent of appointments for this level of the provincial bureaucracy 
came from the ‘Advanced’ category (and only 0.3 per cent from the ‘Backward’ 
classes).30 Indeed, Brahman dominance of the bureaucracy was deemed inevitable 
by some, since they were considered ‘the best at secretarial and administrative 
work’.31 This was evident in the Bombay Government’s Political and Services 
Department’s response to a petition from the Assistant Director of (Army) 
Recruiting, Southern Area, during Governor’s rule in the province in the midst of 
the Second World War. The Assistant Director requested that the Department do 
all it could to push for the employment of more Marathas in the highest-level 
Provincial Services, as an encouragement for Marathas to enlist in the war effort. 
The Department’s response, however, was unequivocal: 
‘So far Marathas in the Deccan area have shown no ability to stand up to 
the Brahman castes in the matters of adroitness and quickness of brain, 
which gets persons on in Government service and if the number of 
Marathas in such appointments is disappointingly small, the educational 
and perhaps psychological makeup of the Marathas has a lot to do with 
it’.32 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 MSA, Political and Services Department File 1673/34 IX, ‘Political and Services 
Department Note regarding a Letter from Mohamedally Allabux on Muslim 
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32 Ibid., ‘Political and Services Department Note’, 2 August 1944. 
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Similar inclinations in the recruitment process were also evident under the 
Congress-led Bombay Government, which came to power after the 1937 
provincial elections. In deciding upon a candidate from Bombay for recruitment to 
the All-India Police Services, for example, the Home Minister K.M. Munshi agreed 
with the Inspector General of Police that there was no need for either restricting 
the level of competition or forwarding the special nomination of an ‘untouchable’, 
despite the underrepresentation of the ‘Backward’ classes at this level of the 
administration.33 The suggestion by the Chief Minister B.G. Kher, that the Home 
Department consider a Harijan (the Gandhian term for the SCs) candidate elicited 
a blunt response from Munshi. He argued, ‘[The] ... Department’s attempts to 
secure good Harijans are being made but the specimen of candidates I have seen 
are scarcely encouraging. The proposal should be dropped’.34 Despite the claims 
of colonial policymakers and nationalist politicians to objectivity and broad all-
India representativeness, the prospects of ‘Intermediate’ and ‘Backward’ classes 
gaining employment in the highest levels of the administrative structure therefore 
remained limited in practice. The highest echelons of the state in Bombay 
remained the preserve of caste-based elites. 
4.2.2 The Inferior Services and ‘Backward’ Classes 
Perhaps the biggest problem was the centrality that both the colonial state and 
Congress politicians in Bombay continued to afford to definitions of ‘community’ 
in the classificatory process. Despite declaring that the categorisation of 
individuals on the basis of their ‘class’ would allow the Government to avoid 
making distinctions in these terms, communal considerations rather than an 
individual’s economic or educational status were actually used to decide to which 
‘class’ they belonged.35 The contradictory nature of this decision was discussed in 
1946, when the Bombay Congress Government responded to the petition of an 
individual who had refused to list his son’s caste or sub-caste on the registration 
                                                          
33 For more on the specific background of K.M. Munshi, see Chapter Three of this 
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34 MSA, Political and Services Department File, ‘Note from K.M. Munshi, Home 
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‘backwardness’ at the all-India level conducted after independence in the 
Constituent Assembly, the judiciary and the Backward Classes Commission see, 
Ornit Shani, Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism: The Violence in Gujarat 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 52-63. 
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form at his new school, claiming that it ‘sanctioned communalism’.36 The school 
authorities had insisted on it being recorded, on account that the information had 
to be furnished to the Government. Whilst acknowledging the potential such 
forms had for ‘developing the caste-complex’ in children, the GOB went on to 
argue that if they did not state their caste, ‘It is difficult to say whether they 
belong to the Advanced, Intermediate or Backward communities’, thereby 
restricting their access to any educational concessions.37 It was therefore 
imperative that caste information was recorded so as to ascertain whether a 
particular candidate for recruitment fell within the reservation guidelines. The 
rights of citizens to various forms of affirmative action were therefore to be 
mediated through the prism of ‘community’. 
Unlike the Provincial Services, then, such categorisation was deemed officially and 
publically essential to the reservation policy followed within the lowest stratum of 
the administration in Bombay, the ‘Inferior Services’. Here the ‘Intermediate’ 
classes were already relatively well represented (69.6 per cent of all ‘Inferior’ jobs 
in 1939), and instead the Bombay Government undertook to bring in more 
representatives from the ‘Backward’ classes.38 The SCs in particular received a 
further ten per cent reservation for ‘Inferior’ jobs, whilst the ‘Backward’ classes as 
a whole also benefited from a fixed ten per cent for recruitment to the middle 
stratum of the provincial bureaucracy, the ‘Subordinate Services’.39 The 
affirmative action strategies followed in these lowest levels of the provincial 
bureaucracy towards ‘Backward’ classes in Bombay correlated with similar 
prerogatives in the north of the subcontinent and at an all-India level. SCs were 
provided with a reservation of 12.5 per cent of vacancies filled by direct 
recruitment in the all-India services by the late 1930s.40 Likewise, under the first 
constitution of an independent India in 1950, SCs and STs were granted reserved 
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quotas of 14 per cent and seven per cent in government jobs, to ensure 
participation and access amongst groups who had historically been subject to 
caste discrimination.41 Critical to these forms of reservation was the 
conceptualisation of ‘minority’ community’s special rights and interests as 
citizens. 
The reservations introduced by the Raj for ‘minorities’ during the interwar period 
were conditioned by practical political necessities related to the maintenance of 
colonial control. In tandem with increased representation in the electoral arena 
(as already considered in Chapter Three), they served as a mechanism through 
which to tie the allegiances of particular ‘communities’ to the Raj through forms 
of preferential treatment, thereby countering the Congress’s claims to all-India 
representativeness. However, reservations were also rationalised in the language 
of imperial liberalism on the basis that these demographically-defined ‘minority 
communities’ required the state’s special protection. They were also central to 
the Congress’s rhetorical justifications for continuing with certain types of 
reservation when the party accepted office in Bombay in 1937 and after it formed 
India’s first independent national government a decade later. Reservations for SCs 
and ‘Backward’ classes in Bombay Province invoked the principle that it was the 
state’s ‘duty’ to see that all ‘communities’ received their ‘proper share’ of 
employment in the bureaucracy, with special standards applying to those who, by 
reason of their ‘illiteracy and backward condition’, would not normally be able to 
gain such jobs.42 ‘Minority communities’ were thus considered a particularly 
important sub-section of the citizenry who required the state’s special protection 
– in an era of constitutional reform and the steady realisation of forms of self-
government, their interests were perceived as likely to be swamped under the 
growing tides of democratisation and the ‘Indianisation’ of the administrative 
services. 
However, the introduction of caste-based reservations for SCs at the all-India level 
was overshadowed by the more extensive forms of affirmative action provided by 
the Government of India (GOI) for religious ‘minorities’, and in particular the 
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Muslim ‘community’. Muslims, treated as a homogeneous bloc despite their 
sectarian, linguistic and class differences, were seen to constitute a sizeable 
‘minority community’ of 22.2 per cent of the subcontinent’s population in the 
1931 census.43 At the all-India level, one-third of all permanent vacancies for 
direct recruitment were to be reserved ‘for redress of communal inequalities’ as a 
result of a debate in the Council of State in 1925.44 However, despite being 
ostensibly ‘negative in nature, i.e. it does not undertake to secure representation 
for any particular community’, recruitment policy did recognise ‘that Muslims are 
entitled to the largest proportion of [vacancies]’.45 Similar prerogatives shaped 
provincial reservation policy in north India. In the United Provinces (UP)’s Civil 
Executive and Subordinate Excise Services, Muslims were provided with 
respective set quotas of 33.3 and 33.0 per cent of all jobs.46 The obligation to 
protect the rights and privileges of ‘minorities’ was thus primarily mediated by the 
colonial state at the all-India level and in the north on the basis of religious 
‘community’ interests.47 And this was also to be carried over into the postcolonial 
period. An analogous notion of state ‘duty’ towards Muslim ‘minorities’ shaped 
the perspectives of certain elements within the Congress leadership, epitomised 
in the principles espoused by the new Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. As Taylor 
Sherman has pointed out,  
‘This was consistent with Nehru’s concept of the nation and his brand of 
secularism ... Nehru did not try to impose a secular point of view on all 
Indians, but rather, he attempted to prevent the use of religion for political 
ends. He accomplished this not by staying out of questions of religious 
identity but by “balancing favours to various religious communities”’.48 
Whilst the presence of reservations in the services for Muslims were considered 
by the Congress as synonymous with Muslim separatism and the Pakistan 
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demand, and were therefore abolished, Nehru suggested that ‘the government 
had a duty to make minority communities feel secure’.49 Accordingly, the 1950 
Constitution’s provisions for the ‘Protection of the interests of minorities’ under 
Article 29 with a ‘distinct language [Urdu], script [Persian/Indo-Arabic] or culture 
[Indo-Islamic] of its own’ were directed primarily at protecting the interests of 
India’s Muslims.50 In a recent article, Joya Chatterji has proclaimed that this era 
saw the production of ‘the new figure of “the minority citizen”, neither citizen nor 
alien, but a hybrid subject of new national regimes of identification and law’, a 
model which was ‘distinct, in critical ways, from models derived from the West’.51 
Indeed, the ‘minority citizen’ was a peculiar South Asian invention. Yet the 
discourse of ‘minority’ could also have a different purchase in the various parts of 
the subcontinent. Chatterji’s focus is primarily concentrated upon the 
conceptualisation of minority citizenship in the north and at the all-India level, as 
India and Pakistan looked to reach an agreement on rules regarding the 
protection and welfare of those Hindus, Sikhs (in Pakistan) and Muslims (in India) 
that had chosen, or had been forced by circumstances, to remain behind. Her 
attention has therefore primarily been drawn towards the manifestation of 
‘minority’ in terms of religious-based communities. 
However, as societal interactions with this discourse of ‘minority’ were primarily 
enacted at the local level, where subject-citizens encountered the state, its 
meaning could alter and shift dependent upon the particular situated perspectives 
of those that it had engaged. During the interwar period, J.D.V. Hodge, a 
particularly perceptive civil servant in the Home Department at the all-India level, 
noted the discrepancies and divergences in governmental policy across India, and 
the different implications and manifestations of the ‘minority’ idiom that occurred 
as a result. He argued that 
‘The recruitment with which we are concerned is made in several provinces, 
and [the Auditor General] suggests that the term ‘minority community’ 
must bear a different significance in different parts of India. To us the term 
practically means ‘Non-Hindu’. This classification is appropriate enough for 
Northern India and Bengal, but it loses its value considerably in Madras, 
where the local Government have adopted a different classification to suit 
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local conditions. It would not be in accordance with our intention to allow 
Brahmans to swamp two-thirds of the vacancies’.52 
The language of ‘minority’ rights and interests was also invoked in the context of a 
different set of circumstances in Bombay. This had important implications for the 
definition of citizenship amongst these groups. Whereas in the north and at an all-
India level, the idiom of ‘minority’ came to be principally associated with 
homogenously-defined Muslim interests, both the state and public in western 
India instead considered it primarily as a justification (alongside the notion of 
‘backwardness’) for affirmative action for the ‘Backward’ classes. Representations 
received from individuals and caste-based groups in western India carefully 
engaged with this language in their efforts to extract maximum concessions and 
benefits from the provincial state. For example, a ‘Petition from certain Daivadnya 
caste people residing in Kanara District’ for their re-classification as ‘Backward’ 
contended that they formed a ‘very small minority of 17,000 souls in a population 
of 417,000 souls in Kanara District’, with a ‘very insignificant ratio of government 
service even taken on a population point of basis’.53 Likewise, the Ahir Sonars of 
Jalgaon city in East Khandesh District, looking back on the redefinition of their 
nomenclature, claimed, ‘We were classed as “Backward” with a view to give us 
the necessary help to which a minority is entitled, but then all of a sudden we 
found ourselves in the company of “Intermediates”’.54 This also had important 
implications in the aftermath of independence and partition. So whereas the 
construction and articulation of ‘minority’ citizenship rights for the new Congress-
led GOI was caught up in a reciprocal relationship with Pakistan related to 
religion, in the context of mass migration, refugee rehabilitation and ‘secular’ 
constitutional commitments, it was articulated rather differently in Bombay. Here 
the vocabulary of swaraj, self-government and democratisation was linked to calls 
for the linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries on 
linguistic lines. The definition of ‘minority’ rights in Bombay was thus primarily 
conditioned by concerns about adequate safeguards for these ‘minorities’ or the 
rejection of reorganisation altogether, and was commonly enacted through caste 
and linguistic ‘minority community’ based idioms. In part, this was a reaction to 
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the threat of ‘majority’ or numerically preponderate castes and linguistic groups 
within a reorganised province and in the context of the implementation of a fully 
democratic political process. 
4.2.3 The Subordinate Services and ‘Intermediate’ Classes 
This brings us back to the idea of the ‘provincialisation’ of state legislative 
practices, as considered at the start of this chapter. And it also provides an angle 
through which to consider the GOB’s policy towards reservations amongst the 
middle stratum of the provincial bureaucracy, the ‘Subordinate Services’ or 
clerical cadre. Here, reservations departed considerably in both content and 
mission from ‘minority’ interests (which, as we have seen, governed the 
justification for affirmative action in Bombay amongst the ‘Backward Classes’ in 
the ‘Inferior Services’) and religious prerogatives. For purposes of administrative 
efficiency Bombay Province had been subdivided into four commissionerships, 
each headed up by a Commissioner who reported back to Bombay’s Governor. 
These commissionerships broadly reflected the linguistic demographic 
composition of the province and, as we shall see in the penultimate section of this 
chapter, lower level provincial civil servants were not generally transferred 
between them. First, Sindh was primarily constituted by Sindhi-speakers, and was 
the only Muslim majority area within the Province. It always had a rather 
ambiguous relationship with the rest of Bombay, and was constituted as a 
separate province of its own in 1935. Meanwhile, what became known as the 
Northern Division was primarily made up of Gujarati-speaking regions (with the 
exception of Thana District), whilst the Central Division was constituted by 
Marathi-speaking areas, and the Southern Division Kannada- and Marathi-
speaking districts. Importantly, Muslims made up fewer than eight per cent of the 
combined population of the Marathi- and Kannada-speaking districts of the 
Central and Southern Divisions.55  
Muslims, then, as a religious minority interest, still maintained ‘separate 
electorates’ in the provincial legislative assembly, whilst their representation 
remained an important aspect of the provincial machinations around 
reservations. Yet they played second fiddle to caste considerations in inter-war 
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Bombay Province, even more so after the separation of Sindh. In response to a 
question from the Mysore Muslim League as to whether the Bombay Government 
had created any forms of special treatment for the province’s Muslims, the 
Political and Services Department noted that, ‘the Government has prescribed 
certain minimum percentages of recruitment to the Intermediate and Backward 
Classes as a whole and not for each and every community as such belonging to 
these castes’.56 Muslims were thereby expected to compete will all other 
‘Intermediate’ classes for reserved appointments. Likewise, they also remained 
standardised as a unitary and homogenised ‘Intermediate’ class, despite demands 
for reclassification from particular sub-sections of Muslims on the lines of sect, 
language, class and caste.57 Indeed, the Sub-Committee of the Backward Classes 
Board in Bombay was to revise the schedule of Aboriginal and Hill Tribes on this 
account, removing the Tadvi Bhil ‘community’ from the list because they were 
also Muslims and therefore not entitled to claim the concessions on offer to both 
‘Intermediate’ and ‘Backward’ classes.58 In another note dismissing a request from 
the Collector of Ratnagiri to reclassify the Daldis (a Muslim fishing community), as 
‘Backward’, the Department argued that ‘“Caste” is not a feature of the Muslim 
community’.59 Religion as a category of classification, as we have seen in the 
previous sub-section too, was therefore relatively peripheral in western India in 
comparison to the north and at an all-India level. 
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Despite this, we can draw some connections between policies geared towards 
ensuring Muslim representation in the north and the reservation scheme 
implemented by the Bombay Government for the Subordinate Services. But in 
doing so it is necessary to move away from the provinces in which Muslims made 
up a sizeable demographic minority of the population, such as UP, and towards 
regions where they constituted majorities. In the north Indian provinces of Bengal 
and the Punjab, Muslims formed a majority of 55.8 and 53.2 per cent of the 
population according to the 1931 Census.60 This slight numerical preponderance 
formed the backdrop to a relatively novel form of reservation in the Muslim 
‘majority’ regions of northern and eastern Bengal, which sought to prescribe 
‘representation ... in proportion to ... numerical strength’, rather than weakness.61 
Here, ‘community’ still mediated the rights of citizens to access bureaucratic jobs 
and were still justified in the language of ‘backwardness’, but were conceptualised 
and articulated on the basis of ‘majority’ Muslim community interests instead.62 
Likewise, by examining the intricate machinations of the Subordinate Services 
reservation system in Bombay Province, we can see how the progressive 
‘Indianisation’ of the services during the interwar period chimed with local ideals 
of belonging, through which the Marathas saw themselves as hereditary ‘sons-of-
the-soil’ deserving of superior representation within Marathi-speaking portions of 
the region. 
As we saw in the previous chapters, growing assertiveness on the part of low- and 
intermediate-caste communities during the interwar period in Bombay often 
manifested itself in agitation against the likelihood of ‘Brahman Raj’ if the British 
were to leave India. The British colonial authorities in Bombay sought to plug-in to 
these concerns and divert non-Brahman political allegiances away from the 
Congress by creating a series of reservations in the recruitment of provincial civil 
servants. For appointments to the middle stratum of the provincial 
administration, the Subordinate Services, a variable percentage was fixed for the 
‘Intermediate’ classes in the different districts of the province, which correlated 
with population figures and the regions in which non-Brahman agitation was at its 
most vociferous. In the Central and Southern Divisions of the province, made up 
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of Marathi- and Kannada-speaking districts, the ‘Intermediate’ classes made up 
large proportions of the population and led their own vernacular non-Brahman 
movements. Here, higher percentages of government reservations were enacted 
for these classes. So, for example, whilst in the Southern Division (made up of 
both Kannada-speaking districts such as Bijapur and Dharwar, and Marathi-
speaking districts such as Kolaba and Ratnagiri, as well as districts like Belgaum 
where sizeable groups from both ‘communities’ lived), this was as high as sixty per 
cent (i.e. a majority of all jobs in the Division), in the Gujarati-speaking districts of 
Surat and Panch Mahals, as well as in Bombay City, it was only thirty per cent.63 
Many Marathas were ideally placed to take advantage of this system of 
recruitment, as a numerical majority in Marathi-speaking districts who controlled 
the non-Brahman movement, but still ‘backward’ enough in comparison to 
‘Advanced’ classes such as the Brahmans to demand reservations to improve their 
social well-being. In the case of the Subordinate Secretariat Service, for example, 
despite reserved ‘Intermediate’ class recruitment not being conducted on the 
basis of specific shares for particular ‘communities’ within this category, out of 30 
per cent of the 51 posts reserved for the ‘Intermediate’ classes, 27 per cent went 
to the Marathas. This, they suggested, ensured that, ‘On the whole it would 
appear the Marathas have got a fair – perhaps more than that – share in the 
Subordinate Secretariat Service, so far as, for instance, the 1940 recruitment was 
concerned’.64 This early example of a ‘creamy layer’ (i.e. the benefits of 
reservations going to those relatively wealthier, better educated, numerically 
preponderate and socially dominant groups within this category) provoked 
consternation amongst other ‘Intermediate’ groups (including the region’s 
Muslims) who found their ostensible rights to reservation circumscribed.65 The 
Kurubar Wool Industry Development Cooperative Association, for example, which 
was based at Kanebennur in Dharwar District, presented a petition to the GOB on 
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behalf of the Kurubar/Dhangar shepherd caste which deprecated the broad 
composition of the ‘Intermediate’ class category. They suggested that ‘all the 
concessions are swept away by the advanced classes among the Intermediate and 
the really backward classes that deserve help are denied all help. Help does not 
reach the really backward classes down to Kurubars and the like’.66 
However, even 27 per cent of recruitment still underrepresented the near 43 per 
cent of the ‘Intermediate’ classes which the Marathas constituted, and ensured 
that calls for their adequate representation on population grounds also continued 
to permeate petitions to the provincial government.67 The manner in which rights 
to reservations were presented therefore deviated on the basis of the particular 
situated perspective of the individual or community concerned. So, whereas the 
interests of a large proportion of Muslim, SC and other non-Brahman groups 
within Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay were often best served by appeals in 
the language of ‘minority’ citizenship rights, in contrast a resolution passed by the 
Working Committee of the Ratnagiri District Maratha Association in September 
1939 proposed that ‘candidates from the Maratha community should be selected 
always in proportion to the strength of the population of the Maratha community 
of this district’.68 But because, as we saw in the previous two chapters, the very 
definition of ‘Maratha’ itself was fluid, it could also sometimes serve the interests 
of these same groups to claim ‘Maratha’ status too, especially in those contexts in 
which citizenship rights were mediated on the basis of locally-defined ‘majorities’.  
The natural upshot of the idea of ‘community’ entitlement based on numerical 
preponderance was the growing demand for the creation of a homogeneous 
province where ‘majority communities’ could assert their authority over local 
institutions and state resources. Just as the Pakistan demand looked to provide 
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Muslims with autonomy in areas where they constituted the greater part of the 
population, demands for linguistic reorganisation promised a greater degree of 
self-sovereignty for either Marathas (if defined on the basis of these loose and 
flexible caste-based affiliations) or Maharashtrians (on the basis of language). 
4.2.4 The 1950 Constitution, OBCs, and Bureaucratic Reservations 
By the time reservations in government services were considered by the 
Constituent Assembly, the ongoing events of partition and the creation of 
Pakistan had drastically altered the political climate. During the debates, P.S. 
Deshmukh proposed ‘that the preponderance of certain communities in 
Government service be done away with and a system of recruitment 
proportionate to the population of groups of backward and intermediate 
communities as exists for instance in the Bombay Presidency be immediately 
introduced’.69 However, this did not correlate with Nehru’s vision of a new 
casteless and egalitarian India which, as we have seen, found its way into the new 
constitution under Article 16.1 which provided for ‘equality of opportunity’ in 
employment by the state. Deshmukh’s scheme was therefore dismissed as a 
‘legacy from the past’ by the Home Department.70 However, despite such 
rhetoric, the constitution did provide for positive preferential treatment in the 
administration to the nation’s SCs and STs, owing to their particularly acute social 
and economic ‘backwardness’.71 This mirrored much of the discourse on ‘minority’ 
representation favoured by the Bombay Government in its reservations amongst 
the Inferior Services towards the SCs and STs, but omitted any coherent decision 
on the OBCs. Yet ‘backwardness’ as defined in the constitution could also be 
considered a condition for reservation for all ‘communities’. As Ornit Shani has 
noted,  
‘Reservation for the backward castes was a more ambiguous manner ... 
Article 16(4) of the constitution secured the provision for reservations of 
posts for “any backward class of citizens”. But there was no clear and 
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acceptable criterion for defining who the Other Backward Classes/Castes 
(OBCs) were’.72 
This ambiguity caused difficulties for the provincial Congress Government in 
implementing the all-India directives and new constitutional requirements. At 
first, it was decided that the ‘proper course’ for the Bombay Government was to 
continue ‘to make reservation in favour of members of the Backward Class as a 
whole (and not only in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes)’, pending 
clearer parameters.73 It was only after protracted debate with the centre on the 
intricate workings and ‘spirit’ of the constitution that the Bombay Government 
was forced to accept their view and separate SCs and STs from the ‘Backward’ 
Class. The Government of India argued that, 
‘ ... while it is not obligatory as a constitutional necessity to make 
reservations in the public services separately for the SCs and STs, such 
reservation should, as far as possible, be made as a matter of convention. 
This is desirable if Government are to carry out the spirit of the obligation 
imposed on them by Articles 16(4) and 335 of the Constitution’.74 
The Bombay Government, on the other hand claimed, 
‘The spirit of the constitution cannot be deduced from certain specific 
provisions but must be deduced from the entire framework of the 
Constitution with special reference to its basic principles ... Of course it is 
open to Government to make provision for reservation in respect of any 
particular SC or ST if it be a backward class of citizens; but that will be a 
matter for consideration in respect of each individual caste or tribe, and 
such reservation will not be qua [considered as/in the capacity of] a SC or 
ST but as a backward class’.75 
Part of the reason for the Bombay Government’s eventual willingness to 
compromise in January 1953 was that it would ensure they were eligible for 
grants the Government of India made available for SCs and STs.76 Reservations for 
‘Intermediate’ classes, too, were not immediately cancelled. In fact educational 
concessions, it was suggested, might be continued indefinitely as certain 
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‘communities’ within the Intermediate class, such as the Dhangars, Bariyas and 
Dharalas were perceived by the GOB to come under the remit of educationally 
‘weaker sections of the people’ in the wording of Article 46.77 Some ‘Intermediate’ 
classes therefore came to be perceived anew as being encompassed within the 
OBC category in Bombay. Meanwhile, Article 340 provided for the creation of a 
Backward Classes Commission (BCC), which was to be tasked with investigating 
the social and economic conditions of OBCs, determining the criteria for 
identification of such groups (caste or class), and preparing a schedule of the 
socially and educationally backward classes in accordance with their chosen 
criteria. Set up in 1953 under the Chairmanship of Kakasaheb Kalelkar, it was also 
to make recommendations as to the ameliorative measures necessary to improve 
their circumstances. Submitting its report in 1955, its most contentious proposal 
advocated a minimum percentage of reservation in government service for OBCs, 
which resulted in a number of the Commission’s members, including its Chairman, 
conveying minutes of dissent, and its eventual shelving by government.78 
The manner and means through which these OBCs were defined mirrored, in 
many ways, the already existing approach of the provincial Bombay Government 
to reservation.79 Indeed, the Commission went as far as to cite the Bombay 
system as an influential example for future practice in northern India and at the 
centre.80 First, OBCs were classified on the basis of caste rather than class, in a 
similar manner to which the ‘Intermediate’ and ‘Backward’ classes were defined 
on the basis of caste in Bombay. This led the Ministry of Home Affairs to dismiss 
the Report: ‘It cannot be denied that the caste system is the greatest hindrance in 
the way of our progress towards an egalitarian society, and the recognition of the 
specified castes as backward may serve to maintain and even perpetuate the 
existing distinctions on the basis of caste’.81 Second, the Commission created a list 
of 2,399 ‘backward communities’ who should be classified as OBCs and provided 
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with greater representation in the services: landowners of uneconomic holdings; 
agricultural and landless labourers; cattle and sheep breeders; artisans; barbers; 
washermen; and communities engaged in domestic and menial service. It 
therefore included ‘communities’ who were numerically preponderate in their 
respective localities and provinces, in a similar manner to the Bombay 
Government with regard to its ‘Intermediate’ classes in the Subordinate Services. 
Finally, it recommended that 25 per cent of vacancies in Class I of the All-India 
Services, 33.3 per cent in Class II, and as much as 40 per cent in Classes III and IV 
should be reserved for OBCs, taking into account reservation in proportion to 
population (although reducing the percentage below half to ‘leave sufficient 
scope for highly qualified candidates to come into the services’).82  
Whilst the Backward Classes Commission Report was ultimately rejected, policy in 
regard to affirmative action continued to be a decisive issue for the remainder of 
the twentieth century. In Maharashtra, for example, a provincial BCC under the 
chairmanship of B.D. Deshmukh recommended caste-based reservations for SCs, 
STs and OBCs in 1964. In 1979, however, Maharashtra’s Chief Minister Sharad 
Pawar decided to reserve 46 per cent of posts for the ‘poor’ on the basis of class 
considerations, thereby permitting the Marathas to benefit from these forms of 
affirmative action, too.83 The move towards ‘universal backwardness’ also finally 
took hold in the north and at the all-India level, with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the 1980 Mandal Commission (the Kalelkar Commission’s 
heir) during the early 1990s alongside much high-caste anger.84 
The variable justifications behind bureaucratic reservations within interwar 
Bombay Province have a number of important implications for an analysis of the 
conceptualisation and enactment of citizenship in India. First, they demonstrate 
that ideas about citizenship were not imposed by a monolithic and distant state, 
and that a sense of citizenship was therefore not abstract, Eurocentric, and 
without any practical purchase for ordinary Indians. Despite the theoretical 
commitment to state impartiality and universal equality of opportunity in 
recruitment to the Provincial Services, candidates continued to be selected on the 
basis of their community’s perceived inherent propensity towards administrative 
service. And beyond this highest echelon of the provincial bureaucracy, 
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community considerations were actively endorsed in the recruitment process. The 
state therefore came to be constituted by a multitude of societal actors, who 
frequently worked at cross-purposes to one another and whose actions were 
conditioned by an engagement with the circumstances of local society. The 
‘provincialisation’ of legislative practices during the interwar period also actively 
encouraged these multiple and competing spatial trajectories of the state. The 
decision to implement different percentage-based gradations of reservations for 
the ‘Intermediate’ classes in the Subordinate Services in Bombay, for example, 
was influenced by greater non-Brahman political assertion within Marathi- and 
Kannada-speaking areas than elsewhere in the province. 
Second, this ensured discrepancies in the everyday application of rhetorical tropes 
utilised by the state to justify reservations. So the commitment to protecting 
minority citizens’ rights and interests amongst both the Raj and the Congress 
were primarily formulated around religion in the north of the subcontinent and at 
the all-India level, especially in the face of growing demands for ‘Muslim 
separatism’ and then in the aftermath of partition. However, in Bombay this 
obligation on the part of the state was mediated through caste-based identities 
instead. These influenced the recommendations of the BCC in 1955, but were 
rejected by the central Congress government at the time. Third, the multiple and 
competing trajectories of the state and the role of local society within it had 
important repercussions upon the articulation of citizenship amongst ordinary 
members of the public themselves. The particular ways in which individuals and 
groups would express their rights to forms of reservation were thus conditioned 
by their own specific situated perspectives on the state. For example, the 
emphasis upon minority citizens’ rights to reservations through the medium of 
caste-based identities in Bombay was perceived as one means of surmounting the 
growing dominance of the Marathas within local levels of the state as a result of 
reservations introduced for the ‘Intermediate’ category. By claiming to constitute 
a hard-pressed ‘minority’, individuals, families and groups within particular caste-
based communities looked to be reclassified as ‘Backward’ and thereby make use 




4.3 Provincial Reservations at the All-India Level? 
By the late 1920s, the GOI was beginning to pay increased attention to the 
divergences and discrepancies in provincial legislative practice, especially as 
individuals, ‘community’ representatives, and provincial governments in their 
capacity as envoys for their constituents, campaigned for the introduction of both 
(a) provincial-based reservations and (b) provincial reservation practices at the all-
India level. The latter anticipated the introduction of affirmative action for locally-
recruited elements of the all-India services (i.e. those recruited to work for the 
GOI, but within Bombay) on similar lines to Bombay provincial policy, where 
‘Intermediate’ classes would be provided with reservations in proportion to their 
local numerical strength. Meanwhile, the former attempted to introduce set 
quotas of recruitment for the entire central, all-India services (mainly based in 
Delhi) to fulfil on the basis of the provincial proportions of the subcontinent’s 
population. Like the previous section, this section of the chapter will consider 
these demands and the central government’s reactions to them in the context of 
citizenship. 
First, this was a period in which an impending and then achieved independence 
ensured high ‘expectations that the first postcolonial governments would bring 
about significant changes in both the composition and the functioning of the 
services’.85 Yet these expectations, and the manner in which they shaped ideas 
about the rights and status of various elements of the Indian public, diverged 
depending upon the particular ‘situated knowledges’ through which individuals 
perceived of their relationship with the state.86 Interestingly, these were still 
articulated on the basis of ‘community’ rather than individual interests, even in 
instances where petitioners probably had more personal predilections in mind. 
For those who argued in favour of provincial reservations at the all-India level, 
much emphasis was placed upon the dominance of particular provincial 
communities within the central administrative services. But their demands for 
reservation on a proportional population basis for the various provinces was also 
conditioned by the ideals of self-government – to be both more accountable and 
representative, the central state needed to draw representatives from all areas of 
the subcontinent, whilst in its localised manifestations it would help 
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immeasurably if the all-India administration’s representative spoke the regional 
vernacular. Conversely, ‘minority’ citizenship rights to the state’s protection were 
evoked by those groups that were likely to suffer if these forms of provincialism 
were integrated into the central bureaucratic system. Their reservations were 
expressed in the language of national integration both ahead of and after 
independence, where provincial demands would damage the solidarity of the new 
nation-state. 
4.3.1 Interwar Provincial Reservation Practices at the All-India Level 
It was in 1928 that the Government of India first decided that it ‘might be 
advantageous to settle at this stage some of the points that have arisen ... with 
reference to the conditions of the provinces’ in regard to all-India recruitment.87 
The Auditor General accepted that ‘local distinctions’ in legislative policy from one 
province to the next ‘should not be applied’ generally across the entire central 
secretariat. However, he perceived the problem as being ‘different’ for those 
limited sections of the all-India services in which ‘recruitment is practically 
confined to particular areas’.88 In these localised pockets of all-India 
administration, located at a distance from Delhi and generally bound to be 
recruited from a limited regional section of Indians, the Auditor General deemed 
it necessary to adopt local recruitment practices in appointment to central offices. 
The Auditor General’s viewpoint was supported by the Home Department civil 
servant W.H. Emerson, who recognised the logic of applying provincial 
representative practice in circumstances that were more likely to ‘suit local 
conditions than any we can devise’.89 Yet others remained unconvinced by such 
arguments. A.H. Lloyd, a civil servant within the Government of India’s Finance 
Department, rejected the idea of following provincial policy in locally-recruited 
stratums of the all-India services as ‘entirely divergent’ from the principle hitherto 
followed at the centre and therefore ‘logistically impossible to defend’. He 
suggested a uniform policy should be pursued across the central secretariat 
wherever located, thereby avoiding loopholes and potential challenges which 
divergent strategies would create. Concurrently, Lloyd also considered the 
application of provincial policies would ‘ensure the taking of a number of men 
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wholly inferior to the requirements of offices’, thereby ‘reducing the minimum 
standard of efficiency ... below a reasonable limit’.90 
This debate on the viability of different reservation policies within the all-India 
services demonstrates the manner in which colonial ideas about managing local 
networks and informal political alliances could shift depending on spatial location. 
And this has a number of important implications for thinking about how 
citizenship was conceptualised, articulated and enacted by different groups within 
Indian society. Under pressure from regional petitions and memorials, as well as 
divergent provincial policies as a result of diarchy, the Auditor General and 
Emerson commended the introduction of provincial reservation practices within 
localised elements of the all-India services. However in doing so, they implicitly 
favoured local, indigenous rights to representation. This could be perceived in a 
positive light. It seemed to fulfil the citizenship aspirations of a broad cross-
section of local society, as a harbinger for the greater democratisation of the 
locally-recruited all-India services by assisting in a (locally) more socially inclusive 
distribution of state jobs. Rather than appointing an ‘outsider’ from an entirely 
different part of India, by recruiting central state representatives from amongst 
vernacular-speaking local society, they would be perceived to be both more 
accessible and accountable towards the majority of the local public.  
At the same time, however, as noted by Lloyd, the introduction of these provincial 
forms of reservation could have more ‘profane’ dimensions. First, they 
contradicted the universal principles of merit that were supposedly central to the 
recruitment process at the all-India level. They promised to circumscribe the 
potential ‘outsiders’ from other parts of the subcontinent would have for gaining 
access to this form of central state employment, as they would not necessarily be 
included within or privy to the existing local classificatory and reservation 
practices. So whilst it marked inclusiveness for some, it excluded others from 
access to state jobs and resources within this particular territorial domain. 
Simultaneously, the introduction of such reservations could also potentially 
permit locally dominant factions and communities to monopolise recruitment to 
government jobs and thereby employ the resources of the central state for their 
own particular benefit. They therefore imperilled the state’s commitment to 
protecting the rights and interests of ‘minority citizens’, whether these were 
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defined on the basis of religion at the all-India level, or more locally on the basis 
of ‘Backward’ and ‘Intermediate’ classes. There was, therefore, a number of ways 
in which citizens’ rights to provincial forms of reservation at the all-India level 
could be conceptualised and acted upon, which often depended on the particular 
perspective of the individual or ‘community’ concerned. 
With no consensus able to be reached in the 1928 debate, the discussion of 
provincial reservation practices in pockets of locally recruited all-India services 
was shelved, and demands for its implementation contained in representations 
and petitions received by the GOI were ignored. Attempts to have Bombay 
provincial policies introduced within the all-India services were primarily led by 
non-Brahmans, and in particular representatives of the Marathas. In March 1932, 
the prominent Non-Brahman Party politician Bhaskarrao Jadhav, a Maratha by 
caste, asked whether the Raj intended to apply ‘the rules made by the 
Government of Bombay for the recruitment of the non-Brahmin backward 
communities from the Marathi and Canarese speaking districts ... when recruiting 
servants in the departments directly under the Government of India ... within the 
territorial limits of that Presidency’.91 And in August 1936, the General Secretary 
of the Maratha Educational Conference V.L. Thube submitted a representation 
requesting Maratha representation at the all-India level. Thube argued that for all-
India reservations, ‘ ... it is not social position or status that has any significance 
here. It is the condition of education that counts. No doubt we are a little [more] 
advanced than depressed, but stand far behind Muslims and others that are 
classed as “Minority Communities”’.92  
Thube thus invoked the idea of educational ‘backwardness’ to demand the 
framing of all-India policies of affirmative action to eliminate social inequalities. 
But at the same time he remained dismissive of these special privileges being 
apportioned solely to demographic ‘minorities’ as followed in contemporary GOI 
reservations policies. Thube’s petition therefore suggested that the epithet of 
‘backwardness’ could also be assigned to groups and ‘communities’ that were 
numerically dominant in the locality but who also continued to suffer from a lack 
of central secretarial representation. The fact that the Marathas had already come 
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to dominate reservations prescribed for the ‘Intermediate’ classes within the 
provincial administrative services was conveniently ignored – their ‘backwardness’ 
was now to be re-contextualised in comparison to others at the all-India level in 
an effort to access central government jobs. Meanwhile Jadhav noted the manner 
in which the Bombay Government’s provincial policies favoured the recruitment 
of ‘backward’ communities from particular localities in the province (as noted in 
the previous section of this chapter), where the non-Brahman movement was at 
its strongest. He expected the same forms of reservation to be introduced in the 
locally recruited elements of the all-India services. Calls for the introduction of 
reservations on Bombay policy lines from amongst Marathas therefore envisaged 
the protection of their local rights to jobs in their ‘homeland’, where they 
represented the numerically preponderate ‘community’ within Marathi-speaking 
districts. 
In the face of this sustained petitioning, the central government was again 
prepared to consider adopting provincial practices in locally recruited elements of 
the all-India services during 1944. In fact, it was anticipated in a note by A.R. 
Mudaliar that the problem of divergent provincial and all-India practices would 
‘come up in acute form’ as a result of the amalgamation of Madras Province’s 
railway services under central jurisdiction from 1 April.93 In the past, the Madras-
based railways had accepted the principle of proportional representation of non-
Brahmans, Brahmans and other ‘communities’ in the service, in line with Madras 
provincial governmental policy.94 But whilst the central Railways Department was 
prepared to accept the continuance of the current system in Madras, on account 
of the railways being located solely in Madras, it was considered that ‘to introduce 
further sub-divisions in reservations on the railways as a whole’ was not 
‘practicable’.95 The Home Department corroborated this argument ‘because the 
demand for such a recognition does not exist universally and the application of 
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the Provincial reservation may upset the policy and proportions in this behalf laid 
down on an all-India basis’.96 
Local reservations were therefore permitted in this instance, but were recognised 
only because they had already been utilised, and to tamper with them would have 
been to cause unnecessary inconvenience. There was no question of these 
provincial policies being extended to cover railway lines that passed through more 
than one province, on account of the difficulties that the application of the 
divergent policies of different provincial administrations would create. 
Meanwhile, Brahman/non-Brahman conflict was deemed not to be of all-India 
significance. In the same year, in fact, a demand for reservations for the Lingayats 
in the central services was rejected because, ‘The minority communities for whom 
a definite percentage of vacancies in the central services is reserved are not 
territorial or tribal sub-sections of India, but the communities who form a distinct 
unit by virtue of their professing a religion distinct from Hinduism’.97 Religion 
rather than caste thus continued to condition the manner in which ‘community’ 
interests were represented in rights to reservation at the all-India level. 
The colonial central government ultimately dismissed the introduction of regional 
reservation policies amongst locally recruited elements of the all-India services for 
a number of interrelated reasons that referenced ideas about the meaning and 
nature of citizenship. First, as noted in Lloyd’s aversion to introducing 
representation on these lines, it was deemed likely to impair the ‘efficiency’ of the 
central bureaucracy, where choosing candidates on the basis of merit and 
intellectual ability was ostensibly presented as the best method for recruitment 
and correlated with colonial justifications for their rule related to state 
impartiality and the rule of law. At one level, then, emphasis was placed on the 
‘equality of opportunity’ for recruitment to state employment at the all-India level 
for all citizens regardless of the candidate’s social background. At another level, 
however, policies of affirmative action on the basis of ‘community’ were given 
credence (as noted in the previous section of this chapter) because Muslims and 
SCs both received forms of reservation at the all-India level during the 1930s. 
These were justified by the colonial state on the novel footing that it was 
necessity to protect and guarantee ‘minority’ citizens’ rights and interests in the 
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context of political ‘democratisation’ and bureaucratic ‘Indianisation’ – in reality 
they had a lot to do with efforts to bolster and maintain colonial authority. 
The second reason for the rejection of regional reservation policies at the all-India 
level by the GOI was, therefore, in part related to this particular interpretation of 
which citizens were ‘deserving’ of reservation. The classificatory and recruitment 
processes of Madras and Bombay tampered with this definition by introducing 
reservations amongst the numerically preponderate non-Brahmans. Justified on 
the basis of ‘backwardness’ but arranged to reflect local demographics, they were 
perceived by their GOI detractors to promote opportunities for the 
monopolisation of all-India state jobs by these groups. This was considered likely 
to take place at the expense of Muslim and SC ‘minority’ interests within the 
province, which the GOI had undertaken commitments to protect, whilst 
restricting the access of individuals and groups from outside the province to all-
India posts too. 
4.3.2 Post-Independence Provincial Reservations at the All-India Level 
After independence, the Congress government at the centre, like their colonial 
predecessors, continued to disavow the efficacy of introducing provincial 
reservation policies within locally recruited elements of the all-India services for 
much the same reasons. In addition, however, the recent events of partition, the 
necessities of establishing the new nation’s legitimacy and territorial integrity, and 
efforts to define the composition, status and rights of its newly-independent 
citizenry ensured that Congress politicians and state servicemen within the GOI 
presented it as an ‘inopportune moment to promulgate any new orders which 
[would] serve to create a rift between communities or between the sub-sections 
of any community’.98 Rejecting the provincial policies on reservation of Bombay 
and Madras, the new Auditor-General of India argued in 1948 that, 
‘The object of the Government of the Dominion of India being to go more 
on the basis of merit, in future, than on communal considerations, except 
to the very limited extent contemplated by the Resolution [for SCs and STs], 
to continue the distinction between the various sub-communities of the 
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Hindu community would only mean the perpetuation of the retrograde 
policy followed in the past’.99 
However, the anticipation of independence and its ultimate arrival with the end of 
colonialism was also perceived as a major transition and generated heightened 
expectations about the implementation of significant changes to the all-India 
services amongst the public at large, too.100 As the national Congress-led 
government sought a novel popular legitimacy that enabled them to act in the 
name of the people, new responsibilities were theoretically furnished upon state 
employees to protect the rights and interests of India’s newly-constituted citizens. 
One of the ways in which these new governmental duties were constructed by 
members of Indian society was in the calls for greater inclusionary practices 
within the central administrative structure of the state, as part of a symbolic 
demonstration of the state’s newfound accountability towards a national 
citizenry. But because a range of different spatially-located interest groups sought 
representation within this central state, the privilege of working for the 
government often became a site of competition and dispute.101 The state thus 
also served as a repository of power, to be subverted and appropriated for 
particularistic interests.102 A range of perspectives on citizenship could therefore 
be conjured out of both interactions between the state and society (as interest 
groups clamoured for representation within the all-India services), and in 
individual and collective imaginings of the state (with reference to the increased 
accountability and inclusiveness of the state with the creation of a national 
government). This is evident, as we shall see, in the language invoked within the 
petitions and memorials received by the newly-independent GOI requesting the 
implementation of provincially-organised and demographically-proportionate 
reservations within the all-India services. 
Many of the petitioners and memorialists concerned referenced the continuing 
dominance of Indians from the Punjab and UP within the all-India bureaucratic 
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structure.103 This dominance is evident if we compare the provincial percentages 
of India’s population at the 1931 and 1951 censuses with a head-count of the 
provincial affinities of all-India staff in early 1947.104 Across all service levels of the 
Secretariat Department and attached offices, Punjabis numbered 1,660 
permanent employees and 10,140 temporary employees, or nearly 42 per cent of 
the total administrative staff. Yet Punjabis made up only 8.1 per cent of the 
subcontinent’s population in 1931, and even less after partition (4.7 per cent). 
Employees from UP came to 921 permanent and 7,523 temporary staff, or nearly 
30 per cent of the total. These figures were slightly less skewed, but UP’s 
residents still only represented 17.5 per cent of India’s population in 1951 and 
14.1 per cent in 1931. The nearest figures from any other province came from 
Bengal, which constituted just over 7 per cent of all-India staff in 1947, 14.4 per 
cent of the Indian population in 1931 and 7.3 per cent (after partition) in 1951. 
Bombay’s share of all-India jobs was lower than 0.9 per cent, even though they 
made up 7.5 per cent of the Indian population in 1931 and ten per cent in 1951. 
The lowest representation came from Orissa, with only five permanent and 
thirteen temporary staff, a paltry 0.06 per cent of the all-India services. Yet Oriya-
speaking groups constituted 1.2 per cent of the population in 1931 and 4.1 per 
cent in 1951.105 
Undeniably, representation was at least partially so skewed because of Delhi’s 
proximity to both Punjab and UP. But, serving as an example of north Indian 
majoritarianism, these statistics had important repercussions on the debates 
regarding the composition of the all-India services during this period. These 
considerations about proportional representation for the provinces were further 
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heightened as a consequence of the central government’s efforts to rehabilitate 
refugee servicemen from Pakistan within the new Indian bureaucracy. In 
December 1949 a member of the Constituent Assembly, P.T. Chacko, accused the 
Government of India of ‘provincialism’ in channelling temporary secretarial 
appointments towards displaced servicemen.106 Likewise, a letter from Y.R. 
Tawde, the President of the Kshatriya Maratha Association in Bombay City, 
contemplated that, 
‘The already precarious and uncertain position of the Marathas will be 
rendered still more uncertain by the influx from Pakistan ... What little 
protection and safeguards [the Marathas] had are being discontinued ... 
whilst Sikhs migrating to Bombay are going to be protected’.107 
The largest and most notable inward migration as a result of partition into 
Bombay Province saw approximately 550,000 non-Muslim Sindhis crossing the 
Arabian Sea by boat and landing at Bombay City’s harbour by 1952. The extent of 
the refugee problem overwhelmed the Bombay Government, who ‘tried to resist 
taking responsibility for refugees’ by petitioning the GOI against any additional 
arrivals – appeals that were rejected by the central government.108 Sindhis were 
indeed aware of their perceived ‘foreignness’ and the hostility with which they 
were treated by ‘locals’ in Bombay. An ex-Congress member of the Sindh 
Legislative Assembly, P.V. Tahilramani, in a letter to Nehru in March 1952, 
complained that ‘we displaced persons from Sindh are, even after four years of 
domicile in Bombay, an unwelcome distinct group if not aliens and outcastes’.109  
Meanwhile, elsewhere in India attempts to rehabilitate servicemen were dealt 
with in a similarly inept and clumsy manner.110 In north-east India, a similar 
refugee influx of Bengali-speakers from East Pakistan was causing serious tensions 
in Assam, which had resulted in ‘the Chief Minister of Assam ... already playing his 
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most serious trump card against the centre: provincial separatism’.111 And it was 
from here that one of the first memorials to demand forms of provincial 
representation at the all-India level had emerged in 1939. It was the Assam 
Government who proposed that a fixed quota should be introduced for each 
province in respect of recruitment to the civil and defence services under central 
control. It had decided to support this proposal, ‘seeing that a small, distant and 
poor province such as Assam, not yet even possessing a University of its own, 
labours under special handicaps in competition with larger and richer 
provinces’.112 Whilst it appreciated that, theoretically, the Assamese ‘community’ 
was provided with the same ‘equality of opportunity’ for service employment 
through competitive examination as any others, it suggested real ‘equality’ would 
only be ensured by the fixing of provincial quotas, which were to be fulfilled by 
holding local examinations under the Assam Government’s jurisdiction. The 
Assam Government thus framed its arguments in the language of the state’s 
commitment towards protecting the welfare of its citizens, arguing that provincial 
reservations should be enacted at the all-India level to ensure greater levels of 
inclusion from amongst ‘backward’ areas. 
At the same time, however, other individuals, groups and governments who 
demanded provincial reservations at the bureaucratic centre could evoke 
principles of self-government developed in anticipation of independence that 
suggested that employment should be restricted to ‘locals’. For example, ICS 
probationers allotted to the joint Bihar and Orissa cadre were required to learn 
two of the official administrative languages of the region during their 
probationary course – these were Bengali, Hindi and Oriya. The Orissa 
Government suggested that those languages should automatically be Oriya (for 
the Orissan section of the cadre) and Hindi (as prescribed for the Bihari section of 
the cadre).113 Bengali, despite being the vernacular of a sizeable linguistically-
defined Bengali ‘minority’ in both these provinces, was to be left out. Efforts to 
ensure that the all-India services were more representative at the national level 
could thus stimulate local dominance at the provincial level, with an ultimately 
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detrimental impact upon the citizenship rights of ‘outsiders’ residing within these 
regions.114 
The construction of ‘minorities’ and ‘majorities’, ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’ on the 
basis of region and language was also conjured up within the Constituent 
Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Minorities. As we saw in the previous section 
of this chapter, the constitutional commitment towards the protection of minority 
linguistic, script and cultural interests was primarily applied in the context of 
India’s Muslim community to the Urdu language, the Perso-Arabic script, and 
Islamic religious practices. However, the Advisory Committee’s original 
recommendation along these lines also took into account the mobilisation of 
communities around linguistic groups. So, when ‘Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar 
deprecated the committee taking up the question of political minorities’, it 
applied as much to his wanting to avoid ‘Tamil v Telugu controversies [being] 
introduced’ as it did to the question of religious ‘minorities’.115 Article 350B of the 
1950 Constitution authorised the appointment of a ‘Special Officer for linguistic 
minorities’, who would ‘investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided 
for linguistic minorities under this Constitution’.116 And in the ‘minority 
representations’ received as petitions by the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) 
during the Constituent Assembly debates, the demands and concerns of regional 
and ethno-linguistic ‘minorities’ were raised as frequently as ‘minority 
communities’ defined on the basis of religion and caste. For example, the AICC 
received letters from the All-India Marwari Federation concerned about increased 
‘anti-outsider’ rhetoric in West Bengal, the Muslims of Karimganj in Assam who 
raised the spectre of Assamese-Bengali conflict as well as religious tensions, an All 
Assam Minorities’ Conference concerned about the potential for minority 
languages to be replaced by Assamese, an appeal to abolish excluded and partially 
excluded areas by the All India Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas Association 
of Rajahmundry, and a memorial from the All Orissa Minority Communities 
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116 ‘Article 350B’, The Constitution of India, p. 177. 
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Conference expressing concern over the place of Bengali- and Telugu-speaking 
groups domiciled within Orissa.117  
This final petition, received on the eve of the Constituent Assembly debates, 
sought to ensure that ‘no loop-hole should be left in the constitution’. For the All 
Orissa Minority Communities Conference, the Fundamental Rights contained 
within the 1935 Government of India Act were ‘defective. [They did] not include 
the case of the linguistic minorities’.118 Appended to the letter was B.K. Pal’s The 
Problem for the Orissan Minorities, a pamphlet published in 1945 which suggested 
that the creation of an Orissan linguistic state in 1936, coupled with 
‘provincialisation’, had resulted in ‘the attempted annihilation of the cultural and 
social existence of the minority communities’ in Orissa.119 The problem emanated 
from the fact that, ‘The word minority refers only to religious minorities in India’, 
whilst ‘Under provincial autonomy in Provinces constituted mainly on a linguistic 
basis, it is linguistic minorities who are most helpless’.120 Pal concluded his 
argument by suggesting that these developments threatened India’s national 
integrity:  
‘They [the ‘majority’ members of the government-appointed Orissa 
Domicile Committee, who suggested linguistic restrictions on the granting 
of certificates for domicile in Orissa] seem to ridicule as “universalism” all 
Patriotism beyond Provincialism. They have, therefore, recommended for 
the establishment of Provincial Sovereign States with independent trade 
and economic policies with an exclusive provincial out-look which according 
to their philosophy is alone entitled to the phraseology of “nationalism”’.121 
Pal therefore sought to establish affirmative action policies for linguistic 
‘minorities’ on a similar footing to caste and religious groups, invoking the ideas 
about the state’s protection of beleaguered and downtrodden minority citizen’s 
interests. But he also constructed these demands around the idea that the 
‘minority’ had the aims of national solidarity on their side, whilst the ‘majority’ 
were governed by parochial interests that would potentially damage the future 
unity of the country. This was of utmost importance in the context of the 
                                                          
117 These petitions and representations are contained in, AICC Papers, Part I, File 
G-17 (1946-1949). 
118 Ibid., ‘“Humble Memorial” from the All Orissa Minority Communities 
Conference, to R.A. Kripalani, Secretary, AICC’, 4 March 1947. 
119 B.K. Pal, The Problem for the Orissan Minorities (Cuttack: The Orient Press, 
1945), pp. 9-10. 
120 Ibid., pp. 12-13, 14-15. 
121 Ibid., p. 20. 
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continuing discussions over the Pakistan demand, as it conflated the possible 
repercussions of linguistic provincialism with religious provincialism in the north-
east and north-west. Just as caste and religious identities could be seen as 
conducive to the growth of ‘fissiparous’ and ‘separatist’ tendencies, language, as 
it also became interlinked with the idea of regional ‘homelands’, was perceived 
anew in an analogous manner. And this drew together minorities who needed the 
state’s protection, and the Congress High Command who sought to maintain the 
central state’s integrity, in their aversion towards the expression of local majority 
backwardness. The note of the Joint Secretary to the Home Department, P.V.R. 
Rao, for example, who considered and rejected the idea of provincial reservations 
at the all-India level in September 1947, argued that, 
‘The persons who enter Government service through reservation will be 
fully aware that their prospects in service are more likely to improve with 
an intensification of provincial jealousies and rivalries than otherwise and 
they will therefore tend to promote them. Also, their loyalties will be 
primarily to their Provincial leaders to whom they will be looking forward 
for help in their advancement and not to the Government, as it should be. 
Moreover, Provincial reservation will intensify the jealousies due to 
differences in language and culture. Assam will derive little comfort if 
Bengalis domiciled in Assam monopolise reservations in favour of Assam 
and Andhras when they find all posts reserved for Madras taken away by 
Tamilians. I feel that a strong and a determined refusal to recognise local 
divisions may still prevent a development of fissiparous tendencies’.122 
Both demands for the introduction of provincial reservation practices in locally-
recruited elements of the all-India services, and demands for the introduction of 
provincial reservations across the entire central bureaucracy are therefore 
revealing of some of the larger questions on citizenship and the nature of the 
state during this transformative period.123 Central governmental policy was to 
generally reject such demands as negating the meritocratic and impartial basis 
upon which the state ostensibly operated. But this often served to present a 
benign facade behind which a more malevolent form of high-caste north Indian 
majoritarianism could dominate. Meanwhile, both those in favour and against 
provincial reservation practices presented their arguments in the language of the 
citizenship rights and interests which an independent national state was expected 
                                                          
122 NAI, Home Department File, ‘Note of P.V.R. Rao, Joint Secretary, Home 
Department’, 30 September 1947. 
123 For more on the ideas of the state’s ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ dimensions see, 
Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Governance and Myths of the State in Mumbai’, in The 
Everyday State and Society, pp. 31-67; Gould, ‘“The Dual State”’. 
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to protect. Those who demanded provincial reservation sought to counter 
Punjabi/UP predominance in the central services by presenting their caste or 
region’s ‘backwardness’ to the state for redress. In this interpretation, the state 
was to act as an adjudicator, balancing out different provincial ‘community’ 
interests and providing forms of affirmative action for those unfairly 
disadvantaged. 
At the same time, these supporters of provincial reservations in the central 
services evoked principles of self-government, in which the central 
administration’s representatives would be more accountable to a localised public. 
But, as Rao suggested in the extract cited above, accountability towards the 
province potentially negated the promotion of a wider sense of Indian identity. It 
was fear over the prospect such ‘fissiparous’ tendencies had for shattering a 
fragile national integrity which ensured they were ultimately rejected by the 
Congress High Command. Their interests thus coalesced in this instance with 
those of ‘minority citizens’ residing within these areas, who were also potentially 
threatened by the creation of provincial reservations, which would turn the 
localised manifestations of the central bureaucracy into a domain to be captured 
and controlled by regionally dominant groups. Their arguments against provincial 
reservations, whilst still constructed in the language of the rights and interests 
that the state was committed to protect, and based around distinct ‘community’ 
interests, also evoked the ideals of national citizenship to undermine the 
contentions of those supporting these forms of affirmative action. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to locate the development of different ideas about 
citizenship within the paradigm of provincial and central policy-making on 
recruitment to the civil service. It has argued that contrasting approaches to 
affirmative action within the different echelons of the services in Bombay helped 
spawn a range of imaginings and experiences of citizenship. Ostensibly, merit and 
efficiency were at the forefront of the provincial government’s considerations 
when deciding upon recruitment to the highest level Provincial Services, where no 
reservations were enacted. Yet despite the rhetoric of state objectivity at this 
level, there remained a tendency to encourage particular ‘communities’ to fill 
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such posts on account of their ‘inherent’ literary and administrative acumen, 
which countered the ostensibly principled emphasis on equality of opportunity for 
all. Amongst the lower levels of the provincial civil service in Bombay, meanwhile, 
the colonial and Congress governments looked much more openly to balance 
‘community’ interests. Justified on the basis of ethical tenets related to the state’s 
‘duty’, reservations were theoretically introduced to see that all ‘communities’ 
received their ‘proper share’ of employment in the bureaucracy.  And because it 
was with these lower and more immediate spatial representations of the state 
that individuals were most likely to interact, citizenship came to be enacted 
primarily at this localised level. Those individuals who sought to access 
bureaucratic reservations as either ‘Intermediate’ or ‘Backward’ classes dressed 
their appeals, petitions and memorandums in the language of citizenship rights 
and ‘community’ interests. But whereas some called upon the necessity for the 
state to protect ‘minority’ rights, others employed the language of ‘self-
government’ by calling for recruitment on the basis of local demographics. 
Moreover, the emphasis upon provincial forms of governmental autonomy also 
points to the efficacy of diarchy in this process. ‘Provincialisation’ during the 
interwar period had vital consequences upon legislative discrepancies between 
the provinces and the all-India centre, and encouraged the further development 
of multiple and competing conceptualisations of citizenship. Whilst in the north 
and at the all-India level religion was privileged as the primary means through 
which rights to reservation were mediated, in the south and west caste was given 
greater prominence. The Bombay Government’s affirmative action policies were 
thus conditioned by local societal circumstances – greater representation was 
provided for the ‘Intermediate’ classes in those divisions and districts of Bombay 
in which the non-Brahman movement was at its strongest. Whilst Muslims formed 
a relatively small fraction of the ‘Intermediate’ class category, it was dominated 
by non-Brahmans and, in particular, the Maratha caste cluster. Notions of 
citizenship, i.e. whether rights were articulated in relation to ‘minority’ interests 
or those of local ‘self-government’, therefore depended upon the specific 
‘situated perspective’ of the individual in western India in relation to the benefits 
and issues with growing Maratha dominance within the reservation process. And 
in this sense they diverged notably from the manner in which citizenship was 
defined in the north. 
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Ultimately, tracing these forms of affirmative action in interwar Bombay, which 
were based upon the ‘backwardness’ of a numerically preponderate group and in 
which reservations could be introduced for as much as 60 per cent of all 
‘Intermediate’ government jobs, provides evidence of a longer history of 
‘majority’ forms of representation. This goes some way towards re-contextualising 
the introduction of reservations for OBCs during the 1990s and tracing their early 
emergence in western India. This chapter has therefore provided an attempt to 
re-write the history of the introduction of reservations and their consequences 
within the civil services with a particular provincial perspective in mind. It has 
argued that these became particularised because of local societal stresses and 
strains, with important repercussions on the nature of citizenship in western 
India. It has therefore privileged a particular facet of ‘community’ identities, which 
were predominant in western India and therefore departed from the ‘Muslim 
Question’ in interesting and innovative ways. 
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5: Classifying and Counting Language at the 1951 Census 
‘Sholapur census enumeration with regard to mother tongue not proper. Kannad 
peoples language not being taken properly by Marathi enumerators’. 
Telegram from N.B. Kadadi, Member of Bombay Legislative Council (MLC), and 
M.S. Sirdar, Barrister-at-Law, Sholapur, to the Chief Minister, Bombay, 20th 
February 1951.1 
--------------- 
This chapter examines the classification and enumeration of language at the 1951 
census in the context of an impending reorganisation of provincial administrative 
boundaries on linguistic lines. By doing so, it develops a number of important 
insights into the formulation and enactment of citizenship in Bombay Province 
during this period. The first section places the arguments of this chapter in the 
context of existing scholarly work on the census in India. By focusing primarily 
upon language it looks into an area of ethno-demographic classification which has 
been largely ignored in the previous historiography. This links in with the points 
raised in the introduction to this thesis about the propensity towards privileging 
the north as the point of theoretical analysis within dominant historical narratives 
on independence, partition, and citizenship. The chapter also considers the 
‘everyday’ practices of local census officials in a number of contested settings in 
Bombay, where the collection of data on mother-tongue was critical to the 
delineation of territorial borders.  
Theoretically, enumerators were expected to ask, listen and record the 
information tendered in their interactions with individual members of local 
society in an impartial and detached manner. But the second section of this 
chapter demonstrates how these state intermediaries, drawn from amongst local 
society themselves, were subject to analogous pressures, concerns and exigencies 
as the rest of the public in Bombay. Census data on language in 1951 could thus 
be incorrectly recorded and knowingly refashioned in the interests of the 
enumerator’s own ‘community’ ahead of provincial reorganisation. In this sense, 
ideas about belonging and status for citizens in Bombay came to be articulated, at 
                                                          
1 Mumbai, Maharashtra State Archives [henceforth MSA], Government of Bombay 
[henceforth GOB], Political and Services Department File 7699/46 – pt.V, 
‘Telegram from Nagapabpa Bandappa Kadadi, MLC, and M.S. Sirdar, Barrister-at-
Law, Sholapur, to the Chief Minister, Bombay’, 20 February 1951. 
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a local level, on the basis of ethno-linguistic affinity. Simultaneously, the second 
section also traces a number of petitions and memorials received by the Bombay 
Government from other members of the public about the manipulation of 
statistics on mother-tongue by local census officials, which called for the higher 
echelons of the state to make redress. Here, appeals were couched in the 
language of the core constitutional values and principles of state objectivity, 
integrity and secularism, and placed emphasis on an inclusive and universalistic 
citizenship. The ways through which the public engaged with and looked to 
benefit from their rights and status as citizens was thus dependent upon their 
particular ‘situated perspective’ in the context of larger historical processes linked 
to linguistic reorganisation. 
The penultimate section of this chapter considers the position of the region’s 
adivasi (tribal) population amidst efforts to define their ethno-linguistic allegiance 
ahead of boundary demarcation. As a result of local enumerative practices, the 
number of adivasis recorded as speaking tribal mother tongues in the Dangs, 
Thana and West Khandesh Districts declined, to be replaced by an increased 
emphasis upon the official provincial languages of Gujarati and Marathi. Everyday 
enumerative mechanisms and procedures thereby served to establish forms of 
regional ethno-linguistic majoritarianism, which departed from the state’s 
professed commitment to protect the citizenship rights of its tribal ‘minorities’. By 
focusing upon the dual perspective through which individuals interacted with its 
local manifestations and practices, and imagined it as a ‘sublime’ entity and 
‘translocal institution’, this chapter therefore ultimately suggests that the state 
had a definitive impact on how a variety of ideas about citizenship were both 
imagined and expressed via language.2 In the context of the enumerative and 
classificatory procedures at the 1951 census in Bombay ahead of linguistic 
reorganisation, the state thus served both as a site to be captured to serve the 
particularistic interests of those individuals who sought to manipulate the census 
returns, and also paradoxically as an entity through which other members of 
                                                          
2 I borrow both these ideas of the ‘sublime’ state and the ‘translocal institution’ 
from the works of Thomas Blom Hansen and Akhil Gupta, respectively. See, 
Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Governance and Myths of the State in Mumbai’, in The 
Everyday State and Society in Modern India, ed. by C.J. Fuller and Véronique Bénéï 
(London: Hurst and Company, 2001), pp. 31-67; Akhil Gupta, Red Tape: 
Bureaucracy, Structural Violence and Poverty in India (Durham, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 2012), pp. 100-104. 
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society sought remedy for this subversion of their constitutionally-defined rights 
and interests. 
 
5.1 The Census, Language and Local Intermediaries 
The decennial all-India Census, inaugurated across the entire subcontinent for the 
first time in 1871, and completed with great rigmarole every ten years since, was 
considered essential for the formulation of state knowledge about indigenous 
society in colonial India.3 For Ronald Inden, writing in 1990, the census was the 
epitome of the colonial project to classify and count Indian ‘communities’, an 
‘imagined India’ of false projections based around Orientalist stereotypes.4 The 
writings of Arjun Appadurai, Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks have since modified 
and introduced important caveats within this approach. Yet for these 
anthropological historians, ‘the empirical project of the census [remains] wedded 
to the most general of Orientalist categories for the classification of the social 
order, with built-in assumptions about hierarchy and precedence’.5 The census 
thus perpetuated colonial misunderstandings that Indian society was ordered 
primarily around religion: both the supposedly primordial communal division that 
existed between Hindus and Muslims; and the ranked and stratified nature of 
Hindu society based around a caste ‘system’, with Brahmans existing at the apex 
of this hierarchy. And, as we have seen in the previous two chapters, it also came 
to have important political implications, structuring the colonial state’s reforms 
and the demarcation of administrative and governmental concessions to Indian 
‘communities’ such as Muslims on the basis of their ‘minority’ demographic 
status, particularly in north India. In this historiography, modern Indian political 
identities are often seen to derive from these colonial processes: ‘[Herbert Hope] 
Risley’s anthropology worked not so much to retard nationalism as to render it 
                                                          
3 Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 201. 
4 Ronald Inden, Imagining India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
5 Dirks, Castes of Mind, p. 202; see also, Bernard Cohn, ‘The Census, Social 
Structure and Objectification in South Asia’, in An Anthropologist Among the 
Historians and Other Essays, ed. by Bernard Cohn (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1987), pp. 224-254; Inden, Imagining India; Arjun Appadurai, ‘Number in the 
Colonial Imagination’, in Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: 
Perspectives on South Asia, ed. by C. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 314-339. 
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communal. In so doing, it also left a bloody legacy for South Asia that continues to 
exact a mounting toll’.6  
For Sumit Guha, Norbert Peabody and others, this approach has glossed over 
administrative continuities from the pre-colonial era, whereby enumerative 
practices were conducted by the Mughals and their successors as they sought to 
acquire knowledge about the local societies they governed.7 It has also obscured 
the extent to which the formation of pre-colonial community identities was 
always political, as individuals, groups and communities engaged with the state’s 
prescriptions and structures to protect their own interests and concerns. And this 
Eurocentric approach has paid relatively scant attention to the consistent 
fluctuations and transformation in the formulation of colonial knowledge during 
this period, as highlighted perhaps most effectively in the work of Susan Bayly.8 
Bayly concurs with Dirks and others that many late nineteenth-century colonial 
ethnographers, such as W.W. Hunter and H.H. Risley, were influenced by a wider 
intellectual climate in which race science in the metropolis and overseas empire 
became increasingly pervasive.9 In this interpretation, different jatis constituted 
separate ‘races’. Paradoxically however, others such as Denzil Ibbetson, were 
drawn towards a ‘material’ or ‘occupational’ understanding of caste, which placed 
stress upon its relative fluidity and openness. The emphasis on ethnicity and 
blood, emerging partially from ideas about a stratified hierarchy of Brahmanical 
values within a caste ‘system’, was deemed by Bayly as not as all pervasive 
amongst the administrators as historians have initially argued. 
Part of the reasoning behind this relates to the particular spatial location of these 
administrators. Whilst Ibbetson developed his ‘material’ interpretation within the 
Punjab, Hunter and Risley’s formulations emerged out of the specific locale of 
                                                          
6 Dirks, Castes of Mind, p. 227. 
7 Norbert Peabody, ‘Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial 
and Early Colonial India’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43 (2001), 
819-850; Sumit Guha, ‘The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India, c.1600-
1990’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45 (2003), 148-167; see also, 
C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social 
Communication in India 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
8 Susan Bayly, ‘Caste and “Race” in the Colonial Ethnography of India’, in The 
Concept of Race in South Asia, ed. by Peter Robb (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1995), pp. 165-218. 
9 See also, Christopher Pinney, ‘Colonial Anthropology in the “Laboratory of 
Mankind”’, in The Raj: India and the British, 1600-1947, ed. by C.A. Bayly (London: 
National Portrait Gallery Publications, 1990), pp. 252-263. 
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Bengal. And this suggests the need to attach adequate importance to local Indian 
societies in the formulation of colonial knowledge. As Peabody has argued, much 
previous research has oft tended ‘to situate the genesis of colonial ways of 
knowing as being entirely within the European episteme’, ensuring that ‘the role 
of indigenous actors, agendas and ways of knowing in the construction of these 
discourses has been systematically ignored’.10 Whilst much of this has been 
rectified by tracing both the changes and continuities between the pre-colonial 
and colonial periods, the continuing efficacy of the census has not yet been 
thoroughly considered in the context of Indians’ gradual transition from colonial 
subjecthood to independent citizenship. This chapter seeks to build upon this 
already nuanced and developed scholarship by stressing the continued 
importance of the local indigenous intermediary in everyday classificatory and 
enumerative processes attached to the collection of data in postcolonial India. 
Within the context of the census, and the vast levels of illiteracy amongst the 
native populace, it was decided that ‘in India we cannot work on the Western 
system, whereby each householder has a schedule handed him to fill up, and that 
schedule is simply collected’.11 Instead, indigenous enumerators and supervisors 
employed by the state were critical to the collection of vast amounts of local data, 
and in effectively relaying it back to the appropriate authorities. However, 
conducting the census was also always simultaneously a political process, with 
important consequences for the potential representation of communities both 
within the electoral arena and the structures of the bureaucracy – the centrality 
of the census in ‘underpin[ning] ethnic quotas in pre-Independence India’, for 
example, has led Steven Wilkinson to describe the colonial state as undertaking a 
form of ‘consociationalism’.12 Hence, the indigenous intermediary also occupied a 
position of important political interest, in which the manipulation of statistics 
could potentially benefit particular factions, groups and ‘communities’. Drawn 
from amongst local society themselves, these enumerators were subject to the 
same pressures and concerns as ordinary members of the public, and could be 
                                                          
10 Peabody, ‘Cents, Sense, Census’, pp. 819-820. 
11 L.J. Sedgwick, Census of India, 1921: Volume VIII: Bombay Presidency: Part I: 
General Report (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1922), pp. ii-iii. 
12 See, Steven I. Wilkinson, ‘India, Consociational Theory and Ethnic Violence’, 
Asian Survey, 40 (2000), 767-791 (pp. 768, 775): ‘Consociationalism featured the 
inclusion of minorities in a political “grand coalition” that granted them cultural 
autonomy. It also gave minorities a veto over important legislation and made 
ethnic “proportionality ... the principal standard of political representation, civil 
service appointments, and allocation of public funds”’. 
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pressurised, cajoled and influenced by particular interest groups and locally 
important individuals.13 In these circumstances, the supposed ‘impartiality’ of the 
enumerator in the collection of data was upset in practice, as they became 
enmeshed within networks of patronage, placed emphasis upon their particular 
social identities, and interpreted the statistics in light of their own interests and 
concerns. For most Indians engaging with the state at the census, their rights and 
status as citizens were enacted in these more informal, on the ground (and oft 
one-sided) negotiations with local state representatives.14 
The everyday interactions through which ideas about citizenship were formulated 
in the context of the census are of especial important when considering the larger 
historical processes linked to the ongoing transition from subjecthood to 
citizenship. In 1941, for example, in an environment saturated by religio-political 
mobilisation in north-east and north-west India after the Lahore Resolution of the 
previous year  ‘census operations became a much more direct fight between 
advocates of Hindu and Muslim enumeration’.15 Half a decade later, these 
statistics were then utilised by indigenous politicians to augment their claims to 
particular tracts of territory in the context of plans for the partition of Punjab and 
Bengal. Whilst Hindu nationalist organisations scrambled to demonstrate the 
analogous religious and cultural identities of tribal and low-caste groups residing 
in these areas, Muslim political organisations looked to foster depictions of the 
cultural distinctiveness and ‘minority’ rights of adivasis to reduce the numerical 
strength of the Hindus. These low-caste and tribal groups were frequently caught 
in the religio-political crossfire, and their own interests and concerns overridden 
and nullified when drawn into these larger, national political debates.16 
Throughout this process, the collection and classification of religious data by 
enumerators was thus of immense importance for a variety of political and 
                                                          
13 C.J. Fuller and John Harriss, ‘For an Anthropology of the Modern Indian State’, in 
The Everyday State and Society, pp. 1-30 (p. 26); Akhil Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries: 
The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State’, 
American Ethnologist, 22.2 (1995), 375-402 (p. 384). 
14 For similar ideas in a different context, see, Taylor C. Sherman, ‘Migration, 
Citizenship and Belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan), 1946-1956’, Modern Asian 
Studies [henceforth MAS], 45 (2011), 81-107 (pp. 100-102); Joya Chatterji, ‘South 
Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946-1970’, The Historical Journal, 55 (2012), 1049-
1071 (p. 1051). 
15 William Gould, Religion and Conflict in Modern South Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 232. 
16 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, ‘Transfer of Power and the Crisis of Dalit Politics in 
India, 1945-47’, MAS, 34 (2000), 893-942. 
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‘community’-based interests – and in fact, they helped shape the final position of 
the new nation-states’ territorial boundaries. 
Similarly, the collection and classification of ‘community’ data at the census of 
1951 was potentially critical to those who espoused notions of citizenship which 
focused upon semi-autonomous forms of provincial self-government within India. 
As made clear in the introduction to this thesis, there was actually nothing 
inevitable about Pakistan’s separate sovereignty – for Jinnah, it was a ‘bargaining 
chip’ to extract concessions from the Congress and the Raj for both India’s 
Muslims and his own political party, the Muslim League. Rather, Jinnah envisaged 
a con-federal constitutional arrangement based upon Hindu-Muslim parity at the 
centre.17 If we thus treat partition and the Pakistan demand as part of a much 
broader trend towards regional mobilisation and sub-national autonomy, we can 
also decipher the continuing importance of the census towards forms of 
citizenship in the aftermath of independence. However, whereas regionalism in 
the north-east and north-west of the subcontinent was constructed around the 
distinctions built up between forms of religious affiliation, it was language which 
dominated similar processes in the south and west of India. Key to local 
enumerative and classificatory processes in western India, then, were attempts to 
carve out limited areas of influence for locally prominent linguistic groups, 
especially as the centre came to be perceived as dominated by a north Indian 
majoritarianism (see Chapter Six). 
Another important strand within this chapter will therefore consider the 
importance of linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries in 
this period, which provided the context for much of the machinations, petitions 
and representations around the census during 1951. The efficacy of linguistic 
demographics within the census has often been largely ignored in the existing 
historiography, particularly because of the emphasis upon caste and religion as 
the key elements in colonial definitions of Indian society.18 Because, as David 
                                                          
17 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand 
for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Asim Roy, ‘Reviews: 
The High Politics of India’s Partition: The Revisionist Perspective’, MAS, 24 (1990), 
385-408. 
18 See, for example, the essays in N. Gerald Barrier’s edited volume on the census: 
Kenneth W. Jones, ‘Religious Identity and the Indian Census’, in The Census in 
British India: New Perspectives, ed. by N. Gerald Barrier (New Delhi: Manohar, 
1981), pp. 73-101; Harry W. Blair, ‘Caste and the British Census in Bihar: Using Old 
Data to Study Contemporary Political Behaviour’, in The Census in British India, pp. 
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Washbrook has noted, histories of ‘the whole’ have invariably been ‘not much 
more than histories of Bengal and the Ganges valley’, the importance of the 
collection and classification of data on language has generally been downplayed.19 
With the enumeration of caste being almost entirely abolished in 1951 and 
replaced with a new stress on socio-economic classifications, the continuing 
political efficacy of ‘community’ in the Nehruvian period has also been generally 
overlooked. But by refocusing our perspective on the wider implications of the 
anticipation and aftermath of independence and partition, in which multiple ideas 
about swaraj and self-rule (including the Pakistan demand) were often expressed 
through a regional idiom, this chapter seeks to trace the importance of the 1951 
census afresh. 
In doing so, the following two sections of this chapter will focus on a number of 
particularly important areas in Bombay Province in the context of demands for 
linguistic reorganisation and the census of 1951. The first section considers the 
taking of the census in the southern districts of Belgaum and Sholapur, where 
particular tracts of territory within this district were to be contested by 
proponents of the unilingual provinces of Maharashtra and Karnataka. Although 
statistics on the linguistic composition of these districts have to be treated with 
the utmost caution considering their manipulation by local census officials, it is 
apparent that Belgaum District was a Kannada-speaking ‘majority’ area, with a 
sizeable Marathi-speaking ‘minority’ residing in the north and west of the district 
and in the district administrative headquarters, Belgaum City. Sholapur, 
meanwhile, was primarily a Marathi-speaking area, with a notable Kannada-
speaking ‘minority’ in Sholapur city and the South Sholapur Taluka.20 The record of 
                                                                                                                                                   
151-175; Frank F. Conlon, ‘The Census of India as a Source for the Historical Study 
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the ethno-linguistic affinities of villages, towns and cities were thus deemed 
critical to the delineation of provincial boundaries. 
The second section analyses the local performance of the census primarily in the 
Dangs District, but also in Thana and West Khandesh, as areas that were claimed 
by supporters of either a unilingual Gujarat or Maharashtra. These districts had 
large adivasi populations, whose ethno-linguistic allegiances were the subject of 
much controversy in 1951. Adivasis made up 21.91 per cent of the population in 
Thana District; 39.42 per cent of the population in West Khandesh; and as much 
as 84.35 per cent of the population in the Dangs.21 In a similar manner to how 
low-caste and adivasi populations in Bengal were treated ahead of the 1941 
census by proponents of Hindu and Muslim politics, the supporters of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat in Bombay Province sought to affiliate the adivasi 
populations of western India with their own linguistic community. In the Dangs, 
where the adivasi population were said to speak a local vernacular known as 
‘Bhili’ or ‘Dangi’, conflict between Maharashtrians and Gujaratis as to whether 
Dangi derived from either Marathi or Gujarati led to a subsequently rapid decline 
in the number of respondents returning Dangi as their mother-tongue in the 
census. Linguistic diversity, it seems, was to be replaced by an emphasis upon 
monolinguism within the newly demarcated provinces. 
This chapter therefore seeks to enhance existing scholarship on the census in 
India in two ways. First, it concentrates upon the everyday enumerative and 
classificatory practices of indigenous intermediaries, who proved essential to the 
larger processes related to the gathering of colonial knowledge, and who 
frequently became embroiled within the political consequences of data-collection. 
Second, it focuses afresh on linguistic demographics in the context of regionalism 
and growing demands for linguistic reorganisation, which has been relatively 
overshadowed in previous studies by the focus upon caste and religious 
community as the key categories and identities of social analysis by the state. It 
thus stresses both continuities and changes in the gradual transition from 
colonialism to independent nationhood – so whilst the classification and 
enumeration of mother-tongue was provided with a relatively novel importance 
                                                          
21 New Delhi, National Archives of India [henceforth NAI], Government of India 
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in the aftermath of independence and partition, in which it became tied up with 
ideals related to forms of local self-government, the census also continued to 
reflect older colonial models and practices. Even though caste was no longer 
counted, and emphasis was put upon socio-economic classifications, individuals 
continued to express their interests and rights through the idiom of ‘community’. 
 
5.2 Boundaries, Enumerators, and the Census of 1951 
This section of the chapter considers both the impact of state justifications and 
principles regarding the collection of census data, and the localised actions of 
census enumerators, on ideas about citizenship in western India. It focuses in 
particular on Sholapur and Belgaum, two southern fringe districts of Bombay, 
which would contain significant sites of contention between Kannada speakers 
and Marathi speakers over the exact linguistic allegiance of certain tracts of 
territory. The first sub-section briefly augments the analysis of the previous 
section of this chapter by comparing and contrasting the prominence accorded to 
‘Language Handbooks’ drawn from the census returns of 1951 in the decisions of 
the States Reorganization Commission (SRC) with the use of census statistics on 
religion in the delineation of the territorial boundaries of India and Pakistan. It 
also emphasises how, despite the suggestion in governmental rhetoric that the 
census would now focus upon economic rather than ‘community’ criteria, the 
decision to continue to collect statistical returns on language, as well as for 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in Bombay still provided the 
potential for the political manipulation of the data. 
The second sub-section demonstrates how the local practices of the census 
enumerators could depart significantly from the notion of the state’s communal 
impartiality, with the political manipulation of statistical returns in the interests of 
particular ‘communities’ ahead of linguistic reorganisation. Simultaneously, 
however, those who presented examples of such local state malpractice couched 
their petitions and memorials within the language of the state’s hyperbolical 
principles. In such circumstances, both quotidian interactions with and translocal 
imaginings of the state shaped the public’s ideas about citizenship in the context 
of the census. The third sub-section demonstrates that at the local level, ethno-
linguistic affinities ahead of reorganisation were essential to the articulation and 
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enactment of citizenship status and rights. But at the same time, those who were 
not considered ‘locals’ or did not belong to the majority ‘community’ could appeal 
to the constitutional guarantees and safeguards which the higher echelons of the 
all-India state were supposed to represent. Citizenship could thus take a number 
of different forms depending upon the particular perspectives of the individual or 
group concerned. 
5.2.1 The 1951 Census: Class versus ‘Community’ 
On 7 February 1951, the Chief Minister of Bombay B.G. Kher sent an ‘Appeal’ to 
the public ahead of the first day of enumeration for the ninth all-India census. 
According to Kher, ‘A modern State, interested in the welfare of its people, cannot 
function efficiently and succeed in its objectives unless it has at its disposal 
accurate information about the number of people under its care and their socio-
economic conditions’.22 Hence, despite the advent of independence and the end 
of British colonial rule, a census was still seen as a necessity by the postcolonial 
administration to augment state knowledge of, and state power over, society. For 
Kher it was deemed a ‘duty’ incumbent upon all citizens to oblige in the census 
operation, and not to ‘look upon the enumerator as someone who has come at 
his door to irritate and annoy him by requiring him to answer questions regarding 
himself and the members of his family’.23 In this interpretation citizenship within 
India was therefore to be defined as much by Indians’ responsibilities towards the 
state as the rights they had been guaranteed under the constitution of the 
previous year. This was also an all-Indian citizenship which, at least ostensibly, 
disparaged the efficacy of divisive communal identities by placing emphasis upon 
the Nehruvian imperatives of secularism, democracy and development instead. 
Kher went on to suggest that, ‘The objectives of the present Census are 
particularly more broad [sic] based than those of the previous Census operations. 
The emphasis has now shifted from religion and caste to economic 
classification’.24 
Supposedly departing significantly from colonial perceptions of Indian society as 
based on two primordially irreconcilable religious communities, and a stratified 
and hierarchical Hinduism, the 1951 Census appeared as the culmination of 
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Congress nationalists’ efforts to have the collection of caste and religious 
statistical information abolished from the data record. However, despite this post-
independence de-emphasis on the enumeration and compilation of information 
regarding communities, ‘the Census authorities still made much of caste in their 
subsidiary descriptive reports’.25 A separate chapter of the census continued to 
tabulate data and offer analytical remarks on the Scheduled Castes (SCs), 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), which was deemed 
critical in light of the special privileges granted to these communities under the 
constitution.26 Meanwhile, statistical returns regarding language were still 
collected, and continued to thereby reflect older patterns whereby language was 
equated with ethnicity. With regards to western India, for example, the 1901 
Census had conflated caste, language, territory and nationhood, by suggesting 
that 
‘the name Maratha ... has a threefold application. It is applied first to the 
section of India south of the Narbada and north of the Karnatak in which 
the Marathi language is spoken; second to the whole of the Marathi-
speaking population; and third, in a narrower and more correct sense, to 
the bulk of the old fighting and now cultivating middle class of the country 
whose language is Marathi’.27 
Ethno-linguistic affinities were considered critical ahead of reorganisation. Indeed, 
by 1954 ‘the Government of India [had] decided to obtain language data 
according to villages for all multi-lingual talukas [‘sub-district’ levels of 
administration] in India by means of a special sorting of the 1951 census slips’.28 
Despite the rhetorical flourish which accompanied the achievement of 
independence and the emphasis on secularism, democracy and development, the 
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suggestion that ‘the basis of classification was economic and not social’ during the 
1951 Census therefore proved at least a partial chimera.29 
The Government of India’s 1954 directive had coincided with the nationwide tour 
of representatives of the States Reorganisation Commission, who had been tasked 
with deciding whether India’s provinces should be reorganised on the basis of 
linguistic, cultural, financial and security considerations. Meanwhile, the SRC’s 
final proposals of 1955 were announced in the same year as these new ‘Language 
Handbooks’ were first published. In this way, the counting of heads on the basis of 
community echoed at least one of the criteria that had been put forward to Sir 
Cyril Radcliffe, as well as the Bengal and Punjab Boundary Commissions, tasked 
with delineating the two new nation-states of India and Pakistan in 1947. Muslim 
League claims within the Punjab, for example, rested upon demography: ‘Muslims 
must, they argued, be given all the districts in Lahore Division, Rawalpindi Division 
and Multan Division, which according to the 1941 census were all Muslim-
majority districts, majority determined simply by “counting of heads and by no 
other means”’.30  The later emphasis upon communal demography during the 
1951 Census ahead of linguistic reorganisation therefore reflected older 
precedents set by enumerative practices and intimately connected to the 
demarcation of Pakistan and the boundaries of partition. And in this sense, as 
noted in the previous section of this chapter, both the 1941 and 1951 censuses 
played a critical role within the much broader trend towards regional mobilisation 
and sub-national autonomy embodied within both the Pakistan demand and 
linguistic reorganisation.31 
Societal and governmental references to the census continued to be critical to 
settling community disputes beyond independence and partition. The 
Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti (Maharashtra Unification Committee) of the 
disputed city and district of Belgaum, for instance, made reference to population 
figures on the basis of mother-tongue within the 1951 Census to argue that 
Belgaum was a Marathi majority city.32 And as we shall see in the Dangs District, 
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both Gujarati and Maharashtrian claimants to the region sought to manipulate 
census figures in their favour to ascertain that the district’s adivasi population 
were ethnically akin to Gujarati or Marathi speakers. Whereas across much of 
northern India (and often in Bombay Province too), the 1941 Census had served 
as a direct fight between advocates of Hindu and Muslim enumeration, the 1951 
Census in western India became much more concerned with the politics of 
linguistic enumeration in the context of increased demands for provincial 
reorganisation. Of course, the importance of mother-tongue within the census 
had been articulated in the past, most notably in reference to the ‘Telugu-Oriya 
question’ and the religio-political connotations attached to the profession of 
Hindi, Urdu or Hindustani as mother-tongue ahead of the 1931 Census.33 It had 
also proved increasingly significant within Bombay Province in the context of the 
increased welfare activities of indigenous governments under diarchic and then 
full provincial autonomy. But language had always been deemed relatively 
insignificant when compared to the colonial emphasis upon caste and religion. 
However, by 1951 the political context had changed significantly.  The need to 
demarcate the boundaries of potential new provinces on the basis of the district, 
town or village’s linguistic demographics, and the desire to access the possible 
benefits which would accrue to those who found themselves included within a 
communally-defined demographic ‘majority’ ensured that the census increasingly 
became a sight of contestation along the lines of language. 
5.2.2 Local Census Enumerators and Trans-local State Principles 
Behind the increased efficacy of linguistic identities were those enumerators and 
checkers who played a critical role in the everyday procedures which underpinned 
the effective operation of the all-India census. Tellingly, Chief Minister B.G. Kher 
was to refer to them as ‘an agency through which a Census is taken’.34 These 
intermediaries therefore occupied an important position between state and 
society, representing the state’s authority to the wider Indian public. But their 
privileged location also allowed them to mediate the state’s power and its 
formulation of knowledge, often seeking political, social and material advantage 
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in the process for themselves, their particular faction, alliance, or in the case of 
this chapter, their community. In the context of the census, for example, the 
recognition that continued to be afforded to the counting of mother tongues 
came to be manipulated by these intermediaries in favour of particular 
communities, ahead of the boundary demarcation that would accompany 
reorganisation. In fact, complaints regarding the conduct of enumerators or their 
supervisors in the recording of their respondents’ mother tongue became 
increasingly commonplace in 1951. Towards the end of February, for example, 
after enumeration had been going on for just over two weeks, the Government of 
Bombay received a letter from two inhabitants of Sholapur, another district which 
contained sizeable populations of both Kannada and Marathi speakers.35 The 
lawyer M.S. Sirdar and the politician N.B. Kadadi accused Sholapur City’s 
enumerators of being involved in special efforts to influence the returns regarding 
their respondents’ mother-tongue. According to Sirdar and Kadadi, 
‘the enumerators do not ask specific question as to the mother tongue of 
the person enumerated and ... consequently the mother-tongue of 
Kannadigas is entered as “MARATHI” simply because the person 
enumerated knows how to speak Marathi and begins to speak in Marathi 
when the enumerator goes to him or her as the case may be’.36 
Part of the problem, Sirdar and Kadadi speculated, was that 90 per cent of 
Sholapur’s enumerators were themselves Marathi-speakers, who intentionally 
avoided asking this relatively unambiguous question. Similar concerns were raised 
in Belgaum City by an organisation formed especially for the purpose, the Census 
Committee of the Kannada Population at Belgaum. In a letter to J.B. Bowman, the 
Superintendent of Census Operations in Bombay, they claimed to ‘have heard of 
instances where questions are asked not as to language spoken by people as their 
mother-tongue but as to whether they understand Marathi’.37 On one level, these 
representations and petitions to higher authorities served to highlight the 
contrasting everyday interests of these Kannada-speaking communities to the 
census officials taken from amongst the local Maharashtrian public, with the 
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former often seeking to have members of their own linguistic group substituted in 
the place of the latter. In the context of boundary demarcation, the opportunity 
to control the classificatory and enumerative process within the census was a 
valuable prize, potentially ensuring that their community would be classified and 
grouped within a larger Kannada-speaking community and able to access the 
benefits that came with constituting a ‘majority’. The Census Committee at 
Belgaum noted this very fact when they suggested that, ‘The data ... will have far 
reaching consequences, and may even be used for ... settling the boundaries of 
new provinces or states that are likely to be formed during the next decade’.38 It 
was therefore not in their best interests that out of the 74 proposed enumerators, 
they claimed, 69 of them were Marathi speakers and only one spoke Kannada (the 
remaining four were said to speak Urdu). With regard to their seven supervisors, 
too, five were said to be Marathi speakers, and only two Kannadigas. 
On another level, however, these appeals by Kannada speakers could and often 
did make reference to the ideologies and ideals upon which the state was 
ostensibly predicated, grasping the utility of its supposedly ‘sublime’ impartial 
nature to deprecate Marathi enumerators.39 In appealing over local state 
representatives to higher administrative authorities at the provincial level, they 
emphasised the official state discourse of an inclusive citizenship where parochial 
loyalties were not welcome. The Census Committee at Belgaum, for instance, 
argued during the collection of data that ‘there ought to be employed a system of 
checks by which vagaries and inconsistencies, are corrected by officers of 
unimpeachable integrity’. In this way, they echoed the central government’s 
emphasis on the impartiality and national duty of enumerators, as an essential 
characteristic of the postcolonial state. This also proved essential to criticisms of 
current enumerative procedures. In Belgaum, where they had been entrusted to 
the city’s municipal council, the Census Committee argued the council was itself 
not free ‘from bias or preconceived notions’.40 Only two years previous, for 
example, just after the Linguistic Provinces Commission had submitted its report 
suggesting it was an inopportune moment for provincial reorganisation, the 
Belgaum Municipality had passed a resolution which favoured inclusion of 
Belgaum in a future Maharashtra Province. This was deemed to impinge upon the 
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ability of the municipal council to conduct the 1951 census in the city with due 
detachedness and objectivity.  
Meanwhile, others sought to place emphasis upon national identity and Indian 
unity above other forms of community organisation, reflecting and redirecting the 
criticism of demands for provincial reorganisation as ‘fissiparous’ and ‘separatist’ 
that emanated from central government. The mamlatdar (a civil servant in charge 
of a taluka) of Athani in Belgaum District claimed to have appealed to the 
‘importance of census operations from a national point of view’ during a public 
meeting, when he had tried to impress upon the local inhabitants the need to 
furnish accurate information to their enumerators.41 Yet the mamlatdar also 
revealed that he had developed a local system of checks and balances, which was 
based around the idea that, ‘The enumerator of each block is a person whose 
mother tongue is either Kannada or Urdu and the checker of each block is a 
teacher in [the] Marathi school’.42 
The idea to divide local enumerators and supervisors on the basis of their 
community also received the backing, at various stages, of S. Nijalingappa, 
President of the Karnatak Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC), B.S. Hiray, 
President of the Maharashtra PCC, and Morarji Desai, who at the time was the 
Home Minister in Bombay’s Congress Government.43 In Belgaum meanwhile, a 
directive was issued by the District Collector to the President of Belgaum Borough 
Municipality in the context of fears over the local enumerative procedure, ‘to 
increase the number of enumerators knowing Kannada to make it approximately 
50 per cent with a view to doing justice to both the languages’.44 Attempts to 
parcel out posts to enumerators on the basis of community had some longer 
precedents, again related to the context of regionalism and sub-national 
autonomy that accompanied partition. Ahead of the 1941 Census in Bengal, for 
example, the provincial Revenue Minister B.P. Roy had suggested that Hindu and 
Muslim enumerators should be paired together in view of continuing communal 
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rivalry, to supervise each other’s work and ensure that the records were not 
falsified.45 Yet the idea provoked a long and critical response from the all-India 
Census Commissioner M.W.M. Yeatts, who insisted it was essential that all census 
officers should be detached from any kind of partisan activity or assistance. To 
conduct a census in the manner suggested by Roy, ‘would be to make the entire 
province during the census period a kind of battlefield’.46 In 1951, too, the 
decision to employ enumerators on the basis of the ‘linguistic divide’ in 
contentious borderline villages, towns and districts, whilst presented as a form of 
secularism, was not based upon the ‘separation of church and state’. Rather, it 
existed as an example of ‘equal respect for all traditions’, a form of Indian 
secularism, with important consequences which correlated with Yeatts’ critique of 
1941.47 The census official’s reasonableness, detachedness and disinterestedness 
in local enumerative practices, a proper separation of the state and communal 
society through which objectivity could be provided, was affected by the local 
procedures involved with the collection and classification of data. The census still 
survived as a site of communal political interest, a place for contestation between 
different communities. The networks of communal recognition contained within 
the classificatory and enumerative procedure – the decision to continue collecting 
data on mother tongue; the concept of communal checks and balances amongst 
enumerators; the very need for local knowledge to ensure the census was 
completed – ensured that ‘pressure could [still] be applied to favour one’s 
community’ in the census returns.48 
5.2.3 Citizenship at the Census 
Local census procedures and the enumerative intermediaries of the state also 
played a critical role in the mediation and formulation of citizenship. For one 
thing, the continued emphasis upon community contrasted decidedly with the 
ostensible commitment to secularism and the state’s supposed communal 
impartiality under the Nehruvian Congress at the all-India level, which apparently 
underpinned the idea of an inclusive Indian society. Here, minority communal 
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groups, howsoever defined, were to be provided with extra rights and guarantees 
by the state, to ensure their protection within a democracy where ‘majority rule’ 
could otherwise impinge upon their interests. This approach to citizenship 
remained embedded, for example, within Kher’s ‘Appeal’ to the western Indian 
public ahead of enumeration in 1951. Citizens were also informed by Kher that it 
was their ‘duty’ to respond accurately to the questions asked by their 
enumerators. However, these intermediaries were themselves participants within 
local society, with their own factional allegiances and communal loyalties.49 For 
those members of western Indian society who would never come into contact 
with higher levels of officialdom it was the enumerator who represented the 
state’s authority. And as citizenship developed (as the introduction to this thesis 
suggested) as a direct consequence of these localised interactions between local 
state actors and specific segments of society, citizenship was frequently mediated 
through the paradigm of ‘community’ and articulated through the capture of state 
resources for particularised interests. 
Where communal recognition continued in the everyday workings of the census, 
notions of loyalty and belonging to a still relatively novel Indian nation-state could 
be mediated by enumerators through ethno-linguistic affinities. This was apparent 
within ‘A Note Regarding the Boundaries of North Karnatak’ prepared by the 
Collector of Belgaum and submitted to the Linguistic Provinces Commission in 
1948. The Collector included information on these contested marginal regions 
from the 1921 and 1931 Censuses within his ‘Note’, arguing that, 
‘The [table] shows uniform retrogression of Kannada in all Deccan States, 
except one or two solitary instances. What does this signify? In the absence 
of migration on the part of Kannada speaking people or the sudden influx of 
Marathi speaking population or the fall of birth rate in the case of 
Kannadigas, one is led to the irresistible conclusion that pro-Marathi 
enumerators deliberately showed Kannada as less in the census returns’.50 
In anticipation of boundary demarcation on the basis of mother tongue, and in his 
efforts to deprecate the findings of the 1921 and 1931 Censuses, the Collector of 
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Belgaum linked the contemporary manipulation of census data to a longer ‘clash 
of civilisations’ which had resulted in the historical dominance of Marathi-
speaking peoples over the original inhabitants of the land, the Kannadigas. A 
direct influence here was the previous depictions of Marathas as a ‘nation’ or 
‘race’ apart in the classificatory categories of past colonial censuses. And in this 
sense, the Collector’s reasoning reflected similar thinking connected to the 1941 
Census in the context of the Pakistan demand, which had seen ‘the concept of 
religious minority, particularly vis-à-vis a notion of a unified Hinduism, [take] on 
board the cultural implications of ethnic separateness created by caste division’.51 
Likewise, Marathi and Kannada speakers came to be increasingly placed within 
the paradigm of irreconcilable ethnic difference, in which the definition of 
‘homelands’ cast aside those who did not ethno-linguistically ‘belong’. The 
Collector of Belgaum’s ‘Note’ argued that these ‘Boundaries of North Karnatak’ 
had come to be ‘misdescribed’ as the ‘Southern Maratha Country’ because of the 
Maharashtrian ethnicity of the native princes of such territories as Kolhapur, 
Kurundwad, Miraj and Sangli: 
‘ ... the Kanarese people have been displaced, to a certain extent, by the 
Marathi people and language in the Native States, only because these 
States were established by the aggressions of Marathas from the north 
whose local influence proved to be greater than that of the native rulers 
whom they dispossessed’.52 
In this interpretation, the influence of the Kannada-speaking natives had thus 
been displaced by conquering Marathi-speaking ‘outsiders’ from the north, in 
what seems a direct transposition of the Aryan invasion to the Collector’s 
contemporary context. Accordingly, the Kannada language had been on the back 
foot ever since the Maratha principalities of Kolhapur and Satara had been 
formed at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and after the death of 
Aurangzeb and the decline of Mughal influence. Others invoked an even longer 
history of Kannada subjugation. In October 1936, for example, a letter entitled 
‘The Unification of Karnatak: A Moral Necessity’ and published in the Bombay 
Chronicle, proclaimed that, 
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‘Under Mahomedan rule the Kanarese language suffered not due to the 
Urdu or Persian tongue of the rulers but due to the Marathi-language of the 
Maratha Sardars serving under the Mahomedan Kings. Then the Maratha 
rule and the Marathi language held the field for a century and a half. The 
net-result of the non-Kannada rule was that the Kannada people began to 
feel like strangers in their own land’.53 
And it was the continued ‘tyranny of the[se] minorities’ under the British Raj that 
had put paid to efforts to create a Karnataka homeland, as they frequently saw in 
the demands for Kannada-speaking rights ‘an attack on their [own] rights and 
begin to raise a row’.54 Citizenship rights and status were to be thus mediated on 
the basis of linguistic ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’ counted at the census. But this 
letter also deprecated forms of ‘consociationalism’ under colonial rule that 
provided minorities with special rights and dispensations, describing it pointedly 
as a ‘tyranny’ that needed to be ‘extirpated for the good of the [Karnatak] 
province as well as the whole nation’.55 A similar incentive seemed to underwrite 
enumerative practices in Sholapur City during the 1951 Census. The 1955 
‘Language Handbook’ for Sholapur, Satara South, Bijapur and Kolhapur Districts 
which, as we have seen, sought to re-work the 1951 Census figures for mother 
tongue at the level of the village and town, ‘disclosed a rather disquieting 
discrepancy’ in this regard. The proportion of Marathi-speakers in Sholapur 
dropped from 47.1 to 38.9 per cent, Kannada-speakers likewise dropped from 
14.8 to 12.8 per cent, and speakers of Telugu, Urdu and other languages saw their 
percentages rise as a result of this ‘re-sort’.56 The cause of the error remained 
unknown, but it does suggest some truth in Sirdar and Kadadi’s earlier claims 
about enumerative bias. 
It seems that those minorities in Sholapur outside of the two largest linguistic 
communities saw their position squeezed as a result of the battle between 
Kannada and Marathi speakers over the city’s ethno-linguistic allegiance. 
Guarantees of state impartiality in the enumerative process and the recognition 
afforded to minority languages under the constitution had been disregarded, as 
approaches to citizenship which emphasised ethno-linguistic affinities 
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overwhelmed all other considerations in the context of linguistic reorganisation. 
The advent of democratic rule and independence, in this view, was to 
complement the ideal of ‘self-government’ by the local majority in a new unitary 
linguistic province. This conceptualisation of greater rights and status for those 
who constituted a locally dominant or majority ‘community’ was perhaps most 
emphatically stated by G.K. Gokhale, the Kannada-speaking representative for 
Belgaum South in the BLA. For Gokhale, pandering towards minority interests was 
incompatible with his own notion of democracy, which meant ‘majority rule’. 
Responding to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s efforts to have the debate on the formation of 
Karnataka abandoned in 1938, on the basis of the potential problems it would 
create for communal minorities (howsoever defined), Gokhale asserted that, 
‘If Dr. Ambedkar has any faith in democracy and if democracy means rule of 
the majority, then minorities must honourably, whole-heartedly, 
sympathetically and heartily accept that particular rule, by applying their 
own honest efforts to the building up of that particular nation ... I [for one] 
will place all that belongs to me at the feet of the Karnatak Mata 
[mother]’.57 
This, notably, would allow the Kannada speakers to control the province, to finally 
be able to access the rights that they deemed they deserved as both the original 
and the majority inhabitants of the region. Increasingly, then, an ethnicised 
interpretation of citizenship informed much of the local procedures related to 
boundary demarcation, including the role of census officials in the collection of 
data on mother tongue. Ethnicity as the crucial criterion behind access to rights 
and status within newly-constituted provinces could also inform the opinions of 
Marathi-speakers on reorganisation too. D.M. Kulkarni, a Marathi-speaking lawyer 
from Karwar in North Kanara District, for example, speculated that it would be 
‘unjust and unfair on the part of Government to impose upon [the people of 
Karwar taluka] a language like Kannad which is in no way allied to their own 
Marathi language, the former being of Dravidian stock and the latter of Aryan 
stock’.58 
As we have seen, enumerators played a critical role in these definitions of 
citizenship, as they mediated and represented the authority of the state for many 
                                                          
57 Mr. K. G. Gokhale (Belgaum South), 4 April 1938. Bombay Legislative Assembly 
[henceforth BLA] Debates, vol. III (18-34), March-April 1938, p. 1728.  
58 MSA, Political and Services Department File 2026/46 – pt. IV, ‘Letter from D.M. 
Kulkarni, Advocate, Karwar (Dt. N. Kanara), to B.G. Kher, Prime Minister and 
Minister for Education, Bombay’, 10 May 1949. 
199 
 
citizens who would otherwise never develop close contacts with officialdom. They 
also sought to re-direct enumerative and classificatory procedures, looking to 
manipulate them in their own interests and those of their community. But they 
were able to do so because everyday enumerative processes still recognised the 
importance of communal allegiance to ensure the smooth running and 
completion of the census as a whole. Ostensible commitments to democracy, 
development and secularism, which were voiced in the census by an emphasis 
upon economic rather than communal classifications, as well as the state’s 
supposed impartiality, existed alongside continued efforts to collect data on 
linguistic groups and STs and SCs, the parcelling out of enumerative posts on the 
basis of community, and the trust afforded to local knowledge in the formulation 
of wider state information. Despite central government rhetoric which suggested 
minorities would be protected by guarantees enshrouded within the constitution, 
the need to demarcate provincial administrative boundaries on linguistic lines 
ensured that ethno-linguistic affinities were essential to notions of belonging and 
rights at the local, everyday level. And this, as we have seen and shall consider in 
more detail in the next section, could have an important impact upon the social 
and cultural existence of a whole host of so-called minorities within western India. 
 
5.3 Bhili, Gujarati, Marathi? Adivasis in the Dangs and Elsewhere 
In similar circumstances to disputes amongst Marathi and Kannada speakers, the 
exact site of the line of demarcation between the proposed states of Gujarat and 
Maharashtra became a point of contention in the northern districts of Dangs, 
Thana and West Khandesh, too. The development of ideas about citizenship, 
which dwelt upon ethno-linguistic affinities as symptomatic of an individual’s 
belonging and status, were therefore also to impact upon those whose mother 
tongue fell outside the ambit of the three primary languages (Gujarati, Kannada 
and Marathi) of the province. During the late 1940s and 1950s, disagreements 
broke out over the classification of the mother-tongue of these districts’ adivasi 
(tribal) populations. In fact, after the cities of Bombay and Belgaum, the 
controversy over the Dangs became the next largest point of contention regarding 
linguistic reorganisation in the whole of western India. At the 1951 census, the 




The first sub-section focuses upon the manner in which educative efforts to 
‘uplift’ the adivasis in the post-independence period reflected earlier interwar 
imperatives amongst some Indian and Hindu nationalists. It notes how, just as 
forms of ‘uplift’ looked to more firmly incorporate adivasis within the Hindu fold, 
imparting education through the ‘official’ language of the province or district, 
rather than the adivasis’ mother tongue, served to more closely assimilate tribals 
with the ‘majority’ linguistic community. The second sub-section concentrates 
more carefully upon the machinations around the 1951 census in Dangs District. It 
highlights how the introduction of larger state processes to establish 
unambiguous data and the more local (and sometimes inadvertent) manipulation 
of statistics by local enumerators ahead of linguistic reorganisation privileged 
standardised, official languages at the expense of local tribal vernaculars. 
Everyday enumerative practices and procedures thereby served to emphasise an 
ethno-linguistic majoritarian notion of belonging as the primary benchmark for 
local enactments of citizenship. These local practices thus departed from the 
central state’s constitutional commitment to guarantee the rights and interests of 
its tribal ‘minority’ citizens – including the protection of their mother tongue. 
5.3.1 Adivasi ‘Uplift’, Religion and Language 
Attempts to define the ethnicity of India’s large adivasi population in the context 
of the census had longer antecedents, too, linked to Hindu communal 
mobilisation and notions of Hindu unity. With the new religio-political 
mobilisation of the Muslim League embodied within the Lahore Demand of March 
1940, the 1941 Census had become ‘a much more direct fight between advocates 
of Hindu and Muslim enumeration’.59 In the process, the religious allegiances of 
tribal communities, whether classified as ‘tribal’, ‘animist’ or Hindu, came to be 
seen as particularly decisive in regions with large percentages of both Hindu and 
Muslim populations. For instance, high-caste Hindu nationalist organisations in 
Bengal ‘were at pains to point out the long standing erroneous basis of colonial 
ethnographies, particularly in their apparent desire to set out the separate 
religious and ethnic identities of tribal and low caste groups’.60 Some British 
administrators too, such as the Superintendent of Census Operations in Bombay 
for the 1921 Census L.J. Sedgwick, expressed similar sentiments to the Hindu 
nationalists in this regard: 
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‘The Bhils, who contribute most to the figures, are practically Hindus, and 
the other castes seem to be so also. I have therefore no hesitation in saying 
that Animism as a religion should be entirely abandoned, and that all those 
hitherto classed as Animists should be grouped with Hindus at the next 
Census, Hinduism being defined as including the religious or semi-religious 
beliefs of those jungle tribes who have not definitely embraced Islam or 
Christianity’.61 
In many ways, this was a longstanding concern, first expressed with conviction in 
U.N. Mukherji’s Hindus: A Dying Race (1909), which had suggested a steady 
decline in Hindu numbers in the census figures of Bengal at the expense of the 
province’s Muslim population.62 Efforts to have tribal communities’ religious 
beliefs classified as within the ambit of Hinduism at the census complemented 
wider efforts amongst some Indian nationalists to ‘uplift’ a wide spectrum of ‘low-
castes’ from their present ‘backward’ state. The problem of ‘untouchability’ was 
to be defined by many as a specifically Hindu concern, distinct from Muslim 
interests. For example, the Bombay Sentinel reported in November 1935 that 
‘Commotion [had] prevailed for a time at a mass meeting of Harijans held 
last night at Deolali attended by some Muslims when Pandarinath Maratha 
a Caste Hindu speaker uttered a word of warning to Muslims to keep aloof 
from the domestic troubles of the Hindus ... Pandarinath regretted that 
Muslims should take unfair advantage of “the sorry state of affairs, purely 
of domestic nature in the Hindu family. Their jubilation over our troubles 
were not becoming. Their one idea is to proselytise and kill Hinduism”’.63 
For Gandhi too, this was a Hindu religious issue, to be overcome by religious 
solutions. In late 1935 Ambedkar threatened to lead his followers in a mass Dalit 
conversion renouncing Hinduism, by proclaiming that he was ‘born a Hindu but 
would not die a Hindu’.64 In response to Ambedkar’s efforts to overcome the 
social and economic subjugation of Dalits at the hands of caste Hindus, Gandhi 
commented in October of that year, ‘I am convinced that a change of faith ... will 
not serve the cause which they have at heart ... especially when it is remembered 
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that their lives for good or evil are intertwined with those of caste Hindus’.65 
Ahead of enumeration at the 1941 Census in Bengal, special efforts were made to 
stress the Hindu ethno-religious allegiance of low-caste and adivasi 
communities.66 ‘Orthodox’ Hindus or Sanatanists, who still resisted efforts to 
remove ‘untouchability’ and grant Dalits equal access to temples, wells and other 
public conveniences, were condemned as ‘mainly instrumental in driving their co-
religionists from the Hindu fold [because they] do not believe in numbers’.67 
Hinduism was thus perceived by Hindu nationalists as being ‘under threat’ from 
external efforts on the part of both Muslims and the colonial state, as well as 
‘internally’ both by the perils of mass ‘untouchable’ conversion and a recalcitrant 
Hindu orthodoxy. Meanwhile, for the more ostensibly ‘secular’ pretensions of the 
Congress, emphasis upon the separate identities of low-caste groups potentially 
undermined their efforts to cultivate and represent Indian unity. 
Ongoing discussions about low-caste and tribal ‘backwardness’ were frequently 
couched within the often complementary discourses of western ‘modernisation’ 
and high-caste Hindu ‘uplift’, in which educational reform would wean the 
adivasis from their ‘habitual vices’ such as drinking, uncleanliness, excessive 
borrowing and petty crime.68 And ‘uplift’ and its connotations of incorporation 
within the Hindu ‘fold’ continued to find favour in the post-independence period, 
despite the state’s secular claims to communal impartiality. The Report on 
Educational Expansion in the Adivasi Areas of the Thana District in Bombay, for 
example, suggested that, ‘It is only through proper education that a new society, 
intelligent and able, industrious and persevering, honest and faithful, self-reliant 
and self-respecting, clean and tidy can be created’.69 These endeavours frequently 
emphasised the necessity of emulating higher status communities, thereby 
underscoring notions of social inadequacy amongst the adivasis by seeking to 
inculcate the norms and traditions of the upper castes and classes amongst 
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them.70 A particularly perceptive social commentator, who sent a letter to The 
Times of India in January 1936, noted that the uplift programmes of the 1930s 
often ensured that low-caste groups were thought of as ‘impure or polluted and 
as such the treatment given to them by selfish and orthodox Hindu society is fully 
justified’.71 Attempts to improve the social welfare of low-caste Hindu groups such 
as the adivasis was repeatedly undercut by efforts to incorporate tribal groups 
within the Hindu fold, whilst also remaining intimately linked with the processes 
of classification and enumeration at the census. 
In the late 1940s and 1950s, an increased emphasis upon ethno-linguistic unity 
amongst Maharashtrians and Gujaratis had a similar impact upon social reform in 
western India. This time, ostensible commitments to improve the welfare of 
adivasis residing in the Dangs and certain talukas of Thana and West Khandesh 
Districts were adversely affected by efforts to include them amongst Marathi or 
Gujarati speakers ahead of provincial reorganisation. Again, the census was to 
play a key role in this process, despite its supposed new emphasis upon economic 
classificatory categories. And these developments were also to have a significant 
part within the formulation of ideas about citizenship amongst those in the 
locality, focusing upon local notions of belonging linked to ethno-linguistic affinity 
which contravened and disregarded the ostensible principles of the state to 
protect ‘minority’ interests. The decision to enumerate the inhabitants of Bombay 
Province on the basis of their mother tongue had, like the matter of religion, often 
been a rather contentious issue. In the same year as he deprecated the continued 
efficacy of the category ‘Animism’ to describe the religion of the province’s adivasi 
community, L.J. Sedgwick also suggested that the enumeration of language should 
be ended at the next census.72 Yet despite his efforts, mother tongue was still 
being counted and classified in the census in 1951, during which time cogent and 
vocal movements for the linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative 
boundaries had now emerged. 
Between the inter-war period and the post-independence era, another notable 
and interlinked change had taken place. In the Dangs, the number of adivasis who 
had been recorded as speaking the local adivasi vernacular, known as either Bhili 
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or Dangi, had seemingly completely disintegrated. In 1931, figures for the Dangs 
had shown 32,350 Bhili speakers, 731 Gujarati speakers and 613 Marathi 
speakers. In stark contrast, the 1951 enumeration classified 45,017 inhabitants of 
the district as professing Marathi as their mother tongue, 1,802 speaking Gujarati, 
and no notable representation of Bhili or Dangi at all.73 These changes were 
reflected elsewhere in Bombay, albeit not quite on the same rapid scale, with East 
Khandesh seeing Bhili speakers within the district decline from nearly three per 
cent to 0.67 per cent between 1911 and 1951, and Surat District going from 3.28 
per cent to 0.95 per cent over the same period.74 In his official report on the 
census returns of 1951, Census Superintendent J.B. Bowman suggested that this 
decline reflected ‘the spread of communications and the growth of education’, 
which was ensuring that ‘the standard languages are tending to drive the dialects 
out’.75 
Yet this sweeping tide of standardised languages also threatened to abrogate the 
ideological imperatives of Article 29.1 of the new Indian Constitution. Seeking to 
guarantee the rights of Indian ‘minorities’, it read as follows: ‘Any section of the 
citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct 
language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same’.76 
Whilst in the previous chapter of this thesis we noted how this commitment was 
primarily conceived and applied in the interests of India’s Muslims in the north 
and the protection of their distinctiveness through Urdu, it could also be re-
contextualised elsewhere in the subcontinent and applied to linguistic minorities. 
The linguistic medium through which education was to be imparted proved a 
matter of concern for the Survey Committee for West Khandesh District Backward 
Area Education, who were appointed to make recommendations for the 
improvement of adivasi’s social, economic and political conditions in 1954. The 
Survey Committee noted that, 
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‘The language spoken by these tribes are local dialects which differ from 
each other to some extent. The men folk can understand Marathi for 
practical purposes. Some of them can speak it also. But the Women folk 
and especially the small children find it difficult either to follow the regional 
language or communicate their thoughts in any language except their own 
dialect. This has made the problem of imparting elementary education in 
the initial stages rather difficult’.77 
However, despite noting the continuing importance of the adivasi vernacular 
(Bhili), the Survey Committee recommended that the children of the tribal 
community in West Khandesh would only be taught with the help of Bhili during 
their ‘preparatory’ and ‘first standard’ years of primary education. Beyond these 
early stages, the rest of their primary education was to be conducted in Marathi. 
Adivasi vernaculars, then, were to be gradually replaced by the major regional 
languages as a concomitant of the educational ‘civilising’/‘uplift’ process, thereby 
mirroring the substitution of adivasi customs and traditions with high-caste 
alternatives that augmented efforts to include low-caste groups within the 
broader Hindu community. The wider implications such a recommendation had 
upon the protection of minority languages and customs, whilst acknowledged by 
the Survey Committee, were ultimately overruled: ‘ ... we have to qualify the 
application of this principle in the case of dilects [sic] which are spoken only by a 
few thousands or a few lakhs of people, in a comparatively small area and which 
have no prospect of ever becoming regional or state languages’.78 Favouring 
Marathi as the district’s official language, as well as those who could 
communicate through it, had important implications for citizenship in the district, 
privileging an ethno-linguistic majoritarianism which departed from both 
guarantees provided to communal minorities and the state secularism favoured 
by Nehru’s central government. 
The medium through which to conduct education amongst the adivasis was also 
deemed critical in the Dangs District. Reporting in January 1949, for example, the 
District Collector noted that in an area consisting of only 335 villages, of which 
none had more than 1,000 inhabitants, as many as 80 new Marathi schools and 40 
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new Gujarati schools had recently been opened.79 In both West Khandesh and the 
Dangs, these attempts to impart the majority of education amongst tribal groups 
through the major regional languages can be linked to larger processes, whereby 
the ethno-linguistic affinity of the province’s adivasis became a site of 
contestation between proponents of Maharashtra and Gujarat as linguistic 
provinces. In this manner, efforts at ‘uplift’ in western India amongst 
Maharashtrians and Gujaratis echoed similar attempts amongst high-caste Hindus 
to ensure adivasis were recorded as Hindus in the context of Hindu-Muslim 
enumeration in 1941. The sudden collapse in numbers of those inhabitants of the 
Dangs who were recorded as speaking Bhili at the 1951 Census must therefore be 
understood within this wider, interlinked context of ‘uplift’, communal 
incorporation and census demographics. Before considering the 1951 Census in 
the Dangs in detail, however, it is necessary to provide some historical context 
regarding this particular patch of territory, as to why it was so keenly contested. 
5.3.2 The Dangs – Language and Citizenship ahead of Linguistic 
Reorganisation 
The Dangs had always maintained a rather special, ambivalent relationship with 
the rest of Bombay Province after it had been subjugated and pacified by the East 
India Company in 1842. First and foremost, it remained apart from British India, as 
the various indigenous tribal rulers of the Dangs maintained some measure of 
sovereignty and autonomy in their actions. However, from an early stage, the 
British imposed upon these princes their right to extract the region’s timber in 
exchange for a hereditary annuity. And even though British laws and regulations 
theoretically did not apply, by the 1930s ‘the area [was] virtually administered by 
a British Officer who administers justice in the spirit of British Indian laws and 
codes’.80 So whilst the Dangs was not officially part of British India, it was in many 
ways entirely different from other princely states too. It was in many ways already 
a district of Bombay in all but name, albeit with forms of special ‘protective’ 
legislation implemented ostensibly in the interests of the region’s tribes.81 Before 
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1903, it was under the administrative control of the District Collector of the 
predominantly Marathi-speaking area of West Khandesh, but after this period, it 
was included afresh within the jurisdiction of the principally Gujarati-speaking 
Surat District.82 Historical fluctuations in its administrative location thus helped 
sow the seeds for later disagreements. In the aftermath of independence, the 
princely states came to be integrated under the national Indian government. The 
Dangs was formed into a separate district within Bombay Province, despite it 
being relatively small at only 650 miles, and populated by a mere 45,000-odd 
people. However, with its amalgamation, it also became necessary for the 
Bombay Government to sanction the new district’s official language. And it was 
this requirement that was to prove to be the first bone of contention between 
Marathi and Gujarati speakers in post-colonial Bombay, particularly in the context 
of demands for provincial reorganisation. 
The Dang Seva Mandal (The Dangs Service Association), based at Nasik, for 
example, argued that, ‘All Government correspondence addressed to the villager 
should only be made in Marathi’, as the tribal population ‘speak and understand 
well Marathi, even children and women’.83 On the other hand, a meeting held 
under the auspices of the Gujarati timber merchants proposed ‘that they should 
get a competent cine-photographer who would take talking pictures [i.e. cine-
film] of the Dangs and its people’, as well as hiring language specialists as a means 
to prove that the region’s inhabitants were ethno-linguistically Gujarati.84 By May 
1949, the issue was becoming so heated that the Marathi-speaking Prime Minister 
B.G. Kher and the Gujarati-speaking Revenue Minister Morarji Desai toured the 
Dangs in an effort to form an impression as to the language of the people and 
therefore put an end to the controversy. They ultimately decided that the official 
language of the Dangs should be Marathi and ‘that the responsibility for primary 
education of children in the Dangs district should be undertaken by the 
Government and carried out either departmentally or through a Board which may 
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be trusted with this work’.85 This Board was to provide facilities for learning in 
either the Gujarati or Marathi state languages where more than 20 children 
petitioned that they required it, meaning some villages were to have more than 
one educational medium. Just as in Khandesh, however, there was no provision 
for the local Bhili/Dhangi vernacular within these schemes. 
The hugely diminished returns for Bhili in the 1951 Census was in part the 
responsibility of Kher and Desai, who had been so vocal in their declaration that 
the district’s official language was Marathi. But the returns also reflected larger 
processes whereby the census continued to serve as a site of communal political 
interest, despite the central government’s efforts to emphasise economic 
classifications instead. Perhaps most importantly in this regard, certain 
‘contractions’ had been introduced in the 1951 Census within Bombay, with the 
emphasis now focusing upon establishing relatively unambiguous data with 
regards to mother tongue ahead of provincial reorganisation. 
‘For instance, in the case of the question on mother tongue, the 
enumerator was asked to write 1 for Marathi, 2 for Gujarati and 3 for 
Kannada. Since the language question in the Dangs had been settled before 
the Census took place in the most sensible way possible by two important 
and impartial persons giving their award [Kher and Desai], the enumerators 
recorded “1” i.e., Marathi as the mother tongue in the case of people who 
spoke the language spoken in the Dangs. In many cases the speakers 
themselves would not put the label “Marathi” on the language they speak 
any more than they would put the label “Hindu” on the religion they 
practice’.86 
Efforts to collect straightforward data on the three-way divide between the major 
administrative languages within Bombay Province therefore provided the 
structure through which local tribal vernaculars could be absorbed by the 
proponents of Maharashtra and Gujarat at the census. Yet it was the enumerators 
themselves who were central to this transformation in the statistical returns, as it 
was these everyday census officials who fleshed out the larger enumerative and 
classificatory processes of the census at the local level.87 In 1921, Census 
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Superintendent L.J. Sedgwick had circulated supplementary instructions to these 
intermediaries in Bombay ahead of enumeration, which had focused in particular 
on mother tongue. He advised the enumerators to ‘Remember that you are to 
enter the language which each person talks in his home and not the language in 
which he talks to you ... Bhils and some other wild tribes speak languages of their 
own’.88 Despite such recommendations, Sedgwick noted that in practice, local 
classificatory procedures would often depart significantly from the state’s claims 
to communal impartiality: ‘Enumerators who speak Marathi or Gujarati enter any 
Bhil whose dialect they understand as a Marathi speaker, or a Gujarati speaker as 
the case may be’.89 Thus, even inadvertently, census officials, who were invariably 
from non-tribal communities, could privilege standardised, official languages at 
the expense of local tribal vernaculars.  
By mediating adivasi voices at the census, these enumerative ‘outsiders’ ensured 
there was no real opportunity for the state to garner tribals’ own outlook on their 
mother tongue. Indeed, representatives of the state at the local level frequently 
expressed condescending attitudes towards the tribal community, which 
suggested they were not really interested in what the adivasis themselves 
believed. The District Collector of the Dangs, for example, argued in 1948 that, 
‘The people of this tract, in my opinion, are not so much interested in the matter 
of official language inasmuch as they are most primitive, uncivilized, backward 
and most illiterate (as will appear from the 182 thumb impressions affixed to this 
petition)’.90 In these circumstances, census data frequently departed from the 
opinions of British and Indian philologists on tribal languages. For example, with 
regards to the tribal vernacular in East and West Khandesh, known as ‘Ahirani’ or 
‘Khandeshi’, ‘In 1911 we get the following: Ahirani 113, Khandeshi 133, Rangari 
32, Gavli 125, Chitodi 60; Possible total 463. Yet the Linguistic Survey estimates 
the number of speakers at 1,253,066, all of which would be in Khandesh and the 
regions immediately adjoining’.91 
The difficulties in establishing the correct figures from local enumerative practices 
became even more apparent at the 1951 Census where, as we have seen, the 
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classificatory structure surrounding mother tongue in Bombay was based around 
numerical ‘contractions’. The 1951 Census Superintendent J.B. Bowman 
suggested that, ‘The Enumerator’s reasoning is probably as follows: “My mother-
tongue is Marathi or Gujarati. I can understand this man’s language perfectly. 
Therefore he speaks Marathi or Gujarati”’.92 But the matter was even further 
complicated by the continuing demands for linguistic reorganisation, in which the 
ethno-linguistic allegiances of the adivasi community became of critical 
importance ahead of boundary demarcation. During a debate within the Bombay 
Legislative Assembly in August 1954, Morarji Desai, who had now become the 
Chief Minister, put the shift in the Dangs district from Bhili/Dangi to Marathi down 
to ‘provincial jealousies and manoeuvres’. This had obscured the fact that, ‘Really 
speaking, the language spoken in the Dangs is Dangi’.93 For those who argued that 
the adivasis’ mother tongue was Gujarati or Marathi, but for whom the census 
figures did not concur, recourse was made instead to suitable linguistic authorities 
or historical factors. A letter received by the Government of India from the 
Gujarat Vepari Mahamandal (Gujarat Chamber of Commerce), for example, made 
reference to the findings of both the Gujarat Research Society and George 
Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India (11 volumes, 1903-1928), to argue that the 
language spoken in the Dangs ‘was basically Gujarati or allied to Gujarati’.94 In 
both the census returns and in references to historical ties and ethno-linguistic 
affinities, the state’s ostensible efforts to protect the interests of adivasi 
minorities were therefore being overridden by the growing tide of ethnic 
majoritarianism within western India as the primary benchmark for local 
enactments of citizenship. 
This rise in an ethnic interpretation of citizenship was deprecated by the Gujarati 
leader of the Praja Socialist Party in Bombay Dr. Amul M. Desai, during a debate 
on the States Reorganisation Bill within the Bombay Legislative Assembly in April 
1956. At pains to stress that he had always been against linguistic reorganisation 
despite now introducing an amendment that suggested the Dangs should go to 
Gujarat, he argued that the ‘guiding principle’ behind reorganisation should be 
what the adivasis themselves wanted. Too much importance had been placed 
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upon ‘what their grand-fathers were or where they came from, from the north or 
from the south or whether they were Dravidians or Aryans. Today the people 
have to decide their own fate’.95 He went on to argue: 
‘I do not for a moment want to make a claim that the language of the 
Adivasis in Umbergaon Taluka [Thana District] is the Gujarati language. 
Unfortunately, things have not been put in the correct perspective. One 
side should have put forward the claim that the language of Adivasis in 
Umbergaon Taluka is influenced more by Gujarati language and the other 
side should have put forward the claim that it is influenced more by 
Marathi language. And it would have been a very rational approach if the 
final decision had been left to a final authority’.96 
The sudden diminishment in the figures of those adivasis being recorded as 
speaking Bhili/Dangi in the Dangs and elsewhere in western India, as well as the 
concomitant increase in the number of Marathi and Gujarati speakers in these 
areas, can therefore be tied in with the circumstances of provincial 
reorganisation. Mother tongue demographics were deemed critical to a ‘politics 
of numbers’, whereby the ethno-linguistic affinities amongst the tribal 
populations of these peripheral districts would potentially determine precisely 
where the line of demarcation would be drawn. Everyday enumerative practices 
and processes in these regions therefore served to emphasise an ethnic 
majoritarianism which favoured the major, official provincial languages above and 
beyond the state’s special commitment to protect the rights and interests of its 
tribal minorities. In such circumstances, these hitherto neglected areas of the 
province took on a new importance in 1951. Yet these developments around the 
census also interacted with larger processes whereby western India’s tribal 
populations in the Dangs, Thana and West Khandesh were to be ‘uplifted’ and 
‘civilised’. Educational ‘reform’ not only emphasised high-caste Hindu norms and 
practices as an exemplary mode of behaviour, but also ensured the gradual 
replacement of tribal vernaculars such as Ahirani, Bhili, Dangi or Khandeshi with 
standardised versions of Gujarati and Marathi. So whilst these reforms reflected 
attempts to improve the social welfare of adivasis, they were frequently undercut 
by efforts to incorporate tribal communities within Maharashtrian or Gujarati 
society in the context of classification and enumeration at the census. In the 
circumstances, the distinctive blend of Gujarati, Marathi, Rajasthani and 
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This chapter has suggested that the classification and enumeration of 
communities at the census was always a dynamic process, fluctuating in response 
to prominent local exigencies and concerns. Whereas in previous decennial 
censuses, for example, the collection of data on mother tongue had been a 
relatively uncontroversial process, in 1951 it became critical ahead of linguistic 
reorganisation. In many ways the increased controversy over mother tongue in 
western India reflected similar concerns and preoccupations to those that 
developed around religion in 1941. And in some senses, mobilisations around 
‘community’ identities in the north-east and north-west in 1941, and around 
language in Bombay a decade later, were both manifestations of ideas about self-
government and local democracy articulated in a regional milieu. But by focusing 
upon Bombay rather than the north, this chapter has simultaneously looked to 
decipher an alternative set of circumstances through which citizenship was 
conceptualised and enacted that departs from the emphasis upon the ‘Hindu-
Muslim Question’ and the creation of Pakistan in much of the existing literature. 
The collection of data on various forms of ‘community’ therefore continued to be 
utilised for political purposes beyond independence, despite central government 
rhetoric which emphasised state detachedness and communal impartiality. Key to 
the performance of enumerative and classificatory processes at the census, as we 
have seen, were the local census officials, who acted as the intermediaries of the 
state for many ordinary Indians. Local circumstances thereby ensured frequent 
fluctuations and transformations in the state’s knowledge of Indian society. The 
privileged position of enumerators, mediating the state’s power and its 
formulation of knowledge often allowed them to seek political, social and 
material advantage in the process for themselves or their particular community. 
Rumours abounded that census figures on mother tongue were being 
manipulated by enumerators ahead of the boundary demarcation that would 
accompany provincial reorganisation. Representations and petitions received by 
the provincial government argued for greater control over the selection of census 
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officials, sometimes demanding the substitution of enumerators for those from 
their own linguistic community instead, or that local enumerators should be 
divided equally on the basis of their mother tongues. At other times, petitioners 
appealed to the state’s supposed impartiality and ‘unimpeachable integrity’, 
emphasising the enumerator’s role as one of detachedness and disinterestedness 
in the enumerative process. However, the very need for local knowledge to 
ensure the census’ ultimate comprehensiveness ensured that pressure could still 
be applied to favour one’s community in the census returns. 
The impending linguistic reorganisation of provincial boundaries also had an 
important impact upon the social position of ‘minorities’, howsoever defined, 
within western India. An increased emphasis upon ethno-linguistic unity amongst 
Maharashtrians and Gujaratis, for example, ensured that the affinities of adivasis 
in the Dangs, Thana and West Khandesh were to become sites of contestation 
between proponents of Gujarati- and Marathi-speaking states at the census. Over 
the course of the inter-war period and into the post-independence era, the 
number of adivasis who had been recorded as speaking local tribal vernaculars 
such as Ahirani, Bhili or Dangi had declined dramatically, at the expense of the 
official provincial languages. This owed something to local enumerative 
procedures, whereby census officials, as ‘outsiders’, would privilege official 
languages, often because of their own linguistic affinities. But it was also related 
to the processes of ‘uplift’, which mirrored earlier efforts to inculcate high-caste 
norms and habits amongst the ‘backward classes’. In an analogous manner, 
educational reform amongst adivasis in western India frequently sought to impart 
education in Marathi or Gujarati rather than tribal vernaculars. By doing so, an 
increased emphasis was put upon the linguistic cohesiveness of the region and its 
inhabitants. Both local educational and enumerative procedures thereby departed 
from the state’s constitutional commitment to protect the cultural and linguistic 
rights and interests of India’s minorities. 
In this sense, this chapter has had something important to say regarding 
citizenship, too. Whilst the central state was ostensibly committed to both 
communal impartiality and the protection of minority interests at the census, at 
the everyday level its message was mediated and redefined by local census 
officials who were themselves drawn from amongst local society. Articulations of 
citizenship amongst the ordinary public engaged with both these everyday actions 
of local state actors and an imagined state which adhered to its norms, values and 
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guarantees. But the manner in which they did so depended upon the particular 
perspective of the individual or ‘community’ concerned. So whereas those citizens 
who considered themselves ‘locals’ or who represented a majority ‘community’ in 
a particular constituency might express their citizenship on the basis of ethno-
linguistic affinity with a region or their rights to self-governance, those who felt 
threatened by these displays of cultural chauvinism and majoritarianism might be 
more likely to engage with the ‘sublime’ principles of the state as a guarantor of 
minority rights and interests. Notions of citizenship amongst ordinary Indians, 
formulated in these interactions with and imaginings of the state, also depended 
upon their own take on local social tensions and concerns in the midst of larger 
historical changes and processes. 
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6: Introducing Hindi: National and Vernacular Languages in 
India 
‘The story of the Ganges, from her source to the sea, from old times to new, is the 
story of India’s civilisation and culture, of the rise and fall of empires, of great and 
proud cities ... of ups and downs, of growth and decay, of life and death’. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004 
[1946]).1 
--------------- 
In January 1965, India’s new Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri attempted to 
introduce Hindi as the sole official language of the Indian Union. In response, the 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of the southern Indian province of Tamil 
Nadu launched a campaign of protest, burning ‘Hindi books and the relevant 
pages of the constitution’, vandalising Hindi signs at railway stations and post 
offices, and indulging in collective strikes and bandhs.2 The DMK’s leader C.N. 
Annadurai was to reject the imposition of what he perceived as a regional 
vernacular (albeit a vernacular spoken by more Indians than any other) as official 
language, on the grounds that: ‘If we had to accept the principle of numerical 
superiority while selecting our national bird, the choice would have fallen not on 
the peacock but on the common crow’.3 For Annadurai, real freedom and 
democracy was not to be based upon the right to rule by the supposed ‘cultural 
mainstream’. The 1965 agitation against Hindi in southern India was the 
culmination of opposition to attempts by the Congress and others at the centre 
over the last four and a half decades to introduce an indigenous language to 
replace English as India’s lingua franca. Throughout this period, opposition to 
Hindi was at its most vociferous in the south. Indeed, the idea of secession and 
the creation of a separate Dravidastan (akin to Pakistan, but seceding on the basis 
of ethno-linguistic rather than ethno-religious difference) received varying levels 
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of support during the 1940s and 1950s from those areas of the subcontinent that 
were part of the former colonial province of Madras.4 
As David Washbrook has pointed out, one of the reasons for the refutation of 
Hindi in Tamil Nadu and other parts of southern India related to particularised 
ideas about self-government, nationhood and citizenship. Here, ‘concepts of self-
rule, betterment and justice were not always synonymous with the creation of 
pan-Indian forms of government’.5 This chapter argues that the perceived threat 
of north Indian majoritarian forms within the language of all-India unity and 
harmony oft provoked the configuration of alternative ideas about citizenship and 
nationhood at the regional and local level. However, not all of these were 
expressed, like the calls for Dravidastan, in overt demands for separation from the 
Indian Union. Others looked more subtly towards the creation of autonomous 
spaces within it, where the state’s obligations to protect the rights and interests 
of its citizens would revolve around ‘local’ interests and priorities. In Bombay, for 
example, these local incentives continued to condition the actions of the 
provincial Congress Government, despite simultaneous commitments towards 
nation-building within an all-India milieu. This chapter therefore addresses three 
major issues within its two subsequent sections, which provide the context 
through which to analyse how ideas about citizenship and belonging were 
formulated and enacted in western India. 
The first section begins by interrogating the first of these chief concerns of the 
chapter. It looks to demonstrate how forms of north Indian majoritarianism were 
evident within the writings and practices of the highest echelons of the Congress 
organisation during the interwar period. This phase of the nationalist movement 
was marked by an (at least rhetorical) shift under Gandhian auspices, in which the 
Congress moved away from an older stereotype which depicted it as an elite and 
constitutional organisation and instead looked to portray itself as representative 
of and accountable towards the interests of the peasant ‘masses’. Both the 
introduction of Hindustani rather than English and a focus upon communal 
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impartiality and social egalitarianism within the party were supposed to mark this 
transformation. But the policies, practices and historical polemics of the Congress 
remained primarily oriented towards north Indian social circumstances and 
concerns and were consistently misapplied elsewhere in the subcontinent.  
As noted in Chapter Three, a Congress candidate’s representativeness was 
considered critical to their ability to mobilise voters behind the party. But this 
representativeness was frequently judged by the local Congress organisation on 
the basis of ‘community’ affinities. In a similar manner the imposition of 
Hindustani as a provincial administrative language within the services, under 
orders from the Congress High Command (CHC), threatened to derail the 
opportunities for local civil servants to develop their knowledge of the regional 
vernacular and thus hinder their representativeness and accountability towards 
the local public. The responses of civil servants to this introduction of Hindustani 
within the services are analysed in the second section of this chapter. 
The second section therefore considers two other major points of interest for this 
chapter. First, it looks at how both the public and local state actors received 
‘national’ ideas and imperatives in western India. There was nothing necessarily 
inevitable about their depiction as north Indian majoritarian symbols. But in the 
context of the gradual realisation of self-government, particular local societal 
groups and communities in Bombay demanded forms of privilege and protection 
to combat both the encroachment of ‘outsiders’ within the services and the 
application of incompatible all-India directives to regional settings. In this sense, 
this chapter touches upon a number of congruent points to those raised earlier in 
Chapter Four. Second, the section also considers the difficulties which provincial 
Congress governments encountered when trying to balance local concerns with 
all-India prerogatives. It provides examples of instances where the Congress 
Government of Bombay [GOB] both looked to implement central policies within a 
provincial administrative setting, and where it continued to privilege ‘local’ 
interests instead. 
 
6.1 Hindustan and the Deccan 
This section explores the presence of north Indian majoritarian premises and 
themes contained within the efforts of prominent Congress politicians to stress 
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Indian society’s national unity and communal harmony. Thus the emphasis upon 
egalitarianism and universalism was often inconsistent with the more parochial 
interests and hidden agendas that were submerged within national rhetoric. The 
first sub-section concentrates upon Jawaharlal Nehru’s The Discovery of India, a 
history conceived by Nehru as a ‘political riposte to British instincts’ that 
contended ‘that without British rule to enforce cohesion, there would have been 
no India to speak of’.6 However, despite Nehru placing great stress on India’s 
historical coherency or ‘unity in diversity’, this was almost entirely approached 
from a north Indian perspective – when references are made to south India, it 
serves as a site of orthodoxy and backwardness rather than adaptation and 
initiative. The second sub-section focuses on the efforts of Gandhi and others to 
introduce a truly ‘national’ language to replace English as the Congress’s lingua 
franca. Hindustani was perceived to be not only a symbol of anti-colonial 
nationalism, but also an emblem of both the party’s broader social support base 
and interreligious unity. However, Hindustani was a primarily north Indian 
language, and its representation of Hindu-Muslim harmony was less efficacious in 
areas where caste and language rather than religious issues conditioned local 
societal contestations and cleavages. 
This section of the chapter thus begins to suggest that the public in western India 
could at times perceive forms of regional majoritarianism that coalesced within 
the Congress’s efforts to emphasise societal unity and its deployment of ‘national’ 
symbols. This is something which will be considered in much greater complexity 
later in the chapter. But with regards to this section, it is worth noting that even 
those Congressmen who have been traditionally lauded for their communal 
impartiality and social egalitarianism could implicitly favour particular groups and 
interests in their policies and writings. By focusing on the depictions and 
developments within the relationship between the Deccan, or peninsula India, 
and the Indo-Gangetic plain to the north, often referred to as Hindustan,7 this 
section thus highlights how both the arguments within Nehru’s The Discovery of 
India and the attempts of the Congress under Gandhi to introduce Hindustani as a 
‘national’ lingua franca were oriented around north Indian influences and 
exigencies. 
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as a whole. 
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6.1.1 Regional Perspectives in Nehru’s The Discovery of India 
Part memoir, part political commentary, Jawaharlal Nehru’s The Discovery of India 
embarks upon an unedited account ‘that spans Indian history from the Indus 
Valley to the Quit India Movement of 1942’.8 Throughout, Nehru takes a particular 
regional perspective on India’s past despite his efforts to emphasise India’s 
abilities to synthesise, absorb and accommodate difference. This sub-section of 
the chapter contends that The Discovery of India frequently alludes to north 
India’s dominance over the rest of the subcontinent, and oft presupposes that the 
north serves as the centre of India’s ‘vitality’ and creativity, whilst the south 
remains ‘static’ and backward. For many, Nehru is seen as the human epitome of 
the ‘unity in diversity’ maxim which ostensibly defined Indian citizenship and 
nationhood. But by emphasising how even Nehru’s own writings and 
philosophical musings implicitly favoured the north, this sub-section reveals how 
the official discourse on a universalistic form of Indian citizenship could be 
perceived to favour more parochial interests and concerns. 
Nehru was obviously far from being the most vociferous proponent of a Hindu, 
high-caste and north Indian leadership of the newly independent nation-state. 
Nehruvian ideals of state-driven industrialisation and national integration were 
formulated in part around the rhetoric of secularism and egalitarianism – caste, 
linguistic or religious political identities were to be opposed.9 We have noted in 
previous chapters that these interests often stood in stark contrast to more local, 
everyday state and political party machinations. Yet they also departed 
significantly from the interests of many other more conservative-minded leaders 
within the CHC. Whilst publicly presenting themselves as committed to the 
secular, egalitarian and impartial principles upon which the state was ostensibly 
predicated, these Congress leaders were often implicitly the most vociferous 
proponents of a north Indian, high-caste social conservatism.  
Forms of cultural majoritarianism could develop around resistance to the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Backward Classes Commission in 
1955.10 They also emerged as a consequence of the debates over the Hindu Code 
                                                          
8 Khilnani, ‘Introduction’, in The Discovery of India, p. xviii. 
9 Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Penguin, 1999). 
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Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 314-316. 
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Bill during the early 1950s.11 Perhaps most noticeably, they developed in reaction 
to continued questions over the loyalties of Indian Muslims after Partition and the 
creation of Pakistan, raised not only by parties of the Hindu Right, but also 
amongst Congressmen such as Vallabhbhai Patel, Purushottam Das Tandon and 
Govind Ballabh Pant.12 By supporting Nehruvian state secularism and national 
integration, they sought to deprecate the right of the state to interfere in the 
communal affairs of its citizens, whilst simultaneously sustaining their own 
communal dominance.13 In this view, the very principles of freedom and 
democracy as embodied in the Constitution, where communalism and casteism 
had been supposedly eradicated, were, therefore, utilised in support of upper-
caste Hindu dominance. 
Cultural majoritarian forms of citizenship at a national level could also apply in the 
context of language, with the attempted imposition of Hindustani, and then Hindi, 
as India’s new lingua franca. There was nothing necessarily inevitable about this – 
as Francesca Orsini has pointed out, Hindi was not always associated with forms 
of Hindu majoritarianism. During the interwar period, for some Hindi politicians in 
the United Provinces (UP), ‘like Madan Mohan Malaviya ... Hindi was a cultural 
marker and part and parcel of Hindi-Hindu nationalism. For others [however], like 
Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, Hindi was the “people’s language” and the means to 
reach the popular public in the non-constitutional arena’.14 Some Hindi-wallahs 
believed Hindi therefore ‘had the strength to be open and accommodating’.15 In 
this sense, however, an emphasis upon Hindi’s inclusivity could also parallel a 
similar conception of Hinduism as an all-embracing and tolerant ‘system of 
thought’ (an almost ‘Indianised’ form of secularism) amongst some Indian 
nationalists.16 Nehru, in his The Discovery of India, was to replicate such 
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13 T.K. Oommen, ‘Insiders and Outsiders in India: Primordial Collectivism and 
Cultural Pluralism in Nation-Building’, in Communal Identity in India: Its 
Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Bidyut Chakrabarty 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 232-255. 
14 Francesca Orsini, The Hindi Public Sphere 1920-1940: Language and Literature in 
the Age of Nationalism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 341. 
15 Ibid., p. 362. 
16 See also in this regard, William Gould, ‘Contesting Secularism in Colonial and 
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depictions of Hinduism despite, paradoxically, his efforts to emphasise both the 
Congress’s and the postcolonial state’s communal impartiality in the protection of 
all citizens’ rights (regardless of religious affiliation). Whilst suggesting that it was 
‘incorrect and undesirable to use “Hindu” or “Hinduism” for Indian culture’, 
especially as they ‘are apt to mislead today when they are associated with a much 
narrower, and specifically religious, concept’17, he also wrote: 
‘Hinduism, as a faith, is vague, amorphous, many-sided, all things to all 
men. It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it 
is a religion or not, in the usual sense of the word. In its present form, and 
even in the past, it embraces many beliefs and practices, from the highest 
to the lowest, often opposed to or contradicting each other. Its essential 
spirit seems to be to live and let live’.18 
A comparable approach towards region and language, which parallels this 
emphasis upon a primarily Hindu religious ‘syncretism’, is also evident in Nehru’s 
work. As suggested by the extract from The Discovery of India with which this 
chapter began, it is the Indo-Gangetic plain or more generally northern India, 
which serves as the site of India’s ‘vitality’, whilst the Deccan is regularly 
perceived in the book as stagnant and underdeveloped. Nehru, as a Kashmiri 
Brahman residing in UP, admitted his own personal predilection towards viewing 
India from a north Indian perspective: 
‘When I think of India I think of many things ... above all, of the Himalayas, 
snow-capped, or some mountain valley in Kashmir in the spring, covered 
with new flowers, and with a brook bubbling and gurgling through it. We 
make and preserve the pictures of our choice, and so I have chosen this 
mountain background rather than the more normal picture of a hot, sub-
tropical country’.19 
Throughout the manuscript, all the opportunities for cultural and ethnic synthesis, 
from the ancient Aryan ‘invasion’, including the infiltration of Islam, and 
culminating in the advent of the Mughals, seem to emanate from the north-west, 
as foreign influences navigate the Khyber Pass before descending upon the north 
Indian plains. ‘The first great cultural synthesis and fusion took place between the 
incoming Aryans and the Dravidians’, for example, in the north-western region of 
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17 Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 71, 69. 
18 Ibid., p. 71. 
19 Ibid., p. 56. 
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the subcontinent amongst ‘the representatives of the Indus Valley civilisation’.20 
Buddha’s philosophy and teachings, stressing good deeds, devotion and ascetic 
renunciation as paths to spiritual liberation rather than priestly intercession, 
emphasised an ethical egalitarianism which for Nehru came ‘like the breath of the 
fresh wind from the mountains after the stale air of metaphysical speculation’, 
and coincided with the ‘Foreign elements [who] continued to stream into India 
from the north-west and were absorbed’.21 Relatively more recently, ‘The coming 
of Islam ... widen[ed] the mental horizon of the people and compel[led] them to 
look out of their shells’.22 And the middle Gangetic valley continued to serve as 
the site of Indian vitality, as the centrepiece of resistance to colonial rule and as 
the flourishing foundation for Congress support. For Nehru, the 48 districts of UP 
were the ‘heart of Hindustan ... the melting pot of so many races and cultures, the 
area where the great revolt of 1857 blazed up and was later ruthlessly crushed’.23 
As noted in the introductory chapter to this thesis, there were compelling reasons 
for privileging a northern regional ‘instituted perspective’ of Indian history. 
However, Nehru’s focus upon the north-west, the Himalayas and the Indo-
Gangetic plains stood in stark contrast to the relatively sporadic references made 
to southern India in the text. 
When southern India is mentioned, it is depicted, by and large, as backward and 
dilapidated. In a brief anecdotal sub-chapter entitled ‘South India’, which packs 
one thousand years of south Indian history into less than a page, Nehru submits 
that ‘The repeated invasions of North India did not affect the South directly’.24 
Rather, it ‘became a centre of the old artistic traditions while the north was more 
affected by new currents which the invaders brought with them. This process was 
accelerated in later centuries and the south became the stronghold of Hindu 
orthodoxy’.25 Whilst the north emerged as a site of energy and vigour as it 
interacted with foreign ideas and initiatives, the south represented all that was 
wrong with Indian society, a place of ‘backward’ religious customs that 
emphasised hierarchy and tradition rather than egalitarianism and change. 
Nehru’s approach therefore generally neglects both south Indians’ interactions 
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with those residing outside the subcontinent, and the ‘energising’ impact of those 
‘outsiders’ that chose to make the Deccan their new home. 
The Discovery of India’s relative neglect of the south marks a considerable 
contrast with more contemporary scholarship which has demonstrated its 
existence as a site of cross-cultural exchange throughout this period. Sugata Bose, 
for example, has characterised the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as an ‘interregional arena’, ‘tied together by webs of 
economic and cultural relationships’, ‘where port cities formed nodal points of 
exchange and interaction’.26 Both India’s Coromandel and Konkan/Malabar Coasts 
served as interfaces for the south to connect with Africa, Arabia and South East 
Asia. Yet when there are references to Indian interactions with South East Asia in 
The Discovery of India, they are primarily ‘Aryan’ in dimension, and saturated with 
imperialist connotations that suggest a one-way hegemonic dialogue.27 Nehru 
writes that in the region, ‘there is a feeling of respect and friendship for India, for 
old memories endure and people have not forgotten that there was a time when 
India was a mother country to these and nourished them with rich fare from her 
own treasure-house’.28 In contrast, there is a distinct lack of reference to South 
East Asian influences upon migrant Indians. For Nehru, South East Asia in this 
period is ‘Greater India’, where ‘Trade and adventure and the urge for expansion 
drew [Indians] to these eastern lands’.29 
Within India, when Nehru’s northern pluralists deigned to avert their attention 
towards the south, the story of synthesis which structures the interactions 
between indigene and invader is replaced by subjugation as the pioneering force 
behind sub-continental unity.30 In this way Nehru’s history replicates the imagery 
associated with the Deccan as a prime site for subjugation – Stewart Gordon has 
revealed how the term ‘translates as “south” ... and suggested an area suitable for 
conquest. Throughout history, “Deccan” has retained these overtones, the 
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29 Ibid., pp. 213, 219, 221, 222 
30 See, for example, Nehru’s references to the conquests of Ashoka over much of 
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perspective of a northern conqueror considering possible domains’.31 The Hindu 
epics the Mahabharata and Ramayana, for example, are depicted in The Discovery 
of India as part of northern ‘Aryan’ efforts to defeat the south, a one-way account 
where the northerners embody Nehru’s ‘spirit of the age’. An ethnicised northern 
Indian community thereby symbolise the notion of Indian unity which Nehru 
enshrines and sponsors:  
‘In the Mahabharata a very definite attempt has been made to emphasise 
the fundamental unity of India, or Bharatvarsha as it was called, from 
Bharat, the legendary founder of the race. An earlier name was Aryavarta, 
the land of the Aryas, but this was confined to Northern India up to the 
Vindhya mountains in Central India. The Aryans had probably not spread 
beyond that mountain range at that period. The Ramayana story is one of 
Aryan expansion to the south. The great civil war, which occurred later, 
described in the Mahabharata, is vaguely supposed to have taken place 
about the fourteenth century B.C. That war was for the overlordship of 
India (or possibly northern India), and it marks the beginning of the 
conception of India as a whole, of Bharatvarsha ... Dilli or Delhi, not the 
modern city but ancient cities situated near the modern site, named 
Hastinapur and Indrapastha, becomes the metropolis of India’.32 
Nehru thus invoked the Hindu epics as a source of Indian unity and national 
citizenship. Likewise, M.K. Gandhi cited Ram Rajya as an Indianised version of the 
ideal state, which could otherwise be referred to as ‘Divine Raj’ or (referencing 
Tolstoy) the ‘Kingdom of God’, and which would relate to the ‘sovereignty of the 
people based on pure moral authority’, ‘self-introspection’ and ‘respect for all 
religions’.33 Whilst there was nothing inevitable about Muslim separatism and 
many Muslim ‘nationalists’ retained their Congress membership, it has become a 
commonly articulated verity amongst historians that such references to Hindu 
symbolism in the mobilisational strategies of Congressmen helped contribute 
towards ultimate Muslim alienation from the mainstream nationalist movement.34 
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However, such references to Ram were also ineffectual at fully mobilising the 
support of other Indian subject-citizens professing Hindu religious beliefs but 
residing outside the Hindi heartland. And in this sense, an understanding of the 
primarily Indo-Gangetic origins of such symbolism complements this thesis’s 
efforts to reorient our understanding of the conceptualisation of citizenship in 
regional environments distinct from the all-India arena and the north. For Tamils, 
rather than symbolising Indian unity, Ram served as a figure of their subjugation 
at the hands of northern ‘outsiders’. Meanwhile, ‘for many Maharashtrians he 
represents a ruler whose support of the orthodox caste system involved the killing 
of an Untouchable boy, Shambuk, for the sin of trying to follow Brahmanic ways 
to salvation’.35 
Just as the employment of primarily Hindu-based symbols could foreground 
concerns about the rights and status of Muslims and ultimately lead to demands 
for Muslim self-government, the use of north Indian idioms could have an 
analogous impact upon perceptions of citizenship amongst those residing in the 
south and west of the subcontinent. This sub-section has chosen to concentrate 
upon Nehru because of the ways in which he is perceived to embody the 
Congress’s and the postcolonial state’s commitments to secularism, social 
egalitarianism and political democracy. These apparent principles and standards, 
as we have seen in previous chapters, conditioned many of the appeals and 
petitions made by members of the public to the higher echelons of both the party 
organisation and the state. But by highlighting the consistent emphasis upon 
Hindustan as a site of initiative and communal harmony within The Discovery of 
India at the expense of a backward and traditionally orthodox southern peninsula 
this sub-section has demonstrated how Nehru implicitly favoured the north 
despite his ostensible support for inclusive forms of an all-Indian citizenship. Even 
amongst its upper echelons the state was no less impervious to employing the 
images and revolving around the interests of particular factions, groups and 
‘communities’ at certain moments in time – with ultimately important 
consequences for how independence, self-government and democracy were 
perceived in Bombay, as the next section of this chapter will suggest. 
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6.1.2 Introducing Hindi/Hindustani 
This sub-section of the chapter focuses upon the Congress’s efforts to locate a 
‘national’ language in the interwar period to replace English, as a corollary of the 
party’s shift towards ‘mass’ Gandhian anti-colonial activism. The choice of 
Hindustani was to serve as both a symbol of anti-colonial nationalism and 
interreligious unity across the north of the subcontinent. But outside the 
Hindi/Hindustani/Urdu-speaking heartland of the north, its efficacy as a ‘national’ 
language was less evident. Here the threat of a north Indian majoritarianism, 
which the imposition of Hindi/Hindustani could potentially symbolise, was 
countered by regional demands for sub-national autonomy and local self-
government. 
In November 1921, during the height of Gandhian power and influence within the 
Non-Cooperation Movement, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) introduced 
a resolution in regard to India’s lingua franca. The resolution suggested that, ‘as 
far as possible’, with regards to the affairs of the Congress and in the publication 
of its circulars and reports, ‘only Hindustani in both Devanagri and Urdu scripts 
should be used and that all proceedings should be conducted in Hindustani’.36 This 
reflected wider efforts by the party to replace English with a truly ‘national’ 
language for communication within the Congress, whilst broadening the party’s 
potential support base and membership beyond only those able to converse in 
the tongue of their colonial rulers. As Francesca Orsini has suggested, the focus 
upon locating a ‘national’ language owed something to the imperatives of non-
constitutional politics and the shift in the Congress’s rhetorical emphasis towards 
the ‘common people’: ‘At least in words, English was devalued in favour of the 
vernacular; the very ordinariness of Hindi writers seemed to place them closer to 
the “true nation” and give them an advantage in communicating with the 
masses’.37 For M.K. Gandhi,  
‘Hindi was the language of village India, a spoken language that cut across 
literacy and script divides ... He called it Hindi-Hindustani or simply 
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Hindustani whenever he felt that the point about script needed to be made 
explicitly, especially in the increasingly communalized 1930s’.38 
Importantly, Gandhi had only ultimately secured Congress support for his 
methods in 1920 by allying Non-Cooperation with the post-war Khilafat 
movement, which had emerged in the post-Great War milieu as a particularly 
cherished cause amongst Indian Muslims.39 Support amongst most prominent 
Indian nationalists for Hindi in the aftermath of the Great War as a symbol of 
national independence in contrast to English had provoked considerable Muslim 
consternation – Hindustani thus emerged amongst some Congressmen as a 
politically neutral compromise. From the outset then, and throughout this period, 
Hindustani was conceived by Gandhi and his supporters as an authoritative 
example of national unity and political consensus across a primarily religious 
divide. The Maharashtrian Congressman B.G. Kher, for example, proclaimed in 
December 1939 
‘It is clear ... that neither is Hindi the language of the Hindus, nor Urdu the 
language of the Musalmans. It is not proper for the Musalmans to oppose 
Hindi or for the Hindus to oppose Urdu ... Just as the language of England is 
English, of Italy Italian, ... of Bengal Bengali, ... in the same way the language 
of Hindustan may rightly be settled as Hindustani ... Hindustani language 
can be written both in Nagari as well as Persian script ... ’.40 
Significantly, a Gandhian emphasis upon interreligious unity through the spoken 
language departed from the agendas of other Congressmen such as M.M. 
Malaviya and P.D. Tandon who were more eager to stress Hindi as the ‘national’ 
Indian language because of what they perceived to be its essentially Hindu core – 
for them, the relatively novel support for Hindustani seemed to jeopardise the 
historical efforts of organisations such as the Nagari Pracharini Sabha and journals 
such as Sarasvati to present Hindi as the pre-eminent and purified literary 
language of India. This highly polemical debate between supporters of Hindi and 
Hindustani over India’s ‘national’ language was to continue into the postcolonial 
period. During the 1950s, for example, K.M. Munshi ‘was rebuked by Nehru for 
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publicly suggesting that Urdu should only be promoted if in the Nagri script’.41 We 
clearly need to be careful about positing a straightforward polarisation between 
Urdu-speaking Muslims and Hindi-speaking Hindus across northern India, not 
least because ‘even within Hindi there were more open-ended notions of 
language than that pushed for by Hindi literary associations and scholars’.42 Yet 
discussions around the various merits and deficiencies of both Hindustani and 
Hindi within organisations like the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan (control of which 
fluctuated between pro-Hindustani and pro-Hindi Congressmen during the 
interwar period and after) also often carried with them communal connotations. 
In fact, some proponents of Hindi were to place an increased emphasis upon 
Urdu’s ‘foreignness’ in connection with pre-British Muslim ‘invaders’ and 
despots.43 
However, the primary focus upon the efficacy of Hindi as ‘national’ language in 
the context of the ‘Hindu-Muslim Question’ within the Indo-Gangetic plains of the 
north has obscured another important consequence of the privileging of what is 
actually a regional vernacular. So, whilst Hindi was favoured by Indian nationalists 
as a powerful symbol against British imperialism, it also raised further structural 
divisions within the anti-colonial movement elsewhere in the subcontinent, which 
were ultimately manifested in an analogous manner to the Pakistan demand. In 
both these instances, calls for sub-national autonomy as an attendant 
consequence of independence placed much emphasis upon the necessity of 
avoiding the potential for cultural majoritarianism within an Indian Union. But 
whereas in the north these concerns were predominantly raised around the 
matter of religion (in which Hindi and Urdu were ultimately sealed off into 
communally-defined hermeneutic boxes), beyond the Hindi-belt they coalesced 
more clearly around language.44 The conceptualisation of citizenship was thereby 
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altered by the significance of the particular provincial environment in which the 
individual was located. 
This is evident if we reconsider some of the points raised in the preceding 
paragraphs of this sub-section afresh. So whilst the introduction of Hindustani as 
the ‘national’ language of the Congress instead of English in its resolution of 1921 
encouraged the widening of the party’s membership, the regional composition of 
its central leadership was fundamentally reoriented towards north India. Between 
1920 and 1939, only one representative from the south (Srinivasa Iyengar in 1926) 
served as Congress President.45 Meanwhile, in fourteen of these twenty interwar 
years, Congress Presidents were chosen from the Hindi-speaking provinces of UP, 
Punjab and Bihar.46 Likewise, J.E. Sanjana, the Oriental Translator to the Bombay 
Government, responded to Kher’s definition of Hindustani in December 1939 by 
suggesting that the conflation of ‘Hindustan’ (which could refer to the entire 
subcontinent and/or the Hindi-speaking heartland) and ‘Hindustani’, ‘sounds 
perilously like, and is only one step from, [Hindu Mahasabha leaders] Mr. 
Savarkar’s and Dr. Munje’s definition of Hindustan, -- “as Afghanistan is the 
country of the Afghans, and Turkistan of the Turks, in the same way Hindustan is 
the country of the Hindus’.47 Kher’s focus on the potential for Hindustani to 
overcome the religious cleavage between Hindus and Muslims in the context of 
wider nationalist purposes neglected the fact that it was also necessary for 
Hindustani to be introduced as the ‘national’ language in areas outside of the 
Indo-Gangetic plain. 
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6.2 Civil Servants, the State and the Introduction of Hindi 
In 1938, the CWC were to release the following statement to clarify Article 19 of 
the party’s constitution, which related specifically to the ‘national’ language: 
‘Hindustani according to the practice of the Congress is the language of the 
bulk of the people of the North and written either in Devanagari or Urdu 
script. Indeed it has been the policy of the Congress more and more to 
insist on the use of Hindustani at all meetings and in the proceedings of the 
Congress Committees. The Working Committee hopes that by the end of 
the year Congressmen will prepare themselves to speak and write in the 
national language so that it may become unnecessary thenceforth to 
Congress Committees [to use English] so far as inter-provincial 
communications are concerned ... ’.48 
This statement coincided with a period of Congress Party rule across many of the 
provinces of British India, after the Congress had accepted governmental office 
following the 1937 provincial elections. Under pressure from the CWC, provincial 
Congress governments were expected to introduce Hindustani as a provincial 
administrative language and as the medium for inter-provincial communication. In 
June 1938, Bombay’s new Home Minister K.M. Munshi identified and suggested 
four areas which he deemed essential to Hindustani’s successful introduction at 
the provincial level: 
‘(a) Hindustani either in Devanagari or Urdu script should be recognised as a 
language of the province in all districts; (b) Every Government servant 
within two years of confirmation should pass a paper test in Hindustani 
before he is eligible for promotion; (c) Every grant-in-aid High School must 
teach Hindustani; (d) The University must be written to have an essay paper 
in this language’.49 
This section of the chapter focuses primarily upon the implementation and 
repercussions of point (b), regarding the new Congress Government’s efforts to 
introduce Hindustani within the provincial administrative services in Bombay. It 
therefore looks to analyse the nature of the state in what was a period of 
immeasurable change, with indigenous and democratically-elected politicians 
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replacing British officials as the governmental executive in the provinces.50 In 
doing so, it utilises anthropological literature on the ‘everyday’ state in 
contemporary India to demonstrate how the state existed as a site of contestation 
and dispute between a variety of political and social actors.51 It focuses in 
particular upon the transformations in the relationship between political parties, 
the public, and what Robert E. Frykenburg described in the 1960s as the do-bashi 
(literally two-language, bilingual) mediator, a ‘double agent’ or ‘go-between’ 
linking together rulers and ruled.52 Significantly, these local administrators were 
‘themselves citizens of the state, who made their own demands of it’.53 
As we saw in the last section, central state directives and principles could 
sometimes obscure more parochial interests and concerns at the national level. In 
part, then, reaction to the introduction of Hindustani within the provincial 
services was a response to fears among citizens of Bombay about the implications 
of a north Indian majoritarianism. But these concerns could also simultaneously 
serve as an expression of ideas about forms of swaraj in the context of the gradual 
realisation of self-government during the interwar period. Bureaucratic 
recruitment customs at the provincial level were already structured around local 
societal circumstances and exigencies. But with the growing demands for 
independence, these recruitment practices were to be newly associated with 
ideas about the locally accountable nature of quotidian state actors able to 
interact with society through the vernacular.  
This, as we shall see, at times contrasted with and conditioned the application of 
the Congress High Command (CHC)’s emphasis upon Indian societal harmony and 
national cohesiveness. The first sub-section focuses upon the way in which 
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Hindustani was presented by the Congress as a more ‘accountable’ and ‘national’ 
alternative to English as an administrative link language. But it demonstrates how 
its application in western India had the opposite impact, where a stress on 
learning the various provincial vernaculars was ultimately of greater importance. 
The second sub-section examines the continuing prominence accorded to the 
‘local’ within provincial recruitment practices. It highlights instances where the 
application of contrasting all-India imperatives for recruitment to the provincial 
services provoked disquiet amongst members of the Bombay public. Both sections 
thus focus on the discrepancies between all-India and local practices and 
reactions to attempts to reconcile these differences. Another strand of interest 
running through this section is thus to trace how the provincial Congress in 
Bombay (and briefly, elsewhere) navigated these contrasting idioms about 
belonging, status and citizenship during the gradual transition from colonialism to 
independence.  
6.2.1 Language and Accountability 
Before accepting office the relationship between Congressmen and bureaucrats 
during the interwar period had been one generally characterised by hostility. In an 
environment in which the Congress had frequently avoided cooperation with the 
Raj, local government servants were decried as imperial stooges and 
collaborators, especially during the Non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience 
campaigns. Meanwhile, despite the ostensible rhetoric of social and political 
impartiality, the indigenous intermediaries of the Raj would have been expected 
to back and implement elements of the imperial agenda within the localities. In 
fact, many had played an important role in monitoring and punishing particular 
expressions of party politics ahead of the 1937 provincial elections – R.G. Soman, 
the Chairman of the Satara District Congress Parliamentary Board, gave a number 
of examples of harassment of Congress candidates, including the requirement to 
present themselves before the local authorities and submit to questioning about 
their status, income and landholdings.54 Likewise, the Hindustan Times was to 
note that ‘allegations of interference by officers of the Government in favour of 
pro-Government parties and against progressive parties and individuals are fairly 
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common’.55 At issue here were the difficulties in separating government and 
state. 
During this interim period of provincial indigenous autonomy but central colonial 
control, the Congress and the Raj continuously clashed in their efforts to control 
bureaucratic networks as sources of political power and patronage. Between 1937 
and 1939, bureaucrat’s political loyalties were thus undergoing a process of 
contestation and reinvention. One of the ways in which the Congress could 
symbolically ‘occupy the state’ was to remedy the heavy reliance upon English for 
verbal and written transactions amongst these provincial administrators and 
introduce Hindustani as a truly ‘national’ language instead. Of course, Bombay 
was a multilingual province, in which both the Education and Home Departments 
had been subdivided into three separate divisions roughly on the basis of 
language (Northern Division – Gujarati- and Marathi-speakers; Central Division – 
Marathi-speakers; and Southern Division – Kannada- and Marathi-speakers), and 
in which it was general departmental policy not to move representatives of the 
intermediate and lower levels of the services from one division to another. In this 
situation, intra- (as well as inter-) provincial state communication relied upon 
English as an administrative lingua franca. 
For the Congress, the use of English for administrative transactions rendered the 
state’s representatives distanced and detached from local society and thus 
unaccountable towards the ‘masses’. Seeking to portray itself as more fully 
representative of broader societal interests and aspirations, the Congress looked 
to gradually replace the preference for English within the administration with 
Hindustani instead, thereby replicating constitutional changes within its own 
organisation at the beginning of the interwar period. Six months prior to Munshi’s 
note on the introduction of Hindustani in Bombay Province, the new Congress 
Government drafted an additional regulation in the Vernacular Exam Rules for 
Mamlatdars (civil servants stationed at the taluka, sub-district level) in Bombay, 
which stated: ‘Every Mamlatdar whose mother-tongue is not Hindustani or who 
has not already passed in Hindustani a test of higher standard shall pass, within 
two years from the date of joining his first appointment an examination in 
Hindustani according to the colloquial test’.56 Whilst English was to remain for the 
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time being, the eventual objective was to ensure Hindustani would be situated in 
prime position to serve as the administrative link language across an ultimately 
independent subcontinent. 
For many Congress politicians, this emphasis upon Hindustani instead of English 
was also presented in the language of increased state accountability towards its 
citizens, thereby reflecting larger paradigmatic transformations which 
accompanied the gradual shift from colonial rule to self-government.57 Gandhi’s 
stress upon the spoken Hindi/Hindustani of the masses had been part of a ‘change 
from a “non-kisan [non-peasant] age” to a “kisan [peasant] age”’ within the 
Congress, with nascent low-class movements prompting ‘a section of the Hindi 
nationalist press and some Congress activists to turn decisively towards socialism 
and engage directly in peasant and labour organization’ by the 1930s.58 
Meanwhile in Maharashtra the Congress under the influence of Keshavrao Jedhe 
and N.V. Gadgil had seemingly reinvented itself as the party of the low-class, non-
Brahman rural ‘masses’ (see Chapter Three of this thesis). With a Congress 
government in power, popular claims upon the provincial state could thus 
potentially proliferate.  
These ‘sublime’ expectations of the state, however, contrasted with the quotidian 
disappointments experienced over the various Congress provincial governments’ 
practical limitations and socially conservative actions when in office.59 In Bombay, 
Munshi was not averse to orchestrating organised state violence to maintain 
order, insisting in a speech directed at working-class militants in Sholapur City, 
‘that they should not think that there will be no occasion for lathi charges under 
Congress Raj’.60 Meanwhile in the countryside, the support of Maharashtrian 
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Congress Socialists for a radical programme of land redistribution met with 
strident opposition from the khots (landlords who maintained proprietary rights in 
the villages of the coastal Konkan districts), many of whom were important local 
Congress leaders. Rather than advocate for the total abolishment of the khoti 
system, the Maharashtra Congress Peasant Enquiry Committee of 1936 instead 
simply pledged that khoti would be brought under a uniform system of control. It 
was argued that the depression of the 1930s had not only hit the tenants hard, 
but also the khots.61 Likewise the emphasis upon Hindustani as an emblem of 
accountability crumbled when applied to local circumstances in both the north 
and elsewhere. 
Central to these displays of social conservatism and the maintenance of the status 
quo was the impression of social harmony and national unity ahead of 
independence. Autonomous political agendas on the part of the peasants were to 
be subsumed within the nationalist organisation. So whilst the Congress was 
prepared to present itself as the party of the entire nation and actively 
encouraged ‘mass’ participation in the anti-colonial movement, it was more 
ambivalent towards introducing socially ameliorative forms of legislation and 
championing forms of working-class action, which threatened to potentially 
alienate its support amongst landlord and business interests. Francesca Orsini has 
suggested that in northern India this dual posture on the part of the Congress was 
‘linked to the issue of openness and exclusion in the Hindi public sphere’.62 The 
emphasis upon a spoken Hindi/Hindustani and the novel infiltration of socialist 
language within the writings of such Hindi-wallahs as Swami Sahajanand Saraswati 
in Bihar contrasted decisively ‘with prevailing notions about the harmony of 
Indian (Hindu) society’.63 Here, the focus upon creating cohesive social units 
through sangathan (literally ‘organisation’) within other more socially 
conservative elements of the Hindi press obscured what was actually the 
expression of elite prerogatives and concerns in a standardised yet highly 
Brahmanic, Sanskritic, and ‘purified’ form of Hindi.64 The representativeness of 
and accountability towards the low in class and status amongst the provincial 
Congress Governments of the north, in places such as Bihar and UP, was thus 
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notably diminished. And as we have already seen, the emphasis upon Sanskritic 
grammatical styles within this form of Hindi could potentially alienate Muslims 
who were more used to employing Perso-Arabic loanwords and idioms. 
Similar concerns about the potential efficacy of Hindi/Hindustani as a tool to 
improve the state’s representativeness and accountability, despite the Congress’s 
political rhetoric, also pervaded the analyses of those who were asked to judge 
the efficacy of its implementation as a provincial language outside the 
Hindi/Hindustani heartland. In Bombay, for example, the respective 
Commissioners of the three major Divisions of the province were asked to provide 
their thoughts on the aforementioned Congress plans to introduce Hindustani as a 
compulsory language for mamlatdars. The Northern Commissioner of Bombay 
noted that mamlatdars in his Division had to already pass examinations in Gujarati 
and Marathi (as the Division was constituted by both primarily Gujarati-speaking 
districts such as Surat; and the primarily Marathi-speaking district of Thana), as 
well as being proficient in English. He suggested that the ‘addition of a third 
examination would be an additional burden to them ... and would practically 
mean a fourth language’.65 In the Southern Division the Commissioner also 
collected the views of his senior-most administrators, the collectors of the 
division’s six districts. The Collector of Kanara opined ‘ ... this language not being 
in use in the Southern Division, there would scarcely be any occasion for the 
Mamlatdars to make any practical use of their knowledge of this language’.66 
Likewise, the Collector of Ratnagiri argued, ‘Unless [the mamlatdars] get 
opportunities to come into contact in their every day life with that language they 
are apt to forget it no sooner than they pass the examination’.67 From the 
perspective of these administrators, therefore, rather than augmenting a sense of 
the state’s social responsibilities towards its citizens, the introduction of 
Hindustani was more likely to hinder state accountability. It was the Southern 
Commissioner himself who perhaps most ably summarised the problematic of 
Hindustani’s introduction within his division. In his reply to the provincial 
government, he suggested that 
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‘This futile knowledge of Hindustani will be used as a reason consciously or 
unconsciously for not getting down to a real knowledge of the colloquial 
without which a Mamlatdar is useless. I am presuming the proposal is not 
based on the necessity of speaking to the Mussalmans in their own 
language. In my experience the ordinary Mussalman from Jacobabad to 
Poona really knows only the colloquial language of the area. His knowledge 
of Hindustani is, for practical purposes, nil’.68 
The Southern Commissioner’s response to the potential introduction of 
Hindustani within the provincial services has a number of important implications 
when we consider the nature of the state during this period. The perception 
encouraged in this period by nationalist politicians that by replacing the Raj with 
the Congress the state would be more accountable towards and representative of 
its citizens was fraught with its own problems when implemented on the ground. 
First, by suggesting that ‘ordinary’ Muslims in western India were not suitably 
proficient in Hindustani for its introduction to be worthwhile, the Commissioner’s 
comments allude to the less consequential impact of the ‘Hindu-Muslim Question’ 
in this part of the subcontinent (in this regard, see the previous section of this 
chapter). Second, whilst English as the language of administration served the 
interests of a colonial elite rather than the general populace, in an equivalent 
manner the introduction of Hindustani in Maharashtra also served the interests of 
nationalist leaders who sought to emphasise the harmony and unity of India 
rather than dwell upon the amelioration of localised social incongruities. 
Following on from this point, the Commissioner’s comments are therefore 
revealing of the manner in which the local state also existed as a site to be 
contested and captured by a range of different political and social interests. 
Whilst local state actors could express allegiance towards the Raj or (increasingly) 
the Congress, these loyalties were frequently mediated by local concerns and 
interests. Drawn from amongst local society themselves, these civil servants were 
to implicitly suggest in their responses that forms of state accountability and 
representativeness were best developed through those capable of communicating 
in the local vernacular. In the context of an impending independence, the 
articulation of ideas about local self-government thus conditioned the generally 
unenthusiastic responses of these administrators towards the introduction of 
Hindustani. 
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6.2.2 Recruitment and Reallocation: Intra- and Inter-Provincial Locals and 
Outsiders 
This sub-section of the chapter looks at the practical difficulties provincial 
Congress governments encountered in trying to reconcile their commitments 
towards nation-building with local circumstances and conditions. This thesis has 
already demonstrated elsewhere (see Chapter Two) how recruitment to the 
provincial services in Bombay was shaped by local exigencies and concerns. But 
the potential introduction of Hindi/Hindustani as an official provincial language 
and the medium for interprovincial communication in Bombay created new 
imperatives for public service employment in the province, which contrasted with 
the provincial government’s erstwhile commitments to privilege ‘local’ 
constituencies in its recruitment strategies. The sub-section will therefore also 
briefly consider how these new imperatives impacted upon conceptualisations of 
citizenship amongst the public in western India. It suggests that reactions against 
the recruitment of provincial state employees from elsewhere in the subcontinent 
fed into broader narratives that anticipated forms of autonomous self-
government for ‘locals’ within sub-federal provincial arenas as a concomitant of 
independence. Meanwhile, such public perceptions of the local state as a site 
through which to prioritise ‘local’ interests continued to condition government 
actions beyond independence, as linguistic affinities came to be considered the 
primary means through which to judge administrative allegiance after the 
reorganisation of provincial boundaries. 
 It was here that the potential advantages that would accrue to native Hindustani 
speakers in accessing service employment across a homogenised and centralised 
subcontinent, where Hindustani would serve as the national lingua franca, came 
to the surface. In this regard, two examples will suffice to highlight the potential 
repercussions of the introduction of Hindi/Hindustani upon the composition of 
the various provincial services across the subcontinent. First, in December 1939, 
the Superintendent of Government Printing and Stationary relayed to the Political 
and Services Department the necessity of employing two individuals from UP 
within the provincial administrative services, as they possessed sufficient 
knowledge of Hindi. Explaining his decision, the Superintendent suggested that 
when he had employed citizens of Bombay Province to fulfil the tasks and 
requirements included within the posts of ‘Reader’ and ‘Copy-holder’ in Hindi, 
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they had proved ‘incapable of carrying out their duties’.69 The shift towards an 
indigenous and truly ‘national’ lingua franca under the Bombay Congress 
Government created new recruitment requirements within the provincial 
services. As William Gould, Taylor Sherman and Sarah Ansari have argued in a 
different context, new recruitment practices for the services ‘also exposed a 
tension between the imperative of creating cohesive national communities and 
the habit of doling out government jobs as a means of currying favour with 
specific groups’.70 
Second, therefore, the recruitment of north Indians to fulfil roles within Bombay 
also provoked consternation amongst ‘locals’ who had previously enjoyed 
privileged entitlements to provincial government employment. In June 1946, Y.G. 
Page, a resident of the suburb of Dadar in Bombay City, argued that with regard to 
recruitment in the police, the ‘Congress Ministry has made a rule in the year 1938 
... that every recruit should be taken from the Bombay Province and not from 
outside. Now Mr. D.K. Godwin is avoiding this rule and recruits generally from 
outside the Province specially from Punjabi Sikhs, UP, Bihar, etc’.71 The Home 
Department were unable to locate any such rule, but did recognise that amongst 
ex-servicemen, recruitment (except in Gujarat) to the police had been nearly 
entirely drawn from natives of the province.72 Compiling a table on general police 
recruitment for the six months from January to June 1946, it was discovered that 
nearly 70 per cent of the new recruits came from Ratnagiri District, while a further 
21 per cent were from districts that would go on to constitute part of 
Maharashtra. 7.5 per cent, however, 
‘ ... have been men from the Punjab ... Punjab Muslims have been accepted 
for the Armed Police in order to provide a reasonable quota of Muslims in 
that Section. Experience has shown that Muslims belonging to Bombay City 
and the Bombay Province do not come forward in sufficient numbers to 
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provide the accepted quota in the Armed Police of one Muslim to four 
others’.73 
Page’s representation and the Congress Government of Bombay (GOB)’s response 
highlight the difficulties in squaring all-India imperatives with local conditions and 
circumstances. First, they continue to demonstrate the inadequacy of the ‘Muslim 
Question’ as the defining principle of social relations in western India. Indeed, 
Muslims had to be found from outside the province to fulfil the specific quota set 
aside for them in the Armed Police. Second, they hint at the linguistic/regional 
lines upon which ethnic/cultural divisions were primarily perceived and provincial 
representation primarily delineated in western India instead. According to the 
statistics, Maharashtrians dominated the provincial police, whilst Gujaratis were 
not even provided with access to the prescribed benefits accruing to ex-
servicemen.  
On one level, this owed something to older patterns of colonial knowledge, in 
which the Marathas had been recruited to the police on the basis of their loyalty 
as a ‘martial race’, whilst Gujaratis were perceived as inherently more effeminate 
and, during the interwar period, in thrall to the Gandhian Congress.74 But on 
another level, patterns of bureaucratic recruitment now came to be invested with 
new meanings ahead of independence. In this shifting environment, opportunities 
for jobs in the services were linked to ideas about the nature of swaraj, forms of 
local self-government and increased state accountability. Reactions against the 
imposition of civil servants from elsewhere in India were therefore part of 
broader efforts to define autonomous spheres of regional interest where ‘natives’ 
would be better entitled to receive a greater share of administrative roles. But 
this was also especially the case in Bombay Province because intra-provincial 
jealousies between linguistic ‘communities’ on the basis of ‘local’ representation 
permeated both public and ‘everyday’ state perceptions about recruitment to the 
services, too. 
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Earlier within this section of the chapter we noted how the provincial services in 
Bombay were broadly split up on the basis of language into three separate 
divisions of administration, and that it was general departmental policy not to 
move civil servants from one division to another. This rule owed something to 
general colonial perceptions about local ‘customs of governance’, in which the 
‘fixity’ of the lower levels of the bureaucracy was ‘tied into notions about ... [their] 
link to the locality and local traditions in the exercise of power’.75 During the 
Second World War, for example, the Assistant Director of Recruiting for the 
Southern Area, Colonel Franks, suggested ‘that a Mamlatdar who is a Mahratta 
should be posted in Maharashtra and not say in [the principally Gujarati-speaking] 
Northern Division’. He deprecated a separate incident within the provincial 
administration in Bombay whereby ‘a special educational officer who was 
Mahratta [was] transferred from Mahad in Kolaba District to Gujerat’.76 A 
particular perception of the local state as a site through which to prioritise the 
interests of Marathas thus emerged, in stark contrast to its public presentation as 
a detached entity capable of impartially adjudicating social conflict. 
These perceptions of the local state as a site through which to prioritise local 
interests and rights continued beyond independence, despite the Congress’s 
commitment towards representing a cohesive national community and its 
guarantee concerning equality of opportunity in public employment within the 
Constitution. In the summer of 1956 the decision taken by the GOI to create a 
bigger bilingual Bombay of Gujarati- and Marathi-speakers (see Chapter One) 
meant that the Marathi-speaking districts of Vidarbha and Marathwada were 
separated from the provinces of Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Hyderabad and 
reallocated to Bombay. In MP, the delineation of the predominantly Marathi-
speaking portions of Vidarbha and principally Hindi-speaking areas of Mahakoshal 
as two distinct spatial entities was accompanied by efforts on the part of the MP 
Government to reallocate provincial servicemen on the basis of this new reality. 
Whilst tensions between Hindi- and Marathi-speakers in MP had long been 
accompanied by claims of linguistic partiality on the part of local state 
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representatives,77 reorganisation reconfigured these arguments and allegations 
on the basis of novel ideas about regional status and belonging amongst both 
citizens and servicemen. 
Rather than relying upon the personal preferences of individuals, the MP 
Government instead assigned civil servants to either Bombay or MP on the basis 
of their mother tongue. Amongst the tahsildars (local tax-collectors) within MP’s 
Revenue Department, for example, 47 posts for Vidarbha and 82 posts for 
Mahakoshal had to be allotted between 63 Hindi speakers, 49 Marathi speakers, 
and 17 tahsildars whose mother tongue was neither of these. This obviously 
resulted in some overlap: five Marathi speakers were included within the 
Mahakoshal allocation; and two Hindi speakers were allocated to Vidarbha.78 But 
ultimately linguistic affiliation came to be considered as the primary means 
through which the MP Government sought to judge local administrative 
allegiance. 
This section of the chapter, then, has looked to demonstrate the reception 
accorded to ‘national’ concerns within the provincial administrative services in 
Bombay and within the context of the gradual realisation of various forms of self-
government in India. It has examined the complications which the Congress GOB 
encountered as a result of its particular provincial location, through which it 
looked to balance all-India prerogatives and more localised obligations. So, for 
example, whilst introducing Hindi/Hindustani within the provincial administrative 
services during the late 1930s, the provincial government simultaneously 
continued to accord privileges to self-styled ‘locals’. This was not only about the 
imperatives of imperial control. Particular societal groups and communities 
petitioned and demanded forms of privilege and protection from the provincial 
government to combat the encroachment of ‘outsiders’ throughout this period. 
Meanwhile local state actors, drawn from amongst provincial society themselves, 
rejected the imposition of Hindi/Hindustani on the basis of the difficulties it would 
cause, not only for them, but also for a society that primarily conversed in 
regional vernaculars. 
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The emphasis upon Hindustani rather than English was theoretically expected by 
Congress politicians to symbolise the increased representativeness and 
responsibility of the ‘national’ (rather than colonial) state towards its citizens. But 
its practical application in western India was perceived to be as likely to hinder 
state accountability amongst provincial civil servants, where the definition of 
language around distinctive ethno-religious ‘communities’ was less severe. 
Citizenship in Bombay thus came to be constructed and articulated in the 
interstices between national imperatives and local concerns. Reactions against the 
recruitment of provincial state employees from elsewhere in the subcontinent 
and the imposition of Hindi/Hindustani were part of wider objectives that 
anticipated forms of ‘local’ self-government as an upshot of independence. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
In June 1955, Article 344 of the Indian Constitution was formally enacted and an 
Official Language Commission was appointed by the Congress GOI, under the 
leadership of the former Chief Minister of Bombay Province, the Maharashtrian 
B.G. Kher. The Commission’s findings were finalised and published in July 1956, 
thus coinciding with the reorganisation of many of India’s provinces on a linguistic 
basis. The Commission backed the provisions made in the Constitution for the 
adoption of Hindi as the official language of the Indian Union, as representing ‘the 
only practicable course’.79 In the context of the achievement of independence and 
the realisation of democracy, it was deemed inconceivable by the Commission 
‘that we should continue to carry on the country’s administration in all its higher 
reaches in a language [English] which is not understood by 99 per cent of the 
country’s population’.80 Hindi was perceived as the most viable alternative, as 
‘apart from the 42 per cent of the total population returned as speaking this 
language as their mother-tongue, it is understood to a considerable extent ... 
outside the Hindi-speaking areas, in the market places in cities, at Railway stations 
and in places of pilgrimage’.81 
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These justifications supporting the introduction of Hindi rather than English as the 
official lingua franca of India by the Official Language Commission replicate earlier 
sentiments expressed by the Congress during the interwar period. This chapter 
has highlighted how the Congress’s attempts to stimulate a ‘national’, all-Indian 
consciousness and present the party as more accountable towards and 
representative of all India’s citizens were in part predicated upon the inauguration 
of Hindi/Hindustani as a truly ‘national’ language of India. However, the chapter 
has revealed that when applied to local and provincial circumstances in regions 
beyond the Hindi-heartland of the north, the introduction of Hindi/Hindustani 
often had the opposite effect, dramatising its inapplicability and the detachedness 
of the state in many ordinary Indians’ everyday lives. The Commissioners within 
Bombay, for example, argued state accountability would be more effectively 
realised by a firm knowledge amongst its staff of the local vernaculars. 
The Official Language Commission deemed it inevitable that some would have to 
learn a new language – but it somewhat condescendingly pointed non-Hindi 
speakers towards ‘the widespread and sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties 
of the non-Hindi-speaking regions with which we met in the Hindi areas’, as well 
as the implementation of constitutional safeguards.82 Such recommendations and 
concessions were deemed ‘far from democratic’ by the two dissenting voices 
amongst the Commission’s members, and likely to have important consequences 
upon the practical experience of citizenship amongst non-Hindi speaking 
communities.83 For Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, the centrality assigned to Hindi was 
likely to ‘bring about the immediate creation ... of Two Classes of Citizens in India 
– Class I Citizens with Hindi as their language, obtaining an immense amount of 
special privileges by virtue of their language only, and Class II Citizens who will be 
suffering from permanent disabilities’, particularly in the matter of recruitment to 
public services.84 
As the note of dissent by Chatterji suggests, and as we have seen elsewhere in this 
chapter, the prominence accorded to Hindi could be perceived to potentially 
threaten the rights and interests of vast swathes of the non-Hindi speaking 
population elsewhere in the subcontinent. The first section of this chapter picked 
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up on the underlying north Indian majoritarian themes within both Nehru’s The 
Discovery of India and in the implementation of Hindustani as the language of 
interprovincial communication between the various Provincial Congress 
Committees (PCCs). Reactions amongst the public typically involved petitioning 
and demanding from the state forms of protection and privilege for ‘locals’ within 
provincial arenas of government, including favours within provincial service 
recruitment. These drew upon longstanding customs on the part of provincial 
governments to privilege ‘local’ constituencies and communities in their 
recruitment strategies, and which, as we have seen, continued to determine 
provincial Congress policies into the postcolonial period. However, they were 
newly conditioned by the implications of the gradual realisation of forms of self-
government and came to incorporate ideas about citizenship rights and status. 
Demands for state recruitment practices to continue to be concerned with local 
societal circumstances therefore fed into larger narratives about local ‘self-




The fundamental objective of this thesis has been to reorient and broaden our 
understanding of the construction of citizenship in India during the formative and 
critical period which marked the transition from British colonialism to 
independent nationhood. In the last decade or so, the ability of historians to 
analyse, decipher and understand the manner in which the events of 
independence and partition in 1947 have come to impact upon ideas about rights 
and status in India has become increasingly accomplished and refined. This thesis 
has looked to supplement and enhance this work by approaching these 
transformative decades from an alternative spatial perspective. Research has 
shown how the transfer of power from the Raj to the Congress was accompanied 
by fresh efforts on the part of the postcolonial Indian state to precisely identify 
and characterise which individuals constituted its citizenry. And in the context of 
partition and the creation of Pakistan, this scholarship has highlighted how those 
Muslim ‘minorities’ who remained behind in India ‘in the midst of massive, 
ongoing displacements’, were rewarded with an ‘ambiguous status’ by the new 
nation-state in which their loyalties and allegiances were openly called into 
question.1 Yet this novel definition of ‘minority citizens’, as Joya Chatterji has 
recently argued, was not solely the result of ‘bureaucratic rationality’ or 
‘governmentality’, but was simultaneously shaped by the ideas, demands and 
actions of refugees as ‘non-state actors’.2 These refugees exerted considerable 
pressure on local state representatives, who were thus forced ‘to backpedal, to 
improvise and revise strategies to deal with the rapidly changing realities on the 
ground’.3 Meanwhile, as these local state agents ‘were themselves citizens of the 
state’, drawn from the very same public which they were to encounter in their 
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everyday practices, their own constructions of citizenship often came to reflect 
similar concerns and prerogatives.4 
What, then, were the implications of this previous scholarship for this thesis? As 
the more recent emphasis in this work has been upon the impact of local society 
and lower-level state functionaries on the construction of ideas about citizens’ 
status and rights, this thesis has also looked to dwell upon the nature of the public 
and lowest echelons of the bureaucracy, but in the specific region of Maharashtra. 
In doing so, it has moved away from concentrating on those parts of the 
subcontinent that were directly partitioned in 1947, as well as those areas that 
saw gigantic levels of migration, had to dedicate their energies towards refugee 
rehabilitation, or retained sizeable Muslim ‘minority’ populations. By focusing 
upon western India instead, this thesis has deciphered how citizenship could also 
be constructed around a different set of circumstances ahead of linguistic 
reorganisation, which drew upon the specific local societal structures and tensions 
within this locale. 
What impact, then, did independence and partition have upon ideas about 
citizenship here? By considering the varied and changeable meanings behind 
ideas and calls for self-government, democratisation and swaraj, this thesis has 
suggested that Pakistan was one particular manifestation of wider demands for 
forms of provincial autonomy within a federal government system.5 However, 
whilst the ‘Pakistan demand’ privileged religion as its point of socio-political 
contention, we have seen how calls for forms of self-government in the south and 
west of the subcontinent were structured around language – a potential 
Maharashtra province was to protect the rights and interests of Marathi-speaking 
‘locals’ from forms of democratic majoritarianism at the centre. And because local 
state actors were almost always drawn from the specific regional sites in which 
they served, they often shared the same particularised visions of swaraj as 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David Gilmartin, ‘Partition, 
Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative’, Journal of Asian 
Studies, 57 (1998), 1068-1095; Sana Aiyar, ‘Fazlul Huq, Region and Religion in 
Bengal: The Forgotten Alternative of 1940-43’, MAS, 42 (2008), 1213-1249. 
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members of the local public. One argument of this thesis has therefore been to 
suggest that these localised pictures of rights to self-government shaped the 
workings of the ‘everyday’ state in Maharashta, and ensured its practices could at 
times depart from both the rhetorical principles of the colonial and postcolonial 
states at the all-India level, and the ways in which citizenship was conceptualised 
further north.  
This thesis has demonstrated how citizenship can be performed in a variety of 
different spatial locations, including at the level of the region – the nation-state is 
not its only referent. But this does not mean that it has argued that the central 
government’s theoretical commitment to accountability, objectivity and 
egalitarianism had no purchase. Throughout this thesis we have seen moments 
when those who were sidelined from the privileges that would potentially accrue 
to ‘locals’ or ‘majorities’ in provincial governmental arenas conceptualised their 
rights on the basis of the state’s supposed obligations to protect a variety of 
‘minority’ groups. At other moments, they appealed to the language of national 
solidarity. If it helped or protected citizens’ interests to make recourse to the 
higher echelons of the state, petitions, appeals and memorandums could 
therefore also be presented in the language of state impartiality and secularism.6 
Various notions of citizenship were thus formulated in the discrepant spaces 
between the state’s high-sounding morals and values, and its regionally specific 
customs and practices on the ground, whilst they could fluctuate depending on 
the particular situated perspective of those concerned and in relation to larger 
historical processes. 
Almost all the chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that ideas about 
citizenship were already emerging during the early twentieth century, especially 
as a concomitant to the gradual devolvement of colonial power and the growing 
anticipation of forms of self-government. They have traced both the connections 
and dissonances between colonial and postcolonial periods, particularly in the 
context of the continuing impact and protracted aftermath of partition. Chapter 
                                                          
6 C.J. Fuller and John Harriss, ‘For an Anthropology of the Modern Indian State’, in 
The Everyday State and Society in Modern India, ed. by C.J. Fuller and Véronique 
Bénéï (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), pp. 1-30; Thomas Blom Hansen, 
‘Governance and Myths of the State in Mumbai’, in The Everyday State and 
Society, pp. 31-67; Akhil Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, 
the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State’, American Ethnologist, 22.2 (1995),  
375-402 (p. 390). 
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Three provided an in-depth analysis of the processes behind the selection of 
Congress Party candidates in this context and ahead of provincial elections. The 
argument here was that the Congress’s reliance upon political powerbrokers to 
organise popular support and mediate political authority ensured that the party’s 
overarching principles were often turned into something unrecognisable when 
conditioned to complement local electoral contingencies.  
Older colonial forms of knowledge and customs of governance, envisaged and 
devised around the perceived efficacy of ‘community’-based interests and carried 
over into the postcolonial political arena, were central to these developments. 
However, this was not to argue, pace Partha Chatterjee, that these norms were 
imposed upon Indian subjects purely in the interests of political elites.7 Indeed, 
Chapter Three also revealed how the invocation of ‘community’ was 
simultaneously reinterpreted and contextualised to define and articulate the 
rights and interests of Maharashtra’s citizens on their own terms, too. The 
demands for the creation of a unilingual province of Maharashtra, and its 
importance in the context of choosing Congress Party candidates for the 1951 
elections served as one such example. Here, preference was frequently shown 
towards Marathi-speaking ‘natives’ defined on the basis of ethno-linguistic 
affinities and justified around the idea of self-government for ‘locals’. 
Concurrently, therefore, the provincial Congress organisation also became a site 
to be ‘captured’, co-opted and colonised in the interests of the locally dominant 
Marathas. Finally, then, the chapter also highlighted the tensions and 
contestations within vernacular-speaking society. There was certainly nothing 
fixed about ‘community’-based political mobilisations and strategies – individuals 
frequently appealed to both the Raj and the Congress on the basis of distinct 
‘minority’ concerns which had been subsumed within the Marathi or Maratha 
category. Rather than homogenising the vernacular-speaking ‘masses’ as distinct 
from an English-speaking elite, this thesis has been critically aware of class- and 
‘community’-based contradictions and contestations within this category.8 
As was seen in Chapter Four, this thesis’s awareness of distinctive interests 
amongst the ‘masses’ has been applied not only within the Marathi-speaking 
                                                          
7 Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in 
Most of the World (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 30. 
8 Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche, ‘Dimensions of Dominance: Class and State in 
Uttar Pradesh’, in The Everyday State and Society, pp. 91-114. 
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districts of Bombay Province, but also when contextualising the differences 
between intra- and inter-provincial circumstances. This chapter suggested that by 
playing closer attention to the discrepancies in reservation policies both within 
the Bombay Provincial Administrative Services, and between Bombay Province, 
other provincial administrations and the Government of India, we are able to 
develop a broader understanding of the various ways in which rights to forms of 
affirmative action were conceived amongst the public in India. At least ostensibly, 
state objectivity and individual merit served as the watchwords of recruitment 
practices within the highest echelons of the services. But beyond this highest 
administrative stratum, it was considered efficacious by the colonial state to 
introduce forms of affirmative action in the recruitment process, to ensure that 
every community ‘gets its proper share’ in the public services.9 In this context, this 
chapter suggested that the ‘provincialisation’ of governmentality during the 
interwar period had vastly important consequences. So, whilst in the north and at 
the all-India level, these reservations were primarily based around the state’s 
‘duty’ to protect Muslim ‘minority’ interests, in the south and west of the 
subcontinent affirmative action policies assigned much greater importance to 
caste. In the reservations provided within the Subordinate Services, in particular, 
‘Intermediate’ classes were provided with greater percentages of reservation (as 
much as 60 per cent in the Southern Division) where the non-Brahman movement 
was at its strongest. 
Because it was with these lower and more immediate spatial representatives of 
the state within the Subordinate and Inferior Services that most individuals were 
more likely to interact with and to influence, Chapter Four also argued that it was 
at this localised level that citizenship came to be primarily enacted. Individuals 
who sought to access bureaucratic reservations as either ‘Intermediate’ or 
‘Backward’ classes addressed their appeals, petitions and memorandums to the 
state in the language of ‘community’ interests. But the manner in which these 
were broached often depended upon the particular ‘situated perspective’ of the 
individual concerned. Whereas some called upon the state to protect ‘minority’ 
community rights, others employed the language of ‘self-government’ by calling 
for recruitment on the basis of local demographics. The chapter argued that the 
latter approach preceded later developments around ‘majority’ forms of 
                                                          
9 Mumbai, Maharashtra State Archives [henceforth MSA], Government of Bombay 
[henceforth GOB], Political and Services Department File 1643/34 II, ‘Political and 
Services Department Note by V.H. Vachhrajani’, 19 September 1938. 
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representation on the basis of caste in both the north and at an all-India level, 
therefore providing a longer historical perspective on the introduction of 
reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) during the 1990s. At the same 
time, by conceptualising citizenship on the basis of caste rather than religious 
interests, the way in which rights and status were invoked diverged notably from 
the contemporaneous manner in which it was defined in the north. 
Chapter Five, meanwhile, focused upon the classification and enumeration 
processes of census officials in Bombay Province at the 1951 Census. Continuing 
with the broad thematic of this thesis raised in the previous chapters, it suggested 
that, whereas at the 1941 Census in the north-east and north-west of the 
subcontinent the collection of data on religion served as the central subject of 
controversy, during the 1951 Census in Bombay it was efforts to record citizens’ 
mother tongue which aroused the biggest debate. Both these controversies were 
linked to broader preoccupations and concerns about forms of local self-
government and democracy – to the Lahore Resolution of the previous year in 
1941; and to the ongoing demands for the creation of a unilingual Maharashtra in 
1951. Superficially, the census had undergone a process of transformation in the 
transition from colonial to national forms of government. Theoretically, statistics 
on ‘community’ were thrown out, to be replaced by a new emphasis upon socio-
economic classifications, as part of the broader objectives of the Nehruvian 
Congress Government to ameliorate social poverty through centrally-coordinated 
agricultural and industrial development initiatives. Yet it was still considered 
necessary to continue to collect statistics on Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) for the state to be fully able to ameliorate their 
‘backwardness’, whilst language data was deemed necessary to effectively 
delineate new provincial administrative boundaries. 
Central to the rather mundane performance of collecting and classifying the 
statistics were the local census officials. Thus, Chapter Five has also indicated how 
the very need for local expertise to ensure the state ultimately comprehended the 
composition of Indian society ensured that these intermediaries occupied a rather 
privileged position in this process. Able to mediate the state’s power and its 
formulation of knowledge, whilst being drawn from amongst local societies in 
which they maintained their own specific interests, these intermediaries could 
potentially acquire political, social and material advantage for themselves or their 
particular ‘community’ through the census’s quotidian practices. Concentrating 
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upon those areas of Bombay with sizeable representatives of at least two 
linguistic groups ahead of provincial reorganisation, the chapter highlighted a 
number of instances in which the provincial and all-India governments received 
complaints about the manipulation of data by enumerators. Many of these made 
much of the state’s supposed principles of communal detachedness and 
disinterestedness. Others mentioned the state’s commitment towards the 
protection of ‘minority’ interests. However, the local manipulation of data often 
had negative consequences for such groups – in Dangs, Thana and West Khandesh 
Districts, the number of adivasis who were recorded as speaking local tribal 
vernaculars such as Ahirani, Bhili or Dangi declined dramatically in the context of 
demands for the creation of both Gujarat and Maharashtra. 
Much of the thesis has thus focused upon how the founding principles and 
ambitions of the state were transformed into something unrecognisable when 
practically applied and conditioned by interactions between ‘everyday’ state 
actors and particularised local societies. It has also noted the occasions in which 
specifically situated citizens have appealed to the benevolence of the higher 
echelons of the state to seek redress for lower-level bureaucratic malfeasance. 
But this is not to argue that those at the apex of government were impervious to 
more parochial group interests. In this regard, Chapter Six looked to identify the 
signs and symbols of north Indian majoritarianism within the Congress’s attempts 
to stimulate and represent a ‘national’, all-India consciousness and more 
accountable state during the interwar period. The chapter therefore 
demonstrated both the focus upon the north’s ‘vitality’ and ‘initiative’ at the 
expense of the south’s ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘backwardness’ within Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
The Discovery of India and the ‘Jekyll and Hyde Character’10 of Hindi/Hindustani as 
both a potentially ‘national’ lingua franca and regional vernacular. When 
attempts were made by the Congress Government of Bombay to introduce 
Hindustani as a language of the provincial administration in 1938, civil servants 
expressed their opinions that it would ultimately hinder interactions between the 
local state and society, highlighting its inapplicability in many ordinary Indians’ 
everyday lives. 
                                                          
10 As Hindi was described by the representative of West Bengal on the Official 
Language Commission, Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, in his minute of dissent within 
its report. See, ‘Note on the Report by Dr. Chatterji’, in Report of the Official 




The introduction of Hindustani within Bombay Province also stimulated new 
bureaucratic recruitment strategies for the Congress, which could potentially 
contradict the erstwhile commitment to balancing out different local ‘community’ 
interests within the services (see Chapter Four). Chapter Six revealed how 
demands for preferences to be shown to ‘locals’ emerged both as part of broader 
efforts to define autonomous spheres of regional interest where ‘natives’ would 
be able to circumvent north Indian majoritarianism, and fed into larger narratives 
about local self-government as a concomitant of independence and 
democratisation. The opportunity to conceptualise and articulate ideas about 
citizenship, then, was not solely the prerogative of a bourgeois-dominated and 
European-derived central nation-state, distanced and detached from ordinary 
society. Neither did ideas about citizenship emerge fully-formed and inclusive at 
the moment of independence – the process was much more complicated, longer 
and difficult than that. By tracing the development of ideas about Indians’ rights 
and statuses back into the colonial period, locating them in the processes of the 
gradual devolution of power, and highlighting their emergence not only at the 
centre, but in regional and local arenas of governance too, this thesis has 
broadened our awareness and understanding of how citizenship came to be 
constructed. In demonstrating its development in a locale affected rather 
differently by the anticipation and aftermath of independence, partition and 
linguistic reorganisation than in conventional accounts on refugee rehabilitation, 
mass migration and the ‘Hindu-Muslim Question’ in the north, it has provided a 
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